olp/server.mjs

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
 * server.mjs — OLP HTTP listener and request dispatcher
 *
 * Authority (entry surface): OpenAI Chat Completions API
 *   https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create
 * Authority (IR): ADR 0003
 * Authority (provider dispatch): ADR 0002
 * Authority (cache layer): ADR 0005
 *
 * Design principles (OCP precedent, ESM/.mjs, http built-ins, no external deps):
 * - Node ESM, no build step, no bundler
 * - http built-in only (no Express/Fastify)
 * - Zero runtime npm dependencies in the proxy core
 *
 * Env vars:
 *   OLP_PORT  — listen port (default: 4567 since D60 / v0.4.0 — moved off 3456
 *               so OLP can co-host with OCP for migration windows. ADR 0010 §
 *               Default port. Set OLP_PORT=3456 explicitly to restore the
 *               pre-D60 default when not co-hosting with OCP.)
 *   OLP_BIND  — listen address (default: 127.0.0.1 since D76 / v0.4.3). Set
 *               to 0.0.0.0 (or a specific interface IP) to accept connections
 *               from LAN clients (required for olp-connect <ip> to actually
 *               reach the server). Server emits a startup warn if BIND
 *               resolves to a non-loopback address AND auth.allow_anonymous
 *               is true (anonymous-key over LAN may be acceptable; anonymous-
 *               key over public internet is not — see ADR 0011 § Deployment
 *               configurations).
 */

import { createServer } from 'node:http';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';

import { openAIToIR, BadRequestError } from './lib/ir/openai-to-ir.mjs';
import {
  irChunkToOpenAISSE,
  irResponseToOpenAINonStream,
  generateRequestId,
  SSE_DONE,
} from './lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs';
import {
  loadProviders,
  listAllProviderNames,
  getAliasMap,
  getModelCreated,
  tryAcquireSpawn,
  releaseSpawn,
  getActiveSpawnCount,
  DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS,
} from './lib/providers/index.mjs';
import { ProviderError } from './lib/providers/base.mjs';
import { computeCacheKey, hasCacheControl, extractCacheControlMarkers } from './lib/cache/keys.mjs';
import { CacheStore } from './lib/cache/store.mjs';
import {
  evaluateHardTriggers,
  executeWithFallback,
  buildDefaultChain,
  loadFallbackConfigSync,
} from './lib/fallback/engine.mjs';
// Phase 2 / D45 — multi-key auth integration per ADR 0007.
// D69 (ADR 0011): findAdvertisedKey for /health.anonymousKey opt-in surface.
import {
  validateKey,
  touchLastUsed,
  loadAuthConfigSync,
  findAdvertisedKey,
  ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID,
  ENV_OWNER_KEY_ID,
} from './lib/keys.mjs';
import { appendAuditEvent } from './lib/audit.mjs';
// Phase 7 / PR-A — sandbox availability preflight module (ADR 0014).
// checkSandboxAvailability is called lazily at first /health hit and memoized
// process-wide (bwrap/socat install state does not change at runtime; we don't
// want a child_process.execFileSync per /health call).
import { checkSandboxAvailability } from './lib/sandbox/doctor.mjs';
// Phase 7 / PR-B — sandbox manager bootstrap + spawn-wrap (ADR 0014 § PR-B).
// bootstrapSandbox() is called at server startup (before listen) and sets up
// the process-wide SandboxManager singleton. isSandboxActive() is used by
// /health to report sandbox.active.
import { bootstrapSandbox, isSandboxActive, __resetSandboxManagerForTests } from './lib/sandbox/manager.mjs';
// Phase 3 / D50 — management endpoints consume the audit aggregate query layer.
// D81 (Phase 5) — adds aggregateProviderQuota for quota_v2 shape.
import {
  aggregateRequests as auditAggregateRequests,
  topFallbackChains as auditTopFallbackChains,
  spendTrendDaily as auditSpendTrendDaily,
  cacheHitRateWindow as auditCacheHitRateWindow,
  aggregateProviderQuota as auditAggregateProviderQuota,
} from './lib/audit-query.mjs';

// ── Config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
const VERSION = pkg.version;

const PORT = parseInt(process.env.OLP_PORT ?? '4567', 10);
// F5 / D76: OLP_BIND env. Defaults to 127.0.0.1 (loopback only — secure
// default). Operators expose LAN by setting OLP_BIND=0.0.0.0 (or a specific
// interface). Per ADR 0011 § Deployment configurations:
//   - 127.0.0.1: trusted single-machine; safe with any auth posture
//   - RFC1918 / tailnet / specific LAN IP: trusted-LAN — anonymous_key OK
//   - 0.0.0.0: ALL interfaces — operator MUST ensure auth posture matches the
//     network reachability (e.g. no advertise_anonymous_key on public IP)
const BIND = process.env.OLP_BIND ?? '127.0.0.1';
const BODY_LIMIT = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB

// ── Logging ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Defined early so it is available for startup-time warnings (e.g. F16
// soft-trigger deferred warning) before the provider registry is loaded.

function logEvent(level, event, data = {}) {
  const entry = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), level, event, ...data };
  if (level === 'error' || level === 'warn') {
    process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
  } else {
    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
  }
}

// ── SSE response headers (D61, ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63) ────────────────
// Canonical SSE response-header set used by every streaming response. Pulled
// out as a top-level constant so all streaming write sites share a single
// source of truth (per OCP db11105 lesson: drift between branches caused the
// "headers sent but no Buffering directive" 502 regression).
//
// Authority: RFC 8895 (text/event-stream); nginx `X-Accel-Buffering: no`
// disables the upstream proxy buffer (load-bearing for real-time delivery
// behind nginx / Cloudflare / Tailscale Funnel).
const SSE_DEFAULT_HEADERS = Object.freeze({
  'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
  'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
  Connection: 'keep-alive',
  'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
});

// ── D62 recentErrors[20] ring buffer (ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63) ─────────
// Last 20 server-side error events. Surfaced via /status (owner-only). Ported
// from OCP server.mjs:301 + 354-358 — same shape adapted to OLP's identity-
// aware error vocabulary (key_id present when known; never client-tier-only
// errors like 401/403 which would let brute-force loops fill the ring).
//
// Lifecycle: module-scope, in-memory only. NOT persisted across restart
// (OCP precedent: same; acceptable per the spec).
//
// Sanitization: filesystem-path-like tokens in `message` are replaced with
// `[path]` so an unintentionally logged absolute path doesn't surface in a
// `/status` payload an owner copy-pastes elsewhere. Port of OCP server.mjs:1395.
//
// 200-char message cap: matches OCP precedent; keeps the ring bounded even
// for verbose stack traces (the dashboard / `olp` CLI surface a one-line
// preview, not the full trace).
const RECENT_ERRORS_MAX = 20;
const recentErrors = [];

/**
 * Push a server-side error event onto the recentErrors ring. Filters out
 * client-tier auth rejections (401/403) so a brute-force loop cannot flood
 * the ring. ProviderError instances are always recorded; other errors are
 * recorded when `statusCode >= 500`.
 *
 * @param {object} opts
 * @param {Error|null|undefined} opts.error
 * @param {string|null} [opts.provider]
 * @param {string|null} [opts.path]
 * @param {number|null} [opts.statusCode]
 */
function _pushError({ error, provider = null, path = null, statusCode = null }) {
  // D61-D63 reviewer P2-1 (defense-in-depth): explicitly reject 401/403 at the
  // function level even if a caller mistakenly passes one. The current call
  // sites all use the "no auth" path → never invoke _pushError, but a future
  // contributor passing a ProviderError tagged statusCode=401 would otherwise
  // slip past the isProviderError branch and flood the ring under brute force.
  if (statusCode === 401 || statusCode === 403) return;
  // Filter: any other status is recorded when (a) statusCode >= 500 OR (b) the
  // error is a ProviderError (provider-shape failure, always interesting for
  // operators).
  const isProviderError = error?.code === 'PROVIDER_ERROR'
    || error?.code === 'SPAWN_FAILED'
    || error?.code === 'CONCURRENCY_LIMIT'
    || error?.constructor?.name === 'ProviderError';
  const looksServerSide = statusCode !== null && statusCode >= 500;
  if (!isProviderError && !looksServerSide) return;

  const rawMessage = String(error?.message ?? error ?? 'unknown error');
  // Strip filesystem-path-like tokens. Port of OCP server.mjs:1395 — the
  // regex catches `/foo/bar` plus dotted/dashed variants. Replaces every
  // match with `[path]`. Truncate to 200 chars after sanitization.
  const sanitized = rawMessage
    .replace(/\/[\w./-]+/g, '[path]')
    .slice(0, 200);

  recentErrors.push({
    time: new Date().toISOString(),
    message: sanitized,
    code: error?.code ?? null,
    provider,
    path,
    status_code: statusCode,
  });
  while (recentErrors.length > RECENT_ERRORS_MAX) recentErrors.shift();
}

/** @internal — test seam: clear the recentErrors ring. */
export function __clearRecentErrors() {
  recentErrors.length = 0;
}

/** @internal — test seam: snapshot the recentErrors ring (copy). */
export function __snapshotRecentErrors() {
  return recentErrors.slice();
}

// ── D63 request counters (ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63) ─────────────────────
// Module-scope counters surfaced via /status (owner-only). _totalRequests is
// the cumulative count of /v1/chat/completions invocations since process
// start; _activeRequests is the live concurrent count.
//
// NOT exposed via /health (already owner-trimmed per Phase 2 D46); only
// /status (owner-only_block) reads them. Ported from OCP `stats.totalRequests`
// + `stats.activeRequests` (server.mjs:288-300).
let _totalRequests = 0;
let _activeRequests = 0;
const _serverStartMs = Date.now();

/** @internal — test seam: reset request counters. */
export function __resetRequestCounters() {
  _totalRequests = 0;
  _activeRequests = 0;
}

// ── Phase 7 PR-A: sandbox availability cache ──────────────────────────────
// checkSandboxAvailability() forks `which bwrap` / `which socat` / `which rg`
// and imports @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime. Neither can change at runtime —
// bwrap is either installed or it isn't. Memoize the first result to avoid
// repeated child_process.execFileSync calls on every /health hit.
//
// _sandboxStatusCache: null  → not yet fetched
//                      object → memoized result from checkSandboxAvailability()
let _sandboxStatusCache = null;
/** @internal — test seam: reset sandbox cache between tests. */
export function __resetSandboxStatusCache() {
  _sandboxStatusCache = null;
}

// ── Startup config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Read ~/.olp/config.json once at startup. Provides:
//   - providers.enabled   → which providers are loaded (ADR 0002 § Disable model)
//   - routing.chains      → fallback chain config (ADR 0004 § D9)
//   - routing.soft_triggers → soft trigger thresholds (ADR 0004)
// If the file is absent or malformed, defaults are safe:
//   empty providersEnabled → all 503 (ALIGNMENT.md § v0.1 zero-Enabled-Providers posture)
//   empty chains/soft_triggers → single-hop mode
const _startupConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();

// D26 round-3 F16: soft triggers are deferred to v1.x per ADR 0004 Amendment 2.
// If the user has configured any, emit a startup warning so the inert state is
// observable rather than silently ignored. ADR 0004 Amendment 2 § Mitigations.
const _softTriggersConfigured = Object.keys(_startupConfig.soft_triggers ?? {}).length > 0;
if (_softTriggersConfigured) {
  logEvent('warn', 'soft_triggers_deferred_v1x', {
    configured_providers: Object.keys(_startupConfig.soft_triggers),
    message: 'routing.soft_triggers configured but soft triggers are deferred to v1.x; ' +
      'thresholds will not fire at v0.1 — see ADR 0004 Amendment 2',
  });
}

