mirror of
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp.git
synced 2026-07-21 21:15:10 +00:00
Second batch of pre-Phase-2 cleanup. 6 GitHub issues closed in one cohesive docs/governance commit with 1 small code addition (#2 debug log line in server.mjs) and 1 transcript artifact (#15 new file). Changes (7 files modified, 1 file created, +470 / -13): **Code changes** 1. **#2 — cache_control partial-noop debug log** (server.mjs) ADR 0005 § D2 says: "for non-Anthropic targets, the bypass markers are noop'd (logged once per request at debug level so users can see they were ignored)". Pre-D36 logEvent fired only when an Anthropic hop actually bypassed; non-Anthropic hops with markers present were silently noop'd. New 12-line block in handleChatCompletions right after hasCacheControlMarkers is computed. Fires logEvent('debug', 'cache_control_partial_noop', { chain: [<provider names>], marker_count: <count> }) when: - hasCacheControlMarkers === true AND - chain.some(hop => hop.provider !== 'anthropic') Fires at most once per request (top-level if, not in a loop). No log when no markers, or when every chain hop is Anthropic. The existing cache_bypass debug log inside shouldBypassCacheForHop is untouched. marker_count sums body-side and IR-side extractCacheControlMarkers results. At v0.1 the IR term is structurally 0 (openAIToIR strips cache_control); inline comment marks this as a revisit point for the future ADR 0003 amendment that activates cache_control in the IR whitelist. **Documentation amendments** 2. **#5 — ADR 0002 vibe.mjs → mistral.mjs** (docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md) § Decision filesystem layout: `vibe.mjs` corrected to `mistral.mjs` (file named after provider key per the convention anthropic.mjs/codex.mjs). The vibe.mjs entry was an early-draft naming choice that never landed. Amendment 5 prepended above Amendment 4 documenting the filename correction + explicit convention statement (file named after provider key, not CLI binary) for future contributors. 3. **#6 — mistral.mjs A5 flip + ALIGNMENT.md table update** (lib/providers/mistral.mjs + ALIGNMENT.md) Pre-D36: header A5 (model flag) status was UNPINNED-D-later-verifies but function body lines 376-380 said CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE (DeepWiki enumeration already confirmed `--model` does not exist on vibe CLI). Header now reflects CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE with DeepWiki citation (DOCS-4). ALIGNMENT.md Speculative-Candidate table mistral row: A5 removed from UNPINNED list; A4, A6, A7, A8 preserved with parenthetical descriptions intact. No code change to function body (already correct). 4. **#13 — /v1/models alias entries — ALIGNMENT.md + spec-pin governance** (ALIGNMENT.md + docs/openai-spec-pin.md) Round-6 F10 flagged D27 F15's alias entries on /v1/models as borderline Rule 2(b) violation (OpenAI spec does not enumerate aliases as separate entries). Option C selected: keep current behavior, document the controlled deviation. - ALIGNMENT.md: new "Controlled deviations (entry-surface scope)" subsection under "Class-specific Exceptions". Entry 1 documents the /v1/models alias deviation with rationale (D27 F15 onboarding), formal contract reference, field constraints (owned_by matches canonical, created matches canonical, no invented fields), SPOT reference (getAliasMap()), and re- evaluation trigger. - docs/openai-spec-pin.md: new alias-surfacing subsection under GET /v1/models with full 4-field contract table (id/object/ created/owned_by), rationale, sourcing explanation, forward path. - server.mjs handleModels: NO CHANGE — behavior preserved. 5. **#15 — Anthropic v2.1.89 transcript artifact** (docs/provider-audits/anthropic.md NEW; ALIGNMENT.md + lib/providers/anthropic.mjs cross-references) Round-6 F12: ALIGNMENT.md anthropic row pin (v2.1.89, observed at D4) cited the plugin header; plugin header cited the observation date but no transcript. Circular per Rule 1 ("observed behaviour, transcript attached"). New file docs/provider-audits/anthropic.md (single living artifact, not version-specific): - Date of capture: 2026-05-24 - Observed `claude --version`: 2.1.132 (Claude Code) — captured today on the project maintainer's primary workstation - Plugin-pinned version: @anthropic-ai/claude-code v2.1.89 (from D4 implementation pin in ALIGNMENT.md Provider Authority Pins) - Version drift: honestly documented — pin is v2.1.89, live is v2.1.132, drift within tolerance, re-audit triggers named - Sample invocation: `claude -p --output-format text --no-session- persistence --model <model> [--debug]` - Flag-surface table: 5 OLP-consumed flags verbatim from `claude -p --help` (-p / --output-format / --no-session- persistence / --model / --debug) - Citation cross-references back to ALIGNMENT.md + plugin header ALIGNMENT.md anthropic row: appended "transcript artifact: docs/ provider-audits/anthropic.md (captured 2026-05-24)" — closes the circular citation. lib/providers/anthropic.mjs header: 5-line pointer to the artifact with version numbers stated explicitly. **Tests** (test-features.mjs): 424 → 431 (+7): - #2 partial-noop log ×3: - Suite 9f case 1: markers + mixed chain → fires once at level=debug - Suite 9f case 2: no markers → suppressed - Suite 9f case 3: anthropic-only chain → suppressed - #14 cache_control slot determinism ×4: - #14a: markers-present IR produces different key from no-markers IR - #14b: same IR computed twice yields identical key - #14c: two independently-constructed IRs with identical payloads yield same key - #14d: both top-level and content-array-nested markers affect the key All 4 tests call computeCacheKey directly on hand-built IRs (bypassing openAIToIR which strips markers at v0.1). Per ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 (No Invention), no sortMarkers helper added — the slot is dead-code at v0.1 and shipping a helper without a caller authority would be invention. Test comment documents the forward-activation contract. Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4): - **D36 reviewer flagged marker_count latent double-count risk** (Suggestion #1, non-blocking). The sum at server.mjs:435-437 is safe at v0.1 (IR term structurally 0) but will 2× when a future ADR 0003 amendment activates cache_control in the IR whitelist. Folded in a 4-line comment marking the revisit point. Two other non-blocking reviewer suggestions not folded: - Test count brief-vs-deliverable discrepancy (4 not 3 for #14) is informational — the 4-test variant is strictly better (covers content-array nesting which is a real extractCacheControlMarkers contract path). - Recapture-procedure git-add reminder in anthropic.md is low-priority procedure documentation. Authority: - ADR 0005 § D2 — cache_control partial-noop debug log requirement (#2) - ADR 0002 § Decision filesystem layout (Amendment 5) — plugin file naming convention (#5) - DeepWiki vibe CLI flag enumeration — A5 not applicable (#6) - ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b) + docs/openai-spec-pin.md GET /v1/models — alias controlled deviation (#13) - ADR 0005 cache key stability invariant + ADR 0003 forward-compat — cache_control slot determinism contract (#14) - ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (observed behaviour, transcript attached) + Provider Authority Pins anthropic row — transcript artifact (#15) - CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — independent fresh-context reviewer - CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — D36 under "Unreleased" against Phase 2; no version bump Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent of drafter): APPROVE. Critical depth checks: - #2: gate condition fires only on (markers AND non-anthropic-hop); pre-existing cache_bypass log inside shouldBypassCacheForHop untouched - #5: lib/providers/ directory verified — mistral.mjs exists, vibe.mjs does not exist - #6: mistral.mjs spawn-site body comment (lines 376-380) already CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE pre-D36 and unchanged in this diff - #13: server.mjs handleModels unchanged (verified via grep) - #14: all 4 tests pass against current code; no sortMarkers helper shipped (Rule 2 No Invention honored) - #15: live `claude --version` independently run by reviewer → matches artifact (2.1.132); all 5 OLP-consumed flags independently verified present in `claude -p --help` - Hygiene: 0 hits for personal markers, home paths, OAuth tokens, internal IPs across all 8 files - 431/431 tests pass in reviewer's independent npm test run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
984 lines
43 KiB
JavaScript
984 lines
43 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* server.mjs — OLP HTTP listener and request dispatcher
