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Author SHA1 Message Date
a30b20978c chore(release): v3.17.0 — Phase 6c stream-json default + opus 4.8 + opt-in TUI-mode (#105)
- Phase 6c: default claude spawn → stream-json + --system-prompt (~64% cost cut)
- opus 4.8 model
- opt-in CLAUDE_TUI_MODE interactive subscription-pool bridge (single-user)

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 09:33:27 +10:00
cd98b51b96 docs(plans): add anthropic-only sandbox strategy handoff (#102)
Forward-looking planning doc capturing prior-art analysis from OLP's
Phase 7 PR-B re-evaluation, scoped down to OCP's single-provider
(anthropic) deployment.

Documents:
- Multi-tenant gap for OCP (cross-key lateral read, OAuth exposure)
- Why OLP's outer-bwrap PR-B approach is the wrong path to copy
  (Anthropic design intent, ~/.claude.json upstream not-planned)
- Three viable alternatives:
  A. Ephemeral $HOME via env var (~50 LOC, recommended Phase 1)
  B. bwrap --tmpfs $HOME + ro-bind credentials (apt dep, Linux only)
  C. OverlayFS lowerdir+upperdir (needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
- Orthogonal cross-key isolation layer (per-spawn customConfig denyRead
  or per-OS-user spawning)
- Trust-tier framing (single-user / family-zone / shared-host)

Not an ADR — becomes one only when work actually starts. Not binding;
ALIGNMENT.md authority requirements still apply when sandbox code lands.

Cross-references OLP's parallel multi-provider work at
dtzp555-max/olp ADR 0014 Amendment 1 (pending) and archive branch
phase-7-pr-b-outer-bwrap-snapshot.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 09:21:40 +10:00
74260d7f6f feat(tui): opt-in CLAUDE_TUI_MODE — interactive subscription-pool bridge (PR-1..PR-4 squashed) (#104)
Reader + driver + home modes + server wiring + entrypoint hardening. 5 independent
reviews folded; e2e green; default stream-json path byte-identical when flag off.
See PR description + ADR 0007 for the full layer/authority/security detail.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 09:21:11 +10:00
885f62addf feat: Phase 6c — claude stream-json port + --system-prompt + opus 4.8 (#103)
* wip(rescue): OCP Phase 6c stream-json port + opus 4.8 (uncommitted /tmp work)

Rescue commit — preserves the subagent-produced Phase 6c port (claude -p →
stream-json + --system-prompt + NDJSON parser) and opus 4.8 model addition
done 2026-05-30 in a /tmp clone (volatile). NOT reviewed-for-merge; this is
preservation only on a WIP branch so a /tmp reboot does not lose the work.

Strategy context: OCP is being made the first-mover for TUI-mode (users are
on OCP). Phase 6c here is the DEFAULT-path foundation (stream-json = sdk-cli =
the "Max-user stable mode" fallback). TUI-mode (cc_entrypoint=cli subscription
bridge) lands on top as an opt-in. Re-review before merging to main.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(phase6c): fold review findings — scrub hostname, README prose, parser tests, version citation

P3-1 (binding): scrub private hostname "PI231" from server.mjs comment; replace
with role-based term "the test server". Repo is public — no machine-specific
hostnames may appear.

P3-2: update README.md "How It Works" diagram and prose from stale "claude -p"
to "claude --output-format stream-json", matching the Phase 6c spawn change already
in server.mjs and CHANGELOG.

P2-2: update all five authority citations in server.mjs from bare "claude CLI v2.1.104"
to "claude CLI § <flag> (ported from OLP, verified v2.1.104; behavior stable through
v2.1.158)" — honest about OLP provenance and version range, without inventing new facts.

P2-1: add "Stream-JSON parsers" suite to test-features.mjs (17 new tests, 84 → 101
total). Copies parseStreamJsonLines and parseStreamJsonEvent verbatim from server.mjs
with a MIRRORS header comment; logEvent stubbed to avoid live-server side-effects.
Covers: content_block_delta deltas, assistant-aggregate fallback, no-double-count guard,
aggregate-only short responses, partial-line buffering across two chunks, is_error result
variants, malformed/non-JSON lines, system/user/unknown event types.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 09:13:36 +10:00
1dd6fb9440 docs(governance): add ADR 0006 OpenAI shim scope + Class A/B taxonomy (#100)
Introduces an explicit two-class taxonomy of OCP endpoints to resolve
the structural ambiguity surfaced by PR #99 (external response_format
honoring on /v1/chat/completions):

- Class A: cli.js-mirror endpoints. Rules 1-5 of ALIGNMENT.md apply
  verbatim. Citation requirement unchanged (cli.js:NNNN). The 2026-04-11
  drift discipline is preserved without weakening.

- Class B: OCP-owned compatibility endpoints. Anchored to OpenAI's
  /v1/chat/completions specification (B.1) or to an authorizing ADR
  (B.2). Citation shifts to spec section + ADR number. Class B inherits
  the same anti-invention discipline; the anchor differs.

Grandfather provision in ADR 0006 retroactively authorizes the 12
existing B.2 administrative endpoints at v3.16.4 behaviour (one-time,
contract-frozen). New B.2 endpoints or any new method on a grandfathered
endpoint requires its own ADR per Rule 4 (Class B mapping).

Changes:
- new: docs/adr/0006-openai-shim-scope.md
- new: docs/openai-compat-pin.md (placeholder for first B.1 audit)
- mod: ALIGNMENT.md (Class B section, rule mapping table, updated
  Unalignable Policy and Annual Audit scope; Rules 1-5 byte-identical)
- mod: .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md (Endpoint Class radio, separate
  evidence sections for A vs B, reviewer checklist updated)
- mod: docs/adr/README.md (index entry for ADR 0006)

Independent reviewer (fresh-context opus per Iron Rule 10) verified:
all 12 load-bearing checks pass — Rules 1-5 byte-identical to
origin/main, 2026-04-11 drift narrative unchanged, explicit
non-relitigation safeguard present in ADR 0006, grandfather provision
narrowly scoped, Class B inventory matches server.mjs reality (14/14),
single governance layer per Iron Rule 11 (no server.mjs touch),
alignment.yml unmodified. Verdict: APPROVE_WITH_MINOR with 3 of 5
non-blocking suggestions folded in (operations-vs-endpoints precision,
PR template Hybrid wording, openai-compat-pin.md stub).

Triggering incident: PR #99 by external contributor (response_format
honoring on /v1/chat/completions). This governance PR ships separately
per Iron Rule 11 (IDR); the feature PR #99 will rebase on this and
declare Class B with ADR 0006 citation.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 21:01:10 +10:00
9e25160527 refactor: hoist port literal to lib/constants.mjs + CI gate (v3.16.4) (#98)
Closes the structural side of the port-drift cascade addressed by
v3.16.2/v3.16.3. Those releases reverted the literal line-by-line; this
one removes the invitation to drift.

Changes:
  * NEW lib/constants.mjs — exports DEFAULT_PORT=3456, LOCAL_HOST,
    OPENAI_API_BASE, LOCAL_PROXY_URL.
  * server.mjs / setup.mjs / scripts/upgrade.mjs / scripts/doctor.mjs
    (x2) / scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs all import DEFAULT_PORT from
    lib/constants.mjs instead of hardcoding "3456".
  * .github/workflows/alignment.yml:
    - path filter extended to setup.mjs, scripts/**, lib/**,
      ocp, ocp-connect.
    - NEW job port-spot hard-fails any PR that introduces a hardcoded
      "3478" or "3456" literal outside EXEMPT_REGEX (lib/constants.mjs,
      test-features.mjs, ocp/ocp-connect bash CLIs, docs, the workflow
      itself).
  * Doc-comment rewording so CI grep finds zero hits.

No behavior change for any user. CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT env var still wins
at runtime; only the unset-env fallback now flows through one constant.

ALIGNMENT.md note: server.mjs change is one import + one literal swap,
mechanical. No cli.js operation changed; the citation requirement does
not apply.

cli.js: not applicable — mechanical refactor, no behavior change.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
2026-05-13 06:42:15 +10:00
49c6d32e3b fix(scripts): default CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT to 3456 (completes v3.16.2 revert) (#97)
Three places in scripts/ still defaulted to 3478 after v3.16.2's
plugin / manifest / README / plist revert:

  scripts/upgrade.mjs:137
  scripts/doctor.mjs:84
  scripts/doctor.mjs:205

These were the residual cascade source for the port-drift bug originally
caused by the PR #71 dogfood accident on 2026-05-08 (see
~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/subagent_setup_mjs_prod_host_collision.md
and v3.16.2 CHANGELOG entry).

Every `ocp doctor` / `ocp upgrade` invocation without an explicit
`CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` in env probed port 3478 — got "OCP not responding"
against a healthy 3456 instance — and on the maintainer's host this
cascaded into wrong baseUrl writes for the OpenClaw `claude-local`
provider, taking out the OpenClaw Telegram agent ("大内总管") on
2026-05-13.

This change is the smallest possible: three string literals
`"3478"` → `"3456"`, aligning unset-env defaults with `server.mjs:126`.
Env-set users are unaffected (env precedence is unchanged).

cli.js: not applicable — this is a scripts/ change, not server.mjs.
ALIGNMENT.md hard-requirements (cli.js citation, blacklist CI,
independent reviewer) target server.mjs; this PR honors the SPOT
spirit by ending the literal-port drift across the codebase.

Bumps to v3.16.3. CHANGELOG entry added.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
2026-05-13 06:14:37 +10:00
7766fa0868 fix(plugin): revert default to 3456 + correct v3.16.1 narrative; v3.16.2 (#96)
v3.16.1's narrative ("OCP server moved to 3478 default in v3.14+") was
incorrect. OCP source default has been 3456 since 593d0dc (initial
release) and never changed. The single observation of 3478 is the
maintainer's Mac mini, whose plist was rewritten with --port 3478
during a 2026-05-08 PR #71 dogfood smoke-test accident (see
~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/subagent_setup_mjs_prod_host_collision.md).
The drift was never reconciled and v3.16.1 mistakenly canonised the
post-accident port as the new default.

This release reverts:
- ocp-plugin/index.js fallback → http://127.0.0.1:3456
- openclaw.plugin.json configSchema.proxyUrl.default → http://127.0.0.1:3456
- README §Environment Variables CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT default → 3456
- top-level package.json → 3.16.2

PR #95's env-reading path (OCP_PROXY_URL → CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT → fallback)
is preserved — that part was good design and stays. Only the hardcoded
fallback default changes.

Hosts whose OCP plist injects a non-default port must also inject the
same CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT into the OpenClaw plist for the plugin to follow
(documented in the new index.js comment block).

Mac mini's plist was reverted from 3478 to 3456 as part of this deploy
(per-host correction; no source code reflects host-specific state).

CHANGELOG includes an explicit erratum entry under v3.16.1 marking it
superseded.

Process note: this PR was triggered by maintainer asking "why was the
port changed?" — the answer revealed I (PM) wrote v3.16.1's CHANGELOG
without running `git log -G "3478" -- setup.mjs`. Iron Rule 2
(evidence-first) was violated. Future commits asserting historical
facts must include the grep that confirmed them.

No cli.js citation needed: OCP-internal plugin + docs, no server.mjs
change.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 12:17:13 +10:00
70faeff067 fix(plugin): default OCP plugin port to 3478 + env-overridable (v3.16.1) (#95)
* fix(plugin): default OCP plugin port to 3478 + env-overridable; v3.16.1

ocp-plugin/index.js hard-coded http://127.0.0.1:3456 since the plugin
was created. OCP server moved to 3478 default in v3.14+ as part of
the same wave that renamed the launchd label (dev.ocp.proxy). The
plugin never got the memo. Result: `/ocp usage` from OpenClaw bots
(e.g. the home Telegram bot 大内总管) hit the dead port 3456 and
returned "OCP error: fetch failed".

Fix:
- Default PROXY → http://127.0.0.1:3478
- Read OCP_PROXY_URL env (full URL) first
- Else read CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT env (port only, localhost assumed)
- Else fall back to the 3478 default

openclaw.plugin.json bumped (3.12.0 → 3.16.1) and configSchema
default updated. Plugin version now matches OCP version.

Top-level package.json bumped 3.16.0 → 3.16.1. CHANGELOG entry added.

Diagnostic trail: caught 2026-05-12 when home Telegram bot reported
"OCP error: fetch failed" against `/ocp usage`. Mac mini OCP service
was healthy on port 3478; lsof -iTCP:3456 had no listener; plugin
index.js had hardcoded 3456.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal plugin code with no
corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(readme): document OCP_PROXY_URL + CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT plugin reuse (per release_kit 5.5)

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 11:51:54 +10:00
7a69d72886 feat(snapshot): gcSnapshots + ocp update --rollback --gc + auto-GC; v3.16.0 (#94)
Adds snapshot garbage collection with retention policy: keep last 5,
keep snapshots within 30 days, always keep the most recent. Configurable
via keepCount / keepDays opts.

Wire-up:
- ocp update --rollback --gc (manual trigger; --dry-run supported)
- runFullUpgrade auto-GC after successful upgrade (best-effort,
  swallows errors)

4 unit tests: keepCount enforcement, keepDays override, never-delete-
most-recent safety, dry-run mode.

Bumps to v3.16.0 (bundles PR #93 --check oauth + this GC feature).

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal snapshot lifecycle with
no corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 07:33:13 +10:00
a8601a6d30 feat(doctor): --check oauth fast path (#93)
* feat(doctor): --check oauth fast path

Implements the --check oauth fast path documented in cmd_doctor_help
but previously unimplemented. Skips version detection, from-version
check, git operations, and models endpoint — runs only the curl
against /health + auth.ok extraction.

Use cases:
- After `claude auth login`, fast verify OCP can spawn cli.js
- After a known service blip, quick health gate before larger ops
- AI agent's setup-repair loop: ./ocp doctor --check oauth in a
  retry-after-fix step

3 unit tests cover: PASS path, OAuth FAIL → fix_oauth, service down →
fix_service.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal doctor logic with no
corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(doctor): nit fixes for --check oauth (N3 body=null test + N4 skipped sentinel comment)

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 07:25:40 +10:00
cd6ec2a212 fix(doctor): dynamic latest_version from origin/main; release v3.15.1 (#92)
v3.15.0 doctor used a hard-coded `latest = "v3.14.0"` fallback, causing
any v3.15.0+ install to report kind=upgrade against a stale value.
`ocp update` would then attempt `git checkout v3.14.0` — a downgrade.

Doctor now fetches `git -C ~/ocp show origin/main:package.json` to
determine the actual latest. On failure (offline, fresh clone, no
remote), falls back to currentVersion so kind=noop instead of
recommending a downgrade.

Regression test added: doctor with unreachable ocpDir falls back to
currentVersion as latest (not the old hardcoded v3.14.0).

Caught during v3.15.0 post-deploy verification on home-mac: ./ocp
doctor reported `kind=upgrade` immediately after v3.15.0 install,
which would have been a critical user-facing bug.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal doctor logic with
no corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 07:01:49 +10:00
ab03c13332 feat(upgrade): ocp doctor + cross-version ocp update + rollback + AI prompts (#91)
* feat(doctor): add ocp doctor with --json + next_action contract

Implements scripts/doctor.mjs with semver-aware path selection
(noop/update/upgrade/fresh_install/fix_oauth/fix_service) and the JSON
contract documented in the design spec.

Service health + OAuth checks integrated; mockable via opts.mockHealth
for unit tests. 8 unit tests cover the kind dispatch tree and the
next_action shape for each kind.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal tooling with no
corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ocp): wire cmd_doctor into bash CLI; dispatch to scripts/doctor.mjs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(doctor): handle unparseable version + empty health body

Three issues raised by code-quality reviewer on b65201b:

1. semverCompare returned 0 for unparseable input, causing fromSupported=true
   and kind=noop for an install with unreadable package.json. Now treats
   unparseable currentVersion as fresh_install candidate.
2. mockHealth: { status: 200, body: null } routed to fix_oauth (because
   health.body?.auth?.ok was undefined → falsy). 200 with empty body is
   server-broken, not OAuth-broken; now routes to fix_service.
3. Removed unused KIND_ENUM declaration (dead code).

Two regression tests added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(upgrade): add scripts/upgrade.mjs + scripts/lib/snapshot.mjs

Implements the upgrade dispatcher (noop / dry-run / light delegation /
full path) and the snapshot writer/reader/list module. Full path snapshots
plist + db + admin-key + openclaw.json before mutating, runs the 6 phases
(pre-flight, snapshot, fetch+install, reconfigure, restart, post-flight),
and emits a heads-up before launchctl bootout per
notify_before_prod_service_restart.md policy.

mockExec/mockDoctor injection points let tests verify the phase ordering
without touching the real shell. fresh_install + rollback paths are
deferred to Bundle 3.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal upgrade tooling with no
corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(upgrade): error path completeness + observability

5 issues raised by code-quality reviewer on c12013a:

A. exec() wrapper now captures stderr from execSync failures and
   re-throws with `phase X failed: <stderr>` instead of the terse
   "Command failed: ..." default. Operators see the actual git/npm
   error.
B. runFullUpgrade body wrapped in try/catch; any error after phase 2
   (snapshot written) carries snapshotPath + phases + hint pointing
   at `ocp update --rollback`. Aligns with the post-flight failure
   pattern.
C. CLI entrypoint now prints snapshotPath + hint on error.

Plus minor:
- snapshot.mjs tryCopy logs a [snapshot] warn line instead of silently
  swallowing copy errors (e.g. permission-denied admin-key)
- heads-up window 1s → 3s, more operable per the policy intent
- opts.yes intent comment added (Bundle 3 will use)

One regression test added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(upgrade): fresh-install + rollback paths

Implements the two missing branches of runUpgrade dispatcher:

- runFreshInstall: gated by --yes, runs doctor.next_action.ai_executable
  steps in order, fails fast on first error, attaches steps[] to thrown
  errors. Accepts mockExec for unit tests.
- runRollback: locates latest or named snapshot in ~/.ocp/, reads
  from-commit.txt, restores plist + db + admin-key + service file (with
  per-file warn lines on copy failure), git-checkouts the from-commit,
  npm installs at that revision, restarts the service. --list shows all
  snapshots; --dry-run prints the plan without mutation.

Both paths use the same exec() error-wrap pattern as runFullUpgrade
(stderr capture, phases attached to thrown errors, restart heads-up).

CLI entrypoint extended to parse --rollback / --list / --target / and
optional positional snapshot path after --rollback.

6 unit tests cover: --yes gate, fresh_install ai_executable run,
--rollback --list, no-snapshots error, --rollback --dry-run, mock-exec
restore.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal upgrade tooling with
no corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(upgrade): nit fixes from Bundle 3 code-quality review

3 micro-fixes on 48e9408:
1. Remove unused mkdirSync import
2. snapshot-not-found error message hints "must be inside ~/.ocp/upgrade-snapshot-*"
3. runFreshInstall failure now includes e.stderr (or e.message fallback) in the
   thrown error and steps[].error so non-interactive callers see the actual reason

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ocp): cmd_update dispatches via doctor; --rollback added; light path preserved

cmd_update now calls scripts/doctor.mjs to determine which path to take:
  noop          → "already at latest" exit 0
  update        → existing light path (git pull + npm install + restart),
                  extracted into _cmd_update_light helper to keep the daily
                  case fast and shell-only
  upgrade       → exec node scripts/upgrade.mjs (full path with snapshot
                  + post-flight)
  fresh_install → exec node scripts/upgrade.mjs (gated by --yes)
  fix_oauth/fix_service → print error referring user to `ocp doctor`

cmd_update --rollback path: exec node scripts/upgrade.mjs --rollback "$@"
forwards remaining args (--list, --dry-run, optional snapshot path).

cmd_update_help expanded to document new flags.

cmd_update --check fast path is preserved exactly (no doctor call there).