// ── Auth config (Phase 2 / D45, ADR 0007 § 7.2) ───────────────────────────
// auth.allow_anonymous default false (production-off). Test seam below.
let _authConfig = loadAuthConfigSync();
if (_authConfig.allow_anonymous === true) {
  logEvent('warn', 'auth_allow_anonymous_enabled', {
    message: 'config.json auth.allow_anonymous is true — all routes accept requests without an OLP API key; production deployments should set this to false (ADR 0007 § 7).',
  });
}
// D69 (ADR 0011): startup-time prerequisite validation for /health.anonymousKey
// advertisement. The field is emitted ONLY when all three prerequisites hold:
//   (1) auth.advertise_anonymous_key === true (config opt-in)
//   (2) auth.allow_anonymous === true         (anonymous tier must be reachable
//                                              for the advertised key to be
//                                              meaningful to zero-config callers)
//   (3) at least one advertised key exists on disk (manifest with
//       plaintext_advertise field, not revoked)
// Violations log warn at startup but the server still boots; the runtime
// handleHealth checks the same conditions and simply omits the field.
if (_authConfig.advertise_anonymous_key === true) {
  if (_authConfig.allow_anonymous !== true) {
    logEvent('warn', 'anonymous_key_advertised_but_denied', {
      message: 'auth.advertise_anonymous_key=true but auth.allow_anonymous=false — the advertised key would not be usable anonymously. /health.anonymousKey will NOT be emitted until allow_anonymous=true. See ADR 0011.',
    });
  } else if (findAdvertisedKey() === null) {
    logEvent('warn', 'anonymous_key_advertised_but_no_anonymous_key_exists', {
      message: 'auth.advertise_anonymous_key=true but no active key with plaintext_advertise exists. Run `olp-keys keygen --anonymous --advertise` to create one. /health.anonymousKey will NOT be emitted until then. See ADR 0011.',
    });
  }
  // F5 / D76 (ADR 0011 Deployment configurations): publishing the anonymous
  // key via /health is only safe when /health is reachable ONLY from a
  // trusted network. If OLP_BIND is set to a non-loopback address AND
  // advertise_anonymous_key is true, warn the operator. We can't tell from
  // here whether the non-loopback bind is "trusted LAN" (RFC1918 / tailnet)
  // or "public internet" — that's the operator's responsibility. The warn is
  // a checkpoint, not a hard gate.
  if (BIND !== '127.0.0.1' && BIND !== 'localhost' && BIND !== '::1') {
    logEvent('warn', 'anonymous_key_advertised_with_lan_bind', {
      message: `auth.advertise_anonymous_key=true with OLP_BIND=${BIND} — /health.anonymousKey will be reachable from any host that can connect to ${BIND}:${PORT}. Confirm this address is on a trusted LAN (RFC1918 / tailnet) — never a public IP. See ADR 0011 § Deployment configurations.`,
      bind: BIND,
    });
  }
}

/** @internal — test seam: inject a synthetic auth config (no file I/O). */
export function __setAuthConfig(config) {
  _authConfig = config ?? { allow_anonymous: false, owner_only_endpoints: ['/health'], fallback_detail_header_policy: 'owner_only', advertise_anonymous_key: false };
  // D69: defensively normalize so tests passing partial configs still get a
  // boolean advertise_anonymous_key value (downstream code treats undefined
  // as falsy but explicit normalisation matches loadAuthConfigSync's contract).
  if (typeof _authConfig.advertise_anonymous_key !== 'boolean') {
    _authConfig.advertise_anonymous_key = false;
  }
}

/** @internal — reset auth config to file-loaded state. */
export function __resetAuthConfig() {
  _authConfig = loadAuthConfigSync();
}

// ── Streaming config (D61, ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63) ────────────────────
// Reads `streaming.heartbeat_interval_ms` from ~/.olp/config.json via the
// same loader used by routing/providers config. Default 0 = disabled;
// behaviour is opt-in. Tests inject synthetic configs via __setStreamingConfig.
let _streamingConfig = _startupConfig.streaming ?? { heartbeat_interval_ms: 0 };

/** @internal — test seam: inject a synthetic streaming config (no file I/O). */
export function __setStreamingConfig(config) {
  _streamingConfig = config ?? { heartbeat_interval_ms: 0 };
}

/** @internal — reset streaming config to file-loaded state. */
export function __resetStreamingConfig() {
  _streamingConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync().streaming ?? { heartbeat_interval_ms: 0 };
}

// ── SSE heartbeat (D61, ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63) ───────────────────────
// Port of OCP `startHeartbeat` (ocp/server.mjs:660-685). Emits `: keepalive\n\n`
// SSE comment frames on `res` every `intervalMs` ms during silent windows.
// The timer is reset on each real chunk write (`reset()`); cancelled on
// stream end / error / client disconnect (`stop()`).
//
// Discipline (load-bearing): this is a downstream liveness hint only — it
// MUST NOT abort or time out a request. The OCP timeout-tier regressions
// (v2.2-v2.5; see OCP spec) showed that any auto-cancellation primitive in
// the streaming branch is hostile to long-reasoning prompts.
//
// Per-attached-client: each call to startHeartbeat creates its own timer
// state. The streaming-singleflight `attached` client and the `source`
// client each get their own heartbeat instance (they share an underlying
// spawn but write to different `res` objects). The `res.on('close')` handler
// in the streaming branch calls `stop()` to cancel each client's timer
// independently.
//
// @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
// @param {number} intervalMs — 0 or negative ⇒ no-op (timer never starts)
// @param {string} requestId — for the one-time `heartbeat_active` log event
// @returns {{ reset: () => void, stop: () => void }}
function startHeartbeat(res, intervalMs, requestId) {
  if (!intervalMs || intervalMs <= 0) {
    return { reset: () => {}, stop: () => {} };
  }
  let handle = null;
  let hasFired = false;
  const onFire = () => {
    if (res.writableEnded || res.destroyed) return;
    try {
      res.write(': keepalive\n\n');
    } catch {
      // res may have been destroyed between the writableEnded check and the
      // write — swallow so the heartbeat is a no-op on a dead socket.
      return;
    }
    if (!hasFired) {
      hasFired = true;
      logEvent('info', 'heartbeat_active', { interval_ms: intervalMs, request_id: requestId });
    }
    handle = setTimeout(onFire, intervalMs);
  };
  handle = setTimeout(onFire, intervalMs);
  return {
    reset: () => {
      if (handle) { clearTimeout(handle); handle = setTimeout(onFire, intervalMs); }
    },
    stop: () => {
      if (handle) { clearTimeout(handle); handle = null; }
    },
  };
}

// ── Provider registry ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 unless
// ~/.olp/config.json has providers.enabled.X = true.
// ADR 0002 § Disable model: enabled toggle in config.json transitions Candidate → Enabled.
const loadedProviders = loadProviders({ enabled: _startupConfig.providersEnabled ?? {} });

// ── Fallback config ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Read ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains at startup. Empty at v0.1.
// Per ADR 0004 § D9: fallback engine is wired; activates when user populates chains.
// Tests may inject a synthetic fallbackConfig via __setFallbackConfig().
let _fallbackConfig = _startupConfig;

/** @internal — test seam: inject a synthetic fallback config (no file I/O) */
export function __setFallbackConfig(config) {
  _fallbackConfig = config ?? { chains: {}, soft_triggers: {} };
}

/** @internal — reset to file-based config */
export function __resetFallbackConfig() {
  _fallbackConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();
}

/**
 * @internal — test seam: reload loadedProviders to match a given enabledMap.
 * Mirrors __setFallbackConfig. Allows tests to exercise the production
 * loadProviders() code path without touching the config file.
 *
 * Usage: __setProvidersEnabled({ anthropic: true }) before creating a server.
 * Reset: __resetProvidersEnabled() or __setProvidersEnabled({}) to clear all.
 *
 * @param {Record<string, boolean>} enabledMap
 */
export function __setProvidersEnabled(enabledMap) {
  const next = loadProviders({ enabled: enabledMap ?? {} });
  // Mutate the shared map in-place so existing references see the update.
  loadedProviders.clear();
  for (const [name, p] of next) {
    loadedProviders.set(name, p);
  }
}

/** @internal — reset loadedProviders to the startup-config state */
export function __resetProvidersEnabled() {
  const startup = loadFallbackConfigSync();
  const next = loadProviders({ enabled: startup.providersEnabled ?? {} });
  loadedProviders.clear();
  for (const [name, p] of next) {
    loadedProviders.set(name, p);
  }
}

/** @internal — clear the cache store (for tests that need a fresh cache state) */
export function __clearCache() {
  cacheStore.clear();
}

// ── Cache layer ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// D1 per-key isolation + D4 singleflight per ADR 0005.
// keyId: '__anonymous__' at D5 — Phase 2 multi-key infrastructure wires in
// the real OLP API key ID here.
export const cacheStore = new CacheStore();

// ── Body reader ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Reads and JSON-parses the request body.
 * Enforces the 5MB body limit.
 * Throws on parse failure or oversized body.
 *
 * @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
 * @returns {Promise<any>}
 */
function readJSON(req) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    let body = '';
    let size = 0;
    req.on('data', chunk => {
      size += chunk.length;
      if (size > BODY_LIMIT) {
        reject(Object.assign(new Error('Request body too large (limit 5MB)'), { statusCode: 413 }));
        req.destroy();
        return;
      }
      body += chunk;
    });
    req.on('end', () => {
      try {
        resolve(JSON.parse(body));
      } catch {
        reject(Object.assign(new Error('Invalid JSON in request body'), { statusCode: 400 }));
      }
    });
    req.on('error', reject);
  });
}

// ── Response helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
 * @param {number} status
 * @param {object} body
 * @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders]
 */
function sendJSON(res, status, body, extraHeaders = {}) {
  const payload = JSON.stringify(body);
  res.writeHead(status, {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
    'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
    ...extraHeaders,
  });
  res.end(payload);
}

/**
 * OpenAI-format error response helper.
 * @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
 * @param {number} status
 * @param {string} message
 * @param {string} type
 * @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders] — optional extra headers (e.g. X-OLP-Latency-Ms)
 */
function sendError(res, status, message, type, extraHeaders = {}) {
  sendJSON(res, status, { error: { message, type } }, extraHeaders);
}

// ── OLP response headers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Returns the standard OLP diagnostic headers.
 * Per spec §4.7 and ADR 0004 § Observability headers:
 *   X-OLP-Provider-Used, X-OLP-Model-Used, X-OLP-Fallback-Hops,
 *   X-OLP-Cache, X-OLP-Latency-Ms.
 * Fallback-Hops reflects which chain index served the request (0=primary).
 * Cache reflects actual hit/miss/bypass status from the cache layer (ADR 0005).
 *
 * @param {object} opts
 * @param {string} opts.providerUsed
 * @param {string} opts.modelUsed
 * @param {number} opts.startMs
 * @param {'hit'|'miss'|'bypass'} [opts.cacheStatus='miss']
 * @param {number} [opts.fallbackHops=0] — from executeWithFallback result
 * @returns {Record<string,string>}
 */
function olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus = 'miss', fallbackHops = 0 }) {
  return {
    'X-OLP-Provider-Used': providerUsed,
    'X-OLP-Model-Used': modelUsed,
    'X-OLP-Fallback-Hops': String(fallbackHops),
    'X-OLP-Cache': cacheStatus,
    'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs),
  };
}

/**
 * Returns the standard 5-header OLP diagnostic set for pre-chain error paths
 * (no provider was attempted yet). Used by sendError call sites that occur
 * before chain construction (415 wrong Content-Type, 400 bad JSON, 400 IR
 * validation failure, 503 no-enabled-providers).
 *
 * Per F8 (D32 round-4 cold-audit): ADR 0004 § Observability requires the full
 * 5-header set on every response; early error paths must emit canonical
 * "no provider attempted" defaults.
 *
 * @param {object} opts
 * @param {number} opts.startMs — request start timestamp (Date.now())
 * @param {string|null|undefined} [opts.model] — ir.model if IR was parsed; undefined/null otherwise
 * @returns {Record<string,string>}
 */
function olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model }) {
  return {
    'X-OLP-Provider-Used': 'none',
    'X-OLP-Model-Used': model ?? 'unknown',
    'X-OLP-Fallback-Hops': '0',
    'X-OLP-Cache': 'bypass',
    'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs),
  };
}

// ── X-OLP-Fallback-Detail (D40, issue #7) ─────────────────────────────────

/**
 * 4KB UTF-8 byte cap on the X-OLP-Fallback-Detail header value. Per RFC 7230 §3.2.5
 * intermediaries are not obligated to forward arbitrarily large header values;
 * 4KB matches the conservative upper bound (well below the 8KB total-header
 * default of common reverse proxies — nginx `large_client_header_buffers`,
 * Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`). Tuples beyond the cap are dropped and
 * a sentinel { truncated:true, omitted_hops:N } is appended.
 */
export const FALLBACK_DETAIL_BYTE_CAP = 4096;