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*
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* Authority (entry surface): OpenAI Chat Completions API
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* https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create
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* Authority (IR): ADR 0003
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* Authority (provider dispatch): ADR 0002
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* Authority (cache layer): ADR 0005
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*
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* Design principles (OCP precedent, ESM/.mjs, http built-ins, no external deps):
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* - Node ESM, no build step, no bundler
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* - http built-in only (no Express/Fastify)
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* - Zero runtime npm dependencies in the proxy core
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*
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* Env vars:
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* OLP_PORT — listen port (default: 3456)
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*/
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import { createServer } from 'node:http';
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
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import { openAIToIR, BadRequestError } from './lib/ir/openai-to-ir.mjs';
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import {
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irChunkToOpenAISSE,
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irResponseToOpenAINonStream,
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generateRequestId,
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SSE_DONE,
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} from './lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs';
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import { loadProviders, listAllProviderNames, getAliasMap, getModelCreated } from './lib/providers/index.mjs';
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import { ProviderError } from './lib/providers/base.mjs';
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import { computeCacheKey, hasCacheControl, extractCacheControlMarkers } from './lib/cache/keys.mjs';
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import { CacheStore } from './lib/cache/store.mjs';
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import {
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evaluateHardTriggers,
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executeWithFallback,
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buildDefaultChain,
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loadFallbackConfigSync,
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} from './lib/fallback/engine.mjs';
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// ── Config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
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const VERSION = pkg.version;
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const PORT = parseInt(process.env.OLP_PORT ?? '3456', 10);
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const BODY_LIMIT = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB
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// ── Logging ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Defined early so it is available for startup-time warnings (e.g. F16
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// soft-trigger deferred warning) before the provider registry is loaded.
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function logEvent(level, event, data = {}) {
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const entry = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), level, event, ...data };
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if (level === 'error' || level === 'warn') {
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process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
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} else {
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process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
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}
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}
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// ── Startup config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Read ~/.olp/config.json once at startup. Provides:
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// - providers.enabled → which providers are loaded (ADR 0002 § Disable model)
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// - routing.chains → fallback chain config (ADR 0004 § D9)
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// - routing.soft_triggers → soft trigger thresholds (ADR 0004)
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// If the file is absent or malformed, defaults are safe:
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// empty providersEnabled → all 503 (ALIGNMENT.md § v0.1 zero-Enabled-Providers posture)
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// empty chains/soft_triggers → single-hop mode
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const _startupConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();
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// D26 round-3 F16: soft triggers are deferred to v1.x per ADR 0004 Amendment 2.
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// If the user has configured any, emit a startup warning so the inert state is
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// observable rather than silently ignored. ADR 0004 Amendment 2 § Mitigations.
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const _softTriggersConfigured = Object.keys(_startupConfig.soft_triggers ?? {}).length > 0;
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if (_softTriggersConfigured) {
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logEvent('warn', 'soft_triggers_deferred_v1x', {
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configured_providers: Object.keys(_startupConfig.soft_triggers),
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message: 'routing.soft_triggers configured but soft triggers are deferred to v1.x; ' +
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'thresholds will not fire at v0.1 — see ADR 0004 Amendment 2',
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});
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}
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// ── Provider registry ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 unless
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// ~/.olp/config.json has providers.enabled.X = true.
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// ADR 0002 § Disable model: enabled toggle in config.json transitions Candidate → Enabled.
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const loadedProviders = loadProviders({ enabled: _startupConfig.providersEnabled ?? {} });
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// ── Fallback config ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Read ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains at startup. Empty at v0.1.
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// Per ADR 0004 § D9: fallback engine is wired; activates when user populates chains.
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// Tests may inject a synthetic fallbackConfig via __setFallbackConfig().
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let _fallbackConfig = _startupConfig;
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/** @internal — test seam: inject a synthetic fallback config (no file I/O) */
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export function __setFallbackConfig(config) {
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_fallbackConfig = config ?? { chains: {}, soft_triggers: {} };
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}
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/** @internal — reset to file-based config */
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export function __resetFallbackConfig() {
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_fallbackConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();
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}
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/**
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* @internal — test seam: reload loadedProviders to match a given enabledMap.