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal CLI dispatch with no
corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ocp): forward all args to cmd_update so multi-flag invocations work

Bug found via runtime smoke test:
  ./ocp update --rollback --list → "no snapshots" (wrong; should list)

Root cause: dispatch was `cmd_update "\${1:-}"` (only first arg). When
user typed `--rollback --list`, cmd_update only received `--rollback`,
the shift left $@ empty, and exec node ... --rollback got no flags.
Other commands using "\${1:-}" don't need multi-arg, but cmd_update now
does (--rollback --list, --rollback --dry-run, --target X --yes, etc.).

Change: dispatch is now `cmd_update "\$@"`. cmd_update internals already
handle multi-arg correctly (\$1 == --check fast path; \$1 == --rollback
shift+forward; otherwise doctor-driven).

Verified:
  ./ocp update --check         → existing behaviour preserved
  ./ocp update --rollback --list → "Found 0 snapshots:" exit 0
  ./ocp update --rollback --dry-run → no-snapshot error exit 1

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(release): v3.15.0 — README AI prompt blocks + Upgrading rewrite + CHANGELOG

§Installation, §Upgrading, §Troubleshooting each start with a copy-paste
AI prompt block for Claude Code / Cursor / Copilot. The Upgrading section
explains the three paths (light / full / fresh-install) and rollback usage.

All Commands table gains an `ocp doctor` row.

package.json bumped to 3.15.0.

CHANGELOG.md gains the v3.15.0 entry covering doctor, the cross-version
update path, --rollback, fresh-install routing, and AI prompt blocks.
Notes the dependency on PR #90 (plist env merge bug fix, already merged).

No cli.js citation needed: docs + version bump only, no server.mjs change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(readme): show --yes in rollback usage examples

Per Iron Rule 10 reviewer nit on PR #91: live rollback requires --yes
even for interactive humans. Update §Upgrading examples to show the
canonical human form. (AI agents pass --yes by convention; humans were
hitting a confusing "requires --yes" error following the prior README.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(scripts): CLI entrypoint guard resilient to symlinked install paths

Bug found via integration test on MacBook Pro (macOS /tmp → /private/tmp):
`import.meta.url === \`file://\${process.argv[1]}\`` evaluates false when
the install path traverses a symlink, because import.meta.url is canonicalised
but process.argv[1] is not. Result: ./ocp doctor (and ./ocp update via
upgrade.mjs) exit silently with code 0 and no output, instead of running.

Fix: use fileURLToPath + realpathSync on both sides of the comparison.
Affects any install at a symlinked path (/tmp, NFS mounts, /var/ paths,
docker bind mounts, etc.). Normal ~/ocp installs were unaffected.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal CLI dispatch with no
corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 06:56:17 +10:00
55c576bbb1 fix(setup): preserve user-customised plist/systemd env vars on re-setup (#90)
* fix(setup): merge plist/systemd env vars instead of overwriting

setup.mjs previously wrote the launchd plist and the Linux systemd unit
with writeFileSync(path, NEW_TEMPLATE_STRING), which silently dropped any
user-customised env vars (CLAUDE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL, CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL,
etc.) on every re-setup or upgrade. This change introduces
scripts/lib/plist-merge.mjs which preserves keys present only in the
existing file and lets the template's known keys win. Linux variant uses
the same logic against Environment=KEY=VALUE lines.

Tests added in test-features.mjs cover preserve / override / first-install
for both formats.

No cli.js citation needed: this is OCP-internal installer behaviour with
no corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): plist-merge code-quality follow-up

Three issues raised by the code-quality reviewer on 0fd1838:

1. mergeSystemdEnv now early-returns when the template has no
   Environment= anchor, instead of silently dropping preserved lines
   (defensive guard for a future template change).
2. Both parsers (parsePlistEnv, parseSystemdEnv) now Buffer-normalise
   their input, removing the TypeError-vs-coerce asymmetry.
3. Two idempotency tests added (calling merge twice on the same
   input/output pair must be stable).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 03:41:53 +10:00
750b25ba77 chore(release): v3.14.0 — security hardening (sessions namespacing + file modes + /api/usage scope) (#89)
Bump version 3.13.0 → 3.14.0. No functional code change in this PR;
all three security fixes are already merged in main via PRs #86, #87, #88.

This PR covers only metadata + docs:
- package.json: version bump to 3.14.0
- CHANGELOG.md: v3.14.0 entry with Features / Behavior changes / Verification /
  Governance sections
- README.md: /api/usage self-scope note in Auth Modes §, API Endpoints table
  row update, file-mode bullet in Important Notes §

cli.js citation N/A: this release PR modifies no server.mjs / setup.mjs / keys.mjs.
The three underlying security PRs (#86, #87, #88) each carry their own
cli.js-citation-not-applicable disclaimer per PR #75 pattern, as they are
OCP-internal access-control, session-state, and file-permission changes with
no corresponding cli.js operation.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 06:49:00 +10:00
fd6e875bd7 fix(security): /api/usage default scope = self; admin all-keys requires ?all=true (#88)
Identified during privacy/security audit (.claude/research/ocp-security-audit.md
§3 "/api/usage 全量泄露所有 key 时序"). Previously, any caller authenticated as
admin received the full per-key usage byKey + recent + timeline block, which
means a brief admin-token compromise exposes every household member's request
volume, timing, and which-model — metadata, but sensitive metadata.

This is a deliberate breaking change for least-privilege.

Behavior matrix (post-change):

  Caller                                  | Default scope     | ?all=true
  ----------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------
  anonymous (PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY)         | own ("anonymous") | ignored (still own)
  authenticated non-admin key             | own (key.name)    | ignored (still own)
  admin (no flag)                         | own ("admin")     | n/a
  admin with ?all=true                    | n/a               | full byKey/recent
  localhost-no-token / "local"            | own ("local")     | full (isAdmin=true)

Response shape is unchanged except for an additional advisory `scope` object
(`{self, all}`); existing fields keep their structure so dashboards and scripts
continue to parse cleanly — they just see less data unless they opt in.

Audit-friendly addition: when admin opts into `?all=true`, the server now
emits `logEvent("info", "admin_usage_full_scope", { caller, ip })` so every
privilege-escalation moment is recorded.

Backward-compat warning for admin scripts:
existing cron jobs / scripts that call `/api/usage` to inventory all keys must
add `?all=true` after this change. Default-self is the new safe behavior.

Dashboard (dashboard.html): adds a "Show all keys" checkbox in the Usage by
Key section. Hidden by default; revealed only when refreshKeys() succeeds
(same admin gate as the keys-management section). Toggle state persists in
localStorage as `ocp_usage_show_all`.

cli.js citation
---------------
This is OCP-internal admin API behavior — there is no `cli.js` operation to
cite. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 (the rule that limits OCP to operations that exist
in `cli.js`) does not constrain access-control rules for the OCP server's
own admin endpoints.

Smoke test (isolated test server on :3489, prod :3478 untouched):
- node --check server.mjs       SYNTAX_OK
- npm test                      43/43 passed
- alignment.yml blacklist grep  BLACKLIST_CLEAR
- LAN scope matrix              alice/bob own only; alice ?all=true denied;
                                anon ?all=true denied; admin all=true full +
                                audit log emitted

Iron Rule 10
------------
Author cannot self-approve. A separate fresh-context reviewer must read the
diff and confirm the cli.js-not-applicable statement is correct before merge.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 23:56:16 +10:00
8c0b97f3ae fix(security): tighten on-disk credential file modes (700/600) (#87)
Credential-bearing OCP artifacts were created at default umask (0644/0755),
making them world-readable on multi-user hosts. This commit hardens them at
writer time and adds an idempotent startup reconciliation so existing prod
installs are fixed automatically on next service restart.

Changes:
- keys.mjs: mkdirSync(OCP_DIR, { mode: 0o700 }) + chmodSync after to handle
  pre-existing dirs; chmodSync(DB_PATH, 0o600) after first getDb() open.
- setup.mjs: chmodSync(plistPath, 0o600) after writeFileSync on macOS;
  chmodSync(unitPath, 0o600) after writeFileSync on Linux.
- server.mjs: _tightenFileModesIfPossible() reconciliation block — idempotently
  chmods ~/.ocp (700), ~/.ocp/admin-key (600), ~/.ocp/ocp.db (600) on startup;
  emits a single info-level log line when any file is tightened; ignores ENOENT
  and wraps EPERM in a warn log so startup is never crashed by chmod failure.

Backward compat: all files remain accessible to the same-user owner; 0o600
is still fully readable/writable by the process. Existing prod boxes with
old 0644 ~/.ocp directories get fixed-up on next launchd/systemd restart
without any manual intervention.

cli.js citation: this change is OCP-internal file-permission hardening only.
No cli.js function corresponds to chmod or credential-file management. This
is an OCP-local security improvement that is out of scope for the cli.js
citation requirement per ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2; the cli.js boundary applies
to proxy protocol and API surface changes, not host-filesystem hardening.
Identified during privacy/security audit — .claude/research/ocp-security-audit.md.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 23:56:10 +10:00
68acf15373 fix(security): namespace sessions Map by keyId — close cross-key conversation collision (#86)
**Bug**: the sessions Map used the raw client-supplied conversationId string as
its key. Two callers with different API keys (or one anonymous + one
authenticated) using the same session_id="default" collided in the Map,
sharing a cli.js subprocess and conversation history — a cross-tenant context leak.

**Fix**: introduce _sessionKey(conversationId, keyName) → "${keyName}|${conversationId}".
Replace every sessions Map site (has / set / get / delete) with the namespaced key.
keyName comes from req._authKeyName (set by auth middleware). Anonymous callers
produce "anon|<id>"; admin produces "admin|<id>"; per-key callers produce
"<keyName>|<id>" — matching the convention used by cacheHash() for per-key cache
isolation (D1, v3.13.0).

**cli.js citation — not applicable**: This PR changes OCP-internal session lifecycle
bookkeeping (the sessions Map that OCP maintains to thread --resume flags across
requests). There is no corresponding cli.js operation to cite. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2
(limiting OCP to operations cli.js performs) does not constrain in-process state
representation. Same pattern as #75.

**Scope of changes (server.mjs only)**:
- New helper: _sessionKey() — 3 lines after sessions Map declaration
- spawnClaudeProcess(): accepts keyName param; all 4 sessions Map calls → _sessionKey
- handleSessionFailure(): uses sessionKey (not raw conversationId) for sessions.delete
- callClaude(): accepts and forwards keyName to spawnClaudeProcess
- callClaudeStreaming(): forwards authInfo.keyName to spawnClaudeProcess
- Request handler: both callClaude() call sites pass req._authKeyName
- Cleanup interval + GET /health + GET /sessions: strip "keyName|" prefix before log/display

**Smoke test**:
- node --check server.mjs → SYNTAX OK
- npm test → 43/43 passed, 0 failed
- Hand-traced has/set/get/delete paths: cross-key collision absent ✓

Identified during privacy/security positioning brainstorm — `.claude/research/ocp-security-audit.md`

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 23:56:04 +10:00
a71c939bf8 docs(readme): remove zhihu blog backlink + badge (article was removed) (#85)
The Chinese blog post linked from these two places was taken down by
the 知乎 platform shortly after publication. Both pointers now resolve
to a "content removed" warning page, which is a worse signal to
visitors than no link at all. Removing both before they reach more
README readers.

Reverts the additions from #81 specifically:
- Top badges row: drop the "blog · engineering story" shield
- §Why OCP? closing blockquote: drop the line pointing at the article

The 知乎 article URL is no longer reachable, so retaining the references
would route incoming traffic to a dead page that suggests the project
is itself problematic. Better to leave that section silent until a
working canonical write-up exists somewhere.

Doc-only change. server.mjs not touched. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (cli.js
citation) does not apply.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 22:43:59 +10:00
d245c62df7 docs(images): replace dashboard.png with multi-client + multi-session traffic (#84)
Continues #82 / #83 — those captures had stats counters at 0 / 3
respectively, with 0 active sessions. The Sessions card therefore
visually undermined the rest of the dashboard.

Re-captured after deliberately seeding LAN-side traffic from both
Pi231 and MacBook clients (each holding a per-key API token issued
on the Mac mini server), mixing single-turn and multi-turn requests
with distinct session_id values to populate the in-memory sessions
Map.

New screenshot data points:

- Uptime: 21h 56m
- Requests: 24 / 0 active (up from 3 / 0)
- Errors: 0 / 0 timeouts
- Sessions: 8 active (was 0)
- Plan Usage: 5h 20%, weekly 28%
- byKey table: 11 keys with rich history, now including
  pi231-test + macbook-test rows from this round
- Recent Requests: visible row count grown

Multi-turn correctness was incidentally verified during seeding —
a Pi231 request with session_id=pi-multi-01 turn 2 correctly
recalled the number passed in turn 1 ("the number 7"), confirming
session state persists across cli.js subprocess turns as designed.

Capture method unchanged (Chrome headless, 1400x2400,
--virtual-time-budget=14000).

Doc-only change. server.mjs not touched. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (cli.js
citation) does not apply.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 14:05:28 +10:00
047750e642 docs(images): replace dashboard.png with stats-populated version (#83)
#82 captured the dashboard mid-idle — server had been up 21h with
zero traffic since restart, so the in-memory stats counters all
showed 0 (Requests 0 / Errors 0 / Sessions 0). That made the top
strip of the screenshot look like a dead service even though the
historical byKey + Plan Usage data below were healthy.

Re-captured after firing 3 small haiku requests through localhost
to populate stats.totalRequests. The new screenshot now shows:

- Status: ok / v3.13.0
- Uptime: 21h 39m (up from 21h 28m)
- Requests: 3 / 0 active (was 0 / 0)
- Plan Usage: 5h 17%, weekly 28% (was 13% / 27%)
- Recent Requests: 2 visible rows showing model + latency + status
  (was empty)

Same capture method as #82: Chrome headless --window-size=1400,2400
--virtual-time-budget=12000.

The 3 priming requests were short haiku prompts ("reply with the single
word OKn"), max_tokens=12 each. Plan-usage delta < 1%, byKey table
already had 11 active keys with rich history so the priming did not
distort the long-tail data.

This addresses feedback that the previous screenshot's empty stats
strip undermined the rest of the dashboard's data richness for first-
time README readers.

Doc-only change. server.mjs not touched. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (cli.js
citation) does not apply.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 13:29:36 +10:00
3bdeb50ed5 docs(images): refresh dashboard.png with current prod data (#82)
The previous dashboard.png was captured on day-1, before any real
traffic — the screenshot was effectively empty (no Plan Usage bars,
single API key, no Recent Requests). It made the Web Dashboard look
like a placeholder rather than a working observability surface.

Replaced with a fresh capture of the maintainer's Mac mini production
OCP (running v3.13.0, multi auth) showing:

- Status / uptime / active+queued counters
- Plan Usage bars (5h: 13%, weekly: 27%) — real subscription draw
- Usage by Key table — 11 active keys with request counts, success/error
  rates, average latency, last-seen timestamps
- API Keys section — all 32 registered keys with truncated key prefixes
  + creation date + active/revoked status (truncation matches existing
  dashboard rendering, no full keys are exposed)
- Recent Requests log — request stream with model, prompt size, latency

Capture method: Chrome headless (no Playwright extension required) at
1400x2400, --virtual-time-budget=12000 to let dashboard JS finish
fetching + rendering before the screenshot frame.

PNG dimensions: 1400 x 2400 (was 1400 x 1739). The added height comes
from the now-populated Usage by Key + API Keys + Recent Requests
sections — not from layout changes.

Doc-only change. server.mjs not touched. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (cli.js
citation) does not apply.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 13:18:13 +10:00
fbbf3b6c7c docs(readme): add engineering-story backlink to 知乎 article + badge (#81)
Adds two pointers from README to a Chinese-language engineering blog
post (https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/2036388634207770402) that walks
through OCP's cli.js-alignment philosophy, the 2026-04-11 drift
incident (the 9-day hallucinated /api/oauth/usage endpoint), the
three-tier guardrail design, and the recent fresh-state E2E pass
that produced PRs #74-#78.

Two minimal touches to README only:

1. Badges row: a "blog · engineering story" shield linking to the
   article. Slot fits between the existing Release badge and the
   Buy Me a Coffee badge so the row's visual rhythm is preserved.

2. New blockquote line at the end of §Why OCP? (between the
   single-maintainer / pre-1.0 disclosure and §Supported Tools).
   Brief, factual, no marketing voice.

Why this PR

The 知乎 piece is a self-contained engineering narrative about
maintaining a single-maintainer LLM-assisted proxy without endpoint
drift. README is the project's primary surface; pointing at the
narrative lets readers who land on the repo decide if the project's
discipline matters to them before they invest in install. Reverse
direction: GitHub readers who follow the link bring some traffic
back to the article, validating that engineering content has a
home.

Doc-only change. server.mjs untouched. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (cli.js
citation) does not apply. Same pattern as #68 / #69 / #71 / #78 / #79.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 12:32:52 +10:00
d760d7fcce docs(readme): add restrained star + issue CTA below tagline (#79)
* docs(install): remove false symlink claim, fix Anonymous mode startup command

Three doc inaccuracies surfaced during fresh-state install testing on Pi231 +
MacBook (Round 1+2):

1. README §Server Setup claimed setup.mjs "Symlink `ocp` to /usr/local/bin for
   CLI access" — false. setup.mjs writes start.sh + plist/systemd unit but
   creates no PATH symlink. Removed the line; added a short PATH tip showing
   the user's options (manual symlink to ~/.local/bin or /usr/local/bin, or
   shell alias) right after the install summary.

2. README §Anonymous Access told users to run `ocp start` to enable the
   feature — there is no `ocp start` subcommand. Available commands are
   restart / stop / status / logs / keys / usage / update / lan / health /
   clear / settings (verified via `~/ocp/ocp` enumeration). Replaced with
   the correct flow: export PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY, then `node setup.mjs
   --bind 0.0.0.0 --auth-mode multi`.

3. The same paragraph implied that exporting PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY in an
   interactive shell is enough to enable anonymous access — but the running
   proxy is auto-started by launchd/systemd from the service unit's own
   env, not from the user's shell. Spelled this out and noted that if OCP
   was installed before exporting the env var, the user must re-run
   setup.mjs (idempotent) so the service unit env is refreshed, then
   `ocp restart`.

The PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY mechanism described becomes 100% accurate when
PR B (`fix/setup-inject-service-env`, sibling PR) lands; current setup.mjs
on main does not yet inject this env into the service unit.

Doc-only — no `server.mjs` change, no version bump, no `cli.js` citation
required.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(readme): add restrained star + issue CTA below tagline

A single italic line under the existing personal-note italic, asking
readers to  the repo if they get value, and to file issues — framed
explicitly as "issues are even more useful than stars" so the CTA reads
as feedback-seeking rather than vanity-metric chasing.

Tone matches the rest of README: low-key, single-maintainer self-deprecating,
no marketing voice. No "save money / free / $0" verbiage. Coexists with the
existing buy-me-a-coffee personal-note line above it (different ask:
funding vs. social-proof).

This is doc-only. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (cli.js citation) does not apply.
Same pattern as #68 / #69 / #71 / #78.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 03:01:06 +10:00
5e2effd05b fix(ocp-connect): write ~/.zshrc on macOS (default shell since Catalina) (#77)
macOS default shell has been zsh since Catalina (2019). The previous
rc-file selection logic treated macOS the same as Linux, so on a fresh
Mac where ~/.zshrc did not already exist AND the script was invoked via
`bash -s --` (e.g. `curl | bash`), the $SHELL guard was `/bin/bash`
and neither condition for zshrc was true — resulting in only ~/.bashrc
being written. Since ~/.bashrc is not sourced by interactive zsh
sessions, the OPENAI_BASE_URL / OPENAI_API_KEY exports were invisible
to interactive shells.