/**
 * Serialises per-hop fallback failure tuples into the X-OLP-Fallback-Detail
 * header value. Returns null if the input array is empty/missing (header
 * should not be emitted in that case).
 *
 * D40 (issue #7) — see ADR 0004 § Observability headers.
 *
 * Cap behaviour:
 *   - JSON.stringify the tuples; if Buffer.byteLength <= 4096, return as-is.
 *   - Otherwise, drop tuples from the tail one at a time until the array PLUS
 *     a trailing { truncated:true, omitted_hops:N } sentinel fits under the cap.
 *   - If even a single tuple + sentinel cannot fit (extremely long error_message
 *     beyond engine truncation, e.g. very long provider/model names), return
 *     just the sentinel { truncated:true, omitted_hops:<all> } — never produce
 *     a value > 4096 bytes.
 *
 * RFC 7230 hygiene: JSON.stringify already escapes raw newlines (\n → \\n),
 * carriage returns, and other control characters. In addition, we escape all
 * non-ASCII code points to \uXXXX sequences because Node's HTTP header
 * validator rejects multi-byte UTF-8 in field values (and RFC 7230 §3.2.6
 * limits `field-vchar` to ASCII VCHAR / obs-text). Without this step, an
 * em dash (U+2014) in a synthesised error message — e.g. the CONCURRENCY_LIMIT
 * message produced in server.mjs `collectAllChunks` — would trigger
 * `Invalid character in header content` from `res.writeHead`.
 *
 * @param {Array<object>|null|undefined} fallbackDetail — from FallbackResult.fallbackDetail
 * @returns {string|null} — header value, or null to skip emission
 */
export function serializeFallbackDetailHeader(fallbackDetail) {
  if (!Array.isArray(fallbackDetail) || fallbackDetail.length === 0) {
    return null;
  }
  const full = jsonStringifyAscii(fallbackDetail);
  if (Buffer.byteLength(full, 'utf8') <= FALLBACK_DETAIL_BYTE_CAP) {
    return full;
  }

  // Cap exceeded — drop tail tuples until [...kept, sentinel] fits.
  // Linear scan from the full array down to 0 kept tuples. Worst case O(n^2)
  // on serialisation length, but n is bounded by chain length (small) so this
  // is fine in practice.
  for (let kept = fallbackDetail.length - 1; kept >= 0; kept--) {
    const omitted = fallbackDetail.length - kept;
    const sentinel = { truncated: true, omitted_hops: omitted };
    const candidate = jsonStringifyAscii([...fallbackDetail.slice(0, kept), sentinel]);
    if (Buffer.byteLength(candidate, 'utf8') <= FALLBACK_DETAIL_BYTE_CAP) {
      return candidate;
    }
  }

  // Even an array containing only the sentinel exceeds the cap — produce the
  // shortest possible valid sentinel value. This branch should be unreachable
  // for any realistic chain (the sentinel itself is ~45 bytes for omitted_hops
  // up to 9999).
  return jsonStringifyAscii([{ truncated: true, omitted_hops: fallbackDetail.length }]);
}

/**
 * JSON.stringify wrapper that escapes every non-ASCII code point as \uXXXX
 * so the result is safe to embed in an HTTP header value (RFC 7230 §3.2.6
 * field-vchar). JSON itself accepts both literal Unicode and \uXXXX escapes,
 * so JSON.parse round-trips correctly.
 *
 * Surrogate-pair handling: characters above U+FFFF (emoji etc.) are already
 * emitted as JS surrogate pairs by the string iterator; each surrogate is
 * a code unit in range 0xD800–0xDFFF, which our >= 0x80 guard catches.
 *
 * @param {unknown} value
 * @returns {string}
 */
function jsonStringifyAscii(value) {
  // The replace pattern is the UTF-8 literal byte range for code points
  // U+0080..U+FFFF (every non-ASCII BMP character). U+0080 is non-printable,
  // so the source line can render as the empty character class "[-...]" in
  // editors that hide it — the range is intentional and load-bearing for
  // RFC 7230 §3.2.6 compliance.
  return JSON.stringify(value).replace(/[€-￿]/g, (ch) => {
    return '\\u' + ch.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0');
  });
}

/**
 * Identity-aware gate for X-OLP-Fallback-Detail emission per ADR 0007 § 7.2.
 * Reads `_authConfig.fallback_detail_header_policy`:
 *   - 'owner_only' (default) → emit only when olpIdentity.owner_tier === 'owner'
 *   - 'all'                  → emit unconditionally (v0.1.1 behaviour, opt-in)
 *   - 'none'                 → suppress unconditionally
 * When olpIdentity is null (early-error paths before auth completed),
 * defaults to 'all' → emit (preserves the v0.1.1 ungated behaviour for
 * pre-auth errors where we don't yet know identity).
 *
 * @param {{owner_tier?: string}|null|undefined} olpIdentity
 * @returns {boolean}
 */
function shouldEmitFallbackDetailHeader(olpIdentity) {
  const policy = _authConfig?.fallback_detail_header_policy ?? 'owner_only';
  if (policy === 'none') return false;
  if (policy === 'all') return true;
  // 'owner_only' — gate by identity tier
  if (!olpIdentity) return true; // pre-auth path: don't suppress diagnostic info
  return olpIdentity.owner_tier === 'owner';
}

/**
 * Merges X-OLP-Fallback-Detail into a base header object when the per-hop
 * failure tuples are non-empty AND the per-request identity is permitted
 * to see the header per the policy (ADR 0007 § 7.2). Returns the base
 * object unchanged otherwise.
 *
 * D40 (issue #7) — gating added at D46 per ADR 0004 Amendment 5 ratification.
 *
 * @param {Record<string,string>} baseHeaders
 * @param {Array<object>|null|undefined} fallbackDetail
 * @param {{owner_tier?: string}|null|undefined} olpIdentity - request identity; null on pre-auth paths
 * @returns {Record<string,string>}
 */
function withFallbackDetailHeader(baseHeaders, fallbackDetail, olpIdentity) {
  if (!shouldEmitFallbackDetailHeader(olpIdentity)) return baseHeaders;
  const value = serializeFallbackDetailHeader(fallbackDetail);
  if (value === null) return baseHeaders;
  return { ...baseHeaders, 'X-OLP-Fallback-Detail': value };
}

// ── Route handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// ── Auth middleware (Phase 2 / D45, ADR 0007 § 5 + § 7) ───────────────────

/**
 * Extract the plaintext OLP token from request headers.
 * Tries `Authorization: Bearer <token>` first, then `x-api-key: <token>`.
 * Returns the token string or null.
 *
 * @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
 * @returns {string|null}
 */
function extractToken(req) {
  const auth = req.headers['authorization'];
  if (typeof auth === 'string') {
    const match = /^Bearer\s+(\S+)$/i.exec(auth);
    if (match) return match[1];
  }
  const xKey = req.headers['x-api-key'];
  if (typeof xKey === 'string' && xKey.length > 0) return xKey;
  return null;
}

/**
 * Authenticate the request per ADR 0007 §§ 5 / 7 / 9.4.
 *   - Try env-owner override first (OLP_OWNER_TOKEN).
 *   - Then filesystem manifest lookup by SHA-256 hash.
 *   - Else, if auth.allow_anonymous is true → anonymous identity.
 *   - Else → 401 auth_required.
 *
 * Returns { ok: true, authContext } on success or
 * { ok: false, status, code, message } on failure (401).
 *
 * @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
 * @returns {{ ok: true, authContext: { keyId: string, owner_tier: 'owner'|'guest'|'anonymous', providers_enabled: string[]|'*', source: 'env'|'filesystem'|'anonymous' } } | { ok: false, status: number, code: string, message: string }}
 */
function authenticate(req) {
  const token = extractToken(req);
  const identity = validateKey(token, { allowAnonymous: _authConfig.allow_anonymous });
  if (identity === null) {
    // Distinguish "no token presented" from "token presented but invalid/revoked".
    // Both surface as 401 to the client (don't leak which case it was), but the
    // server-side audit + log captures the source for operator diagnosis.
    return {
      ok: false,
      status: 401,
      code: token ? 'invalid_or_revoked_key' : 'auth_required',
      message: token
        ? 'OLP API key is invalid or has been revoked.'
        : 'OLP API key required. Pass via "Authorization: Bearer <token>" or "x-api-key: <token>".',
    };
  }
  return {
    ok: true,
    authContext: {
      keyId: identity.id,
      owner_tier: identity.owner_tier,
      providers_enabled: identity.providers_enabled,
      source: identity.source,
    },
  };
}

/**
 * Check whether the given provider key is permitted for this identity.
 * `providers_enabled: '*'` grants all; an array is a whitelist.
 *
 * @param {{ providers_enabled: string[]|'*' }} authContext
 * @param {string} providerKey
 * @returns {boolean}
 */
function isProviderEnabled(authContext, providerKey) {
  if (authContext.providers_enabled === '*') return true;
  return Array.isArray(authContext.providers_enabled) && authContext.providers_enabled.includes(providerKey);
}

/**
 * GET /health
 *
 * Phase 2 / D46 (ADR 0007 § 7.1): identity-aware payload.
 *   - owner identity     → full per-provider details (existing payload)
 *   - guest / anonymous  → trimmed { ok, version } only
 *   - no auth, allow_anonymous=false → 401 (consistent with /v1/* routes)
 *
 * The trimming behavior is gated on `_authConfig.owner_only_endpoints` —
 * the entry `/health` lives there by default. Removing `/health` from
 * the list reverts to v0.1.1 full-payload-to-everyone behaviour.
 *
 * Authority: ADR 0007 § 7.1 (Identity-class table) + § 7.2 (owner_only_endpoints).
 * Closes acceptance criterion #4.
 */
async function handleHealth(req, res) {
  const startMs = Date.now();

  // D46: audit on /health is intentionally NOT enabled at Phase 2.
  // /health is a high-volume monitoring endpoint; per-call audit rows would
  // generate operational noise that has no observability value until a
  // Phase 3+ Dashboard aggregates /health stats. Deferred to Phase 3.

  const authResult = authenticate(req);
  if (!authResult.ok) {
    return sendError(res, authResult.status, authResult.message, authResult.code);
  }
  const olpIdentity = authResult.authContext;

  // Per § 7.1: owner sees full payload; guest + anonymous see trimmed.
  // Per § 7.2: gating is opt-out via `owner_only_endpoints` config; if
  // `/health` is removed from the list, all identities see the full
  // payload (operators wanting v0.1.1 behaviour have this knob).
  const gatedEndpoints = Array.isArray(_authConfig?.owner_only_endpoints)
    ? _authConfig.owner_only_endpoints
    : ['/health'];
  const isGated = gatedEndpoints.includes('/health');
  const isOwner = olpIdentity.owner_tier === 'owner';

  // Touch last_used_at for filesystem identities post-response. The callee
  // also early-returns on ANONYMOUS / ENV_OWNER keyIds (lib/keys.mjs § 6.3
  // wrapper) — this guard is defense-in-depth + skip the async call entirely
  // for non-filesystem identities.
  if (olpIdentity.keyId !== ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID && olpIdentity.keyId !== ENV_OWNER_KEY_ID) {
    res.on('finish', () => {
      touchLastUsed(olpIdentity.keyId).catch(() => {});
    });
  }

  // D69 (ADR 0011): compute opt-in /health.anonymousKey. The field is added
  // to BOTH trimmed and full payloads (the trimmed payload's whole purpose
  // is to be readable by anonymous clients so they can self-bootstrap into
  // a real key). Three prerequisites must hold (see startup warns above):
  //   (1) auth.advertise_anonymous_key === true
  //   (2) auth.allow_anonymous === true
  //   (3) findAdvertisedKey() returns a non-null active manifest
  // When any fails, the field is absent (NOT null) — preserves the v0.3.x
  // /health payload shape for clients that strict-validate keys.
  let anonymousKey = null;
  if (_authConfig.advertise_anonymous_key === true && _authConfig.allow_anonymous === true) {
    try {
      const adv = findAdvertisedKey();
      if (adv && typeof adv.plaintext_advertise === 'string' && adv.plaintext_advertise.length > 0) {
        anonymousKey = adv.plaintext_advertise;
      }
    } catch {
      // Filesystem error reading manifests is non-fatal; just omit the field.
      anonymousKey = null;
    }
  }

  if (isGated && !isOwner) {
    // Trimmed payload per § 7.1. D69: include anonymousKey here too — zero-
    // config olp-connect callers read it BEFORE they have a key.
    const trimmed = { ok: true, version: VERSION };
    if (anonymousKey !== null) trimmed.anonymousKey = anonymousKey;
    return sendJSON(res, 200, trimmed);
  }