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* Mirrors __setFallbackConfig. Allows tests to exercise the production
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* loadProviders() code path without touching the config file.
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*
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* Usage: __setProvidersEnabled({ anthropic: true }) before creating a server.
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* Reset: __resetProvidersEnabled() or __setProvidersEnabled({}) to clear all.
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*
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* @param {Record<string, boolean>} enabledMap
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*/
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export function __setProvidersEnabled(enabledMap) {
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const next = loadProviders({ enabled: enabledMap ?? {} });
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// Mutate the shared map in-place so existing references see the update.
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loadedProviders.clear();
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for (const [name, p] of next) {
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loadedProviders.set(name, p);
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}
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}
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/** @internal — reset loadedProviders to the startup-config state */
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export function __resetProvidersEnabled() {
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const startup = loadFallbackConfigSync();
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const next = loadProviders({ enabled: startup.providersEnabled ?? {} });
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loadedProviders.clear();
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for (const [name, p] of next) {
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loadedProviders.set(name, p);
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}
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}
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/** @internal — clear the cache store (for tests that need a fresh cache state) */
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export function __clearCache() {
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cacheStore.clear();
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}
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// ── Cache layer ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// D1 per-key isolation + D4 singleflight per ADR 0005.
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// keyId: '__anonymous__' at D5 — Phase 2 multi-key infrastructure wires in
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// the real OLP API key ID here.
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export const cacheStore = new CacheStore();
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// ── Body reader ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Reads and JSON-parses the request body.
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* Enforces the 5MB body limit.
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* Throws on parse failure or oversized body.
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*
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* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
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* @returns {Promise<any>}
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*/
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function readJSON(req) {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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let body = '';
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let size = 0;
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req.on('data', chunk => {
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size += chunk.length;
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if (size > BODY_LIMIT) {
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reject(Object.assign(new Error('Request body too large (limit 5MB)'), { statusCode: 413 }));
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req.destroy();
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return;
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}
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body += chunk;
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});
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req.on('end', () => {
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try {
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resolve(JSON.parse(body));
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} catch {
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reject(Object.assign(new Error('Invalid JSON in request body'), { statusCode: 400 }));
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}
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});
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req.on('error', reject);
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});
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}
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// ── Response helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
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* @param {number} status
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* @param {object} body
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* @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders]
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*/
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function sendJSON(res, status, body, extraHeaders = {}) {
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const payload = JSON.stringify(body);
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res.writeHead(status, {
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
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...extraHeaders,
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});
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res.end(payload);
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}
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/**
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* OpenAI-format error response helper.
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* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
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* @param {number} status
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* @param {string} message
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* @param {string} type
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* @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders] — optional extra headers (e.g. X-OLP-Latency-Ms)
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*/
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function sendError(res, status, message, type, extraHeaders = {}) {
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sendJSON(res, status, { error: { message, type } }, extraHeaders);
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}
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// ── OLP response headers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Returns the standard OLP diagnostic headers.
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* Per spec §4.7 and ADR 0004 § Observability headers:
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* X-OLP-Provider-Used, X-OLP-Model-Used, X-OLP-Fallback-Hops,
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* X-OLP-Cache, X-OLP-Latency-Ms.
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* Fallback-Hops reflects which chain index served the request (0=primary).
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* Cache reflects actual hit/miss/bypass status from the cache layer (ADR 0005).
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*
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* @param {object} opts
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* @param {string} opts.providerUsed
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* @param {string} opts.modelUsed
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* @param {number} opts.startMs
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* @param {'hit'|'miss'|'bypass'} [opts.cacheStatus='miss']
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* @param {number} [opts.fallbackHops=0] — from executeWithFallback result
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* @returns {Record<string,string>}
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*/
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function olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus = 'miss', fallbackHops = 0 }) {
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return {
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'X-OLP-Provider-Used': providerUsed,
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'X-OLP-Model-Used': modelUsed,
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'X-OLP-Fallback-Hops': String(fallbackHops),
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'X-OLP-Cache': cacheStatus,
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'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs),
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};
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}
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/**
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* Returns the standard 5-header OLP diagnostic set for pre-chain error paths
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* (no provider was attempted yet). Used by sendError call sites that occur
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* before chain construction (415 wrong Content-Type, 400 bad JSON, 400 IR
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* validation failure, 503 no-enabled-providers).
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*
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* Per F8 (D32 round-4 cold-audit): ADR 0004 § Observability requires the full
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* 5-header set on every response; early error paths must emit canonical
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* "no provider attempted" defaults.
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*
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* @param {object} opts
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* @param {number} opts.startMs — request start timestamp (Date.now())
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* @param {string|null|undefined} [opts.model] — ir.model if IR was parsed; undefined/null otherwise
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* @returns {Record<string,string>}
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*/
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function olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model }) {
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return {
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'X-OLP-Provider-Used': 'none',
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'X-OLP-Model-Used': model ?? 'unknown',
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'X-OLP-Fallback-Hops': '0',
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'X-OLP-Cache': 'bypass',
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'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs),
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};
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}
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// ── Route handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* GET /health
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* Returns server health including count of loaded providers and per-provider
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* healthCheck() snapshots (ADR 0002 § Provider contract: healthCheck is used
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* by startup and /health endpoint per ADR 0002 § Provider contract description).
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*/
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async function handleHealth(req, res) {
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const enabled = loadedProviders.size;
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const available = listAllProviderNames().length;
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const providerStatuses = {};
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||
for (const [name, provider] of loadedProviders) {
|
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try {
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providerStatuses[name] = await provider.healthCheck();
|
||
} catch (e) {
|
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providerStatuses[name] = { ok: false, error: e.message };
|
||
}
|
||
}
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sendJSON(res, 200, {
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ok: true,
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||
version: VERSION,
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providers: { enabled, available, status: providerStatuses },
|
||
});
|
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}
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|
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/**
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* GET /v1/models
|
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* Returns the list of models served by all currently loaded (enabled) providers.