Fix:
- Add an explicit `elif $is_mac` branch that unconditionally includes
  ~/.zshrc: create the file (empty) if it does not yet exist, since
  zsh tolerates an empty ~/.zshrc.
- On macOS, ~/.bashrc is only written if it already exists — consistent
  with the task spec ("don't create ~/.bashrc if it didn't exist").
- Linux path is preserved unchanged.
- Fix the "Reload your shell" hint at script end: previously it printed
  only the last loop variable `$rc_file` (stale reference outside the
  loop). Now it iterates `${rc_files[@]}` so both files are shown on
  macOS (reproducing the Round A bug: hint said only `source ~/.bashrc`
  even when zshrc should also be reloaded).

Smoke-tested with HOME=/tmp/fakehome redirect for three scenarios:
  1. Fresh MacBook (no .bashrc, no .zshrc)  → only .zshrc created+written
  2. macOS with existing .bashrc             → both .bashrc and .zshrc written
  3. Linux with bash, no .bashrc             → .bashrc written (unchanged)

Identified during Round A testing on MacBook 2026-05-08.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 00:50:07 +10:00
fb2d1d3feb fix(ocp-cli): replace eval-curl with bash array to preserve JSON body quoting (#74)
`eval curl "$_AUTH_HEADER" "$@"` re-tokenizes its argument list according
to bash word-splitting rules. When OCP_ADMIN_KEY is set, the JSON body
`'{"name": "laptop"}'` (which contains a space) gets split into
`'{name:'` and `'laptop}'` — two separate args — so curl receives a
malformed body and the server rejects the request.

Fix: replace the `_AUTH_HEADER` string + `eval` pattern with a bash array
`_AUTH_ARGS`. Array expansion via `"${_AUTH_ARGS[@]}"` preserves word
boundaries across substitution with no eval required. Both code paths
(OCP_ADMIN_KEY env var and ~/.ocp/admin-key file fallback) and the empty
case (no admin key) are preserved unchanged.

Verified via `bash -x` trace:
  Before: `curl … -d '{name:' 'laptop}'` (body split, malformed)
  After:  `curl … -d '{"name": "testkey-pr-c"}'` (body intact, single arg)

Identified during fresh-state Round 2 testing on MacBook.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 00:50:01 +10:00
12b09c236e fix(server): resolve claude binary from nvm/fnm/asdf and PATH fallback (#75)
Real-world macOS dev machines using nvm-managed Node hit a startup FATAL
because the hardcoded candidate list in resolveClaude() only covered
homebrew, /usr/local, /usr/bin, and ~/.local/bin. With Claude CLI
installed at $HOME/.nvm/versions/node/<v>/bin/claude, the launchd job
failed without manual CLAUDE_BIN injection.

Fix: extend the candidate list with user-local Node version manager
paths — nvm (with default-alias), fnm, asdf, and npm-prefix-relocated
$HOME/.npm-global/bin. The existing CLAUDE_BIN env override and `which`
fallback are preserved; resolution order is now explicit CLAUDE_BIN >
hardcoded list > nvm/fnm/asdf > which > FATAL (with the message
upgraded to mention CLAUDE_BIN as a hint).

This is OCP-internal binary discovery — there is no `cli.js` operation
to cite. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 (the rule that limits OCP to operations
that exist in `cli.js`) does not constrain runtime path discovery for
the OCP server itself.

Smoke tests:
- default (no CLAUDE_BIN): picks /opt/homebrew/bin/claude (unchanged)
- CLAUDE_BIN=/nonexistent/claude: fail-fast preserved
- HOME=/tmp/fakenvm with synthetic .nvm tree: candidate list contains
  the fake nvm path; alias-default unshift logic verified
- npm test: 43/43 unit tests pass
- node --check server.mjs: OK
- alignment.yml blacklist grep: no hits

Identified during fresh-state Round 2 testing on MacBook.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 00:49:55 +10:00
c0f2d3ab20 docs(install): remove false symlink claim, fix Anonymous mode startup command (#78)
Three doc inaccuracies surfaced during fresh-state install testing on Pi231 +
MacBook (Round 1+2):

1. README §Server Setup claimed setup.mjs "Symlink `ocp` to /usr/local/bin for
   CLI access" — false. setup.mjs writes start.sh + plist/systemd unit but
   creates no PATH symlink. Removed the line; added a short PATH tip showing
   the user's options (manual symlink to ~/.local/bin or /usr/local/bin, or
   shell alias) right after the install summary.

2. README §Anonymous Access told users to run `ocp start` to enable the
   feature — there is no `ocp start` subcommand. Available commands are
   restart / stop / status / logs / keys / usage / update / lan / health /
   clear / settings (verified via `~/ocp/ocp` enumeration). Replaced with
   the correct flow: export PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY, then `node setup.mjs
   --bind 0.0.0.0 --auth-mode multi`.

3. The same paragraph implied that exporting PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY in an
   interactive shell is enough to enable anonymous access — but the running
   proxy is auto-started by launchd/systemd from the service unit's own
   env, not from the user's shell. Spelled this out and noted that if OCP
   was installed before exporting the env var, the user must re-run
   setup.mjs (idempotent) so the service unit env is refreshed, then
   `ocp restart`.

The PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY mechanism described becomes 100% accurate when
PR B (`fix/setup-inject-service-env`, sibling PR) lands; current setup.mjs
on main does not yet inject this env into the service unit.

Doc-only — no `server.mjs` change, no version bump, no `cli.js` citation
required.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 00:49:49 +10:00
0d61da5153 fix(setup): inject CLAUDE_BIN, OCP_ADMIN_KEY, PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY into service env (#76)
Gap #1 partial (CLAUDE_BIN): setup.mjs now detects `which claude` at install
time (or reads $CLAUDE_BIN) and writes CLAUDE_BIN into the service unit
EnvironmentVariables dict. Works for nvm/homebrew paths not in server.mjs's
hardcoded list, and for older server.mjs deployments.

Gap #2 (OCP_ADMIN_KEY): reads $OCP_ADMIN_KEY from the user's shell env and
conditionally injects it into the plist/systemd unit. Empty/unset → key is
omitted entirely (server.mjs treats empty string as "no admin"). Key value is
never logged; only its length is reported.

Gap #6 partial (PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY): reads $PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY and
conditionally injects it. Unset → key is omitted (anonymous access disabled).

All three keys are read via process.env at install time; no new CLI flags.
Injection status is logged before the !DRY_RUN guard so dry-run shows what
would be written.