  // Full payload (owner OR /health removed from owner_only_endpoints).
  const enabled = loadedProviders.size;
  const available = listAllProviderNames().length;
  const providerStatuses = {};
  for (const [name, provider] of loadedProviders) {
    // D56 / v1.x roadmap #4 (ADR 0002 Amendment 6 forward note): surface
    // per-provider active spawn count for capacity-planning observability.
    // D38 shipped getActiveSpawnCount; this is the /health integration.
    // The field is set BEFORE healthCheck() in case healthCheck throws —
    // activeSpawns is cheap (in-memory counter read) and useful even
    // when healthCheck fails.
    const activeSpawns = getActiveSpawnCount(name);
    try {
      providerStatuses[name] = { ...(await provider.healthCheck()), activeSpawns };
    } catch (e) {
      providerStatuses[name] = { ok: false, error: e.message, activeSpawns };
    }
  }
  // Phase 7 PR-A (ADR 0014): sandbox availability field.
  // Result is memoized process-wide in _sandboxStatusCache — bwrap/socat
  // install state does not change at runtime. If the library call throws for
  // any reason, the field is still included with available: false + error
  // (don't crash /health).
  if (_sandboxStatusCache === null) {
    try {
      _sandboxStatusCache = await checkSandboxAvailability();
    } catch (e) {
      _sandboxStatusCache = {
        available: false,
        missing: [],
        details: { platform: process.platform, error: String(e?.message ?? e) },
      };
    }
  }
  const sandboxField = {
    available: _sandboxStatusCache.available,
    // Phase 7 PR-B: active = sandbox was bootstrapped and SandboxManager is
    // ready to wrap spawns. available=true + active=true means every provider
    // spawn is actually sandboxed. available=true + active=false means deps
    // present but bootstrap failed at runtime (see server startup log).
    active: isSandboxActive(),
    missing: _sandboxStatusCache.missing ?? [],
    platform: _sandboxStatusCache.details?.platform ?? process.platform,
  };
  if (!_sandboxStatusCache.available) {
    // Include human-readable install hint for owner-tier callers.
    const missingDeps = (_sandboxStatusCache.missing ?? []).filter(
      m => m === 'bubblewrap' || m === 'socat' || m === 'ripgrep',
    );
    if (missingDeps.length > 0) {
      sandboxField.message =
        `Sandbox dependencies not available: ${missingDeps.map(m => `${m} not installed`).join(', ')}.` +
        ` Install: sudo apt-get install -y ${missingDeps.join(' ')}`;
    } else if (_sandboxStatusCache.details?.error) {
      sandboxField.message = `Sandbox check error: ${_sandboxStatusCache.details.error}`;
    } else if (_sandboxStatusCache.details?.libError) {
      sandboxField.message = `Sandbox library error: ${_sandboxStatusCache.details.libError}`;
    }
  }

  const fullPayload = {
    ok: true,
    version: VERSION,
    providers: { enabled, available, status: providerStatuses },
    sandbox: sandboxField,
  };
  if (anonymousKey !== null) fullPayload.anonymousKey = anonymousKey;
  sendJSON(res, 200, fullPayload);
}

/**
 * GET /v1/models
 * Returns the list of models served by all currently loaded (enabled) providers.
 * Per ADR 0002 § "Loading model" + OpenAI spec /v1/models:
 *   Each entry: { id, object: 'model', created, owned_by }
 *   - id:        canonical model ID (or alias string for alias entries)
 *   - object:    literal 'model' (OpenAI spec)
 *   - created:   Unix epoch seconds (stable per request; computed once from Date.now())
 *   - owned_by:  provider.name (e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral')
 * Order: canonical models first (insertion order of loadedProviders, then models[]),
 *        then alias entries (for aliases whose target provider is currently loaded).
 * Authority: OpenAI /v1/models spec (https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/models);
 *            models-registry.json alias map (SPOT per D17); F15 round-3 adds alias surfacing.
 * Empty case: if no providers are enabled, data: [] is returned naturally.
 */
function handleModels(req, res) {
  const startMs = Date.now();

  // Audit + auth for /v1/models per Phase 2 / D45 (ADR 0007 § 7).
  const auditCtx = {
    ts: new Date().toISOString(),
    key_id: ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID,
    owner_tier: 'anonymous',
    method: 'GET',
    path: '/v1/models',
    provider: null,
    model: null,
    status_code: 0,
    latency_ms: 0,
    cache_status: null,
    fallback_hops: 0,
    tried_providers: [],
    error_code: null,
    ir_request_hash: null,
    chain_id: null,
  };
  let _authedKeyId = null;
  res.on('finish', () => {
    auditCtx.status_code = res.statusCode;
    auditCtx.latency_ms = Date.now() - startMs;
    try { appendAuditEvent(auditCtx); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
    if (_authedKeyId && _authedKeyId !== ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID) {
      touchLastUsed(_authedKeyId).catch(() => {});
    }
  });

  const authResult = authenticate(req);
  if (!authResult.ok) {
    auditCtx.error_code = authResult.code;
    return sendError(res, authResult.status, authResult.message, authResult.code,
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
  }
  auditCtx.key_id = authResult.authContext.keyId;
  auditCtx.owner_tier = authResult.authContext.owner_tier;
  _authedKeyId = authResult.authContext.keyId;

  const data = [];

  // Canonical entries first
  for (const [providerName, provider] of loadedProviders) {
    for (const modelId of provider.models) {
      data.push({
        id: modelId,
        object: 'model',
        // F12 (round-5 cold-audit): use stable per-model timestamp from
        // models-registry.json rather than Date.now() on each request.
        // OpenAI spec treats `created` as a stable per-model attribute.
        created: getModelCreated(modelId),
        owned_by: providerName,
      });
    }
  }

  // Alias entries for loaded (enabled) providers, canonical-first ordering preserved
  for (const [alias, { providerName, canonicalModel }] of getAliasMap()) {
    if (loadedProviders.has(providerName)) {
      data.push({
        id: alias,
        object: 'model',
        // Alias entries use the same stable timestamp as their canonical model.
        created: getModelCreated(canonicalModel),
        owned_by: providerName,
      });
    }
  }

  sendJSON(res, 200, { object: 'list', data });
}

/**
 * POST /v1/chat/completions
 * Core dispatch path: OpenAI request → IR → fallback engine → provider.spawn → OpenAI response.
 *
 * D9: Fallback engine (ADR 0004) is wired between IR construction and provider.spawn.
 * Chain advancement, soft/hard trigger evaluation, and first-chunk safety are all
 * handled by executeWithFallback(). At v0.1 with empty routing.chains config, this
 * is a transparent single-hop pass-through. Multi-hop fallback activates when the
 * user populates ~/.olp/config.json.
 *
 * @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
 * @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
 */
async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
  const startMs = Date.now();

  // D63 (ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63): request counters for /status. Increment
  // at the top (every request counts, even authentication failures); decrement
  // in a single `res.on('close')` listener that fires on both normal end and
  // client disconnect, ensuring _activeRequests cannot leak. `res.on('finish')`
  // alone would miss client-disconnect-before-finish cases.
  _totalRequests++;
  _activeRequests++;
  let _activeDecremented = false;
  const _decrementActive = () => {
    if (_activeDecremented) return;
    _activeDecremented = true;
    _activeRequests = Math.max(0, _activeRequests - 1);
  };
  res.on('close', _decrementActive);
  res.on('finish', _decrementActive);

  // Audit context — fields populated as the request proceeds; § 8 schema.
  // Fired on res.on('finish') below regardless of success / error path.
  const auditCtx = {
    ts: new Date().toISOString(),
    key_id: ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID,        // updated post-auth
    owner_tier: 'anonymous',         // updated post-auth
    method: 'POST',
    path: '/v1/chat/completions',
    provider: null,
    model: null,
    status_code: 0,                  // updated on finish
    latency_ms: 0,                   // updated on finish
    cache_status: null,
    fallback_hops: 0,
    tried_providers: [],
    error_code: null,
    ir_request_hash: null,
    chain_id: null,
  };
  // Wire post-response audit + lazy last_used_at update once, at the top, so
  // every code path below (401, 400, 500, 200, streaming) emits an audit row.
  // touchLastUsed is best-effort and never throws (§ 6.3).
  let _authedKeyId = null;
  res.on('finish', () => {
    auditCtx.status_code = res.statusCode;
    auditCtx.latency_ms = Date.now() - startMs;
    try { appendAuditEvent(auditCtx); } catch { /* audit is best-effort */ }
    if (_authedKeyId && _authedKeyId !== ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID) {
      // Anonymous + __env_owner__ have no on-disk manifest to touch; touchLastUsed
      // itself early-returns for those identities (§ 6.3 wrapper). For
      // filesystem-stored keys, fire-and-forget.
      touchLastUsed(_authedKeyId).catch(() => { /* warned internally */ });
    }
  });

  // ── Authentication (Phase 2 / D45, ADR 0007 § 5 + § 7) ───────────────────
  // olpIdentity carries the OLP-side identity (keyId / owner_tier /
  // providers_enabled). It is SEPARATE from `authContext` which is the
  // per-provider OAuth/credential artifact passed to provider.spawn().
  // Provider plugins treat `authContext === null` as "fall back to your
  // own credential discovery (env / keychain / file)" — that contract is
  // preserved at D45. Per-provider per-key credential mapping is a Phase
  // 3+ concern (ADR 0007 § 12 Out of scope; v0.1 spec § 4.5 anticipated).
  const authResult = authenticate(req);
  if (!authResult.ok) {
    auditCtx.error_code = authResult.code;
    return sendError(res, authResult.status, authResult.message, authResult.code,
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
  }
  const olpIdentity = authResult.authContext;
  auditCtx.key_id = olpIdentity.keyId;
  auditCtx.owner_tier = olpIdentity.owner_tier;
  _authedKeyId = olpIdentity.keyId;

  // Require JSON content-type
  const ct = req.headers['content-type'] ?? '';
  if (!ct.includes('application/json')) {
    auditCtx.error_code = 'invalid_content_type';
    return sendError(res, 415, 'Content-Type must be application/json', 'invalid_request_error',
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
  }

  let body;
  try {
    body = await readJSON(req);
  } catch (e) {
    auditCtx.error_code = 'invalid_request_body';
    return sendError(res, e.statusCode ?? 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
  }

  // Translate OpenAI → IR (ADR 0003)
  let ir;
  try {
    ir = openAIToIR(body);
  } catch (e) {
    if (e instanceof BadRequestError) {
      auditCtx.error_code = 'invalid_ir';
      return sendError(res, 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
        olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
    }
    throw e;
  }
  auditCtx.model = ir.model;

  // ── Fallback engine: build chain (ADR 0004) ─────────────────────────────
  // buildDefaultChain returns null if no enabled provider serves this model.
  // Per ADR 0004 § D9: at v0.1, chain is single-hop (no fallback) unless the
  // user has populated ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains.
  //
  // `let` (not `const`) because the chain may be filtered below per the
  // authenticated key's providers_enabled allowlist (ADR 0007 § 10 #11).
  let chain = buildDefaultChain(
    ir.model,
    loadedProviders,
    _fallbackConfig.chains,
    _fallbackConfig.soft_triggers,
  );

  if (!chain) {
    // ALIGNMENT.md: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 → 503 per spec
    auditCtx.error_code = 'no_enabled_provider';
    return sendError(
      res, 503,
      `No enabled providers for model ${ir.model}. See README § Supported Providers.`,
      'no_enabled_provider',
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model: ir.model }),
    );
  }

  // ── providers_enabled scope enforcement (Phase 2 / D45, ADR 0007 § 10 #11) ─
  // Filter the chain to providers this key is authorized for. If the resulting
  // chain is empty, return 403 — the model exists in the registry but no hop
  // is reachable from this identity's allowlist.
  const _originalChainProviders = chain.map(hop => hop.provider);
  chain = chain.filter(hop => isProviderEnabled(olpIdentity, hop.provider));
  if (chain.length === 0) {
    auditCtx.error_code = 'key_no_provider_access';
    // D53 (D45 P2 deferral fix): tried_providers semantic per ADR 0007 § 8 is
    // "providers the server actually dispatched a spawn against". On 403 the
    // filtered chain is empty — no provider was dispatched, so the audit
    // value is []. The configured-but-blocked chain providers go into the
    // human-readable error message + a separate _diagnostic field we don't
    // surface in audit (would distort downstream queries like "which
    // providers did key X actually call"). ADR 0007 § 8 amended in this
    // D-day's CHANGELOG entry to spell the semantic.
    auditCtx.tried_providers = [];
    const allowed = olpIdentity.providers_enabled === '*' ? '*' : (olpIdentity.providers_enabled ?? []).join(', ') || '(none)';
    return sendError(
      res, 403,
      `This OLP key does not have access to any provider serving model "${ir.model}". Key's providers_enabled: [${allowed}]. Chain providers: [${_originalChainProviders.join(', ')}].`,
      'key_no_provider_access',
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model: ir.model }),
    );
  }

  // Auth context is null at D45 — providers fall back to their own credential
  // discovery (env var, keychain, credentials file). The OLP-side identity
  // (olpIdentity above) is consumed for cache namespacing + providers_enabled
  // gating + audit attribution. Per-provider per-key credential mapping is a
  // Phase 3+ deferral (ADR 0007 § 12).
  const authContext = null;

  const requestId = generateRequestId();