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||
* Per ADR 0002 § "Loading model" + OpenAI spec /v1/models:
|
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* Each entry: { id, object: 'model', created, owned_by }
|
||
* - id: canonical model ID (or alias string for alias entries)
|
||
* - object: literal 'model' (OpenAI spec)
|
||
* - created: Unix epoch seconds (stable per request; computed once from Date.now())
|
||
* - owned_by: provider.name (e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral')
|
||
* Order: canonical models first (insertion order of loadedProviders, then models[]),
|
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* then alias entries (for aliases whose target provider is currently loaded).
|
||
* Authority: OpenAI /v1/models spec (https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/models);
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* models-registry.json alias map (SPOT per D17); F15 round-3 adds alias surfacing.
|
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* Empty case: if no providers are enabled, data: [] is returned naturally.
|
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*/
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function handleModels(req, res) {
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const data = [];
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||
|
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// Canonical entries first
|
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for (const [providerName, provider] of loadedProviders) {
|
||
for (const modelId of provider.models) {
|
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data.push({
|
||
id: modelId,
|
||
object: 'model',
|
||
// F12 (round-5 cold-audit): use stable per-model timestamp from
|
||
// models-registry.json rather than Date.now() on each request.
|
||
// OpenAI spec treats `created` as a stable per-model attribute.
|
||
created: getModelCreated(modelId),
|
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owned_by: providerName,
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Alias entries for loaded (enabled) providers, canonical-first ordering preserved
|
||
for (const [alias, { providerName, canonicalModel }] of getAliasMap()) {
|
||
if (loadedProviders.has(providerName)) {
|
||
data.push({
|
||
id: alias,
|
||
object: 'model',
|
||
// Alias entries use the same stable timestamp as their canonical model.
|
||
created: getModelCreated(canonicalModel),
|
||
owned_by: providerName,
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
sendJSON(res, 200, { object: 'list', data });
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* POST /v1/chat/completions
|
||
* Core dispatch path: OpenAI request → IR → fallback engine → provider.spawn → OpenAI response.
|
||
*
|
||
* D9: Fallback engine (ADR 0004) is wired between IR construction and provider.spawn.
|
||
* Chain advancement, soft/hard trigger evaluation, and first-chunk safety are all
|
||
* handled by executeWithFallback(). At v0.1 with empty routing.chains config, this
|
||
* is a transparent single-hop pass-through. Multi-hop fallback activates when the
|
||
* user populates ~/.olp/config.json.
|
||
*
|
||
* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
|
||
* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
|
||
*/
|
||
async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
|
||
const startMs = Date.now();
|
||
|
||
// Require JSON content-type
|
||
const ct = req.headers['content-type'] ?? '';
|
||
if (!ct.includes('application/json')) {
|
||
return sendError(res, 415, 'Content-Type must be application/json', 'invalid_request_error',
|
||
olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let body;
|
||
try {
|
||
body = await readJSON(req);
|
||
} catch (e) {
|
||
return sendError(res, e.statusCode ?? 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
|
||
olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Translate OpenAI → IR (ADR 0003)
|
||
let ir;
|
||
try {
|
||
ir = openAIToIR(body);
|
||
} catch (e) {
|
||
if (e instanceof BadRequestError) {
|
||
return sendError(res, 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
|
||
olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
|
||
}
|
||
throw e;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Auth context is null at D5/D9 — providers fall back to their own credential
|
||
// discovery (env var, keychain, credentials file). Phase 2 multi-key
|
||
// infrastructure will pass a real authContext carrying the per-key OLP token.
|
||
const authContext = null;
|
||
|
||
// ── Fallback engine: build chain (ADR 0004) ─────────────────────────────
|
||
// buildDefaultChain returns null if no enabled provider serves this model.
|
||
// Per ADR 0004 § D9: at v0.1, chain is single-hop (no fallback) unless the
|
||
// user has populated ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains.
|
||
const chain = buildDefaultChain(
|
||
ir.model,
|
||
loadedProviders,
|
||
_fallbackConfig.chains,
|
||
_fallbackConfig.soft_triggers,
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
if (!chain) {
|
||
// ALIGNMENT.md: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 → 503 per spec
|
||
return sendError(
|
||
res, 503,
|
||
`No enabled providers for model ${ir.model}. See README § Supported Providers.`,
|
||
'no_enabled_provider',
|
||
olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model: ir.model }),
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const requestId = generateRequestId();
|
||
|
||
// ── Cache layer (ADR 0005) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
// keyId: '__anonymous__' at D5/D9. Phase 2 multi-key infrastructure wires the
|
||
// real OLP API key ID here for D1 per-key isolation.
|
||
const keyId = '__anonymous__';
|
||
|
||
// D2 bypass (per-hop, per ADR 0005 § D2):
|
||
// cache_control markers bypass OLP's response cache ONLY when the active hop
|
||
// provider is Anthropic. For non-Anthropic hops the markers are noop'd
|
||
// (openai-to-ir already strips them from the IR before provider translation,
|
||
// so they never reach a non-Anthropic plugin — no separate strip needed here).
|
||
//
|
||
// Pre-compute whether the raw request carries any cache_control markers at all.
|
||
// The per-hop decision is: markers present AND hop is Anthropic → bypass.
|
||
const hasCacheControlMarkers =
|
||
hasCacheControl(ir) || extractCacheControlMarkers(body?.messages ?? []).length > 0;
|
||
|
||
// D36 #2 (ADR 0005 § D2): when cache_control markers are present AND at least one
|
||
// hop in the chain is non-Anthropic, the markers are noop'd for those hops.
|
||
// Per ADR 0005 § Context: "for non-Anthropic targets, the bypass markers are
|
||
// noop'd (logged once per request at debug level so users can see they were
|
||
// ignored)." Fires at most once per request, gated on (markers AND mixed/non-anthropic
|
||
// chain). No log when no markers, or when every chain hop is Anthropic.