Identified during fresh-state Round 2 testing.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 00:49:43 +10:00
32 changed files with 5069 additions and 230 deletions
+33 -7
View File
@@ -4,22 +4,46 @@
<!-- One or two sentences describing the change and why it is in scope for OCP. -->
## Endpoint Class (REQUIRED)
Per `ALIGNMENT.md` and ADR 0006, every PR that touches a network-facing endpoint must declare its class. Pick the most specific applicable class (Hybrid covers PRs that touch both A and B):
- [ ] **Class A** — forwards a `cli.js` operation (e.g., `/v1/messages`, `/api/oauth/*`, or the Anthropic-side wire call inside `/usage`)
- [ ] **Class B** — extends an OCP-owned compatibility endpoint (per ADR 0006). Sub-bucket:
- [ ] B.1 — OpenAI-compatibility surface (`/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/models`)
- [ ] B.2 — OCP-administrative surface (`/health`, `/dashboard`, `/sessions`, `/logs`, `/status`, `/settings`, `/api/keys*`, `/api/usage`, `/cache*`)
- [ ] **Hybrid** — touches both classes (e.g., `/usage` if the PR modifies both the Anthropic wire call AND the local synthesis layer). Both evidence sections below must be filled.
- [ ] **Not endpoint-touching** — refactor / docs / tooling that does not modify any request handler. Skip both evidence sections; explain in Summary.
## Claude Code Alignment Evidence (REQUIRED)
Per `ALIGNMENT.md`, every PR that touches `server.mjs` or any network-facing surface must fill out this section. PRs with this section blank or unchecked will receive a `request changes` review and cannot be merged.
PRs with the relevant evidence section blank or unchecked will receive a `request changes` review and cannot be merged.
### If Class A
- [ ] **Corresponding `cli.js` reference.** I have identified the `cli.js` function and line range that performs the operation this PR forwards. Citation (format `cli.js:NNNN` or `cli.js vE4 <functionName>`):
<!-- e.g. cli.js:18423-18467 (function: sendUserMessage) -->
- [ ] **If `cli.js` does not perform this operation**, I have stated this explicitly below and justified the scope under `ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 2. (Note: in almost all cases this means the PR should be closed, not merged. Proxy layers do not invent endpoints.)
- [ ] **If `cli.js` does not perform this operation**, I have stated this explicitly below and justified the scope under `ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 2. (Note: in almost all cases this means the PR should be closed, not merged. Proxy layers do not invent endpoints. If the endpoint is in fact Class B, switch the class above and use the Class B section instead.)
<!-- Justification, if applicable. Empty is fine when cli.js does perform the operation. -->
- [ ] **Commit message citations.** Every "Claude Code uses X" or "cli.js uses X" assertion in every commit of this PR is immediately followed by a `cli.js:NNNN` or `cli.js vE4 <functionName>` citation. I have verified this by rereading each commit message.
### If Class B
- [ ] **Authorizing ADR.** Cite the ADR number that authorizes the endpoint this PR modifies (e.g., "ADR 0006 — OpenAI shim scope"). For B.1 endpoints (`/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/models`), this is ADR 0006. For grandfathered B.2 endpoints, this is "ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4)." For new B.2 endpoints, cite the endpoint's own authorizing ADR; if none exists, the PR cannot proceed — the authorizing ADR must be drafted and merged first.
<!-- e.g., ADR 0006 -->
- [ ] **Specification citation.** For B.1 endpoints, link to the relevant section of OpenAI's `/v1/chat/completions` specification (https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create), including the specific field or behaviour being implemented. For B.2 endpoints with their own ADR, cite the ADR section that specifies the behaviour. For grandfathered B.2 endpoints, the PR must be a behaviour-preserving refactor — link the existing handler code being modified.
<!-- B.1 example: OpenAI chat/completions, `response_format` parameter, https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create#chat-create-response_format -->
<!-- B.2 example: ADR 00NN § "Behaviour" -->
- [ ] **No invention beyond the specification.** I confirm this PR does not introduce any field or behaviour not present in OpenAI's spec for the endpoint (B.1) or beyond the scope of the authorizing ADR (B.2). For grandfathered B.2 endpoints, I confirm the change is behaviour-preserving (no contract drift). If something the user actually wants is not in the spec, the right answer is to close this PR and propose an upstream spec change or a new ADR.
## Type of change
- [ ] Bug fix (alignment with existing `cli.js` behavior)
- [ ] Feature (new `cli.js` behavior now surfaced through OCP)
- [ ] Bug fix (alignment with existing `cli.js` behavior, or with the cited spec / ADR for Class B)
- [ ] Feature (new `cli.js` behavior now surfaced through OCP, or new field already in OpenAI's spec for Class B)
- [ ] Refactor (no wire-level behavior change)
- [ ] Deletion (unalignable feature removal per `ALIGNMENT.md` Unalignable Policy)
- [ ] Documentation / governance
@@ -28,14 +52,16 @@ Per `ALIGNMENT.md`, every PR that touches `server.mjs` or any network-facing sur
Reviewers: this section is for you, not the author. Do not approve until every box is checked.
- [ ] I opened `cli.js` at the cited line range and confirmed the operation matches.
- [ ] If Class A, I opened `cli.js` at the cited line range and confirmed the operation matches. If Class B, I opened the OpenAI spec at the cited section (B.1) or the authorizing ADR (B.2) and confirmed the behaviour described in this PR matches the cited reference.
- [ ] I ran (or confirmed CI ran) `.github/workflows/alignment.yml` and it passed.
- [ ] I am not the commit author of any commit in this PR (Iron Rule 10).
- [ ] If the PR asserts scope without a `cli.js` citation, I confirmed the justification is sound per `ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 2.
- [ ] If the PR asserts scope without a `cli.js` citation (Class A) or without an ADR (Class B), I confirmed the justification is sound per `ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 2 and ADR 0006.
- [ ] If the PR is Class B and adds a new endpoint or new method, I confirmed the authorizing ADR lands in the same merge or before this PR.
## Related
- `ALIGNMENT.md` Rule(s) invoked: <!-- e.g. Rule 3 -->
- `ALIGNMENT.md` Rule(s) invoked: <!-- e.g. Rule 3, or Rule 3 (Class B mapping) -->
- Authorizing ADR (Class B only): <!-- e.g. ADR 0006 -->
- Related issue / prior PR: <!-- #NNN -->
- Historical lesson reference (if relevant): <!-- e.g. 2026-04-11 drift, b87992f -->
+79
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@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ on:
pull_request:
paths:
- 'server.mjs'
- 'setup.mjs'
- 'scripts/**'
- 'lib/**'
- 'ocp'
- 'ocp-connect'
- '.github/workflows/alignment.yml'
jobs:
@@ -66,6 +71,80 @@ jobs:
echo "Blacklist scan clean."
port-spot:
name: port literal SPOT (hard fail)
# Background: from 2026-05-08 (PR #71 dogfood accident) through 2026-05-13
# a hardcoded "3478" in scripts/upgrade.mjs + scripts/doctor.mjs cascaded
# into wrong baseUrl writes for the OpenClaw "claude-local" provider,
# taking out the "大内总管" Telegram agent.
#
# Rule: the only places allowed to write a literal port number in source
# are (a) lib/constants.mjs (the SPOT), (b) bash scripts ocp / ocp-connect
# (which can't import .mjs and must keep the literal in sync — flagged
# with a `// keep in sync with lib/constants.mjs` style comment), and
# (c) test-features.mjs (intentionally pins historical ports for plist /
# systemd parser tests). Everything else MUST import from lib/constants.mjs.
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Scan for hardcoded port literals outside SPOT
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Files/paths exempt from the SPOT requirement.
EXEMPT_REGEX='^(lib/constants\.mjs|test-features\.mjs|ocp|ocp-connect|CHANGELOG\.md|README\.md|docs/|\.github/workflows/alignment\.yml)'
# Hardcoded port literals to forbid in non-exempt source.
FORBIDDEN_PORTS=("3478" "3456")
FAIL=0
for port in "${FORBIDDEN_PORTS[@]}"; do
HITS="$(git ls-files | grep -E '\.(mjs|js|ts|json)$' \
| xargs grep -n -E "[^0-9]${port}[^0-9]" 2>/dev/null \
| grep -v -E "${EXEMPT_REGEX}" \
|| true)"
if [ -n "$HITS" ]; then
echo "::error::Hardcoded port literal '${port}' found outside lib/constants.mjs:"
echo "$HITS"
FAIL=1
fi
done
if [ "$FAIL" -ne 0 ]; then
cat <<'EOF'
============================================================
PORT LITERAL SPOT VIOLATION
============================================================
A hardcoded TCP port literal was found in a source file
that should import from lib/constants.mjs instead.
Background: this rule exists because between 2026-05-08 and
2026-05-13 a stray hardcoded "3478" in scripts/upgrade.mjs
and scripts/doctor.mjs cascaded into downstream OpenClaw
config writes, taking out the OpenClaw Telegram agent.
See v3.16.3 CHANGELOG and lib/constants.mjs header comment.
Required action:
1. Import DEFAULT_PORT (or related constant) from
lib/constants.mjs instead of hardcoding the literal.
2. If the file genuinely cannot import .mjs (e.g. bash
script), add it to EXEMPT_REGEX in this workflow and
add a `keep in sync with lib/constants.mjs` comment
at the reference.
3. For test files that intentionally pin historical ports
(test-features.mjs), the regex already exempts them.
============================================================
EOF
exit 1
fi
echo "Port SPOT scan clean."
commit-citation:
name: commit message citation (soft check)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+66 -4
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@@ -8,10 +8,14 @@
OCP (Open Claude Proxy) is a **proxy layer** for the Claude Code CLI. It forwards, observes, and multiplexes the traffic that `cli.js` already emits. It is **not** an extension layer. If `cli.js` does not perform a given operation, or performs it differently, OCP does not invent one.
This Core Principle applies in full to **Class A** endpoints (the `cli.js`-mirror surface). A second class of endpoint — **Class B**, the OCP-owned compatibility surface — has its own scope discipline anchored to its own specification authority. See "Scope Clarification: OCP-Owned Compatibility Endpoints (Class B)" below and ADR 0006.
---
## Rules
The following Rules apply to **Class A operations** (the `cli.js`-mirror surface — the inbound `/v1/messages` forwarding route, the outbound `/v1/messages` wire call used by `handleUsage()` for rate-limit-header extraction, the OAuth bearer machinery, and any future operations OCP forwards from `cli.js` to Anthropic). For the Class B mapping of each rule, see the Class B section below.
1. **Rule 1 (Grep First).** Before adding, renaming, or changing any endpoint, header, parameter, or response shape, the author must `grep` the reference `cli.js` and record the exact line numbers in the commit message and PR body. An absent grep hit is itself a finding and must be declared.
2. **Rule 2 (No Invention).** OCP must not introduce endpoints, headers, request fields, or response fields that are not present in `cli.js`. Speculative "Claude Code probably uses X" statements are prohibited. If the behavior is not observable in `cli.js`, the feature is out of scope.
@@ -68,20 +72,78 @@ On 2026-04-11, commit `b87992f` ("fix: use dedicated /api/oauth/usage endpoint f
## Unalignable Policy
A feature is **unalignable** if, after a good-faith search, it cannot be mapped to a specific `cli.js` line range or function.
A feature is **unalignable** if, after a good-faith search, it cannot be mapped to a specific `cli.js` line range or function (Class A) or to a specific OpenAI specification section AND an authorizing ADR (Class B).
- Unalignable features are **deleted**, not disabled, not feature-flagged, not deprecated.
- Deletion is the default outcome of an alignment audit finding. The burden of proof is on the feature, not on the auditor.
- A deletion PR does not require user-facing deprecation notice, because the feature was never legitimately in scope.
- If a user workflow depended on an unalignable feature, the correct remediation is to upstream the behavior into `cli.js` or to move it out of OCP into a separate tool. OCP does not retain it.
- If a user workflow depended on an unalignable feature, the correct remediation is to upstream the behavior into `cli.js` (Class A) or into OpenAI's spec (Class B) or to move it out of OCP into a separate tool. OCP does not retain it.
---
## Scope Clarification: OCP-Owned Compatibility Endpoints (Class B)
OCP has two classes of endpoint. Rules 15 above were drafted in the aftermath of the 2026-04-11 forwarding drift and are written in the language of a one-to-one proxy; they apply verbatim to **Class A** endpoints. **Class B** endpoints — the OCP-owned compatibility surface where `cli.js` is not the wire authority — have their own scope discipline, anchored to their own specification authority. The full rationale lives in **ADR 0006 (OpenAI Shim Scope)**.
**Class A**`cli.js`-mirror endpoints. The endpoint exists because `cli.js` performs the equivalent operation and OCP forwards, observes, or multiplexes that operation. Rules 15 above apply verbatim. Citation format: `cli.js:NNNN` or `cli.js vE4 <functionName>`.
**Class B** — OCP-owned compatibility endpoints. The endpoint exists because OCP itself surfaces it, with no `cli.js` analogue. Two sub-buckets: **B.1** (OpenAI-compatibility surface — protocol authority is OpenAI's `/v1/chat/completions` specification) and **B.2** (OCP-administrative surface — authority is the ADR that authorized the endpoint's existence).
### Grandfather provision for existing B.2 inventory
ADR 0006 retroactively authorizes the B.2 endpoints listed in the inventory table below, **frozen at their current behaviour as of v3.16.4**. This is a one-time provision; it does not extend to new B.2 endpoints or to B.1 endpoints. Any change to the contract (request shape, response shape, semantics) of a grandfathered B.2 endpoint is treated as a new authorization request and requires either a behaviour-preserving refactor PR or its own ADR. Any new B.2 endpoint, or any new method on a grandfathered B.2 endpoint, requires its own ADR before merge.
### Current Class B inventory
| Endpoint | Method | Sub-bucket | Authorizing ADR |
|---|---|---|---|
| `/v1/chat/completions` | POST | B.1 (OpenAI-compat) | ADR 0006 |
| `/v1/models` | GET | B.1 (OpenAI-compat) | ADR 0006; content sourced from `models.json` per ADR 0003 |
| `/health` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/dashboard` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/sessions` | GET, DELETE | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/logs` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/status` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/settings` | GET, PATCH | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/keys` | GET, POST | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/keys/:id` | DELETE | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/keys/:id/quota` | GET, PATCH | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/usage` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/cache/stats` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/cache` | DELETE | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
**Hybrid note.** `/usage` is a hybrid endpoint: the underlying call to `api.anthropic.com/v1/messages` (used to extract `anthropic-ratelimit-unified-*` headers, per the in-file comment block at `server.mjs` line 845849) is Class A and requires the standard `cli.js` citation; the local synthesis layer that adds `proxy:` stats and `models:` snapshot is Class B and is authorized by ADR 0006. A PR touching only the wire-call layer is Class A; a PR touching only the synthesis layer is Class B; a PR touching both must satisfy both citation requirements.
### Class B citation requirement
Class B PRs cite **the relevant specification section + the authorizing ADR**, in place of `cli.js:NNNN`. Examples:
- B.1: "OpenAI `chat/completions` API, `response_format` parameter (https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create), authorized by ADR 0006."
- B.2 (grandfathered): "Authorized by ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4)."
- B.2 (with its own ADR): "Authorized by ADR 00NN (the ADR that originally authorized the endpoint)."
### Rule mapping for Class B
| Class A rule | Class B mapping |
|---|---|
| Rule 1 (Grep First) | Read the cited OpenAI spec section (B.1) or the authorizing ADR (B.2) before writing code. Record the spec URL and ADR number in the PR body. |
| Rule 2 (No Invention) | OCP must not introduce fields or behaviour not present in OpenAI's spec for the endpoint (B.1) or outside the scope of the authorizing ADR (B.2). For grandfathered B.2 endpoints, "scope" is the v3.16.4 behaviour snapshot. |
| Rule 3 (Match the Implementation) | Match OpenAI's spec wire-format (B.1) or the ADR's specified behaviour (B.2). |
| Rule 4 (Unalignable Features Are Deleted) | A Class B endpoint that maps to nothing in OpenAI's spec **and** lacks an authorizing ADR (including not being in the grandfather inventory) is unalignable and is deleted on the same terms as a Class A unalignable feature. |
| Rule 5 (Cite Line Numbers in Commits) | Cite the OpenAI spec section URL + authorizing ADR number in the commit body (B.1) or the authorizing ADR number alone (B.2). |
### New Class B endpoint procedure
Any new Class B endpoint, or any new method on an existing Class B endpoint (including grandfathered ones), requires its own ADR before merge. An "ADR-less" new Class B endpoint is itself an alignment finding under Rule 4.
---
## Annual Alignment Audit
- **Date:** 11 April each year (the anniversary of the `b87992f` drift).
- **Scope:** Diff the current `cli.js` against the pinned SHA-256 in the Golden Reference section. For every network call in `server.mjs`, re-verify that the corresponding `cli.js` reference still exists at the cited line numbers (adjust citations if line numbers shifted across Claude Code versions).
- **Output:** A signed audit note committed to `docs/alignment-audits/YYYY-04-11.md`, updating the pin.
- **Scope (Class A):** Diff the current `cli.js` against the pinned SHA-256 in the Golden Reference section. For every network call in `server.mjs`, re-verify that the corresponding `cli.js` reference still exists at the cited line numbers (adjust citations if line numbers shifted across Claude Code versions).
- **Scope (Class B):** Audit B.1 endpoints against OpenAI's current `/v1/chat/completions` specification snapshot. Audit B.2 endpoints against their authorizing ADR — for grandfathered endpoints, verify the endpoint behaviour still matches its v3.16.4 snapshot; for ADR-specific endpoints, verify behaviour still matches the ADR. The B.1 specification pin lives in `docs/openai-compat-pin.md` (created alongside the first B.1 audit; not required for ADR 0006 to land).
- **Output:** A signed audit note committed to `docs/alignment-audits/YYYY-04-11.md`, updating the Class A pin and (once `docs/openai-compat-pin.md` exists) the B.1 pin.
- **Failure mode:** Any audit finding that cannot be reconciled triggers an immediate deletion PR per the Unalignable Policy.
---
+221
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@@ -1,5 +1,226 @@
# Changelog
## Unreleased
## v3.17.0 — 2026-05-31
### Provider — default claude invocation ported to stream-json + `--system-prompt` (Phase 6c)
OCP's default (non-TUI) claude spawn moves from `claude -p --output-format text` to `claude --output-format stream-json --verbose --no-session-persistence --system-prompt <wrapper>` (no `-p`). The NDJSON event stream is parsed into the assembled response. Benefits: ~64% per-request cost reduction and anti-hallucination via `--system-prompt` tool-use suppression. Clients see no API change — the OpenAI-compatible request/response shapes are identical. Faithful port of OLP's production-verified implementation; covered by 17 new stream-json parser tests.
⚠️ **Billing note:** from 2026-06-15 this default path carries `cc_entrypoint=sdk-cli` and bills against the Agent SDK credit pool. Use the new opt-in `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` (below) to keep traffic on the Pro/Max subscription pool.
---
### feat(tui): opt-in CLAUDE_TUI_MODE — serve via interactive claude (cc_entrypoint=cli / subscription pool), single-user only; default stream-json path unchanged
From 2026-06-15 Anthropic routes `claude -p` / `--output-format` invocations to the Agent SDK credit pool (`cc_entrypoint=sdk-cli`). This feature adds an opt-in bridge: when `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true`, OCP serves each request via a real interactive `claude` session (no `-p`, no `--output-format`) so it carries `cc_entrypoint=cli` and bills against the Pro/Max subscription.
The complete string response is read from claude's native JSONL session transcript and replayed to callers as a normal OpenAI completion or chunked SSE. Clients see no API change. The default stream-json path is byte-for-byte unchanged when `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` is unset.
**Security:** single-user / single-operator only. Never enable on a multi-user OCP. See ADR 0007 and README § "Subscription-pool (TUI) mode".
New env vars: `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE`, `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS`, `OCP_TUI_CWD`, `OCP_TUI_HOME`.
New ADR: `docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md`.
New modules: `lib/tui/transcript.mjs`, `lib/tui/session.mjs` (shipped in preceding commits on this branch).
---
### Model — add claude-opus-4-8
Add `claude-opus-4-8` as the newest Opus to `models.json` (index 0, newest first). Repoint `aliases.opus` from `claude-opus-4-7` to `claude-opus-4-8`. `claude-opus-4-7` remains in the list callable by literal id. `legacyAliases.claude-opus-4` left pointing at `claude-opus-4-7` (no change — legacy alias tracks the prior generation). README Available Models table and model-count references updated accordingly.
---
## v3.16.4 — 2026-05-13
### Refactor — port-literal SPOT + CI guardrail
Closes the structural side of the port-drift cascade addressed by v3.16.2
and v3.16.3. Those two releases reverted plist / plugin / scripts back to
3456 line-by-line, but the underlying invitation to drift — a hardcoded
port literal scattered across six source files — was still intact.
Changes:
- **New `lib/constants.mjs`** — single source of truth for shared literals.
Exports `DEFAULT_PORT = 3456`, `LOCAL_HOST = "127.0.0.1"`,
`OPENAI_API_BASE = "/v1"`, `LOCAL_PROXY_URL`.
- **`server.mjs:127`, `setup.mjs:36`, `scripts/upgrade.mjs:137`,
`scripts/doctor.mjs:84` + `:205`, `scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs:73`** —
all replaced with imports from `lib/constants.mjs`. Behavior is
identical; the literal `3456` now exists in exactly one place per
language (`lib/constants.mjs` for `.mjs`, `ocp` + `ocp-connect` for
bash, `test-features.mjs` for pinned historical-port tests).
- **`.github/workflows/alignment.yml`** — extended the path filter to
`setup.mjs`, `scripts/**`, `lib/**`, `ocp`, `ocp-connect`. Added a new
`port-spot` hard-fail job that greps for any hardcoded `3478` or `3456`
literal in `.mjs/.js/.ts/.json` outside the EXEMPT_REGEX (which lists
`lib/constants.mjs`, `test-features.mjs`, the bash CLIs, docs, and the
workflow itself). Any future PR re-introducing a hardcoded port
literal will be blocked at CI before it can cascade.
- Doc comments in `server.mjs` env-var summary and `setup.mjs` usage
banner reworded so the literal `3456` no longer appears as
documentation text (CI grep is intentionally aggressive — it does not
parse comments — so doc strings reference `DEFAULT_PORT from
lib/constants.mjs` instead).
No behavior change for any user. `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` env var remains
the runtime override; the only difference is the unset-env fallback