  // ── Cache layer (ADR 0005, namespaced per OLP key per ADR 0007 § 7) ─────
  // keyId is the authenticated identity's namespace token. For anonymous
  // (when auth.allow_anonymous=true) this is the legacy '__anonymous__'
  // shared namespace; for filesystem keys it is the per-key id; for the
  // OLP_OWNER_TOKEN env override it is the synthetic '__env_owner__'.
  const keyId = olpIdentity.keyId;

  // D2 bypass (per-hop, per ADR 0005 § D2):
  // cache_control markers bypass OLP's response cache ONLY when the active hop
  // provider is Anthropic. For non-Anthropic hops the markers are noop'd
  // (openai-to-ir already strips them from the IR before provider translation,
  // so they never reach a non-Anthropic plugin — no separate strip needed here).
  //
  // Pre-compute whether the raw request carries any cache_control markers at all.
  // The per-hop decision is: markers present AND hop is Anthropic → bypass.
  const hasCacheControlMarkers =
    hasCacheControl(ir) || extractCacheControlMarkers(body?.messages ?? []).length > 0;

  // D36 #2 (ADR 0005 § D2): when cache_control markers are present AND at least one
  // hop in the chain is non-Anthropic, the markers are noop'd for those hops.
  // Per ADR 0005 § Context: "for non-Anthropic targets, the bypass markers are
  // noop'd (logged once per request at debug level so users can see they were
  // ignored)." Fires at most once per request, gated on (markers AND mixed/non-anthropic
  // chain). No log when no markers, or when every chain hop is Anthropic.
  if (hasCacheControlMarkers && chain.some(hop => hop.provider !== 'anthropic')) {
    // marker_count sums body-side and IR-side markers. At v0.1 the IR term is
    // structurally 0 (openAIToIR strips cache_control). When a future ADR 0003
    // amendment activates cache_control in the IR whitelist, both terms will be
    // non-zero for the same logical marker set → revisit to avoid 2× counting.
    const markerCount =
      extractCacheControlMarkers(body?.messages ?? []).length +
      extractCacheControlMarkers(ir.messages ?? []).length;
    logEvent('debug', 'cache_control_partial_noop', {
      chain: chain.map(hop => hop.provider),
      marker_count: markerCount,
    });
  }

  /**
   * Returns true if OLP's response cache should be bypassed for the given hop.
   * Per ADR 0005 § D2: bypass only when provider is Anthropic AND markers present.
   *
   * @param {string} hopProviderName — e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral'
   * @returns {boolean}
   */
  function shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProviderName) {
    return hasCacheControlMarkers && hopProviderName === 'anthropic';
  }

  // ── executeHopFn: per-hop spawn + cache wrapper ─────────────────────────
  // This is the function executeWithFallback calls for each chain hop.
  // Each hop gets its own (provider, model) cache key per ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation.
  //
  // First-chunk safety (ADR 0004 § Fallback safety):
  //   collectAllChunks fully buffers the provider response before returning.
  //   Therefore, if executeHopFn throws, zero bytes have been written to `res`.
  //   The fallback engine safely advances the chain on hard triggers.
  //   If executeHopFn returns successfully, the chunks are buffered and we write
  //   them to `res` only AFTER executeWithFallback returns — ensuring no writes
  //   occur during chain iteration.
  //
  // F8 (round-5 cold-audit): track whether the SERVING hop's response came from
  // cache. preCheckHit only covered the PRIMARY hop's key; when a fallback hop
  // serves from its own cache, the header must report 'hit', not 'miss'.
  // lastHopWasCached is set by executeHopFn before returning so the cacheStatus
  // computation below can consume it after executeWithFallback completes.
  let lastHopWasCached = false;

  async function executeHopFn(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq) {
    const hopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq);
    const hopProviderPlugin = loadedProviders.get(hopProvider);

    if (!hopProviderPlugin) {
      // Provider in the chain is not loaded (config references a disabled provider)
      throw Object.assign(
        new Error(`Provider ${hopProvider} is not enabled`),
        { statusCode: 503 },
      );
    }

    // Collect all chunks from this provider, throwing on error chunks.
    // Error semantics: ProviderError thrown here propagates to executeWithFallback
    // which decides whether to advance the chain.
    //
    // D16 (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): if the generator throws ProviderError SPAWN_FAILED
    // after yielding one or more chunks, those chunks are usable content the provider
    // committed — dropping them and falling back to the next hop is strict waste.
    // In that case: synthesize a stop chunk with finish_reason='length', return the
    // partial chunks, and do NOT re-throw (fallback engine sees a success, hops=0).
    // If chunks.length===0 on SPAWN_FAILED, re-throw as before (hard trigger fires).
    // Any other error code always re-throws unchanged.
    //
    // D16 cache note: truncated responses are NOT cached (ADR 0005 § cache write
    // conditions item 1 requires no truncation). A non-enumerable __truncated marker
    // is set on the returned array so executeHopFn can evict the cache entry below.
    async function collectAllChunks() {
      // D38 (issue #1): maxConcurrent runtime enforcement.
      // Authority: ADR 0002 Amendment 6 + ADR 0004 Amendment 4.
      //
      // Try to acquire a spawn slot for this provider BEFORE invoking spawn().
      // If at limit, synthesise ProviderError(CONCURRENCY_LIMIT) which the
      // fallback engine treats as a hard trigger — the chain advances to the
      // next hop. validateProvider guarantees hints.maxConcurrent is present;
      // DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS is a defense-in-depth fallback.
      const maxConcurrent = hopProviderPlugin.hints?.maxConcurrent ?? DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS;
      if (!tryAcquireSpawn(hopProvider, maxConcurrent)) {
        const concurrencyErr = new ProviderError(
          `provider ${hopProvider} at maxConcurrent (${maxConcurrent}) — advancing to next hop`,
          'CONCURRENCY_LIMIT',
        );
        concurrencyErr.providerName = hopProvider;
        concurrencyErr.maxConcurrent = maxConcurrent;
        // activeSpawns reflects the live counter at the rejection moment,
        // queried directly. Since tryAcquireSpawn returned false the value
        // equals maxConcurrent — read it explicitly for diagnostic clarity
        // rather than echoing the limit (avoids future-reader confusion).
        concurrencyErr.activeSpawns = getActiveSpawnCount(hopProvider);
        throw concurrencyErr;
      }

      const chunks = [];
      // D75 (v0.4.2) F7 — per-hop model override.
      // The chain config (routing.chains[<requested-model>][<hop>].model) is the
      // model name to pass to THIS hop's provider plugin — NOT the model the
      // user originally requested. Pre-D75, executeHopFn used hopModel for the
      // cache key + audit ctx but passed the ORIGINAL irReq (with irReq.model
      // still set to the user's request) into hopProviderPlugin.spawn(). Result:
      // a 2-hop chain like [{anthropic, claude-sonnet-4-6}, {openai, gpt-5.5}]
      // would spawn codex with --model claude-sonnet-4-6 on hop 1 — openai rejects
      // the unknown model and the chain dies. This broke the core OLP value prop
      // (cross-provider fallback with provider-appropriate model substitution).
      //
      // Fix: build a per-hop IR variant with the hop's model substituted. Skip
      // the clone when hopModel === irReq.model (single-provider chains and
      // chain hops whose model matches the request). Authority: ADR 0004 §
      // Chain advancement step 1 (per-hop config supplies provider AND model).
      const hopIrReq = irReq.model === hopModel ? irReq : { ...irReq, model: hopModel };
      try {
        try {
          for await (const irChunk of hopProviderPlugin.spawn(hopIrReq, authContext)) {
            // D16: check error chunks BEFORE pushing — preserves the invariant that
            // chunks array contains only delta/stop chunks. Without this, the catch
            // block's `chunks.length > 0` would mistake a single error chunk for
            // "usable content streamed" (Case B) and synthesize a stop + return,
            // sending an empty body to the client when the correct behavior is to
            // re-throw and let the fallback engine advance the chain.
            if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
              throw new ProviderError(
                irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk',
                'SPAWN_FAILED',
              );
            }
            chunks.push(irChunk);
            if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
          }
        } catch (spawnErr) {
          if (spawnErr instanceof ProviderError && spawnErr.code === 'SPAWN_FAILED' && chunks.length > 0) {
            // Case B (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): provider emitted usable chunks then exited
            // non-zero. Synthesize a truncated stop and surface the partial response.
            chunks.push({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' });
            logEvent('warn', 'spawn_failed_after_usable_chunks', {
              chunks_count: chunks.length - 1, // exclude the synthesized stop
              provider: hopProvider,
              model: hopModel,
            });
            // Mark as truncated so the caller can evict this entry from cache.
            Object.defineProperty(chunks, '__truncated', { value: true, enumerable: false });
            return chunks;
          }
          // Case A (SPAWN_FAILED with no chunks) or any other error: re-throw.
          // Fallback engine fires hard trigger and advances chain as before.
          throw spawnErr;
        }
        return chunks;
      } finally {
        // D38: spawn lifecycle ended (drain completed, stop chunk received,
        // SPAWN_FAILED salvage returned, or any unexpected throw). Release
        // the slot so the next caller can acquire it. Single-threaded JS
        // guarantees no other caller has incremented this provider's count
        // between our tryAcquireSpawn() above and this releaseSpawn().
        releaseSpawn(hopProvider);
      }
    }

    // D23: cacheable opt-out check (ADR 0002 Amendment 3 + ADR 0005 Amendment 3).
    // If a provider explicitly sets hints.cacheable === false, skip the cache entirely
    // for every request to this provider. collectAllChunks is called directly; neither
    // cacheStore.get nor cacheStore.set is invoked. This is upstream of D13's
    // cache_control bypass — both are "skip the cache" paths, but for different reasons.
    if (hopProviderPlugin.hints?.cacheable === false) {
      logEvent('debug', 'cache_opted_out', {
        provider: hopProvider,
        model: hopModel,
      });
      return collectAllChunks();
    }

    // D13: per-hop bypass evaluation (ADR 0005 § D2).
    // Bypass only when this hop's provider is Anthropic AND markers are present.
    const bypassCacheForThisHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProvider);
    if (bypassCacheForThisHop) {
      logEvent('debug', 'cache_bypass', {
        model: hopModel,
        provider: hopProvider,
        reason: 'cache_control_markers',
      });
      return collectAllChunks();
    }

    // D4 singleflight + D1 per-key isolation per ADR 0005.
    // Each hop has its own (provider, model) key — cross-provider contamination
    // is structurally impossible (ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation).
    //
    // D16: after getOrCompute returns, check if collectAllChunks used the salvage
    // path (chunks.__truncated===true). If so, evict the just-written cache entry
    // to satisfy ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1 (no truncation).
    // D4 singleflight is preserved: getOrCompute still deduplicates concurrent
    // requests during the spawn; the eviction only affects persistent caching.
    //
    // F8 (round-5 cold-audit): peek before getOrCompute so we know whether the
    // value comes from cache or is freshly computed. peek() is stats-neutral per
    // its contract (no hit/miss counter side-effect), so it does not distort the
    // stats that getOrCompute will update on the canonical miss path.
    // This is option (b) of the F8 spec: check cache BEFORE calling getOrCompute.
    const hopWasCached = await cacheStore.peek(keyId, hopCacheKey);
    const result = await cacheStore.getOrCompute(keyId, hopCacheKey, collectAllChunks);
    // Record for use in cacheStatus computation after executeWithFallback returns.
    lastHopWasCached = hopWasCached;
    if (result.__truncated) {
      // Evict the truncated entry so future requests get a fresh spawn.
      // ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1: truncated responses must
      // not persist in cache.
      //
      // D39 (issue #3 Part 1): use explicit cacheStore.delete() rather than
      // the prior set(..., ttlMs=0) tombstone. delete() removes the entry
      // from the namespace Map immediately (and removes the empty namespace
      // entry from the outer Map if applicable), instead of waiting for the
      // next get/peek to lazily purge a TTL=0 entry.
      // Capture the boolean — false indicates a race (concurrent eviction or
      // TTL purge already removed the entry). Surfaces in the log so the
      // dashboard can distinguish "we evicted" from "we tried but it was gone."
      const evicted = cacheStore.delete(keyId, hopCacheKey);
      // D39 (issue #3 Part 2): observability — surface salvage frequency to
      // dashboards. Provider + model identify which hop's truncated entry was
      // evicted. cache_eviction_hit distinguishes actual-evict vs already-gone.
      logEvent('info', 'cache_evicted_truncated', {
        provider: hopProvider,
        model: hopModel,
        cache_eviction_hit: evicted,
      });
    }
    return result;
  }