|
||
if (hasCacheControlMarkers && chain.some(hop => hop.provider !== 'anthropic')) {
|
||
// marker_count sums body-side and IR-side markers. At v0.1 the IR term is
|
||
// structurally 0 (openAIToIR strips cache_control). When a future ADR 0003
|
||
// amendment activates cache_control in the IR whitelist, both terms will be
|
||
// non-zero for the same logical marker set → revisit to avoid 2× counting.
|
||
const markerCount =
|
||
extractCacheControlMarkers(body?.messages ?? []).length +
|
||
extractCacheControlMarkers(ir.messages ?? []).length;
|
||
logEvent('debug', 'cache_control_partial_noop', {
|
||
chain: chain.map(hop => hop.provider),
|
||
marker_count: markerCount,
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Returns true if OLP's response cache should be bypassed for the given hop.
|
||
* Per ADR 0005 § D2: bypass only when provider is Anthropic AND markers present.
|
||
*
|
||
* @param {string} hopProviderName — e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral'
|
||
* @returns {boolean}
|
||
*/
|
||
function shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProviderName) {
|
||
return hasCacheControlMarkers && hopProviderName === 'anthropic';
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── executeHopFn: per-hop spawn + cache wrapper ─────────────────────────
|
||
// This is the function executeWithFallback calls for each chain hop.
|
||
// Each hop gets its own (provider, model) cache key per ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation.
|
||
//
|
||
// First-chunk safety (ADR 0004 § Fallback safety):
|
||
// collectAllChunks fully buffers the provider response before returning.
|
||
// Therefore, if executeHopFn throws, zero bytes have been written to `res`.
|
||
// The fallback engine safely advances the chain on hard triggers.
|
||
// If executeHopFn returns successfully, the chunks are buffered and we write
|
||
// them to `res` only AFTER executeWithFallback returns — ensuring no writes
|
||
// occur during chain iteration.
|
||
//
|
||
// F8 (round-5 cold-audit): track whether the SERVING hop's response came from
|
||
// cache. preCheckHit only covered the PRIMARY hop's key; when a fallback hop
|
||
// serves from its own cache, the header must report 'hit', not 'miss'.
|
||
// lastHopWasCached is set by executeHopFn before returning so the cacheStatus
|
||
// computation below can consume it after executeWithFallback completes.
|
||
let lastHopWasCached = false;
|
||
|
||
async function executeHopFn(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq) {
|
||
const hopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq);
|
||
const hopProviderPlugin = loadedProviders.get(hopProvider);
|
||
|
||
if (!hopProviderPlugin) {
|
||
// Provider in the chain is not loaded (config references a disabled provider)
|
||
throw Object.assign(
|
||
new Error(`Provider ${hopProvider} is not enabled`),
|
||
{ statusCode: 503 },
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Collect all chunks from this provider, throwing on error chunks.
|
||
// Error semantics: ProviderError thrown here propagates to executeWithFallback
|
||
// which decides whether to advance the chain.
|
||
//
|
||
// D16 (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): if the generator throws ProviderError SPAWN_FAILED
|
||
// after yielding one or more chunks, those chunks are usable content the provider
|
||
// committed — dropping them and falling back to the next hop is strict waste.
|
||
// In that case: synthesize a stop chunk with finish_reason='length', return the
|
||
// partial chunks, and do NOT re-throw (fallback engine sees a success, hops=0).
|
||
// If chunks.length===0 on SPAWN_FAILED, re-throw as before (hard trigger fires).
|
||
// Any other error code always re-throws unchanged.
|
||
//
|
||
// D16 cache note: truncated responses are NOT cached (ADR 0005 § cache write
|
||
// conditions item 1 requires no truncation). A non-enumerable __truncated marker
|
||
// is set on the returned array so executeHopFn can evict the cache entry below.
|
||
async function collectAllChunks() {
|
||
const chunks = [];
|
||
try {
|
||
for await (const irChunk of hopProviderPlugin.spawn(irReq, authContext)) {
|
||
// D16: check error chunks BEFORE pushing — preserves the invariant that
|
||
// chunks array contains only delta/stop chunks. Without this, the catch
|
||
// block's `chunks.length > 0` would mistake a single error chunk for
|
||
// "usable content streamed" (Case B) and synthesize a stop + return,
|
||
// sending an empty body to the client when the correct behavior is to
|
||
// re-throw and let the fallback engine advance the chain.
|
||
if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
|
||
throw new ProviderError(
|
||
irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk',
|
||
'SPAWN_FAILED',
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
chunks.push(irChunk);
|
||
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
|
||
}
|
||
} catch (spawnErr) {
|
||
if (spawnErr instanceof ProviderError && spawnErr.code === 'SPAWN_FAILED' && chunks.length > 0) {
|
||
// Case B (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): provider emitted usable chunks then exited
|
||
// non-zero. Synthesize a truncated stop and surface the partial response.
|
||
chunks.push({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' });
|
||
logEvent('warn', 'spawn_failed_after_usable_chunks', {
|
||
chunks_count: chunks.length - 1, // exclude the synthesized stop
|
||
provider: hopProvider,
|
||
model: hopModel,
|
||
});
|
||
// Mark as truncated so the caller can evict this entry from cache.
|
||
Object.defineProperty(chunks, '__truncated', { value: true, enumerable: false });
|
||
return chunks;
|
||
}
|
||
// Case A (SPAWN_FAILED with no chunks) or any other error: re-throw.
|
||
// Fallback engine fires hard trigger and advances chain as before.
|
||
throw spawnErr;
|
||
}
|
||
return chunks;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// D23: cacheable opt-out check (ADR 0002 Amendment 3 + ADR 0005 Amendment 3).
|
||
// If a provider explicitly sets hints.cacheable === false, skip the cache entirely
|
||
// for every request to this provider. collectAllChunks is called directly; neither
|
||
// cacheStore.get nor cacheStore.set is invoked. This is upstream of D13's
|
||
// cache_control bypass — both are "skip the cache" paths, but for different reasons.