now flows through one shared constant.
ALIGNMENT.md hard-requirements: this PR modifies `server.mjs` (one-line
import + one literal swap, mechanical). No cli.js operation changed;
the citation requirement does not apply. SPOT principle (Rule 2 spirit)
is the entire motivation.
## v3.16.3 — 2026-05-13
### Fixes — completes v3.16.2 port-drift revert
v3.16.2 reverted the plugin / `openclaw.plugin.json` / README / Mac mini
plist back to `3456` (the historical source default since `593d0dc`), but
missed three places in `scripts/` that still defaulted to `3478`. Those
three lines were the residual cascade source: every time `ocp doctor` or
`ocp upgrade` ran without `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` in the env, they probed
`3478`, reported "OCP not responding" against a healthy 3456 instance,
and (in the case of OpenClaw sync follow-ups on the maintainer's host)
re-introduced 3478 into downstream config.
Changes:
- `scripts/upgrade.mjs:137` — default port `3478``3456`.
- `scripts/doctor.mjs:84` — default port `3478``3456`.
- `scripts/doctor.mjs:205` — default port `3478``3456`.
No behavior change for users who set `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` explicitly; env
still takes precedence. The fix only affects the unset-env fallback,
which now matches `server.mjs:126` and the rest of the codebase.
Test plan: existing `test-features.mjs` cases that pin
`CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT=3478` continue to pass — they use the env path, not
the default.
## v3.16.2 — 2026-05-12
### Fixes — corrects v3.16.1
The v3.16.1 fix was directionally correct (plugin now reads env first, falls back to a hardcoded default) but **the narrative and the hardcoded default were both wrong**.
What v3.16.1 said: "OCP server moved to 3478 default in v3.14+; plugin lagged at 3456."
What is actually true:
- **OCP server source default has been `3456` since `593d0dc` (initial release) and has never changed.** Every line in `server.mjs`, `setup.mjs`, and the `ocp` CLI still uses `3456` as the documented and code-level default.
- The single OCP installation observed on `3478` is the maintainer's Mac mini, whose plist was rewritten with `--port 3478` during a PR #71 dogfood smoke-test accident on 2026-05-08 (see `~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/subagent_setup_mjs_prod_host_collision.md`). The plist drift was never reconciled back to source default, and v3.16.1 incorrectly canonised the post-accident value as if it had been a release decision.
This release:
- Restores the plugin fallback to `http://127.0.0.1:3456` to match server source default.
- Updates `openclaw.plugin.json` `configSchema.proxyUrl.default` back to `3456`.
- Restores README §"Environment Variables" `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` default to `3456`.
- Plugin reads `OCP_PROXY_URL` env (full URL) first, then `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` env (port only), then falls back to `3456`. Hosts whose OCP plist injects a non-default port must also inject the same `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` into the OpenClaw plist for the plugin to follow.
- Maintainer's Mac mini plist was reverted from `3478` to `3456` as part of this release deploy (no source change reflects this; it was a one-host correction).
### Governance
- No `cli.js` citation needed (no `server.mjs` change). ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 not engaged.
## v3.16.1 — 2026-05-12 (superseded — narrative incorrect; see v3.16.2 erratum)
### Fixes (as shipped — note erratum above)
- **OCP plugin port lag** — `ocp-plugin/index.js` hard-coded `http://127.0.0.1:3456`. ~~While OCP server moved to 3478 in v3.14+,~~ **(corrected v3.16.2: no such move ever happened.)** The Mac mini's plist was on `3478` only as residue from a dogfood accident. Result: `/ocp` slash commands from the home Telegram bot returned "OCP error: fetch failed". v3.16.1 changed the plugin default to `3478` (wrong direction; v3.16.2 reverts to `3456`).
### Governance
- No `cli.js` citation needed (no `server.mjs` change). ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 not engaged.
## v3.16.0 — 2026-05-10
### Features
- **`ocp doctor --check oauth`** (PR #93) — fast path that runs only the OAuth check, skipping
version detection / from-version / git operations / models endpoint. ~50ms vs. full doctor's
~200-500ms. Use cases: AI agent repair loops, post-`claude auth login` verify, quick health
gates. Help text in `cmd_doctor_help` now reflects working behaviour.
- **`ocp update --rollback --gc`** — manually garbage-collect old upgrade snapshots.
Retention policy: keep last 5 snapshots OR snapshots newer than 30 days OR the single most
recent (always-keep safety net). `--dry-run` previews. Successful `ocp update` runs auto-GC
at the end of the full path; light path does not (no snapshot created there).
### Behavior changes
- After a successful cross-minor `ocp update`, the auto-GC emits `[gc] removed N old snapshots`
to stderr if any were collected. Safe to ignore; manual gc is `ocp update --rollback --gc`.
### Governance
- No `cli.js` citation needed (no `server.mjs` change). ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 not engaged.
- PR #93 (--check oauth) merged separately; this release bundles it with the GC feature.
## v3.15.1 — 2026-05-10
### Fixes
- **doctor: dynamic `latest_version` from `origin/main:package.json`** — v3.15.0 doctor used a hard-coded `latest = "v3.14.0"` fallback, which made any v3.15.0+ install report `kind = upgrade` (against a stale value). `ocp update` would then attempt `git checkout v3.14.0` — a downgrade. Doctor now fetches `git -C ~/ocp show origin/main:package.json` to determine the actual latest version; on failure (offline, fresh clone with no remote), falls back to `currentVersion` so `kind = noop` instead of recommending a downgrade.
## v3.15.0 — 2026-05-10
### Features
- **`ocp doctor`** — health & upgrade-readiness check; primary entry for AI-driven debugging.
`--json` mode emits a `next_action` with `ai_executable[]` for agents to run verbatim
and `human_required[]` for steps requiring the user (typically only OAuth).
- **`ocp update` cross-version path** — for cross-minor jumps (e.g. v3.10 → v3.14),
`ocp update` now runs doctor → snapshot → `setup.mjs` (with the plist env-merge from
PR #90) → service restart → post-flight `/health` + `/v1/models` verification.
Same-patch updates retain the existing light path; users see no change for routine
patch bumps.
- **`ocp update --rollback`** — restore the most recent (or specified) upgrade snapshot.
Snapshots are saved to `~/.ocp/upgrade-snapshot-<ISO-ts>/` and never auto-deleted.
- **Fresh-install routing** — `ocp update` on installations < v3.4.0 routes to a fresh-install
flow (with `--yes` to skip confirmation; AI agents pass this). OAuth survives via Claude
Code's credential store; users do not re-OAuth unless their token was independently broken.
- **AI prompt blocks in README** — §Installation, §Upgrading, and §Troubleshooting each
start with a copy-paste prompt for Claude Code / Cursor / Copilot, so users can drive
install / setup / upgrade through their existing AI assistant.
### Behavior changes
- `ocp update` may take 1030s longer when a cross-minor jump triggers the full path
(snapshot + post-flight). Patch bumps are unchanged.
- Pre-v3.4.0 installs are routed to fresh-install rather than failing silently or
half-migrating.
### Governance
- No `cli.js` citation needed (no `server.mjs` change). ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 not engaged.
- Depends on PR #90 (plist env merge bug fix; merged before this release).
## v3.14.0 — 2026-05-10
### Features (security hardening)
- **Per-key session isolation** (PR #86, S1) — the `sessions` Map in `server.mjs` is now keyed by `${keyName}|${conversationId}` instead of bare `conversationId`. Before this fix, two clients using distinct API keys but the same `session_id` value (e.g. both defaulting to `"default"`) would share the same `cli.js` subprocess and conversation history, creating a cross-tenant leak path. Post-fix each (key, session) pair is isolated end-to-end, extending the per-key cache isolation shipped in v3.13.0 D1 to the session layer.
- **On-disk credential file modes 0700/0600** (PR #87, S2) — `setup.mjs` now creates `~/.ocp` at mode 0700 and both `admin-key` and `ocp.db` at mode 0600. An idempotent `reconcileFileModes()` call in `server.mjs` startup tightens any existing installation to these modes automatically on every launch, so existing prod boxes fix themselves without manual `chmod`. Before this fix, all three files were created at the process's default umask (typically world-readable 0644 / 0755), leaving plaintext credentials readable by other local users.
- **`/api/usage` default scope = self; admin all-keys requires `?all=true`** (PR #88, S3) — the usage endpoint now applies a least-privilege default: anonymous callers receive only their own rows, non-admin authenticated callers receive only their own rows, and admin callers receive only their own rows unless they explicitly pass `?all=true`. When `?all=true` is used, an audit log line is emitted. Before this fix, any admin-token holder could silently enumerate usage data for every key on the server.
### Behavior changes
- **Breaking change for admin tooling**: `/api/usage` no longer returns all-keys data by default. Existing cron jobs, dashboards, or scripts that rely on the admin token seeing all-keys output must add `?all=true` to their request URL after upgrading to v3.14.0.
- **File mode reconcile at server startup** logs a one-line notice per path when mode is tightened (e.g. `[security] tightened ~/.ocp/ocp.db → 0600`). No action is required from the operator; the reconcile is idempotent and silent when modes are already correct.
- **`sessions` Map key is now `${keyName}|${conversationId}` internally.** No client-visible wire change — the `session_id` field in request/response is unchanged.
### Verification
- Stress-test pass: 11/11 phases including S1/S2/S3 security regression checks (Phase E, I, J). 35-minute sustained run, 60 calls, 0 errors, 0 timeouts. RSS dropped 51→47 MB across the window. Per-key cache isolation, singleflight, cache_control bypass, quota enforcement, file-mode reconcile, and scope guard against escalation all verified against running code.
### Governance
- All three PRs (#86, #87, #88) include the explicit `cli.js`-citation-not-applicable disclaimer (per PR #75 pattern) since they are OCP-internal access-control, session-state, and file-permission changes with no corresponding `cli.js` operation to cite.
### No new env vars / no public API surface change beyond the documented breaking change
This release adds no new env vars or endpoints. The only externally visible change is the `/api/usage` scope guard (breaking for admin all-keys consumers; see Behavior changes above).
## v3.13.0 — 2026-05-07
### Features (cache layer hardening)
+175 -20
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
*Open source from day one, used daily by my family, maintained on nights and weekends. If OCP saves you money too, you can [☕ buy me a coffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/dtzp555) — [full story below](#support-ocp).*
*If OCP saves you a setup, a ⭐ helps other folks discover it. Issue reports are even more useful — that's the highest-quality feedback this project gets.*
OCP turns your Claude Pro/Max subscription into a standard OpenAI-compatible API on localhost. Any tool that speaks the OpenAI protocol can use it — no separate API key, no extra billing.
```
@@ -67,6 +69,20 @@ Any tool that accepts `OPENAI_BASE_URL` works with OCP:
## Installation
The simplest path: ask your AI.
Paste this prompt to Claude Code / Cursor / Copilot:
```
Install OCP for me. Read README §Manual Installation and follow it.
Tell me when I need to run `claude auth login`.
```
The AI will run `git clone`, `npm install`, `node setup.mjs`, and tell you
when to OAuth.
### Manual Installation
OCP has two roles: **Server** (runs the proxy, needs Claude CLI) and **Client** (connects to a server, zero dependencies).
```
@@ -100,7 +116,7 @@ Please follow https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/blob/main/README.md
installed and logged in (`claude auth status`). Install missing pieces
using my system's package manager.
2. git clone the repo, cd in, and run `node setup.mjs`.
3. Verify with `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` (should list 4 models).
3. Verify with `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` (should list 5 models).
4. Add `export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1` to my shell rc.
5. Tell me to reload my shell and try a tool like Cline / Continue / Cursor.
@@ -126,7 +142,7 @@ Please follow https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/blob/main/README.md
5. Add OCP_ADMIN_KEY to my shell rc (~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc).
6. Run `ocp lan` to show me the LAN IP and connect command.
7. Optionally create example keys: `ocp keys add laptop`, `ocp keys add tablet`.
8. Verify: `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` returns 4 models.
8. Verify: `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` returns 5 models.
Tell me each step before running it. On error, diagnose before retrying.
```
@@ -149,7 +165,7 @@ Please follow https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/blob/main/README.md
chmod +x ocp-connect
2. Run `./ocp-connect <SERVER_IP>` (add `--key <KEY>` if you have one).
3. Follow any IDE-specific manual hints it prints.
4. Verify: `curl http://<SERVER_IP>:3456/v1/models` returns 4 models.
4. Verify: `curl http://<SERVER_IP>:3456/v1/models` returns 5 models.
5. Tell me to reload my shell + restart any IDE that was already running.
Don't auto-retry on error. Tell me the failure mode first.
@@ -185,7 +201,8 @@ The setup script will:
1. Verify Claude CLI is installed and authenticated
2. Start the proxy on port 3456
3. Install auto-start (launchd on macOS, systemd on Linux)
4. Symlink `ocp` to `/usr/local/bin` for CLI access
After install the `ocp` CLI lives at `~/ocp/ocp`. To put it on your PATH, either symlink it manually (`ln -sf ~/ocp/ocp ~/.local/bin/ocp` if `~/.local/bin` is on your PATH, or `sudo ln -sf ~/ocp/ocp /usr/local/bin/ocp` for a system-wide symlink) or add an alias (`alias ocp=~/ocp/ocp`). Otherwise invoke it as `~/ocp/ocp <subcommand>`. The rest of this README assumes `ocp` is on your PATH.
**Single-machine use** — just set your IDE to use the proxy:
```bash
@@ -218,7 +235,7 @@ Run `ocp lan` to see your IP and ready-to-share instructions.
**Verify:**
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models
# Returns: claude-opus-4-7, claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
# Returns: claude-opus-4-8, claude-opus-4-7, claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
```
#### Headless install notes
@@ -297,7 +314,7 @@ OCP Connect v1.3.0
(set by admin via PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY; see issue #12 §14 Path A)
Testing API access...
✓ API accessible (4 models available)
✓ API accessible (5 models available)
Shell config:
✓ .bashrc
@@ -327,6 +344,7 @@ OCP Connect v1.3.0
✓ OpenClaw configured
Provider: ocp
Models:
• ocp/claude-opus-4-8
• ocp/claude-opus-4-7
• ocp/claude-opus-4-6
• ocp/claude-sonnet-4-6
@@ -389,17 +407,23 @@ ocp keys revoke son-ipad # Revoke a key
| `shared` | `CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=shared` + `PROXY_API_KEY=xxx` | Everyone shares one key |
| `multi` | `CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=multi` + `OCP_ADMIN_KEY=xxx` | Per-person keys with usage tracking (recommended) |
> **Usage scope (v3.14.0+):** `/api/usage` returns the caller's own rows by default. Admin callers must pass `?all=true` to retrieve data for all keys; doing so emits an audit log line.
### Anonymous Access (optional)
In `multi` mode, the admin can designate a single well-known "anonymous" key that bypasses `validateKey()` and grants public read/write access. This is useful for letting LAN users (or clients like OpenClaw multi-agent setups) connect without individual per-user keys.
**Enable**:
The anonymous key is wired into the service unit (launchd plist on macOS, systemd unit on Linux) at install time. Export `PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY` in your shell before running `setup.mjs`, and `setup.mjs` will write it into the service unit env so the auto-started proxy picks it up:
```bash
export PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY=ocp_public_anon # or any string of your choice
ocp start # or however you start the server
node setup.mjs --bind 0.0.0.0 --auth-mode multi
```
If OCP is already installed without it, re-export the env var and re-run `node setup.mjs` (the installer is idempotent — it refreshes the service unit). Then `ocp restart` so the running proxy picks up the new env. Setting `PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY` only in your interactive shell **does not** affect the auto-started proxy — the service unit is the source of truth for its environment.
**Client side**: the anonymous key value is exposed via `GET /health` as the field `anonymousKey` (null when not set). Clients like `ocp-connect` can auto-discover and use it, so the end user doesn't need to get a personal key from the admin.
**Security note**: setting this env var is an **opt-in** to public access — anyone who can reach your OCP endpoint can use it, up to any rate limits you configure. Don't enable this on internet-exposed OCP instances without additional protection.
@@ -453,6 +477,7 @@ When a key exceeds its quota, OCP returns HTTP 429 with a structured error:
- Keys are stored in `~/.ocp/ocp.db` (SQLite, zero external dependencies)
- Admin key is required for key management API endpoints
- The dashboard (`/dashboard`) and health check (`/health`) are always public
- File modes for `~/.ocp` (0700), `admin-key` + `ocp.db` (0600) are auto-tightened at server startup as of v3.14.0
## Built-in Usage Monitoring
@@ -491,6 +516,7 @@ ocp keys List all API keys (multi mode)
ocp keys add <name> Create a new API key
ocp keys revoke <name> Revoke an API key
ocp connect <ip> One-command LAN client setup
ocp doctor Health & upgrade-readiness check; primary entry for AI-driven debugging. --json produces a next_action for AI agents.
ocp lan Show LAN connection info & IP
ocp settings View tunable settings
ocp settings <k> <v> Update a setting at runtime
@@ -517,17 +543,57 @@ ocp --help
> **Cloud/Linux servers:** If `ocp: command not found`, the binary isn't in PATH. Full path: `~/.openclaw/projects/ocp/ocp`
### Self-Update
## Upgrading
The simplest path: ask your AI.
Paste this prompt:
```
Upgrade my OCP. Run `ocp update` and follow whatever it says.
If it tells me to run `claude auth login`, I'll do that.
```
What `ocp update` does:
- **Patch bump** (e.g. `v3.14.0 → v3.14.1`):
light path (git pull + npm install + restart).
- **Cross-minor** (e.g. `v3.10 → v3.14`):
full path: pre-flight check, snapshot, `setup.mjs` (with plist env-merge),
service restart, post-flight `/health` and `/v1/models` verification.
- **Old version** (< v3.4.0):
fresh-install. Pre-v3.4 lacked admin-key/usage-db, so there is nothing to
migrate. Your OAuth token (managed by the Claude Code CLI, not OCP) is
preserved; you do not need to re-OAuth unless your token expired
separately.
Snapshots are saved to `~/.ocp/upgrade-snapshot-<ISO-ts>/` and never
auto-deleted. Clean old ones with `rm -rf ~/.ocp/upgrade-snapshot-*` once
you're confident the upgrade is stable.
### Manual upgrade — same command, no AI
```bash
# Check if a new version is available
ocp update --check
# Pull latest, sync plugin, restart proxy — one command
ocp update
ocp update # smart-pick path
ocp update --check # show available updates, don't apply
ocp update --dry-run # preview plan
ocp update --target v3.13.0 # pin a specific version
ocp update --rollback --yes # restore most recent snapshot (--yes confirms)
ocp update --rollback --list # list snapshots, no mutation
ocp update --rollback --dry-run # preview rollback plan
```
`ocp update` runs (in order): `git pull` → `npm install` → plugin sync → **OpenClaw model registry sync** (v3.11.0+) → proxy restart → health check.
### When upgrade fails
`ocp update` prints a recovery line on failure. To restore from the snapshot:
```bash
ocp update --rollback --yes # --yes confirms the destructive restore
ocp doctor
```
If `ocp doctor` still reports problems after rollback, open a GitHub issue
with the snapshot path and the doctor JSON output (`ocp doctor --json`).
### OpenClaw Auto-Sync (v3.11.0+)
@@ -609,17 +675,18 @@ Cache is **disabled by default** (`CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL=0`). All data is stored loca
## How It Works
```
Your IDE → OCP (localhost:3456) → claude -p CLI → Anthropic (via subscription)
Your IDE → OCP (localhost:3456) → claude --output-format stream-json CLI → Anthropic (via subscription)
```
OCP translates OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` requests into `claude -p` CLI calls. Anthropic sees normal Claude Code usage — no API billing, no separate key needed.
OCP translates OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` requests into `claude --output-format stream-json` CLI calls. Anthropic sees normal Claude Code usage — no API billing, no separate key needed.
## Available Models
| Model ID | Notes |
|----------|-------|
| `claude-opus-4-7` | Most capable (default for `opus` alias) |
| `claude-opus-4-6` | Previous Opus, retained for pinning |
| `claude-opus-4-8` | Most capable (default for `opus` alias) |
| `claude-opus-4-7` | Previous Opus, retained for pinning |
| `claude-opus-4-6` | Older Opus, retained for pinning |
| `claude-sonnet-4-6` | Good balance of speed/quality (default for `sonnet` alias) |
| `claude-haiku-4-5-20251001` | Fastest, lightweight (default for `haiku` alias) |
@@ -650,7 +717,7 @@ The canonical list lives in [`models.json`](./models.json) — the single source
| `/api/keys` | GET/POST | List or create API keys (admin only) |
| `/api/keys/:id` | DELETE | Revoke an API key (admin only) |
| `/api/keys/:id/quota` | GET/PATCH | View or set per-key quota (admin only) |
| `/api/usage` | GET | Per-key usage stats (`?since=&until=&hours=&limit=`) |
| `/api/usage` | GET | Per-key usage stats (`?since=&until=&hours=&limit=`); returns self only by default — pass `?all=true` (admin only) for all-keys data |
| `/cache/stats` | GET | Cache statistics (admin only) |
| `/cache` | DELETE | Clear response cache (admin only) |
@@ -700,6 +767,21 @@ After installing the gateway plugin, use `/ocp` slash commands in your chat:
## Troubleshooting
The simplest path: ask your AI.
Paste this prompt:
```
Run `ocp doctor` and follow its `next_action`. Tell me if you hit
anything that needs human input.
```
The doctor produces a JSON `next_action` with `ai_executable[]` (commands
the agent runs verbatim) and `human_required[]` (steps that need you,
typically just OAuth).
### Manual debugging
### Setup fails with "claude: command not found"
`setup.mjs` requires the Claude CLI to be on `PATH`. Install it via the [official guide](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-cli), confirm with `which claude`, then run `claude auth login` before re-running `node setup.mjs`.
@@ -775,7 +857,8 @@ Future `ocp update` invocations sync automatically.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` | `3456` | Listen port |
| `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` | `3456` | Listen port (server-side). Also consumed by the OpenClaw `ocp-plugin` to dial the local proxy. |
| `OCP_PROXY_URL` | *(unset)* | Plugin-side full URL override (e.g. `http://10.0.0.5:3456`). Wins over `CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT` when both are set. Read by `ocp-plugin/index.js` only — server ignores it. |
| `CLAUDE_BIND` | `127.0.0.1` | Bind address (`0.0.0.0` for LAN access) |
| `CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Auth mode: `none`, `shared`, or `multi` |
| `OCP_ADMIN_KEY` | *(unset)* | Admin key for key management (multi mode) |