  // ── Execute with fallback (ADR 0004) ────────────────────────────────────
  // Pre-check for cache status reporting uses first hop's key (primary provider).
  // D13: preCheckHit is gated on whether the first hop would bypass — if it would
  // bypass (anthropic + markers), the cache is not consulted (preCheckHit=false).
  // If the first hop is non-Anthropic (or no markers), the cache peek proceeds normally.
  const bypassCacheForFirstHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(chain[0].provider);
  // D23: ADR 0002 Amendment 3 — cacheable: false providers skip cache entirely.
  // Compute once here so both the peek guard and the streaming-branch entry condition
  // can consult the same flag without re-reading the plugin map.
  const firstHopProvider = loadedProviders.get(chain[0].provider);
  const cacheableForFirstHop = firstHopProvider?.hints?.cacheable !== false;
  const firstHopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(chain[0].provider, chain[0].model, ir);
  const preCheckHit = (bypassCacheForFirstHop || !cacheableForFirstHop) ? false : await cacheStore.peek(keyId, firstHopCacheKey);

  // ── P1.2: Real SSE streaming path (single-hop cache-miss) ──────────────
  // ADR 0003 entry adapter pattern: for await irChunk → res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE).
  // Condition: streaming + single-hop + no bypass + no pre-check cache hit.
  //   - stream===true  → caller wants SSE
  //   - chain.length===1  → no fallback needed; first-chunk rule allows streaming
  //   - !bypassCacheForFirstHop + !preCheckHit → genuine cache miss (not hit/bypass)
  //   - cacheableForFirstHop → provider allows caching (D23: cacheable: false falls
  //     through to the buffered executeHopFn path which already respects the opt-out)
  //
  // If any chunk has been written (firstChunkEmitted), fallback is impossible
  // per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety first-chunk rule. On error after first chunk:
  // truncate the response (end with no [DONE]). On error before any chunk:
  // throw so the outer handler can surface a clean error (no bytes written).
  //
  // On success: chunks are written to res, and the cache layer (via
  // getOrComputeStreaming) writes accumulated chunks on source completion.
  //
  // D58 — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §§7, 11, 12: streaming singleflight via
  // cacheStore.getOrComputeStreaming(...). The peek+spawn TOCTOU window
  // (server.mjs:1104 peek vs. spawn) is collapsed by the synchronous Map
  // check+insert in the cache layer (D57). The D38 tryAcquireSpawn gate now
  // lives INSIDE the sourceFactory closure: only the first caller acquires a
  // slot; attached joiners share it. On factory-throw CONCURRENCY_LIMIT, the
  // cache layer rejects → we fall through to the buffered path (same outcome
  // as today). preCheckHit gates entry exactly as before — the cache_hit
  // outcome from getOrComputeStreaming is the TTL-race safety net; in
  // practice it should not fire because preCheckHit excludes alive entries.
  // See docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md Amendment 8 + issue #16.
  if (ir.stream && chain.length === 1 && !bypassCacheForFirstHop && !preCheckHit && cacheableForFirstHop) {
    const streamProvider = chain[0].provider;
    const streamModel = chain[0].model;
    const streamCacheKey = computeCacheKey(streamProvider, streamModel, ir);
    const streamPlugin = loadedProviders.get(streamProvider);

    if (!streamPlugin) {
      // Provider disappeared between chain build and here (edge case).
      auditCtx.provider = streamProvider;
      auditCtx.error_code = 'no_enabled_provider';
      return sendError(res, 503, `Provider ${streamProvider} is not enabled`, 'no_enabled_provider',
        olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model: ir.model }));
    }

    // D58 — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §7: sourceFactory wraps acquire + spawn.
    // Acquire fires ONLY for the first caller; attached clients share the
    // slot. Release fires EXACTLY ONCE when the source iterator's
    // try/finally executes (normal exhaustion, error, or iterator.return()
    // propagated from sourceAbortController via the cache layer).
    const candidateMax = streamPlugin.hints?.maxConcurrent ?? DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS;
    const sourceFactory = () => {
      if (!tryAcquireSpawn(streamProvider, candidateMax)) {
        const err = new ProviderError(
          `provider ${streamProvider} at maxConcurrent (${candidateMax})`,
          'CONCURRENCY_LIMIT',
        );
        err.providerName = streamProvider;
        err.maxConcurrent = candidateMax;
        err.activeSpawns = getActiveSpawnCount(streamProvider);
        throw err;
      }
      // Wrap streamPlugin.spawn in an async generator that guarantees
      // releaseSpawn fires exactly once in finally — regardless of normal
      // exhaustion, mid-stream throw, or iterator.return() from cache-layer
      // sourceAbortController propagation (§9).
      //
      // D75 (v0.4.2) F7 — per-hop model override (streaming path).
      // Mirror the buffered-path fix: pass the hop's configured model (streamModel)
      // into streamPlugin.spawn(), not the user's original ir.model. Skip the
      // clone when ir.model === streamModel. See executeHopFn() above for the
      // full F7 rationale + authority citation.
      const streamIr = ir.model === streamModel ? ir : { ...ir, model: streamModel };
      return (async function* sourceWithRelease() {
        try {
          for await (const irChunk of streamPlugin.spawn(streamIr, authContext)) {
            yield irChunk;
          }
        } finally {
          releaseSpawn(streamProvider);
        }
      })();
    };

    // D58 — invoke the cache-layer coordinator. CONCURRENCY_LIMIT from the
    // factory falls through to the buffered path (the buffered fallback
    // engine re-attempts acquire). Any other pre-stream error surfaces 502.
    let stream;
    let role;
    try {
      const result = await cacheStore.getOrComputeStreaming(
        keyId,
        streamCacheKey,
        sourceFactory,
        { clientId: requestId },
      );
      stream = result.stream;
      role = result.role;
    } catch (e) {
      if (e instanceof ProviderError && e.code === 'CONCURRENCY_LIMIT') {
        // Fall through to the buffered path — the existing executeHopFn /
        // executeWithFallback machinery re-attempts acquire and surfaces a
        // chain-exhausted 502 for a single-hop chain at maxConcurrent, which
        // matches today's pre-D58 behaviour for this saturation scenario.
        logEvent('debug', 'streaming_concurrency_limit_fallthrough', {
          provider: streamProvider,
          model: streamModel,
        });
        // (proceed past this block)
      } else {
        // Any other pre-first-chunk error — surface a clean 502.
        auditCtx.provider = streamProvider;
        auditCtx.tried_providers = [streamProvider];
        auditCtx.cache_status = 'miss';
        auditCtx.error_code = e?.code ?? 'provider_error';
        logEvent('error', 'streaming_error_before_first_chunk', {
          provider: streamProvider,
          model: streamModel,
          error: e.message,
        });
        _pushError({
          error: e,
          provider: streamProvider,
          path: '/v1/chat/completions',
          statusCode: 502,
        });
        return sendError(res, 502, e.message ?? 'Provider error', 'provider_error',
          olpHeaders({ providerUsed: streamProvider, modelUsed: streamModel, startMs, cacheStatus: 'miss', fallbackHops: 0 }));
      }
    }

    if (stream) {
      // D58 — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §11: cache_status reflects role-of-this-
      // client at attach-time. `source` did real work (miss); `attached`
      // shared a live spawn (streaming_attached); `cache_hit` served from
      // cache (hit). See lib/audit.mjs cache_status JSDoc for the enum.
      auditCtx.provider = streamProvider;
      auditCtx.tried_providers = [streamProvider];
      if (role === 'cache_hit') {
        auditCtx.cache_status = 'hit';
      } else if (role === 'attached') {
        auditCtx.cache_status = 'streaming_attached';
      } else {
        auditCtx.cache_status = 'miss';
      }

      // D58 — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §9: wire HTTP req close → iterator
      // return() so a client disconnect propagates into the cache layer.
      // Without this the cache layer never learns of disconnect and the
      // source spawn may orphan (last-client-gone abort would not fire).
      // try/catch guards against concurrent return() throws (Node async
      // generators can throw if return() is invoked while iteration is
      // pending). The cache layer's iterator return() is idempotent.
      // D58 — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §9: detect client disconnect via res
      // 'close' event (not req 'close'). For SSE responses Node emits
      // res.on('close') when the underlying socket goes away while the
      // response is still streaming. req.on('close') in Node 18+ fires only
      // after the response is fully sent, which is too late for our abort
      // propagation needs. Without this wire-up the cache layer would never
      // learn of disconnect → potential orphan spawns.
      // Forward declaration of the heartbeat handle so the close-listener
      // installed here can stop the timer when the client disconnects.
      // (The handle itself is assigned a few lines below — startHeartbeat
      // is invoked after eager-headers run, but the close listener must
      // already be wired so a disconnect during the source-factory await
      // path still propagates iterator return + heartbeat stop.)
      let heartbeatRef = null;
      const onClose = () => {
        try { stream.return?.(); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
        try { heartbeatRef?.stop?.(); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
      };
      res.on('close', onClose);

      // D58 — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §11: X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight header.
      //   role === 'source'   → 'source' (first caller; may upgrade to
      //                          'solo' post-stream if no joiners ever
      //                          attached — see deferral note below).
      //   role === 'attached' → 'attached'
      //   role === 'cache_hit'→ omitted; the existing X-OLP-Cache: hit
      //                          already signals that path.
      // 'solo' (no joiners ever attached) is observable only post-stream —
      // emitted via streaming_inflight_source_done log event with
      // attached_count=0; the wire header reports `source` initially and
      // does NOT flip mid-stream. Future ADR may expose it on a trailer.
      const cacheStatusForHeader = (role === 'cache_hit') ? 'hit' : 'miss';
      const streamHeaders = olpHeaders({
        providerUsed: streamProvider,
        modelUsed: streamModel,
        startMs,
        cacheStatus: cacheStatusForHeader,
        fallbackHops: 0,
      });
      if (role === 'source' || role === 'attached') {
        streamHeaders['X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight'] = role;
      }

      // D14: writeHead is deferred until just before the first res.write so
      // that pre-first-chunk errors can still produce a JSON 502 (matching
      // the buffered path). Calling writeHead unconditionally was the D14
      // defect.
      //
      // D61 (ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63): when streaming heartbeat is
      // enabled (streaming.heartbeat_interval_ms > 0), headers must be
      // flushed BEFORE the first chunk so the `: keepalive\n\n` SSE comment
      // frame has somewhere to land. Without eager-headers the heartbeat
      // would write into a buffer that the client never sees (OCP db11105
      // lesson — the bug was that `ensureHeaders()` returned `false` after
      // headers were sent for the "connection-dead" case, which made all
      // post-headers chunks no-ops). We send eager-headers only when
      // heartbeat is enabled — preserving D14's lazy-headers default so
      // pre-first-chunk errors still surface as JSON 502s when heartbeat
      // is off (the legacy / current path).
      const heartbeatIntervalMs = _streamingConfig.heartbeat_interval_ms ?? 0;
      const eagerHeaders = heartbeatIntervalMs > 0;
      if (eagerHeaders && !res.headersSent) {
        res.writeHead(200, {
          ...SSE_DEFAULT_HEADERS,
          ...streamHeaders,
        });
      }

      // Heartbeat instance is per-attached-client (each call to
      // startHeartbeat creates its own timer state; source and attached
      // clients write to different `res` objects and therefore each get
      // their own timer). Heartbeat fires only AFTER headers are sent
      // (eager-headers gate above); when intervalMs is 0 the returned
      // object is a no-op stub so `reset()` / `stop()` calls are cheap.
      const heartbeat = startHeartbeat(res, heartbeatIntervalMs, requestId);
      // Expose to the onClose listener so a client disconnect cancels the
      // timer immediately rather than waiting for the finally block.
      heartbeatRef = heartbeat;

      const streamedChunks = [];
      let firstChunkEmitted = false;
      try {
        for await (const irChunk of stream) {
          if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
            // Error chunk from provider
            if (firstChunkEmitted) {
              // Past first-chunk boundary — emit truncation marker + [DONE].
              logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
                provider: streamProvider,
                model: streamModel,
                error: irChunk.error,
              });
              auditCtx.error_code = 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk';
              _pushError({
                error: { message: irChunk.error ?? 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', code: 'SPAWN_FAILED' },
                provider: streamProvider,
                path: '/v1/chat/completions',
                statusCode: null, // headers already sent; status_code intentionally null — record by error code only (D61-D63 reviewer P2-2: explicit intent over numeric-but-meaningless 200)
              });
              res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' }, requestId, ir.model));
              res.write(SSE_DONE);
              res.end();
              return;
            }
            throw new ProviderError(irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk', 'SPAWN_FAILED');
          }

          if (!res.headersSent) {
            res.writeHead(200, {
              ...SSE_DEFAULT_HEADERS,
              ...streamHeaders,
            });
          }
          streamedChunks.push(irChunk);
          res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
          // D61: reset the heartbeat timer on every real chunk so the next
          // keepalive frame fires only after another silent window of
          // intervalMs ms (rather than rapidly chasing the data stream).
          heartbeat.reset();
          firstChunkEmitted = true;

          if (irChunk.type === 'stop') {
            res.write(SSE_DONE);
            res.end();
            // D58 — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §4: cache write is performed by the
            // cache layer's tee task on source completion. Server no longer
            // calls cacheStore.set from this branch; the cache layer applies
            // the same write conditions (truncated-not-cached, cacheable:false
            // opt-out, replay-cap, maxEntryBytes cap) internally.
            return;
          }
        }