|
||
if (hopProviderPlugin.hints?.cacheable === false) {
|
||
logEvent('debug', 'cache_opted_out', {
|
||
provider: hopProvider,
|
||
model: hopModel,
|
||
});
|
||
return collectAllChunks();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// D13: per-hop bypass evaluation (ADR 0005 § D2).
|
||
// Bypass only when this hop's provider is Anthropic AND markers are present.
|
||
const bypassCacheForThisHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProvider);
|
||
if (bypassCacheForThisHop) {
|
||
logEvent('debug', 'cache_bypass', {
|
||
model: hopModel,
|
||
provider: hopProvider,
|
||
reason: 'cache_control_markers',
|
||
});
|
||
return collectAllChunks();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// D4 singleflight + D1 per-key isolation per ADR 0005.
|
||
// Each hop has its own (provider, model) key — cross-provider contamination
|
||
// is structurally impossible (ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation).
|
||
//
|
||
// D16: after getOrCompute returns, check if collectAllChunks used the salvage
|
||
// path (chunks.__truncated===true). If so, evict the just-written cache entry
|
||
// to satisfy ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1 (no truncation).
|
||
// D4 singleflight is preserved: getOrCompute still deduplicates concurrent
|
||
// requests during the spawn; the eviction only affects persistent caching.
|
||
//
|
||
// F8 (round-5 cold-audit): peek before getOrCompute so we know whether the
|
||
// value comes from cache or is freshly computed. peek() is stats-neutral per
|
||
// its contract (no hit/miss counter side-effect), so it does not distort the
|
||
// stats that getOrCompute will update on the canonical miss path.
|
||
// This is option (b) of the F8 spec: check cache BEFORE calling getOrCompute.
|
||
const hopWasCached = await cacheStore.peek(keyId, hopCacheKey);
|
||
const result = await cacheStore.getOrCompute(keyId, hopCacheKey, collectAllChunks);
|
||
// Record for use in cacheStatus computation after executeWithFallback returns.
|
||
lastHopWasCached = hopWasCached;
|
||
if (result.__truncated) {
|
||
// Evict the truncated entry so future requests get a fresh spawn.
|
||
// ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1: truncated responses must not
|
||
// persist in cache. Overwrite with ttlMs=0 so any subsequent get/peek
|
||
// finds the entry already-expired and deletes it.
|
||
await cacheStore.set(keyId, hopCacheKey, result, 0);
|
||
}
|
||
return result;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Execute with fallback (ADR 0004) ────────────────────────────────────
|
||
// Pre-check for cache status reporting uses first hop's key (primary provider).
|
||
// D13: preCheckHit is gated on whether the first hop would bypass — if it would
|
||
// bypass (anthropic + markers), the cache is not consulted (preCheckHit=false).
|
||
// If the first hop is non-Anthropic (or no markers), the cache peek proceeds normally.
|
||
const bypassCacheForFirstHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(chain[0].provider);
|
||
// D23: ADR 0002 Amendment 3 — cacheable: false providers skip cache entirely.
|
||
// Compute once here so both the peek guard and the streaming-branch entry condition
|
||
// can consult the same flag without re-reading the plugin map.
|
||
const firstHopProvider = loadedProviders.get(chain[0].provider);
|
||
const cacheableForFirstHop = firstHopProvider?.hints?.cacheable !== false;
|
||
const firstHopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(chain[0].provider, chain[0].model, ir);
|
||
const preCheckHit = (bypassCacheForFirstHop || !cacheableForFirstHop) ? false : await cacheStore.peek(keyId, firstHopCacheKey);
|
||
|
||
// ── P1.2: Real SSE streaming path (single-hop cache-miss) ──────────────
|
||
// ADR 0003 entry adapter pattern: for await irChunk → res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE).
|
||
// Condition: streaming + single-hop + no bypass + no pre-check cache hit.
|
||
// - stream===true → caller wants SSE
|
||
// - chain.length===1 → no fallback needed; first-chunk rule allows streaming
|
||
// - !bypassCacheForFirstHop + !preCheckHit → genuine cache miss (not hit/bypass)
|
||
// - cacheableForFirstHop → provider allows caching (D23: cacheable: false falls
|
||
// through to the buffered executeHopFn path which already respects the opt-out)
|
||
//
|
||
// If any chunk has been written (firstChunkEmitted), fallback is impossible
|
||
// per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety first-chunk rule. On error after first chunk:
|
||
// truncate the response (end with no [DONE]). On error before any chunk:
|
||
// throw so the outer handler can surface a clean error (no bytes written).
|
||
//
|
||
// On success: write chunks to res AND cache so subsequent identical requests
|
||
// hit the burst-replay path.
|
||
if (ir.stream && chain.length === 1 && !bypassCacheForFirstHop && !preCheckHit && cacheableForFirstHop) {
|
||
const streamProvider = chain[0].provider;
|
||
const streamModel = chain[0].model;
|
||
const streamCacheKey = computeCacheKey(streamProvider, streamModel, ir);
|
||
const streamPlugin = loadedProviders.get(streamProvider);
|
||
|
||
if (!streamPlugin) {
|
||
// Provider disappeared between chain build and here (edge case).
|
||
return sendError(res, 503, `Provider ${streamProvider} is not enabled`, 'no_enabled_provider',
|
||
olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model: ir.model }));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const streamHeaders = olpHeaders({
|
||
providerUsed: streamProvider,
|
||
modelUsed: streamModel,
|
||
startMs,
|
||
cacheStatus: 'miss',
|
||
fallbackHops: 0,
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// D14: writeHead is deferred until just before the first res.write so that
|
||
// pre-first-chunk errors can still produce a JSON 502 (matching the buffered
|
||
// path). Calling writeHead unconditionally here was the D14 defect.
|
||
|
||
const streamedChunks = [];
|
||
let firstChunkEmitted = false;
|
||
try {
|
||
for await (const irChunk of streamPlugin.spawn(ir, authContext)) {
|
||
if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
|
||
// Error chunk from provider
|
||
if (firstChunkEmitted) {
|
||
// Past first-chunk boundary — can't fallback; emit truncation marker + [DONE]
|
||
// so clients can detect the incomplete response in-band (aligns D26 F19
|
||
// stop-less exhaustion behaviour and the catch-block fix in D35 #10).