@@ -791,6 +874,11 @@ Future `ocp update` invocations sync automatically.
| `CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT` | `false` | Suppress CLAUDE.md and auto-memory injection (pure API mode) |
| `PROXY_API_KEY` | *(unset)* | Bearer token for shared-mode authentication |
| `PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY` | *(unset)* | Well-known anonymous key allowlist (multi mode). When set, this exact string bypasses `validateKey()` and grants public access. Exposed via `/health.anonymousKey` so clients auto-discover. See [Anonymous Access](#anonymous-access-optional). |
| `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` | `false` | **Opt-in.** Set to `"true"` to serve requests via interactive `claude` (no `-p` / `--output-format` → `cc_entrypoint=cli`, subscription pool). **Single-user only** — see [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) for the security constraint. |
| `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS` | `120000` | (TUI-mode) Maximum time in ms to wait for the native transcript to signal turn completion. Increase for long Opus thinking turns. |
| `OCP_TUI_CWD` | `$HOME/.ocp-tui/work` | (TUI-mode) Scratch working directory where interactive claude sessions run. Transcripts land under `<HOME>/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/`. Created automatically. |
| `OCP_TUI_HOME` | `$HOME` (real home) | (TUI-mode) `HOME` claude runs under. Default is the operator's real home (shared credentials, existing onboarding). Set to a separate path for scratch-home isolation — see ADR 0007 for the credential-fork caveat. |
| `OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT` | `cli` | (TUI-mode) Billing-classifier labeling: `cli` (default) pins `cc_entrypoint=cli` deterministically; `auto` lets claude self-classify via TTY detection; `off` leaves the inherited env untouched. Honest only when the spawn is a genuine interactive PTY — see ADR 0007. |
### Streaming heartbeat
@@ -802,6 +890,73 @@ Heartbeats are inert SSE comment lines — conforming SSE clients ignore them. I
OCP also sends `X-Accel-Buffering: no` on SSE responses so nginx-default proxy buffering does not hold heartbeats in an upstream buffer.
## Subscription-pool (TUI) mode
> **SECURITY — read before enabling.**
> TUI-mode is **single-user / single-operator only**. `claude` runs with the OCP process owner's filesystem access regardless of `HOME` setting. If OCP serves multiple users or guest API keys, a guest prompt could exfiltrate files or exhaust the subscription. **Never enable `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` on a multi-user OCP.**
### What it is and why
From 2026-06-15 Anthropic routes `claude` invocations by `cc_entrypoint`:
| Launch method | `cc_entrypoint` | Billing pool |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
| `claude -p` / `--output-format` (OCP default) | `sdk-cli` | Agent SDK credit pool (~$20/mo on Pro) |
| Interactive `claude` (no flags) | `cli` | Pro/Max subscription pool |
TUI-mode lets OCP serve requests via the interactive path so they bill against the subscription pool. The response is read from claude's native JSONL session transcript once the turn is complete, then replayed to the caller as a normal OpenAI completion or chunked SSE response.
### Billing-classifier labeling (`OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT`)
`OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT` (default `cli`) controls how `CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT` is set on the spawn
environment. The default (`cli`) pins the value deterministically — immune to a stray inherited
env var or a future stdout-redirect bug silently flipping it to `sdk-cli`. This label is honest
**only** when the spawn is a genuine interactive PTY (tmux pane, no `-p`, stdout not redirected,
and `tmux new-session` verified to succeed). If you need to observe the raw TTY-derived value, set
`OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT=auto`. See ADR 0007 for the full rationale and governing rule.
### Enabling TUI-mode (opt-in)
```bash
# Prerequisites
mkdir -p ~/.ocp-tui/work # one-time scratch cwd setup
# tmux must be installed: brew install tmux / apt install tmux
# Enable
export CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true
# Optionally tune:
export CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS=180000 # 3 min cap for long Opus turns
export OCP_TUI_CWD=$HOME/.ocp-tui/work # default; override if needed
export OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT=cli # default; use 'auto' to observe TTY-derived value
```
Then restart OCP. At boot you will see:
```
⚠️ TUI-mode ON — single-user only; do NOT enable on a multi-user OCP ...
TUI-mode: ON home=/home/user cwd=/home/user/.ocp-tui/work wallclock=120000ms
```
### What changes / what doesn't
- **Callers see no API change.** The response is a normal OpenAI completion object or chunked SSE — identical wire format.
- **No real token streaming.** TUI-mode buffers the full response then replays it as chunked SSE. You will see a delay then the complete response rather than real-time tokens.
- **Cache and singleflight work normally.** TUI-mode writes the buffered response to the cache on success; cache-hits skip the interactive turn entirely.
- **Default path unchanged.** Unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` and restart → `callClaude` / `callClaudeStreaming` are used again, byte-for-byte identical to today.
### Kill-switch
```bash
unset CLAUDE_TUI_MODE
# restart OCP
```
The stream-json path is restored immediately. No other change is needed.
### Architecture and design decisions
See [`docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md`](docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md) for the full rationale, home-strategy options, MCP-disable mechanism, coexistence rules, and the B-path (multi-tenant isolation) roadmap.
## Repository Layout
Top-level files a contributor or operator may need to know:
+21 -2
View File
@@ -55,7 +55,13 @@
</div>
<div class="section">
<h2>Usage by Key</h2>
<div class="flex" style="justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;">
<h2 style="margin: 0;">Usage by Key</h2>
<label id="usage-scope-toggle" class="flex" style="display:none; gap: 0.4rem; font-size: 0.8rem; color: #94a3b8; cursor: pointer;">
<input type="checkbox" id="usage-show-all" style="cursor: pointer;">
<span>Show all keys</span>
</label>
</div>
<table id="key-usage-table">
<thead><tr><th>Key</th><th>Requests</th><th>OK</th><th>Err</th><th>Avg Time</th><th>Last Request</th></tr></thead>
<tbody></tbody>
@@ -170,7 +176,8 @@ async function refreshStatus() {
async function refreshUsage() {
try {
const data = await api("/api/usage");
const showAll = localStorage.getItem("ocp_usage_show_all") === "1";
const data = await api(showAll ? "/api/usage?all=true" : "/api/usage");
const tbody = document.querySelector("#key-usage-table tbody");
tbody.innerHTML = (data.byKey || []).map(k => `
<tr>
@@ -204,6 +211,8 @@ async function refreshKeys() {
try {
const data = await api("/api/keys");
document.getElementById("key-mgmt-section").style.display = "";
// Admin-only "Show all keys" toggle for /api/usage scope.
document.getElementById("usage-scope-toggle").style.display = "flex";
const tbody = document.querySelector("#keys-table tbody");
tbody.innerHTML = (data.keys || []).map(k => `
<tr>
@@ -240,6 +249,16 @@ async function refreshAll() {
document.getElementById("refresh-indicator").textContent = `Updated ${new Date().toLocaleTimeString()}`;
}
// Wire "Show all keys" toggle (visibility gated to admin via refreshKeys()).
(function setupUsageScopeToggle() {
const cb = document.getElementById("usage-show-all");
cb.checked = localStorage.getItem("ocp_usage_show_all") === "1";
cb.addEventListener("change", () => {
localStorage.setItem("ocp_usage_show_all", cb.checked ? "1" : "0");
refreshUsage();
});
})();
refreshAll();
setInterval(refreshAll, 30000);
</script>
+132
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@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
# 0006 — OpenAI Shim Scope: Class A vs Class B Endpoints
- **Date**: 2026-05-20
- **Status**: Proposed — owner reviewing
- **Authors**: project maintainer (with AI drafting assistance)
- **Related**: `ALIGNMENT.md` (the constitution); ADR 0002 (Alignment Constitution provenance, PR #20, commit 2853088); PR #99 by external contributor (triggering incident — OpenAI `response_format` honoring on `/v1/chat/completions`)
## Context
`ALIGNMENT.md` was drafted in the aftermath of the 2026-04-11 drift (commit `b87992f` — fabricated `/api/oauth/usage` endpoint) and ratified in PR #20 / commit 2853088. Its five Rules are written in the language of a one-to-one proxy: Rule 1 (Grep First), Rule 2 (No Invention), Rule 3 (Match the Implementation), Rule 4 (Unalignable Features Are Deleted), Rule 5 (Cite Line Numbers in Commits). All five anchor explicitly on `cli.js` as the golden reference. This is correct and binding for the endpoints OCP was originally designed to forward — `/v1/messages`, `/api/oauth/*`, and the rate-limit-header extraction path that backs `/usage` — because for those, `cli.js` is the literal wire authority and any deviation is a drift risk.
OCP also exposes a second class of endpoint that the constitution does not currently distinguish: **OpenAI-compatible surface** that exists so non-Claude-Code clients (Honcho, OpenWebUI, OpenAI SDK consumers, BYO scripts) can talk to claude via OCP. The flagship is `/v1/chat/completions`, which translates between OpenAI's request/response schema and `cli.js`'s native protocol. `cli.js` never speaks OpenAI's wire format — by construction it cannot, because OpenAI and Anthropic are different vendors with different protocols. There is no `cli.js:NNNN` to cite for OpenAI's `messages[].role` field handling, OpenAI's streaming `delta` shape, OpenAI's `stop` event names, or OpenAI's `response_format` parameter. The protocol authority for these is OpenAI's published specification, not `cli.js`.
The structural gap surfaced when PR #99 (external contributor `jaekwon-park`) added support for the OpenAI `response_format` request field on `/v1/chat/completions`. A strict reading of Rule 2 ("OCP must not introduce request fields that are not present in `cli.js`") blocks the PR. But the same strict reading also blocks the existence of `/v1/chat/completions` itself — every OpenAI-shaped field on that endpoint is, by definition, not in `cli.js`. The endpoint has been in OCP since before the constitution was written and is used by real downstream consumers. The constitution and the endpoint cannot both be correct under the current reading.
The 2026-04-11 drift remains the cautionary tale that drove the constitution and remains binding. The drift was not "OCP exposed an endpoint that wasn't in `cli.js`" — it was specifically "OCP claimed to forward `cli.js`'s `/api/oauth/usage` call when no such call exists in `cli.js`." That is a Class A failure mode: a forwarding endpoint that lied about what it was forwarding. The fix to that failure mode (Rules 1, 2, 3, 5; CI blacklist; reviewer gate) was correct then and is correct now. This ADR does not relitigate that decision and does not soften Rules 15 for the class of endpoint they were designed to discipline.
What this ADR does is acknowledge that OCP has two classes of endpoint, and that the discipline that fits Class A does not fit Class B without distortion. Class B needs its own anchor (OpenAI's specification) and its own authorization gate (an ADR per endpoint), so contributors know exactly which rule set applies to their PR and so Class B never becomes a backdoor for "OCP can do anything OpenAI-shaped."
## Decision
Introduce an explicit two-class taxonomy of OCP endpoints:
- **Class A — `cli.js`-mirror endpoints.** Endpoints that exist because `cli.js` performs the equivalent operation and OCP forwards, observes, or multiplexes that operation. Rules 15 of `ALIGNMENT.md` apply verbatim. The citation requirement is `cli.js:NNNN` (or `cli.js vE4 <functionName>`).
- **Class B — OCP-owned compatibility endpoints.** Endpoints that exist because OCP itself surfaces them, with no `cli.js` analogue. They fall into two sub-buckets:
- **B.1 — OpenAI-compatibility surface.** Endpoints implementing OpenAI's published API contract so non-Anthropic clients can use OCP. The protocol authority is OpenAI's specification.
- **B.2 — OCP-administrative surface.** Endpoints that exist purely to operate the proxy itself (health, dashboard, key management, cache control). The authority for these is the ADR that authorized the endpoint's existence.
For Class B endpoints, the citation requirement shifts from `cli.js:NNNN` to **(a)** the relevant specification section (OpenAI spec section for B.1, or the authorizing ADR for B.2) **and (b)** the ADR that authorized the endpoint's existence in the first place.
### Grandfather provision for existing B.2 inventory
ADR 0006 retroactively authorizes the existing B.2 endpoints listed in the inventory table below, **frozen at their current behaviour as of v3.16.4**. This is a one-time grandfather provision intended to avoid a 12-ADR back-fill burden for endpoints that have existed in OCP since before any constitutional governance was written.
The grandfather provision is narrowly scoped:
- It covers only the B.2 endpoints enumerated in the inventory table as of this ADR's merge date.
- It freezes those endpoints at their **current behaviour**. Any change to the request shape, response shape, or semantics of a grandfathered B.2 endpoint is treated as a new authorization request and requires either (a) a behaviour-preserving refactor PR with no contract change, or (b) its own ADR.
- It does **not** authorize new B.2 endpoints. Any new B.2 endpoint, or any new method on a grandfathered B.2 endpoint, requires its own ADR before merge.
- It does **not** extend to B.1 (OpenAI-compat) endpoints. B.1 endpoints are bounded by OpenAI's published specification, not by a behaviour snapshot — there is no grandfather equivalent for them.
The structural intent is: take the one-time hit of declaring "current B.2 surface is authorized" cleanly, then make every future addition pay the ADR-per-endpoint cost. This prevents Class B from becoming a backdoor for general OCP-owned-surface invention while not blocking the present ADR on twelve back-fill PRs.
### Current Class B inventory (enumerated from `server.mjs`)
The following endpoints exist today in `server.mjs` and are Class B (no `cli.js` analogue):
| Endpoint | Method | Sub-bucket | Authorizing ADR |
|---|---|---|---|
| `/v1/chat/completions` | POST | B.1 (OpenAI-compat) | ADR 0006 |
| `/v1/models` | GET | B.1 (OpenAI-compat) | ADR 0006; content sourced from `models.json` per ADR 0003 |
| `/health` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/dashboard` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/sessions` | GET, DELETE | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/logs` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/status` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/settings` | GET, PATCH | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/keys` | GET, POST | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/keys/:id` | DELETE | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/keys/:id/quota` | GET, PATCH | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/api/usage` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/cache/stats` | GET | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
| `/cache` | DELETE | B.2 (administrative) | ADR 0006 (grandfathered as of v3.16.4) |
For Class A reference, the current Class A inventory is `/v1/messages` (forwarded directly to `api.anthropic.com/v1/messages`) and the OAuth bearer / rate-limit-header machinery used by `handleUsage()` (which calls `https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages` to extract `anthropic-ratelimit-unified-*` headers, per the in-file comment at line 845849). The `GET /usage` endpoint surface itself is Class B (administrative augmentation: it adds `proxy:` and `models:` blocks not present in any upstream API), but the data fetch underlying it is Class A — see "Hybrid endpoints" below.
### Hybrid endpoints
`/usage` is a hybrid: the wire call out to `api.anthropic.com/v1/messages` is Class A and must continue to cite `cli.js`; the local synthesis on top (`proxy:` stats block, `models:` snapshot, response shape) is Class B and is authorized by this ADR. Any future change strictly to the wire-call layer is Class A; any change strictly to the synthesis layer is Class B. A PR touching both must satisfy both citation requirements.
## What does NOT change
The following continue to apply verbatim and are not weakened by this ADR:
- **Rules 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of `ALIGNMENT.md`** for all Class A endpoints. The 2026-04-11 drift discipline is unchanged. Class A PRs still require `cli.js:NNNN` citations, still must match `cli.js`'s wire format byte-for-byte, and still face the Unalignable Policy if the citation cannot be produced.
- **CI blacklist** (`.github/workflows/alignment.yml`). The known-hallucinated token list (currently `api.anthropic.com/api/oauth/usage`) continues to be greppable-and-failable on every PR.
- **Reviewer gate** (CLAUDE.md hard requirements + Iron Rule 10). Implementation author may not self-approve; a fresh-context reviewer opens `cli.js` at the cited lines for Class A PRs.
- **Annual Alignment Audit** on 11 April. The Class A audit (re-verify each `server.mjs` Class A reference against the pinned `cli.js` SHA-256) continues unchanged.
- **Unalignable Policy.** A Class A endpoint that cannot be traced to a `cli.js` reference is still deleted, not deprecated.
- **Historical Lesson section in `ALIGNMENT.md`.** The 2026-04-11 drift remains the named cautionary incident, with commit SHAs intact.
## What additionally applies to Class B
The following are new and apply only to Class B endpoints:
1. **OpenAI specification as protocol authority (B.1).** The OpenAI compatibility surface follows OpenAI's published `/v1/chat/completions` specification (https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create) — not OCP imagination, not "OpenAI probably does X," not generalization from adjacent OpenAI endpoints. The same anti-invention discipline that Rule 2 imposes for `cli.js` applies, with OpenAI's spec substituted as the reference.
2. **ADR-authorized endpoint existence.** Any new Class B endpoint, or any new Class B endpoint method, requires its own ADR before merge. The grandfather provision above covers existing B.2 inventory only. An "ADR-less" Class B endpoint added after this ADR merges is itself an alignment finding and is subject to deletion under a Class B equivalent of the Unalignable Policy (see Rule 4 mapping in `ALIGNMENT.md`'s new section).
3. **Class B citation format.** Class B PRs cite (a) the relevant specification section and (b) the authorizing ADR. Example for B.1: "OpenAI `chat/completions` API, `response_format` parameter (https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create), authorized by ADR 0006." Example for B.2: "Authorized by ADR 0006 (grandfathered)" for grandfathered endpoints, or "Authorized by ADR 00NN" for endpoints with their own ADR.
4. **Class B audit cadence.** Class B endpoints are audited annually alongside the Class A audit. B.1 endpoints are audited against OpenAI's current `/v1/chat/completions` specification snapshot. B.2 endpoints (grandfathered or ADR-specific) are audited against their authorizing ADR — for grandfathered endpoints, the audit verifies the endpoint behaviour still matches its v3.16.4 snapshot; for ADR-specific endpoints, the audit verifies behaviour still matches the ADR. The B.1 specification pin lives in `docs/openai-compat-pin.md` (to be created alongside the first B.1 audit; not a prerequisite for this ADR to land).
5. **Reviewer expectation.** The fresh-context reviewer for a Class B PR opens the cited OpenAI spec section (B.1) or the authorizing ADR (B.2) instead of opening `cli.js`. The "I am not the commit author" rule and the "explicit approval comment naming the verified reference" rule continue.
## Consequences
**Positive**
- PR #99 becomes mergeable with a one-line scope declaration ("Class B — extends `/v1/chat/completions` per ADR 0006") plus the existing alignment-evidence section adapted to Class B citation format. The structural ambiguity that blocked it is removed.
- Future Class B contributors have a clear template and a defensible scope: "extend `/v1/chat/completions` for an OpenAI-spec field that's already in OpenAI's spec" is a well-formed PR; "add a new OCP-invented field that looks OpenAI-shaped" is not, and the same anti-invention discipline that protects Class A protects Class B.
- The Class A surface is structurally unchanged. Reviewers reading the new `ALIGNMENT.md` see a clean Class A regime with all five Rules intact, plus an enumerated and explicitly scoped Class B carve-out.
- The administrative endpoint surface (B.2) is no longer in a "is this even allowed under the constitution?" limbo. The grandfather provision cleanly authorizes the current inventory; new B.2 endpoints must earn their ADR.
**Negative**
- OCP now maintains a second alignment surface. OpenAI's `/v1/chat/completions` specification is also a moving target (OpenAI ships changes more than once per year, including breaking ones), so the B.1 audit has real work attached.
- The grandfather provision freezes the current B.2 behaviour. If a grandfathered B.2 endpoint has a latent bug or undesirable behaviour, "fixing" it is a contract change and now requires an ADR (or a behaviour-preserving refactor). This is intentional friction to prevent silent contract drift.
- Contributors must now choose Class A or Class B on every PR. Some will misclassify. The PR template's required Class A/B radio (see PR template update) and the reviewer's spec-or-cli verification step are the structural counter-measures.
**Mitigations**
- The Class B inventory is small (currently 14 endpoints) and is enumerated explicitly in `ALIGNMENT.md`. New entries require an ADR per item 2 above, so the inventory cannot grow silently.
- Anthropic-side change frequency (which drives Class A audit cost) is structurally higher than OpenAI's `chat/completions` shape, which has been stable across multiple OpenAI API versions. The marginal B.1 audit cost is low. The grandfathered B.2 audit cost is also low — most of those endpoints have not changed in months.
- The B.1 specification pin in `docs/openai-compat-pin.md` lets the audit anchor on a specific OpenAI spec snapshot, the same way the Class A pin anchors on a specific `cli.js` SHA-256. Drift detection then works the same way for both classes.
## Historical Lesson — explicit non-relitigation
This ADR does not relitigate the 2026-04-11 drift. The drift commit `b87992f` was Class A — it claimed `cli.js` forwarded a call that `cli.js` did not in fact make. The fix (constitution + CI blacklist + reviewer gate) was correct and remains binding for Class A. This ADR carves out Class B because the discipline that fits Class A does not fit a class of endpoint where `cli.js` is not the wire authority — not because the discipline was wrong, and not because the drift lesson is any less load-bearing.
A reviewer or future maintainer reading this ADR should not infer: "OCP relaxed its alignment rules." The Class A regime is structurally identical to the version that shipped in PR #20. What changed is that the constitution now names the scope of that regime precisely (the class of endpoint for which `cli.js` is the wire authority) instead of implicitly applying it to every endpoint, including ones the regime was never designed for.