        // Generator exhausted without a stop chunk — emit truncation marker
        // + [DONE]. D58 — the cache layer (per ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §4) writes
        // accumulatedChunks on normal source exhaustion regardless of stop-
        // chunk semantics; IR-level stop-chunk inspection is the server's
        // responsibility. Mirror D16 truncation-eviction: the source role
        // explicitly deletes the just-written entry so subsequent identical
        // requests respawn (matches D16 buffered-path truncation behaviour
        // and ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1). Only the source
        // role performs the delete; attached clients did not trigger the
        // write. Idempotent across concurrent source-truncation observers.
        if (streamedChunks.length > 0) {
          const truncMarker = { type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' };
          res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(truncMarker, requestId, ir.model));
        }
        if (role === 'source' && cacheableForFirstHop) {
          cacheStore.delete(keyId, streamCacheKey);
        }

        // D35 #9: zero-chunk empty-stream — writeHead deferred (no chunks
        // yielded), emit headers + [DONE] so the response is still valid SSE.
        if (!res.headersSent) {
          res.writeHead(200, {
            ...SSE_DEFAULT_HEADERS,
            ...streamHeaders,
          });
        }

        res.write(SSE_DONE);
        res.end();
        if (streamedChunks.length > 0 && cacheableForFirstHop) {
          logEvent('warn', 'streaming_no_stop_chunk', {
            chunks_count: streamedChunks.length,
            provider: streamProvider,
            model: streamModel,
          });
        }
      } catch (e) {
        if (firstChunkEmitted) {
          logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
            provider: streamProvider,
            model: streamModel,
            error: e.message,
          });
          _pushError({
            error: e,
            provider: streamProvider,
            path: '/v1/chat/completions',
            statusCode: null, // headers already sent; status_code intentionally null — record by error code only (D61-D63 reviewer P2-2)
          });
          res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' }, requestId, ir.model));
          res.write(SSE_DONE);
          res.end();
        } else {
          // No bytes written — surface a clean JSON error.
          logEvent('error', 'streaming_error_before_first_chunk', {
            provider: streamProvider,
            model: streamModel,
            error: e.message,
          });
          auditCtx.error_code = e?.code ?? 'provider_error';
          _pushError({
            error: e,
            provider: streamProvider,
            path: '/v1/chat/completions',
            statusCode: 502,
          });
          if (!res.headersSent) {
            sendError(res, 502, e.message ?? 'Provider error', 'provider_error',
              olpHeaders({ providerUsed: streamProvider, modelUsed: streamModel, startMs, cacheStatus: 'miss', fallbackHops: 0 }));
          } else {
            res.end();
          }
        }
      } finally {
        // D58 — releaseSpawn lives inside sourceFactory's finally (only the
        // source caller acquired). The req-close listener is detached here
        // so it doesn't leak past the response lifetime.
        res.removeListener('close', onClose);
        // D61: cancel the heartbeat timer on every exit path (normal stop,
        // error, generator-exhausted, client-disconnect). The no-op stub
        // returned when intervalMs<=0 makes this cheap when disabled.
        heartbeat.stop();
      }
      return;
    }
    // CONCURRENCY_LIMIT fallthrough — flow continues into the buffered path
    // below.
  }

  let fallbackResult;
  try {
    fallbackResult = await executeWithFallback(chain, ir, executeHopFn, {
      logEvent,
    });
  } catch (e) {
    // executeWithFallback throws only on programming errors (empty chain).
    logEvent('error', 'fallback_engine_error', { error: e.message });
    _pushError({
      error: e,
      provider: null,
      path: '/v1/chat/completions',
      statusCode: 500,
    });
    return sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error',
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model: ir.model }));
  }

  const {
    chunks,
    providerUsed,
    modelUsed,
    fallbackHops,
    originalError,
    triedProviders,
    fallbackDetail,  // D40 (issue #7): per-hop failure tuples for X-OLP-Fallback-Detail
  } = fallbackResult;

  // ── Chain exhausted or non-trigger error ─────────────────────────────────
  if (chunks === null) {
    logEvent('error', 'spawn_error', {
      model: ir.model,
      providerUsed,
      fallbackHops,
      triedProviders,
      error: originalError?.message,
    });
    // D62: surface the chain-exhausted / provider-error onto the recentErrors
    // ring so /status (D63) shows it to owner identities. The ring filter
    // requires either a ProviderError code or statusCode >= 500; spawn errors
    // typically map to 502 below — fall back to 500 if no statusCode is
    // present so a programming-error throw still records.
    {
      const httpStatus = originalError?.statusCode ?? originalError?.status ?? 502;
      _pushError({
        error: originalError ?? new Error('unknown chain-exhausted error'),
        provider: providerUsed ?? (chain[0]?.provider ?? null),
        path: '/v1/chat/completions',
        statusCode: httpStatus,
      });
    }

    // Emit exhausted header if more than one provider was tried
    const exhaustedHeader = triedProviders.length > 1
      ? { 'X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted': triedProviders.join(',') }
      : {};

    // Determine status: preserve client errors (400/401/403/404/422) as-is.
    // Otherwise map ProviderError → 502, unknown → 500.
    let errStatus = 502;
    if (originalError) {
      const httpStatus = originalError.statusCode ?? originalError.status ?? null;
      if (httpStatus !== null) {
        errStatus = httpStatus;
      } else if (!(originalError instanceof ProviderError)) {
        errStatus = 500;
      }
    }

    // Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: all responses (including errors) carry
    // the standard 5-header set. On the exhausted/error path the engine returns
    // values per ADR 0004 step 4 ("preserve A's identity — return the FIRST hop's
    // provider/model and original error to the user"):
    //   - providerUsed: chain[0].provider on chain-exhausted (the primary that
    //                   first failed); set to 'none' only if engine somehow returned null
    //   - modelUsed:    chain[0].model on chain-exhausted, or the original request
    //                   model if engine state is unknown
    //   - cacheStatus:  'miss' — all hops were attempted (bypass is per-hop, not relevant
    //                   when the whole chain exhausted)
    //   - fallbackHops: number of hops actually attempted before exhaustion
    // X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted is preserved as an additional flag on top of these.
    const errorOlpHeaders = olpHeaders({
      providerUsed: providerUsed ?? 'none',
      modelUsed: modelUsed ?? ir.model,
      startMs,
      cacheStatus: 'miss',
      fallbackHops: fallbackHops ?? 0,
    });

    // Audit ctx capture for chain-exhausted / provider-error path (audit fires
    // on res.on('finish'); fields populated here so the row reflects what we
    // know at exhaustion time — provider is the chain[0] primary per ADR 0004
    // step 4, tried_providers is the failed-hop trail from fallbackDetail).
    auditCtx.provider = providerUsed ?? 'none';
    auditCtx.fallback_hops = fallbackHops ?? 0;
    auditCtx.tried_providers = Array.isArray(fallbackDetail)
      ? fallbackDetail.map(t => t?.provider).filter(Boolean)
      : [];
    auditCtx.cache_status = 'miss';
    auditCtx.error_code = originalError?.code ?? 'provider_error';

    // Send error with standard OLP headers + optional exhausted header +
    // D40 X-OLP-Fallback-Detail (when any hop attempted to spawn failed).
    // D40 (issue #7) — ungated v0.1 per maintainer decision; owner-vs-non-owner
    // gating planned for Phase 2 with lib/keys.mjs.
    const payload = JSON.stringify({
      error: {
        message: originalError?.message ?? 'Provider error',
        type: 'provider_error',
      },
    });
    const detailHeader = withFallbackDetailHeader({}, fallbackDetail, olpIdentity);
    res.writeHead(errStatus, {
      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
      'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
      ...errorOlpHeaders,
      ...exhaustedHeader,
      ...detailHeader,
    });
    res.end(payload);
    return;
  }

  // ── Success: emit response ─────────────────────────────────────────────
  // Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: X-OLP-Fallback-Hops reflects the
  // chain index of the serving hop; 0 = primary served, 1 = first fallback, etc.
  // D13: bypass status is per the SERVING hop's provider (providerUsed), not a
  // global flag. If the serving provider was Anthropic and markers were present,
  // the cache was bypassed; otherwise it was a hit (preCheckHit) or miss.
  const bypassCacheForServingHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(providerUsed);
  // F8 (round-5 cold-audit): cacheStatus accounts for fallback-hop cache hits.
  // preCheckHit covers the primary-hop case (fallbackHops===0); lastHopWasCached
  // covers any hop (including fallback hops that served from their own cache).
  // The two flags combine: if either signals a cache hit AND no bypass, report 'hit'.
  const cacheStatus = bypassCacheForServingHop ? 'bypass'
    : (lastHopWasCached || (preCheckHit && fallbackHops === 0)) ? 'hit'
    : 'miss';
  // D40 (issue #7): when at least one prior hop failed before this success,
  // surface X-OLP-Fallback-Detail with the failure trail. Header is omitted
  // when fallbackDetail is empty (single-hop success).
  const headers = withFallbackDetailHeader(
    olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus, fallbackHops }),
    fallbackDetail,
    olpIdentity,
  );

  // Audit ctx capture for success path (audit fires on res.on('finish');
  // status_code + latency_ms populated then).
  auditCtx.provider = providerUsed;
  auditCtx.fallback_hops = fallbackHops;
  auditCtx.tried_providers = (Array.isArray(fallbackDetail) ? fallbackDetail.map(t => t?.provider).filter(Boolean) : []).concat([providerUsed]);
  auditCtx.cache_status = cacheStatus;

  if (ir.stream) {
    // Streaming response path: burst replay from buffered chunks.
    // Reaches here only when: bypassCacheForFirstHop=true OR preCheckHit=true OR chain.length>1.
    // (Single-hop cache-miss streaming is handled by the real-streaming path above.)
    // D61: SSE headers are emitted from the shared SSE_DEFAULT_HEADERS
    // constant so all streaming paths agree on `X-Accel-Buffering: no`.
    // Heartbeat is intentionally not wired in the buffered replay path: the
    // burst write completes synchronously into the socket buffer, so silent
    // windows are bounded by the chunk count, not by provider think-time.
    res.writeHead(200, {
      ...SSE_DEFAULT_HEADERS,
      ...headers,
    });

    for (const irChunk of chunks) {
      res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
      if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
    }
    res.write(SSE_DONE);
    res.end();
  } else {
    // Non-streaming response path
    const responseObj = irResponseToOpenAINonStream(chunks, requestId, ir.model);
    sendJSON(res, 200, responseObj, headers);
  }
}

// ── Phase 3 / D50 — Management endpoints (owner_only_block per ADR 0008 §8) ──

// Read dashboard.html once at startup; cached in memory thereafter. If the
// file is absent (e.g. test that imports server.mjs from a non-repo cwd), we
// still serve a minimal in-memory fallback. The file lives at the repo root.
let _dashboardHtmlCache = null;
function _loadDashboardHtml() {
  if (_dashboardHtmlCache !== null) return _dashboardHtmlCache;
  try {
    const path = join(__dirname, 'dashboard.html');
    _dashboardHtmlCache = readFileSync(path, 'utf-8');
  } catch {
    _dashboardHtmlCache = '<!DOCTYPE html><title>OLP Dashboard</title><p>dashboard.html not on disk; server has fallen back to this in-memory stub. Check the OLP installation.</p>';
  }
  return _dashboardHtmlCache;
}

/**
 * Gated owner-only_block handler factory per ADR 0008 §8 + §7.5. Builds the
 * audit ctx, runs auth, blocks non-owner with 401, wires res.on('finish') for
 * audit + touchLastUsed, then calls inner(req, res, olpIdentity, auditCtx).
 *
 * inner should be async (or sync); errors propagate to the router's catch.
 */
async function _runOwnerOnlyManagementEndpoint(req, res, method, path, inner) {
  const startMs = Date.now();
  const auditCtx = {
    ts: new Date().toISOString(),
    key_id: ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID,
    owner_tier: 'anonymous',
    method,
    path,
    provider: null,
    model: null,
    status_code: 0,
    latency_ms: 0,
    cache_status: null,
    fallback_hops: 0,
    tried_providers: [],
    error_code: null,
    ir_request_hash: null,
    chain_id: null,
  };
  let _authedKeyId = null;
  res.on('finish', () => {
    auditCtx.status_code = res.statusCode;
    auditCtx.latency_ms = Date.now() - startMs;
    try { appendAuditEvent(auditCtx); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
    if (_authedKeyId && _authedKeyId !== ANONYMOUS_KEY_ID && _authedKeyId !== ENV_OWNER_KEY_ID) {
      touchLastUsed(_authedKeyId).catch(() => {});
    }
  });