|
||
logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
|
||
provider: streamProvider,
|
||
model: streamModel,
|
||
error: irChunk.error,
|
||
});
|
||
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' }, requestId, ir.model));
|
||
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
||
res.end();
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
// No bytes written yet — throw to surface a clean error.
|
||
throw new ProviderError(irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk', 'SPAWN_FAILED');
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Defer writeHead until the moment we are about to emit the first byte.
|
||
// After this point firstChunkEmitted===true ↔ res.headersSent===true.
|
||
if (!res.headersSent) {
|
||
res.writeHead(200, {
|
||
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
|
||
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
|
||
Connection: 'keep-alive',
|
||
'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
|
||
...streamHeaders,
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
streamedChunks.push(irChunk);
|
||
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
|
||
firstChunkEmitted = true;
|
||
|
||
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') {
|
||
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
||
res.end();
|
||
// Cache the buffered chunks for burst-replay on subsequent identical requests.
|
||
// D23 defense-in-depth: cacheableForFirstHop is true here (cacheable: false
|
||
// falls through to the buffered path, never enters this block), but the guard
|
||
// makes the intent explicit and survives future refactors.
|
||
if (cacheableForFirstHop) {
|
||
await cacheStore.set(keyId, streamCacheKey, streamedChunks);
|
||
logEvent('info', 'streaming_response_cached', {
|
||
provider: streamProvider,
|
||
model: streamModel,
|
||
chunks: streamedChunks.length,
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Generator exhausted without a stop chunk — emit [DONE] but do NOT cache.
|
||
// A stop-less exhaustion means the response is truncated (the generator
|
||
// ended without the model signalling completion). Caching a truncated
|
||
// response would serve wrong answers to future identical requests.
|
||
// Compare: D16's buffered-path truncation eviction explicitly avoids
|
||
// persisting truncated entries for the same reason.
|
||
//
|
||
// D26 round-3 F19: emit a synthetic truncation marker BEFORE [DONE] so
|
||
// clients can detect the incomplete response in-band. Only emit when there
|
||
// is actual partial content (streamedChunks.length > 0) — emitting a
|
||
// truncation marker on an empty response is misleading.
|
||
// The buffered D16 path synthesizes {type:'stop', finish_reason:'length'}
|
||
// before returning; this aligns the streaming branch with that behaviour.
|
||
if (streamedChunks.length > 0) {
|
||
const truncMarker = { type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' };
|
||
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(truncMarker, requestId, ir.model));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// D35 #9: Zero-chunk empty-stream path — writeHead is still deferred
|
||
// (firstChunkEmitted===false) when the generator yields no chunks at all and
|
||
// exits cleanly. Without an explicit writeHead Node auto-emits 200 with the
|
||
// default Content-Type and none of the X-OLP-* headers.
|
||
// A provider that yielded nothing still constitutes an attempted call, so we
|
||
// emit the full olpHeaders (provider WAS attempted, just yielded zero chunks).
|
||
if (!res.headersSent) {
|
||
res.writeHead(200, {
|
||
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
|
||
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
|
||
Connection: 'keep-alive',
|
||
'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
|
||
...streamHeaders,
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
||
res.end();
|
||
// Loop exhausted without stop chunk = truncation. The stop-chunk completion
|
||
// path returns earlier (above, inside the for-await loop); reaching here means
|
||
// the generator returned without emitting stop. Never cache (per ADR 0005 cache
|
||
// write conditions item 1: truncated responses must not persist in cache).
|
||
if (streamedChunks.length > 0 && cacheableForFirstHop) {
|
||
logEvent('warn', 'streaming_no_stop_chunk', {
|
||
chunks_count: streamedChunks.length,
|
||
provider: streamProvider,
|
||
model: streamModel,
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
} catch (e) {
|
||
if (firstChunkEmitted) {
|
||
// Past first-chunk boundary — can't fallback; emit truncation marker + [DONE]
|
||
// so clients can detect the incomplete response in-band (aligns with D26 F19
|
||
// stop-less exhaustion behaviour). ADR 0004 § Fallback safety: no fallback
|
||
// after first-chunk boundary; truncation is the correct recovery.
|
||
logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
|
||
provider: streamProvider,
|
||
model: streamModel,
|
||
error: e.message,
|
||
});
|
||
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' }, requestId, ir.model));
|
||
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
||
res.end();
|
||
} else {
|
||
// No bytes written — surface a clean JSON error.
|
||
logEvent('error', 'streaming_error_before_first_chunk', {
|
||
provider: streamProvider,
|
||
model: streamModel,
|
||
error: e.message,
|
||
});
|
||
if (!res.headersSent) {
|
||
sendError(res, 502, e.message ?? 'Provider error', 'provider_error',
|
||
olpHeaders({ providerUsed: streamProvider, modelUsed: streamModel, startMs, cacheStatus: 'miss', fallbackHops: 0 }));
|
||
} else {
|
||
res.end();
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let fallbackResult;
|
||
try {
|
||
fallbackResult = await executeWithFallback(chain, ir, executeHopFn, {
|
||
logEvent,
|
||
});
|
||
} catch (e) {
|
||
// executeWithFallback throws only on programming errors (empty chain).
|
||
logEvent('error', 'fallback_engine_error', { error: e.message });
|
||
return sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error',
|
||
olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model: ir.model }));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const {
|
||
chunks,
|
||
providerUsed,
|
||
modelUsed,
|
||
fallbackHops,
|
||
originalError,
|
||
triedProviders,
|
||
} = fallbackResult;
|
||
|
||
// ── Chain exhausted or non-trigger error ─────────────────────────────────
|
||
if (chunks === null) {
|
||
logEvent('error', 'spawn_error', {
|
||
model: ir.model,
|
||
providerUsed,
|
||
fallbackHops,
|
||
triedProviders,
|
||
error: originalError?.message,
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// Emit exhausted header if more than one provider was tried
|
||
const exhaustedHeader = triedProviders.length > 1
|
||
? { 'X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted': triedProviders.join(',') }
|
||
: {};
|
||
|
||
// Determine status: preserve client errors (400/401/403/404/422) as-is.