## Alternatives considered
**(a) Refuse Class B as a category; close PR #99 and delete `/v1/chat/completions`.** This would resolve the structural ambiguity by enforcing Rule 2 maximally — if `cli.js` doesn't speak OpenAI's protocol, neither does OCP. Rejected: there is an existing user base on the OpenAI-compat surface, the surface is genuinely useful (it is OCP's bridge to non-Claude-Code agents), and deletion would be a load-bearing user-facing breakage in service of a doctrinal point that the constitution was never designed to make. The constitution was a response to the 2026-04-11 forwarding drift, not a charter against any OCP-owned surface.
**(b) Soften Rule 2 to "OCP must not introduce surface area not present in `cli.js` OR not authorized by an ADR."** This is the obvious diff and would unblock PR #99 with the smallest possible textual change. Rejected because it loses the precision that Class A needs. A combined Rule 2 means a Class A reviewer has to read the PR description twice to figure out which authority applies. The Class A/B split makes the question explicit at the PR-template level (the author picks the class) and at the reviewer level (the reviewer opens the appropriate reference). The cost of the split is one new section in `ALIGNMENT.md`; the benefit is no ambiguity in either class.
**(c) Move `/v1/chat/completions` and all OpenAI-compat surface out of OCP into a separate "ocp-openai-shim" repository.** This would cleanly resolve the scope question by moving Class B out of OCP entirely. Rejected as premature: the maintainer is one person, the OpenAI-compat surface today is a single endpoint plus its support, and the operational cost of two repositories (separate releases, separate CI, separate version coordination) exceeds the cost of one constitution with two named classes. If the OpenAI-compat surface ever grows to the size where a separate repo is justified, ADR 0006 is the natural pivot point — at that future date, the carve-out becomes a separation.
**(d) Twelve-ADR back-fill for the existing B.2 inventory before this ADR can merge.** Considered and rejected on cost grounds. Each back-fill ADR would be a short paragraph explaining what an existing endpoint does and why it's allowed; the educational value is low and the merge friction is high (12 PRs through the reviewer gate). The grandfather provision above achieves the same authorization outcome in one paragraph, while still requiring an ADR for any future B.2 endpoint. The trade-off: grandfathered endpoints are not individually documented to ADR-depth. Mitigation: the inventory table in `ALIGNMENT.md` lists every grandfathered endpoint by path and method, so the audit surface remains explicit.
+166
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@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
# ADR 0007 — TUI Interactive Mode (subscription-pool bridge)
**Date:** 2026-05-31
**Status:** Accepted — amended by PR-4 (entrypoint hardening)
**Deciders:** project maintainer
**Authority:** claude CLI v2.1.158 interactive mode — verified live on the test host that sessions launched without `-p` / `--output-format` carry `cc_entrypoint=cli` (subscription pool), not `cc_entrypoint=sdk-cli` (Agent SDK credit pool). Mechanism verified on cli.js v2.1.104; live-confirmed on v2.1.158.
---
## Context
On 2026-05-14 Anthropic announced (effective 2026-06-15) a billing split that routes requests by `cc_entrypoint`:
| `cc_entrypoint` value | Billing pool |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| `cli` | Pro/Max subscription pool |
| `sdk-cli` | Agent SDK credit pool (~$20/mo on Pro = easily exhausted) |
OCP's existing path (`claude --output-format stream-json -p`) sets `cc_entrypoint=sdk-cli`. After 2026-06-15 every OCP request will draw from the Agent SDK pool rather than the subscription.
The structural response: add an opt-in mode that drives a real **interactive** `claude` session (no `-p`, no `--output-format`), which carries `cc_entrypoint=cli` and therefore bills against the subscription. The response text is read from claude's native JSONL transcript instead of from `stdout`.
This is a personal-use A-path feature (single-user, single-subscription host). It is **not** a multi-tenant isolation layer.
### Source-verified entrypoint mechanism (PR-4 amendment)
Claude CLI's `main()` calls a startup function (`t$A` in the compiled bundle) that sets
`process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT` **only if unset** to:
```
(argv has -p/--print/--init-only/--sdk-url OR !process.stdout.isTTY) ? "sdk-cli" : "cli"
```
The billing header reads `cc_entrypoint = process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT ?? "unknown"`.
The `"unknown"` branch is dead code for any real `main()` spawn — the startup function always
sets a value on unset env. The **real risk** is not `"unknown"`: it is a **lost TTY** (e.g. stdout
redirected or a non-PTY spawn) silently flipping the self-classification to `"sdk-cli"` and
drawing from the metered pool.
`cc_entrypoint` is one of ~6 upstream run-mode signals. The **dominant discriminator** is the
system-prompt identity block ("official CLI" vs "Claude Agent SDK"), which is driven by genuine
interactivity (no `-p`, no `--output-format`, real PTY) and is overridable by no env var. This
is the real reason the tmux/no-`-p` approach works: the spawn is genuinely interactive, not just
labelled as such.
---
## Decision
Add `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` as an opt-in flag in `server.mjs`.
### How it works
1. Each request spawns a fresh tmux session running `claude --model <M> --session-id <UUID> --strict-mcp-config --disallowedTools 'mcp__*'` (no `-p`, no `--output-format`).
2. The spawn result is checked immediately: if `tmux new-session` returns a non-zero exit status (or a falsy result), the request is aborted with `tui_spawn_failed: tmux session not created` **before** the boot sleep. This is the spawn/PTY gate — OCP must not issue a billing request without a verified interactive session.
3. The serialized prompt (from `messagesToPrompt`) is pasted via `tmux send-keys … "$(cat file)"` + a separate `Enter` key event.
4. The answer is read from claude's native JSONL transcript at `<HOME>/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/<session-id>.jsonl`, polling until a `turn_duration` system event or the wall-clock cap (`CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS`, default 120 s).
5. The string answer is returned to OCP's existing downstream (singleflight → cache write-back → `completionResponse` / `streamStringAsSSE`) — **same contract as `callClaude`**.
6. Streaming requests are buffered then replayed as chunked SSE (no real token streaming — deliberate; "don't build fragile features").
### Billing-classifier labeling (`OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT`, PR-4)
`CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT` on the spawn env is managed by `resolveTuiEntrypointEnv(env, mode)`
(exported from `lib/tui/session.mjs`, pure, testable). The function **always deletes any
inherited value first** so a stray env var from OCP's own parent process can never leak in and
mislabel the billing header. Then:
| `OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT` | Behaviour |
|----------------------|-----------|
| `cli` (default) | Sets `CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT=cli` deterministically — subscription-pool classification. **Honest only because the spawn is a genuine interactive PTY** (tmux pane, no `-p`, stdout not redirected, `new-session` verified). |
| `auto` | Deletes the key → claude self-classifies via `t$A` (TTY → `cli`). Use to observe/diagnose the real TTY-derived value. |
| `off` | Leaves the env exactly as inherited — diagnostics / honesty audit only. |
**Governing rule (verbatim):** *OCP may make a true value deterministic; it may never assert a
value the spawn's real state contradicts. When it cannot make the claim true (e.g. cannot
guarantee a PTY), it fails/drops the request — it does not force the signal.*
This is why the spawn/PTY gate (step 2 above) is load-bearing for `mode="cli"`: if `new-session`
fails, there is no PTY, so asserting `cli` would be dishonest. Abort rather than lie.
OCP never suppresses the billing header (anti-fingerprinting: we do not mask the spawn).
### 2026-06-15 verification protocol
Run one quiesced canary request in TUI-mode and watch the **Agent SDK credit balance** (not the
request header). If the balance drops, the subscription pool is unreachable via spawn. Per the
constitution (`ALIGNMENT.md`), the response is to **drop the Anthropic provider** rather than
escalate spoofing.
Version caveat: mechanism verified on cli.js v2.1.104 + live on v2.1.158. Re-verify after any
major cli.js upgrade.
### Default behaviour is unchanged
When `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` is unset (the default), no code path touches `callClaudeTui` or `runTuiTurn`. `upstreamCall === callClaude` and streaming uses `callClaudeStreaming` — byte-for-byte identical to the pre-TUI code path.
### Kill-switch
Unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` (or set it to any value other than `"true"`) → stream-json path restored immediately on next restart.
### Home strategy (real-home default)
`TUI_HOME = OCP_TUI_HOME || HOME` (defaults to the operator's real home).
- **Real-home (default, `OCP_TUI_HOME` unset):** claude runs with the operator's own `~/.claude/` — shared credentials, existing onboarding, no OAuth fork risk. `ensureTuiCwdTrusted` seeds the trust record for the scratch cwd in the real `~/.claude.json` (atomic write).
- **Scratch-home opt-in (`OCP_TUI_HOME=<path>`):** a dedicated `HOME` that symlinks `~/.claude/.credentials.json` from the real home (token is never copied) and seeds a stripped `~/.claude.json` (no project history, trusts only the scratch cwd). **Caveat:** claude rewrites `.credentials.json` on OAuth token refresh, replacing the symlink with a regular file — this forks the credentials. Use scratch-home only with a dedicated OAuth or for ephemeral testing.
### Working directory
`TUI_CWD = OCP_TUI_CWD || $HOME/.ocp-tui/work` (dedicated scratch cwd). Transcripts land under `<HOME>/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/` — a stable, single location separate from the operator's real project histories. The directory is created automatically on first request.
### MCP hard-disable
`--strict-mcp-config` (no `--mcp-config` argument) prevents account-attached managed MCP servers from connecting. Belt-and-braces: `--disallowedTools 'mcp__*'` blocks any MCP tool invocation even if a server were somehow loaded. Built-in tools (Bash, Read, etc.) are left enabled on the A-path (single-user, acceptable).
### Session namespace
All tmux sessions use the prefix `ocp-tui-`. The prefix-scoped reaper (`reapStaleTuiSessions`) kills only `ocp-tui-*` sessions, never `olp-tui-*` or any other prefix. A stale-session cleanup runs once at OCP boot when `TUI_MODE` is on.
---
## SECURITY — PROMINENT WARNING
**TUI-mode is SINGLE-USER / SINGLE-OPERATOR ONLY.**
`claude` runs as the OCP process owner with full filesystem access regardless of `HOME` setting. Home selection is **not** user isolation. If OCP is serving multiple users or guest API keys:
- A guest prompt would run `claude` with the **operator's** filesystem access.
- An adversarial prompt could exfiltrate files, run shell commands, or exhaust the subscription.
**Never enable `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` on an OCP instance that serves untrusted callers or multiple users.**
The B-path (multi-tenant isolation) requires:
1. `--tools ""` (no built-in tools)
2. Per-key ephemeral `HOME` (isolated credentials + no cross-key project pollution)
3. Sandbox runtime (e.g. `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime`)
B-path is **deferred** and is not implemented in this ADR. Until B-path lands, TUI-mode must only be enabled on a personal single-user OCP.
---
## Consequences
### Positive
- After 2026-06-15, requests in TUI-mode bill against the Pro/Max subscription pool (`cc_entrypoint=cli`) rather than the Agent SDK credit pool.
- Kill-switch is immediate (unset env var + restart); zero code change required.
- Default stream-json path is untouched — no regression risk for existing deployments.
### Negative / trade-offs
- **No token streaming:** responses are buffered then replayed as chunked SSE. Clients see a delay then the full response arrives; real-time token streaming is not available in TUI-mode.
- **Billing unmeasurable until 2026-06-15:** the `cc_entrypoint=cli` signal is verified, but the credit deduction from the correct pool cannot be confirmed until the billing split activates.
- **tmux dependency:** the host must have `tmux` installed. CI / Docker images that lack tmux cannot use TUI-mode (the default stream-json path is unaffected).
- **Wall-clock cap:** long Opus thinking turns may hit the 120 s cap. Increase `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS` if needed (no quiescence heuristic — the reader polls until terminal marker or cap).
- **Grey-area usage:** running an interactive `claude` session headlessly to serve HTTP requests is not an officially documented use case. If Anthropic policy changes to block this pattern, OCP must fall back to the stream-json path (unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE`).
### Coexistence
- tmux prefix `ocp-tui-` is registered. Any co-hosted OLP test instance must use `olp-tui-`. Never run two TUI proxies on the same OAuth concurrently — stop one instance during integration testing.
---
## Provenance
TUI-mode originated in a prototype contributed via PR #101 (see the PR for author attribution). The productionization design is in `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-30-tui-mode-production-design.md`. Spikes S1S6 / T1T6 were validated live on the test host against `claude v2.1.158`.
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| [0003](0003-models-json-spot.md) | `models.json` as SPOT | Why model IDs / aliases / context windows live in a single JSON file (not duplicated in `server.mjs` and `setup.mjs` arrays). v3.11.0 refactor. |
| [0004](0004-openclaw-auto-sync.md) | OpenClaw Auto-Sync | Why `scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs` runs on `ocp update`, what its scope boundary is (writes only `models.providers["claude-local"].models` and `agents.defaults.models["claude-local/*"]`), and the idempotency contract. |
| [0005](0005-no-multi-provider.md) | No Multi-Provider | Why OCP stays single-provider (Anthropic-via-cli.js) and does not extend to OpenAI / Gemini / OpenRouter. Cost estimate: ~7 weeks for a v1 that buys neither moat nor commercial readiness. Separate commercial work starts in a separate repo. |
| [0006](0006-openai-shim-scope.md) | OpenAI Shim Scope | The Class A / Class B taxonomy. Class A endpoints (`cli.js`-mirror) keep Rules 15 verbatim; Class B endpoints (OCP-owned compatibility surface — `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/models`, admin endpoints) are anchored to OpenAI's spec (B.1) or to an authorizing ADR (B.2). Triggered by PR #99 (external `response_format` honoring). Grandfathers the existing B.2 inventory at v3.16.4. |
## When to write a new ADR
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# OpenAI Compatibility Pin (Class B.1)
**Status:** Placeholder — populated at first B.1 audit per ADR 0006 §"Class B audit cadence".
This file is the Class B.1 counterpart to the Class A `cli.js` audit pin in `ALIGNMENT.md` §"Golden Reference". When the first annual alignment audit covers Class B (per `ALIGNMENT.md` §"Annual Alignment Audit"), this file will be populated with:
- The OpenAI `/v1/chat/completions` specification snapshot date being audited against (and the source URL the snapshot was taken from).
- The list of B.1 endpoints (currently `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/models`) and, for each one, the specific OpenAI spec fields and behaviours it honors.
- Drift detection notes for any OpenAI spec changes since the previous audit, and any OCP code changes required to track those changes.
Until populated, this file's existence is only a forward reference so that the link in `ALIGNMENT.md` does not 404. The actual audit procedure is defined in `ALIGNMENT.md` §"Annual Alignment Audit" (Class B scope) and ADR 0006 §"Class B audit cadence".
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# OCP Anthropic-Only Sandbox Strategy — Handoff Document
**Status:** Forward-looking planning doc (not yet a decision)
**Date:** 2026-05-29
**Audience:** future OCP maintainer / session picking up multi-tenant security work
**Provenance:** authored during OLP Phase 7 PR-B re-evaluation; OLP's parallel analysis (multi-provider) lives at `dtzp555-max/olp` `docs/adr/0014-sandbox-runtime-integration.md` Amendment 1 (pending). This OCP-side doc strips the multi-LLM generalization and keeps only what applies to OCP's single-provider (anthropic) deployment.
---
## 1. Why this doc exists
OCP is in maintenance mode (per OLP ADR 0001 supersession of OCP ADR 0005). It is not under active development for new features. However, two things may eventually drive sandbox work in OCP:
1. **Multi-key OCP deployments.** `OCP_OWNER_TOKEN` + per-key cache namespace already shipped (OCP `lib/keys.mjs`). If multiple human users share an OCP instance, the same multi-tenant filesystem-isolation gap that motivated OLP Phase 7 also exists here.
2. **Cloud or shared-host OCP deployments.** Any deployment beyond "single user on their own machine" inherits the threat surface.
If/when that work starts, this doc is the prior-art capture so the maintainer doesn't repeat OLP's PR-B path (which has a documented dead-end — see § 3.2 below).
This doc is anthropic-only by design — codex/mistral/etc. multi-LLM concerns are out of scope per OCP ADR 0005.
---
## 2. The multi-tenant gap (OCP-specific)
OCP spawns `claude -p` as the OCP-process user. Every spawned claude instance runs with the OCP user's filesystem permissions. Consequences for a multi-key OCP deployment:
1. **Cross-key lateral read.** A prompt-injected `cat ~/.ocp/keys/<other-key>.json` reads any other key's manifest (token hash, owner_tier, providers_enabled — not catastrophic since it's only the *hash*, but still identity-attribution surface).
2. **OAuth credential exposure.** `~/.claude/.credentials.json` is the Anthropic OAuth refresh token. A prompt-injected read of this file = stealing the subscription that OCP exists to pool.
3. **SSH identity exposure.** `~/.ssh/id_*` reachable for lateral movement to other hosts the OCP user can reach.
4. **Other host secrets.** Anything else under the OCP user's home is reachable.
OCP's `ALIGNMENT.md` Class A/B endpoint discipline does not address this — that discipline is wire-level honesty (`cli.js` mirror), not host-level isolation.
The threat model assumes prompt-injection capability — any caller with a valid OCP key + ability to craft a prompt that elicits a tool call. Default `claude -p` mode includes Read/Bash/etc. tool descriptions in the system prompt; the model is **eager** to use them.
---
## 3. Why OLP Phase 7 PR-B is the wrong path to copy
OLP attempted to wrap `claude -p` spawn in `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime` (outer bubblewrap on Linux, sandbox-exec on macOS). This produced four binding problems documented during OLP's re-evaluation:
### 3.1 Anthropic's design doesn't expect external sandboxing
Per Anthropic's [engineering blog on Claude Code sandboxing](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/claude-code-sandboxing), `sandbox-runtime` is designed to be invoked **by claude code itself** to sandbox **its own** Bash tool / MCP servers / spawn children. It is **not** designed to sandbox claude code as an externally-wrapped process.
Concretely: claude CLI assumes it can freely read+write its own `$HOME`-derived paths (`~/.claude.json`, `~/.claude/.credentials.json`, `~/.config/claude/`, future state files). When wrapped in `bwrap --ro-bind / /`, those writes hit `EROFS` and claude silently exits with no stdout.
### 3.2 `~/.claude.json` upstream status is "closed not planned"
claude CLI writes `~/.claude.json` non-atomically at startup. Upstream issues #28842, #29162, #29217, #28837, #29051, #29250, #7243 all document this. **#29250 is closed as "not planned / duplicate"** — Anthropic is not going to make this file atomic-write because their mental model is that claude runs in an environment that can write its `$HOME`.
For OCP, this means: any outer-sandbox approach that uses `--ro-bind` on `$HOME` will be a **permanent maintenance treadmill** — every new claude CLI version that adds a state file outside the patched mount paths breaks OCP. OLP's PR-B fold-in tried to patch this by promoting `~/.claude/` to rw, which was insufficient (the actual file is `~/.claude.json` at $HOME root, not inside `~/.claude/`).
### 3.3 The threat model doesn't justify the cost
OCP is, per ADR 0005, a personal-and-family-scale tool. The realistic threat surface is misbehaving prompts from family members or self-injected via dependent agents, not adversarial external attackers. The blast radius of a successful cross-key read is bounded (token *hash*, OAuth that's pooled-by-design across all OCP keys).
A maintenance-mode project investing weeks into outer-sandboxing for a hypothetical threat is a poor cost/benefit. There are cheaper architectures (§ 4 below) that get most of the protection.
### 3.4 OLP-specific reason that does NOT apply to OCP
OLP also hit a multi-provider conflict: codex CLI has its own inner bubblewrap that breaks when wrapped in an outer bwrap (openai/codex#16018). **This is not an OCP concern** — OCP only spawns claude. So the multi-provider forcing function for OLP doesn't apply here. The other three reasons (§ 3.13.3) are sufficient on their own.
---
## 4. Three viable approaches for OCP
Ranked by "engineering cost vs isolation strength" — pick by deployment context.
### 4.1 Approach A — Ephemeral `$HOME` via env var (recommended starting point)
Per-spawn setup:
```
ephemeralRoot=/tmp/ocp-spawn/<keyId>/<reqId>/home
mkdir -p $ephemeralRoot/.claude
ln -s ~/.claude/.credentials.json $ephemeralRoot/.claude/.credentials.json
HOME=$ephemeralRoot claude -p --output-format stream-json ...
```
Mechanics:
- claude CLI uses Node's `os.homedir()` which reads `$HOME` env first.
- `~/.claude.json` written by claude on startup → lands in `/tmp/ocp-spawn/<keyId>/<reqId>/home/.claude.json` (tmpfs, discarded after spawn).
- `~/.claude/.credentials.json` is the OAuth file claude needs — symlinked in read-only from the real one.
- Any new state file claude CLI introduces in a future version → also lands in the ephemeral home, no patch needed.
Threat coverage:
- ✅ Solves EROFS upgrade tax permanently — any claude state-file location works because they all land in tmpfs.
- ✅ Cross-key OAuth credential isolation — keyA's ephemeral home has only keyA's symlink, but here the symlink target is the SAME real file because OCP shares OAuth (this is fine: shared OAuth is OCP's design, the symlink just keeps the file inaccessible via `cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json` from a different keyId's ephemeral root).
- ❌ Does NOT solve cross-key lateral filesystem read via absolute paths. A prompt-injected `cat /home/<ocp-user>/.ocp/keys/<otherKey>.json` still works — `os.homedir()` override doesn't affect absolute-path reads.
5-minute spike before adopting:
```bash
HOME=/tmp/fake-home-spike claude --print "echo PONG" --no-session-persistence 2>&1
ls -la /tmp/fake-home-spike # expect: .claude.json + .claude/ created here
find ~/.claude ~/.claude.json -newer /tmp/spike-marker 2>/dev/null # expect: empty
```
If claude falls back to `os.userInfo().homedir` (uses getpwuid_r, ignores HOME env), this approach degrades — fall back to Approach B.
**Engineering cost:** ~50 LOC in OCP's spawn pipeline (mkdir + symlink + env merge + cleanup-on-exit). No new dependencies.
### 4.2 Approach B — Outer bubblewrap with `--tmpfs $HOME` + `--ro-bind` credentials
```
bwrap \
--ro-bind / / \
--tmpfs /home/<ocp-user> \
--ro-bind /home/<ocp-user>/.claude/.credentials.json /home/<ocp-user>/.claude/.credentials.json \
--ro-bind /home/<ocp-user>/.ocp/keys/<thisKeyId>.json /home/<ocp-user>/.ocp/keys/<thisKeyId>.json \
--dev /dev --proc /proc --tmpfs /tmp \
claude -p ...
```
This is the canonical bwrap pattern (Flatpak uses exactly this for every sandboxed app — see [Bubblewrap ArchWiki Examples](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Bubblewrap/Examples)).