  // Step 1: authenticate.
  const authResult = authenticate(req);
  if (!authResult.ok) {
    auditCtx.error_code = authResult.code;
    return sendError(res, authResult.status, authResult.message, authResult.code,
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
  }
  const olpIdentity = authResult.authContext;
  auditCtx.key_id = olpIdentity.keyId;
  auditCtx.owner_tier = olpIdentity.owner_tier;
  _authedKeyId = olpIdentity.keyId;

  // Step 2: owner-only_block. ADR 0008 §8 says management endpoints REJECT
  // non-owner identities outright (vs /health's trim model). Anonymous +
  // guest both produce 401 here.
  if (olpIdentity.owner_tier !== 'owner') {
    auditCtx.error_code = 'owner_required';
    return sendError(res, 401,
      'OLP owner-tier identity required for this management endpoint.',
      'owner_required',
      olpErrorHeaders({ startMs }));
  }

  // Step 3: delegate.
  return await inner(req, res, olpIdentity, auditCtx);
}

/**
 * GET /dashboard
 * Serves dashboard.html to owner identities. Owner-only_block (per ADR 0008 §8).
 * Cached in memory at startup; D51 ships the real multi-panel UI; D50 ships a
 * placeholder.
 */
async function handleDashboard(req, res) {
  return _runOwnerOnlyManagementEndpoint(req, res, 'GET', '/dashboard',
    async (_req, res2, _identity, _auditCtx) => {
      const html = _loadDashboardHtml();
      res2.writeHead(200, {
        'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
        'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(html, 'utf-8'),
        'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
      });
      res2.end(html);
    });
}

/**
 * GET /v0/management/dashboard-data
 * Full JSON aggregate per ADR 0008 § 7.2. The dashboard 30s poll consumes
 * this. Owner-only_block.
 */
async function handleManagementDashboardData(req, res) {
  return _runOwnerOnlyManagementEndpoint(req, res, 'GET', '/v0/management/dashboard-data',
    async (_req, res2, _identity, _auditCtx) => {
      // Quota panel (legacy): collect quotaStatus from each loaded provider; null on
      // throw or null return → "unavailable" indicator.
      // DEPRECATED: kept for backwards compat with current dashboard.html (D82 will
      // switch consumers to quota_v2; legacy 'quota' key removed at v1.0.0 or earlier).
      const quota = [];
      for (const [name, provider] of loadedProviders) {
        try {
          const q = await provider.quotaStatus(null);
          quota.push({ provider: name, ...(q ?? {}), available: q?.available ?? null });
        } catch (err) {
          quota.push({ provider: name, error: err?.message ?? String(err), available: null });
        }
      }

      // quota_v2 (D81 / Phase 5): normalized per-provider quota shape for enriched
      // dashboard rendering. Built from aggregateProviderQuota() in lib/audit-query.mjs.
      // Each entry contains: provider, status, schema_version, last_fresh_at,
      // utilization, reset, representative_claim, fallback_percentage, overage, raw_available.
      // Providers with null quotaStatus() return { status: 'unavailable', reason: ... }.
      // Authority: ADR 0008 Amendment (D81) + ADR 0012 D81 + ADR 0013 Rule 5.
      let quota_v2 = [];
      try {
        quota_v2 = await auditAggregateProviderQuota({ providers: loadedProviders });
      } catch (err) {
        // Graceful degradation: quota_v2 is optional enrichment; don't fail entire payload.
        logEvent('warn', 'dashboard_data_quota_v2_failed', { error: err?.message ?? String(err) });
      }

      const WINDOW_24H = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
      const payload = {
        generated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
        window_24h: auditAggregateRequests({ windowMs: WINDOW_24H, logEvent }),
        cache_hit_24h: auditCacheHitRateWindow({ windowMs: WINDOW_24H, logEvent }),
        quota,
        quota_v2,
        spend_trend_30d: auditSpendTrendDaily({ days: 30, logEvent }),
        top_fallback_chains_24h: auditTopFallbackChains({ windowMs: WINDOW_24H, limit: 10, logEvent }),
        cache_stats: cacheStore.stats(),
      };
      sendJSON(res2, 200, payload);
    });
}

/**
 * GET /v0/management/quota
 * Per-provider quota snapshot only (subset of dashboard-data). Useful for
 * scripted monitoring. Owner-only_block.
 */
async function handleManagementQuota(req, res) {
  return _runOwnerOnlyManagementEndpoint(req, res, 'GET', '/v0/management/quota',
    async (_req, res2, _identity, _auditCtx) => {
      // Legacy quota array (backwards compat).
      const quota = [];
      for (const [name, provider] of loadedProviders) {
        try {
          const q = await provider.quotaStatus(null);
          quota.push({ provider: name, ...(q ?? {}), available: q?.available ?? null });
        } catch (err) {
          quota.push({ provider: name, error: err?.message ?? String(err), available: null });
        }
      }
      // quota_v2 (D81): normalized per-provider quota shape per ADR 0008 Amendment (D81).
      let quota_v2 = [];
      try {
        quota_v2 = await auditAggregateProviderQuota({ providers: loadedProviders });
      } catch (err) {
        logEvent('warn', 'management_quota_v2_failed', { error: err?.message ?? String(err) });
      }
      sendJSON(res2, 200, { generated_at: new Date().toISOString(), quota, quota_v2 });
    });
}

/**
 * GET /v0/management/status
 *
 * D63 (ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D61-D63). Combined snapshot of process lifecycle,
 * per-provider health, request counters, cache stats, and recentErrors[20].
 * Owner-only_block per ADR 0008 §8 (matches the rest of the management
 * namespace).
 *
 * Port of OCP server.mjs:1151-1188 adapted to OLP's namespace + identity model:
 *   - Path is /v0/management/status (not root /status — OLP's namespace
 *     discipline is stricter than OCP's).
 *   - No "plan" field (OCP's plan came from the Anthropic Pro/Max API which
 *     OLP does not call directly).
 *   - Adds provider-quota subset + cache stats + cumulative request counters.
 *   - recentErrors is filtered upstream (no 401/403 entries) and capped at 20.
 *
 * Response shape:
 *   {
 *     ok: true,
 *     version: "0.4.0-phase4",
 *     uptime_ms: <number>,
 *     uptime_human: "Xh Ym Zs",
 *     started_at: <ISO8601>,
 *     providers: {
 *       enabled: <number>,
 *       available: <number>,
 *       status: { [providerKey]: { ok, ...healthCheck, activeSpawns } }
 *     },
 *     stats: {
 *       total_requests: <number>,
 *       active_requests: <number>,
 *       cache: { hits, misses, size, inflightCount, ... },
 *     },
 *     recent_errors: [{ time, message, code, provider, path, status_code }, ...],
 *     generated_at: <ISO8601>,
 *   }
 */
async function handleManagementStatus(req, res) {
  return _runOwnerOnlyManagementEndpoint(req, res, 'GET', '/v0/management/status',
    async (_req, res2, _identity, _auditCtx) => {
      const now = Date.now();
      const uptimeMs = now - _serverStartMs;
      const hours = Math.floor(uptimeMs / 3600000);
      const minutes = Math.floor((uptimeMs % 3600000) / 60000);
      const seconds = Math.floor((uptimeMs % 60000) / 1000);

      // Provider status subset: ok + activeSpawns + a single optional error
      // string (mirrors the /health full payload shape but trimmed — /status
      // is for owner monitoring, not external probes).
      const providerStatus = {};
      for (const [name, provider] of loadedProviders) {
        const activeSpawns = getActiveSpawnCount(name);
        try {
          const hc = await provider.healthCheck();
          providerStatus[name] = { ...hc, activeSpawns };
        } catch (err) {
          providerStatus[name] = { ok: false, error: err?.message ?? String(err), activeSpawns };
        }
      }

      const payload = {
        ok: true,
        version: VERSION,
        uptime_ms: uptimeMs,
        uptime_human: `${hours}h ${minutes}m ${seconds}s`,
        started_at: new Date(_serverStartMs).toISOString(),
        providers: {
          enabled: loadedProviders.size,
          available: listAllProviderNames().length,
          status: providerStatus,
        },
        stats: {
          total_requests: _totalRequests,
          active_requests: _activeRequests,
          cache: cacheStore.stats(),
        },
        recent_errors: recentErrors.slice(),
        generated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
      };
      sendJSON(res2, 200, payload);
    });
}

/**
 * GET /cache/stats
 * Live in-memory CacheStore stats. Owner-only_block.
 * Per ADR 0008 § 7.4: returns the current cacheStore.stats() shape
 * ({ hits, misses, size, inflightCount }). Per-(provider, model) breakdown
 * is a Phase 4+ amendment trigger.
 */
async function handleCacheStats(req, res) {
  return _runOwnerOnlyManagementEndpoint(req, res, 'GET', '/cache/stats',
    async (_req, res2, _identity, _auditCtx) => {
      sendJSON(res2, 200, { generated_at: new Date().toISOString(), ...cacheStore.stats() });
    });
}

// ── Request router ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
 * @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
 */
async function router(req, res) {
  const { method, url } = req;

  // Strip query string for routing
  const path = url?.split('?')[0] ?? '/';

  try {
    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/health') {
      return await handleHealth(req, res);
    }

    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/v1/models') {
      return handleModels(req, res);
    }

    if (method === 'POST' && path === '/v1/chat/completions') {
      return await handleChatCompletions(req, res);
    }

    // Phase 3 / D50 — management endpoints (owner-only_block per ADR 0008 § 8)
    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/dashboard') {
      return await handleDashboard(req, res);
    }
    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/v0/management/dashboard-data') {
      return await handleManagementDashboardData(req, res);
    }
    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/v0/management/quota') {
      return await handleManagementQuota(req, res);
    }
    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/v0/management/status') {
      return await handleManagementStatus(req, res);
    }
    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/cache/stats') {
      return await handleCacheStats(req, res);
    }

    // 404 for any unrecognised route
    sendError(res, 404, `Route ${method} ${path} not found`, 'not_found');
  } catch (e) {
    logEvent('error', 'unhandled_request_error', { method, path, error: e?.message });
    _pushError({
      error: e,
      provider: null,
      path,
      statusCode: 500,
    });
    if (!res.headersSent) {
      sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error');
    }
  }
}

// ── Server factory + main guard ───────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Factory pattern: `createOlpServer()` returns an http.Server bound to the
// shared router but NOT yet listening. Tests import this factory and call
// .listen() on their own port. The main guard below only runs .listen()
// when this file is invoked directly via `node server.mjs` — preventing
// import-time side effects when tests pull in server.mjs.

export function createOlpServer() {
  return createServer(router);
}

export { router, loadedProviders, VERSION };
// Phase 7 PR-B: re-export sandbox manager test seam so tests can reset state.
export { __resetSandboxManagerForTests };

// Main guard: only listen when invoked as the entrypoint. ESM equivalent of
// `require.main === module` is comparing import.meta.url against argv[1].
const isMain = (() => {
  try {
    return import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`;
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
})();

if (isMain) {
  // Phase 7 PR-B (ADR 0014 § PR-B): bootstrap sandbox before listening.
  // bootstrapSandbox() is idempotent + error-safe — server always starts even
  // if sandbox initialization fails (degrades to unsandboxed, logs a warning).
  // The /health.sandbox.active field reflects the result.
  const sandboxBoot = await bootstrapSandbox();
  if (sandboxBoot.active) {
    process.stdout.write(
      `OLP sandbox active (config-at-boot): ${sandboxBoot.summary}\n`,
    );
  } else {
    process.stderr.write(
      `OLP sandbox NOT active: ${sandboxBoot.reason} — ` +
      `provider spawns will run UNSANDBOXED (test/dev only; not safe for cloud)\n`,
    );
  }

  const server = createOlpServer();
  server.listen(PORT, BIND, () => {
    const enabledCount = loadedProviders.size;
    // D74 P3-5: banner no longer hardcodes the phase. Derives from VERSION
    // (which advances at every Phase close) so banner stays accurate
    // without future-maintenance touch-ups at every Phase boundary.
    process.stdout.write(
      `OLP v${VERSION} listening on :${PORT} (${enabledCount} providers enabled)\n`,
    );
  });
}