|
||
// Otherwise map ProviderError → 502, unknown → 500.
|
||
let errStatus = 502;
|
||
if (originalError) {
|
||
const httpStatus = originalError.statusCode ?? originalError.status ?? null;
|
||
if (httpStatus !== null) {
|
||
errStatus = httpStatus;
|
||
} else if (!(originalError instanceof ProviderError)) {
|
||
errStatus = 500;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: all responses (including errors) carry
|
||
// the standard 5-header set. On the exhausted/error path the engine returns
|
||
// values per ADR 0004 step 4 ("preserve A's identity — return the FIRST hop's
|
||
// provider/model and original error to the user"):
|
||
// - providerUsed: chain[0].provider on chain-exhausted (the primary that
|
||
// first failed); set to 'none' only if engine somehow returned null
|
||
// - modelUsed: chain[0].model on chain-exhausted, or the original request
|
||
// model if engine state is unknown
|
||
// - cacheStatus: 'miss' — all hops were attempted (bypass is per-hop, not relevant
|
||
// when the whole chain exhausted)
|
||
// - fallbackHops: number of hops actually attempted before exhaustion
|
||
// X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted is preserved as an additional flag on top of these.
|
||
const errorOlpHeaders = olpHeaders({
|
||
providerUsed: providerUsed ?? 'none',
|
||
modelUsed: modelUsed ?? ir.model,
|
||
startMs,
|
||
cacheStatus: 'miss',
|
||
fallbackHops: fallbackHops ?? 0,
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// Send error with standard OLP headers + optional exhausted header
|
||
const payload = JSON.stringify({
|
||
error: {
|
||
message: originalError?.message ?? 'Provider error',
|
||
type: 'provider_error',
|
||
},
|
||
});
|
||
res.writeHead(errStatus, {
|
||
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
|
||
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
|
||
...errorOlpHeaders,
|
||
...exhaustedHeader,
|
||
});
|
||
res.end(payload);
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Success: emit response ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
// Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: X-OLP-Fallback-Hops reflects the
|
||
// chain index of the serving hop; 0 = primary served, 1 = first fallback, etc.
|
||
// D13: bypass status is per the SERVING hop's provider (providerUsed), not a
|
||
// global flag. If the serving provider was Anthropic and markers were present,
|
||
// the cache was bypassed; otherwise it was a hit (preCheckHit) or miss.
|
||
const bypassCacheForServingHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(providerUsed);
|
||
// F8 (round-5 cold-audit): cacheStatus accounts for fallback-hop cache hits.
|
||
// preCheckHit covers the primary-hop case (fallbackHops===0); lastHopWasCached
|
||
// covers any hop (including fallback hops that served from their own cache).
|
||
// The two flags combine: if either signals a cache hit AND no bypass, report 'hit'.
|
||
const cacheStatus = bypassCacheForServingHop ? 'bypass'
|
||
: (lastHopWasCached || (preCheckHit && fallbackHops === 0)) ? 'hit'
|
||
: 'miss';
|
||
const headers = olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus, fallbackHops });
|
||
|
||
if (ir.stream) {
|
||
// Streaming response path: burst replay from buffered chunks.
|
||
// Reaches here only when: bypassCacheForFirstHop=true OR preCheckHit=true OR chain.length>1.
|
||
// (Single-hop cache-miss streaming is handled by the real-streaming path above.)
|
||
res.writeHead(200, {
|
||
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
|
||
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
|
||
Connection: 'keep-alive',
|
||
'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
|
||
...headers,
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
for (const irChunk of chunks) {
|
||
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
|
||
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
|
||
}
|
||
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
||
res.end();
|
||
} else {
|
||
// Non-streaming response path
|
||
const responseObj = irResponseToOpenAINonStream(chunks, requestId, ir.model);
|
||
sendJSON(res, 200, responseObj, headers);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Request router ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
|
||
* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
|
||
*/
|
||
async function router(req, res) {
|
||
const { method, url } = req;
|
||
|
||
// Strip query string for routing
|
||
const path = url?.split('?')[0] ?? '/';
|
||
|
||
try {
|
||
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/health') {
|
||
return await handleHealth(req, res);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/v1/models') {
|
||
return handleModels(req, res);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (method === 'POST' && path === '/v1/chat/completions') {
|
||
return await handleChatCompletions(req, res);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 404 for any unrecognised route
|
||
sendError(res, 404, `Route ${method} ${path} not found`, 'not_found');
|
||
} catch (e) {
|
||
logEvent('error', 'unhandled_request_error', { method, path, error: e?.message });
|
||
if (!res.headersSent) {
|
||
sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error');
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Server factory + main guard ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
//
|
||
// Factory pattern: `createOlpServer()` returns an http.Server bound to the
|
||
// shared router but NOT yet listening. Tests import this factory and call
|
||
// .listen() on their own port. The main guard below only runs .listen()
|
||
// when this file is invoked directly via `node server.mjs` — preventing
|
||
// import-time side effects when tests pull in server.mjs.
|
||
|
||
export function createOlpServer() {
|
||
return createServer(router);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
export { router, loadedProviders, VERSION };
|
||
|
||
// Main guard: only listen when invoked as the entrypoint. ESM equivalent of
|
||
// `require.main === module` is comparing import.meta.url against argv[1].
|
||
const isMain = (() => {
|
||
try {
|
||
return import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`;
|
||
} catch {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
})();
|
||
|
||
if (isMain) {
|
||
const server = createOlpServer();
|
||
server.listen(PORT, '127.0.0.1', () => {
|
||
const enabledCount = loadedProviders.size;
|
||
process.stdout.write(
|
||
`OLP v${VERSION} listening on :${PORT} (${enabledCount} providers enabled — Phase 1 in progress)\n`,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
}
|