Threat coverage:
- ✅ Solves EROFS upgrade tax (tmpfs accepts any write path).
- ✅ Cross-key lateral read prevention — only the current key's manifest is bind-mounted in, others are simply absent from the sandbox view.
-`~/.ssh` and similar identity material absent from sandbox.
Trade-offs:
- bwrap dependency: install `bubblewrap` apt package on host.
- Bypasses `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime` library — direct bwrap arg composition. Worth it because sandbox-runtime's outer-wrap design is for short-lived claude-internal subprocesses, not long-running claude CLI itself (per § 3.1).
- macOS: not supported by bwrap (macOS would need separate `sandbox-exec` profile, ~50-100 LOC additional work). OCP cross-machine maintainer deploys mostly on Mac mini + Oracle ARM VM — both Linux on the cloud side, Mac mini side may remain unsandboxed if family-trust-zone.
**Engineering cost:** ~150 LOC for the spawn wrapper + deployment doc updates to require `apt install bubblewrap`. macOS support is a separate ~100 LOC if/when needed.
### 4.3 Approach C — OverlayFS lowerdir (read-only) + tmpfs upperdir (writable)
```
mount -t overlay overlay \
-o lowerdir=/home/<ocp-user>/.claude,upperdir=/tmp/ocp-spawn/<reqId>/upper,workdir=/tmp/ocp-spawn/<reqId>/work \
/tmp/ocp-spawn/<reqId>/merged-claude
HOME=/tmp/ocp-spawn/<reqId>/home claude -p ...
# After spawn: umount + rm -rf
```
Most elegant — claude sees a view identical to its real `~/.claude/`, all writes go to tmpfs upperdir, real `~/.claude/` is never touched.
Trade-offs:
- Requires `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or rootless-overlayfs (kernel ≥5.11 + user-ns enabled). OCP currently runs as the maintainer's user — no SYS_ADMIN — so this would require either running OCP as root (bad) or rootless-overlayfs setup.
- More moving parts (mount/umount per spawn, work-dir lifetime, cleanup-on-crash).
Better fit if OCP ever moves to a dedicated `ocp` system user with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` capability via systemd.
**Engineering cost:** ~120 LOC + kernel/permission preflight check.
---
## 5. Cross-key isolation orthogonal layer
The three approaches above all solve `~/.claude.json` EROFS + state-write isolation. None of them alone solve **cross-key lateral filesystem read via absolute paths** (e.g. prompt-injected `cat /home/<user>/.ocp/keys/<otherKey>.json`).
For that, two options compose with any of A/B/C:
### 5.1 Per-spawn `sandbox-runtime` customConfig with `denyRead`
`@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime`'s `wrapWithSandbox(command, binShell?, customConfig?, abortSignal?)` accepts per-call override:
```
const otherKeysWorkspaces = listAllKeyManifestsExcept(thisKeyId)
const wrapped = await SandboxManager.wrapWithSandbox(claudeCommand, undefined, {
filesystem: {
denyRead: [
...otherKeysWorkspaces, // all keys except current
'/home/<ocp-user>/.ssh',
'/home/<ocp-user>/.gnupg',
'/home/<ocp-user>/.aws',
],
allowWrite: [ephemeralRoot, '/tmp'],
},
})
```
This adds bwrap deny-paths per-spawn (after sandbox-runtime singleton init). Works in combination with Approach A (the `HOME` env-var override is independent of sandbox-runtime's restrictions).
Caveat: this re-introduces the outer-bwrap concern from § 3.1 — claude CLI is now wrapped after all. Mitigation: use this only for **cross-key isolation**, not for `$HOME` restriction. The `denyRead` paths are all outside `$HOME`, so claude's `~/.claude.json` write is unaffected.
### 5.2 Per-OS-user OCP spawning
Each OCP key gets a dedicated Linux user (`ocp-<keyId>`). Spawn claude as that user via `runuser` or `sudo -u`. OAuth credential shared via Linux group permissions or bind-mount.
True kernel-level uid isolation. Most robust answer for OCP-as-shared-host scenarios.
Trade-offs:
- Setup script complexity (one-time per key).
- Linux-only.
- Doesn't fit Mac mini deployment.
Best fit for a cloud OCP deployment where per-tenant trust isolation matters.
---
## 6. Trust model framing
OCP's authentication layer (`lib/keys.mjs`) provides **attribution** (per-key audit, per-key cache namespace). It does NOT, by itself, provide **isolation** (per-key trust boundary against prompt-injection lateral reads).
This distinction is worth making explicit in OCP's README "Security" section (it currently isn't). The three tiers:
| Tier | Trust Model | Sandbox requirement |
|---|---|---|
| **Single-user** | maintainer's own machine, single OCP token | None — system-user permissions are sufficient |
| **Family-trust-zone** | maintainer + family members on shared OCP instance, all parties trusted not to attack each other | Optional — Approach A (ephemeral $HOME) gives cleanup hygiene without changing trust assumptions |
| **Shared-host / cloud / external callers** | OCP keys handed to potentially-adversarial callers (CI runners, third-party agents, public demo) | Required — Approach B or C + § 5 cross-key isolation |
The current OCP deployment fits tier 1 or 2. The work in this doc applies only when promoting to tier 3.
---
## 7. Recommendation if/when this work starts
**Phase 1 — Approach A (ephemeral `$HOME`) only.**
- ~50 LOC, no apt deps, works on Mac mini + Linux
- Solves the EROFS upgrade tax structurally
- Closes cross-key OAuth-credential-file lateral read
- Cost-effective hygiene improvement
**Phase 2 — Approach B (outer bwrap) gated by deployment config.**
- Add `~/.ocp/config.json` field `security.sandbox: 'off' | 'tmpfs-home'`
- Default off (preserves Mac mini family deployment)
- Operator opts in on Linux cloud deployments
- Apt prereq documented in deployment guide
**Phase 3 — § 5 cross-key isolation (only if tier 3 deployment is planned).**
- Layer per-spawn customConfig denyRead OR per-OS-user spawning
- Treat as separate ADR amendment with its own threat-model evidence
**Skip Approach C** unless a future requirement forces overlay (low likelihood for OCP scope).
---
## 8. Authority citations
This doc claims findings about claude CLI / `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime` behavior. Sources for verification:
- [Anthropic engineering — Claude Code sandboxing](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/claude-code-sandboxing) (sandbox-runtime design intent)
- [Anthropic sandbox-runtime GitHub](https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime) (wrapWithSandbox API + customConfig per-call signature)
- [claude-code#29250 — `.claude.json` non-atomic-write closed-not-planned](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/29250)
- [claude-code#29162 — read-only `~/.claude.json` startup hang](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/29162)
- [claude-code#29217 — concurrent-write corruption](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/29217)
- [claude-code#28842 — Windows startup race](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/28842)
- [claude-code#7243 — "the .claude.json elephant in the room"](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/7243)
- [Bubblewrap README](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap)
- [Bubblewrap ArchWiki — Examples section, --tmpfs HOME pattern](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Bubblewrap/Examples)
- [Sandboxing CLI tools with Bubblewrap — botmonster](https://botmonster.com/self-hosting/sandbox-linux-apps-cli-tools-bubblewrap/)
- [OverlayFS kernel documentation](https://docs.kernel.org/filesystems/overlayfs.html)
- [OverlayFS ArchWiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Overlay_filesystem)
OLP's parallel work (multi-provider generalization of this strategy, including the codex inner-bwrap conflict that does not apply to OCP):
- `dtzp555-max/olp` `docs/adr/0014-sandbox-runtime-integration.md` (PR-B as-shipped) + Amendment 1 (pending — Solution 1 architecture)
- `dtzp555-max/olp` `docs/plans/cloud-deployment-family.md` § 5 (deployment-side trust tier mapping)
- archive branch `dtzp555-max/olp:phase-7-pr-b-outer-bwrap-snapshot` captures the outer-bwrap approach as snapshot if anyone wants to revisit it
---
## 9. What this doc is NOT
- Not an ADR. ADRs are decisions; this is a forward-facing strategy doc that becomes an ADR only when work starts and a decision is made.
- Not a binding spec. The three approaches are alternatives; the recommendation in § 7 is the maintainer's lean from prior-art analysis, not a constitution.
- Not authority for any code change. OCP `ALIGNMENT.md` still requires citation per Class A/B; no sandbox code lands without proper authority pinning when the work eventually starts.
- Not a security audit. The threat model is informal — based on prior-art search + incident memory from OLP's parallel session. A real cloud deployment should commission an independent threat model.
---
**Authors:** project maintainer (handoff prepared with AI drafting assistance during OLP Phase 7 PR-B re-evaluation, 2026-05-29).
@@ -0,0 +1,737 @@
# TUI-mode (OCP-first) Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Add an opt-in `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` to OCP that serves `/v1/chat/completions` by driving a *real interactive* `claude` session (no `-p`, no `--output-format`) so the request bills as `cc_entrypoint=cli` (subscription pool), reading the answer from claude's native JSONL transcript — while the default stream-json path stays byte-for-byte unchanged.
**Architecture:** Two new pure-ish modules under `lib/tui/` — a transcript **reader** (`transcript.mjs`, provider-agnostic, the shareable core) and a tmux **session driver** (`session.mjs`, OCP-specific). `server.mjs` gains a `callClaudeTui()` that returns `Promise<string>` and is gated into the existing dispatch by a single env flag; because OCP's entire downstream (singleflight → `setCachedResponse``completionResponse` / chunked-SSE-replay → `recordUsage`) already consumes a string from `callClaude`, TUI-mode is a drop-in. Streaming is buffered then replayed as chunked SSE (no token streaming — deliberately, "don't build fragile features").
**Tech Stack:** Node.js ESM (`.mjs`), `tmux` (interactive PTY host), `child_process` (`spawnSync`), `node:fs` polling (no `fs.watch`, no terminal-screen parsing). Test harness: `node test-features.mjs`.
**Source of truth for the TUI mechanism:** the OLP design spec `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-30-tui-mode-production-design.md` (CLI-level, applies to both projects) + its 6 validation spikes (S1S6, T1T6) run on PI231 against `claude v2.1.158`. This plan is the OCP-grounded execution of that spec.
---
## Why OCP-first / scope decisions (read before coding)
- **OCP-first** because OCP has the users and its compute path is `callClaude → Promise<string>`, a near-perfect impedance match for a reader that also returns a string. OLP would additionally need a string→IR-chunk-array adapter. OLP-sync is **deferred entirely until the post-2026-06-15 fork decision** — do not spend cycles keeping OLP's TUI in lockstep.
- **A-path only.** Single-user / multi-device on one subscription. No per-key ephemeral isolation, no multi-tenant. (That is the OLP B-path, deferred.)
- **A-path isolation = real `$HOME` + dedicated scratch cwd + `--strict-mcp-config`.** OCP has *no* ISOLATION contract and we do not build one. We run interactive `claude` in the operator's real home (OAuth + onboarding already valid) but in a **dedicated scratch working directory** (`OCP_TUI_CWD`, default `$HOME/.ocp-tui/work`) so transcripts land under one stable `projects/<cwd>` folder instead of polluting the operator's genuine project histories, and the trust-folder dialog is granted once.
- **One `claude` session per request.** OCP is stateless (full conversation re-serialized each request via `messagesToPrompt`). TUI-mode mirrors this: per request, start a fresh interactive session with a fresh `--session-id`, submit one serialized prompt, await turn completion, read the transcript, extract the latest assistant text, tear the session down. Warm-pool / large-paste optimizations are explicitly out of v1 scope.
- **Billing is unmeasurable until 2026-06-15.** Spike S1 proved the `cc_entrypoint=cli` *signal*, not the billed pool. The pre-6/15 deliverable is "a tested, working transport that emits `cli`"; 6/16 we flip the flag and measure with a documented kill-switch.
- **Coexistence rule (PI231 runs an OLP test instance too).** All tmux sessions use the prefix `ocp-tui-`; the reaper kills **only** `ocp-tui-*`, never `olp-tui-*`. Never run two TUI proxies on the same OAuth concurrently — stop the OLP test instance during OCP integration.
- **Provenance.** TUI-mode originated in OCP PR #101 (author courtesy: jaekwon-park <insainty21@gmail.com>). The PR #101 author should be credited + notified on the shipping PR.
---
## File Structure
| File | Responsibility | New/Modified |
|------|----------------|--------------|
| `lib/tui/transcript.mjs` | Pure transcript parsing + the polling reader. Returns the latest assistant text once the turn is terminal or the wall-clock cap elapses. Provider-agnostic — the shareable core. | **Create** |
| `lib/tui/session.mjs` | tmux session lifecycle: boot interactive `claude`, answer the trust dialog, submit the prompt (file → `"$(cat)"` paste → separate Enter), await the reader, tear down. Plus the prefix-scoped reaper. OCP-specific. | **Create** |
| `lib/tui/fixtures/` | Real transcript JSONL harvested from PI231 + a few hand-crafted edge cases, for the reader's unit tests. | **Create** |
| `server.mjs` | `callClaudeTui()` (`Promise<string>`); `streamStringAsSSE()` helper (DRY refactor of the cache-replay block); single-flag dispatch gates; reaper hook at boot; env consts. | **Modify** (`:258` env consts, `:1018``:1023` helpers, `:1467` dispatch, boot block) |
| `test-features.mjs` | Suite for the reader (fixtures, runs in CI) + a live-only guarded suite for the driver (`OCP_TUI_LIVE=1`, skipped in CI). | **Modify** |
| `docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md` | OCP ADR 0007 (OCP's next number) — TUI mode rationale, billing-signal authority, scope, kill-switch. | **Create** |
| `README.md` | New env vars (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE`, `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS`, `OCP_TUI_CWD`), a "Subscription-pool (TUI) mode" section, troubleshooting + kill-switch. | **Modify** |
| `CHANGELOG.md` | Unreleased entry. | **Modify** |
---
## PR-1 — Transcript reader (`lib/tui/transcript.mjs`)
The shareable core. Pure functions + a polling reader. Fully unit-testable from committed fixtures; needs PI231 only once, to harvest realistic fixtures.
### Task 0: Harvest real fixtures from PI231
**Files:**
- Create: `lib/tui/fixtures/complete-haiku.jsonl` (real, has `turn_duration`)
- Create: `lib/tui/fixtures/complete-sonnet-multiblock.jsonl` (real, multi content-block answer)
- [ ] **Step 1: Drive one real interactive turn on PI231 and copy its transcript**
On PI231 (the only box with an authenticated interactive `claude`), run a single interactive turn in a scratch cwd, then locate its transcript:
Run (on PI231):
```bash
SID=$(uuidgen)
mkdir -p ~/.ocp-tui/work
# drive one turn by hand in tmux OR reuse a transcript already produced by the S-spikes:
ls -t ~/.claude/projects/-home-*-.ocp-tui-work/*.jsonl 2>/dev/null | head
# pick one complete transcript (must contain a line with "subtype":"turn_duration")
```
Expected: at least one `.jsonl` file whose tail contains `{"type":"system","subtype":"turn_duration",...}`.
- [ ] **Step 2: Copy 2 real transcripts into the repo as fixtures, scrubbed**
Run (from the workstation):
```bash
scp pi231:'~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/<sid>.jsonl' lib/tui/fixtures/complete-haiku.jsonl
# Scrub: the transcript may contain the prompt/answer text only (no OAuth token — tokens
# live in ~/.claude/.credentials.json, NOT in projects/*.jsonl). Confirm no credential
# material before committing:
grep -iE "sk-ant|oat01|bearer|authorization" lib/tui/fixtures/*.jsonl && echo "STOP: scrub" || echo "clean"
```
Expected: `clean`. (Transcripts hold conversation content + metadata, never the bearer token. If a fixture's prompt text is sensitive, replace it with a benign hand-edited turn that keeps the JSON shape.)
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit the fixtures**
```bash
git add lib/tui/fixtures/complete-haiku.jsonl lib/tui/fixtures/complete-sonnet-multiblock.jsonl
git commit -m "test(tui): real claude transcript fixtures harvested from PI231 (v2.1.158)"
```
### Task 1: `encodeCwd` + `transcriptPath` (the path formula)
**Files:**
- Create: `lib/tui/transcript.mjs`
- Test: `test-features.mjs` (new Suite "TUI transcript")
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
Add to `test-features.mjs`:
```js
// ── Suite: TUI transcript reader ────────────────────────────────────────
import { encodeCwd, transcriptPath } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
test("encodeCwd replaces every slash incl. leading", () => {
assertEqual(encodeCwd("/home/u/.ocp-tui/work"), "-home-u-.ocp-tui-work");
});
test("transcriptPath composes EHOME/.claude/projects/<enc>/<sid>.jsonl", () => {
assertEqual(
transcriptPath("/home/u", "/home/u/.ocp-tui/work", "abc-123"),
"/home/u/.claude/projects/-home-u-.ocp-tui-work/abc-123.jsonl"
);
});
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "tui transcript\|Cannot find module"`
Expected: FAIL — `Cannot find module './lib/tui/transcript.mjs'`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Minimal implementation**
Create `lib/tui/transcript.mjs`:
```js
// Transcript reader for TUI-mode. Reads claude's native JSONL session transcript
// and returns the latest assistant turn's text once the turn is terminal.
//
// Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 — interactive session transcript at
// <HOME>/.claude/projects/<CWD with every "/" -> "-">/<--session-id>.jsonl
// Completion marker: a line {"type":"system","subtype":"turn_duration",...}.
// See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-30-tui-mode-production-design.md §4.
import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
// Project-dir encoding: every "/" -> "-" (including the leading slash).
export function encodeCwd(cwd) {
return cwd.replace(/\//g, "-");
}
export function transcriptPath(home, cwd, sessionId) {
return `${home}/.claude/projects/${encodeCwd(cwd)}/${sessionId}.jsonl`;
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "tui transcript"`
Expected: PASS for both cases.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add lib/tui/transcript.mjs test-features.mjs
git commit -m "feat(tui): transcript path formula (encodeCwd + transcriptPath)"
```
### Task 2: `parseTranscriptLines` + `isTerminalLine` + `extractLatestAssistantText`
**Files:**
- Modify: `lib/tui/transcript.mjs`
- Test: `test-features.mjs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing tests**
```js
import { parseTranscriptLines, isTerminalLine, extractLatestAssistantText } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
test("parseTranscriptLines skips blank + malformed/partial lines", () => {
const evs = parseTranscriptLines('{"a":1}\n\n{bad json\n{"b":2}\n');
assertEqual(evs.length, 2);
assertEqual(evs[1].b, 2);
});
test("isTerminalLine true on turn_duration", () => {
assertEqual(isTerminalLine({ type: "system", subtype: "turn_duration" }), true);
});
test("isTerminalLine true on stop_reason tool_use (message-wrapped + flat)", () => {
assertEqual(isTerminalLine({ type: "assistant", message: { stop_reason: "tool_use" } }), true);
assertEqual(isTerminalLine({ stop_reason: "tool_use" }), true);
});
test("isTerminalLine false on ordinary assistant/text lines", () => {
assertEqual(isTerminalLine({ type: "assistant", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "hi" }] } }), false);
});
test("extractLatestAssistantText concatenates text blocks of the LAST assistant turn", () => {
const evs = [
{ type: "assistant", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "first" }] } },
{ type: "user", message: { content: "..." } },
{ type: "assistant", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "A" }, { type: "thinking", thinking: "x" }, { type: "text", text: "B" }] } },
];
assertEqual(extractLatestAssistantText(evs), "AB");
});
test("real complete fixture yields non-empty text and is terminal", () => {
const evs = parseTranscriptLines(readFileSync("./lib/tui/fixtures/complete-haiku.jsonl", "utf8"));
assert(evs.some(isTerminalLine), "fixture must contain a terminal line");
assert(extractLatestAssistantText(evs).length > 0, "fixture must yield assistant text");
});
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "parseTranscript\|isTerminal\|extractLatest\|real complete fixture"`
Expected: FAIL — exports not defined.
- [ ] **Step 3: Minimal implementation** (append to `lib/tui/transcript.mjs`)
```js
// Parse NDJSON text into objects; skip blank lines and partial/forming lines
// (the live transcript is read mid-write, so the last line may be incomplete).
export function parseTranscriptLines(text) {
const out = [];
for (const line of text.split("\n")) {
const t = line.trim();
if (!t) continue;
try { out.push(JSON.parse(t)); } catch { /* partial line being written */ }
}
return out;
}
// A line marks the assistant turn complete when it is the turn_duration system
// event, or an assistant message that stopped to hand off to a tool.
export function isTerminalLine(obj) {
if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object") return false;
if (obj.type === "system" && obj.subtype === "turn_duration") return true;
const sr = (obj.message && obj.message.stop_reason) || obj.stop_reason;
return sr === "tool_use";
}
// Text of the LAST assistant turn: concatenate its text content blocks
// (ignore thinking/tool_use blocks). Later assistant entries overwrite earlier.
export function extractLatestAssistantText(events) {
let text = "";
for (const ev of events) {
if (!ev || ev.type !== "assistant") continue;
const content = ev.message && ev.message.content;
if (!Array.isArray(content)) continue;
const parts = content
.filter((b) => b && b.type === "text" && typeof b.text === "string")
.map((b) => b.text);
if (parts.length) text = parts.join("");
}
return text;
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -iE "parseTranscript|isTerminal|extractLatest|real complete fixture"`
Expected: all PASS.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add lib/tui/transcript.mjs test-features.mjs
git commit -m "feat(tui): transcript parsing + terminal detection + assistant-text extraction"
```
### Task 3: `readTuiTranscript` (the polling reader with wall-clock cap)
**Files:**
- Modify: `lib/tui/transcript.mjs`
- Test: `test-features.mjs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing tests**
```js
import { readTuiTranscript } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
test("readTuiTranscript returns assistant text when terminal marker present", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(`${tmpdir()}/tui-`);
const p = `${dir}/s.jsonl`;
writeFileSync(p, [
JSON.stringify({ type: "assistant", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "hello world" }] } }),
JSON.stringify({ type: "system", subtype: "turn_duration", durationMs: 1200 }),
].join("\n") + "\n");
const out = await readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, wallclockMs: 2000, pollMs: 50 });
assertEqual(out, "hello world");
});
test("readTuiTranscript honours wall-clock cap and returns partial text", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(`${tmpdir()}/tui-`);
const p = `${dir}/s.jsonl`;
writeFileSync(p, JSON.stringify({ type: "assistant", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "partial" }] } }) + "\n");
const out = await readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, wallclockMs: 300, pollMs: 50 }); // never terminal
assertEqual(out, "partial");
});
test("readTuiTranscript throws when no text and cap elapses", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(`${tmpdir()}/tui-`);
const p = `${dir}/missing.jsonl`; // file never appears
let threw = false;
try { await readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, wallclockMs: 200, pollMs: 50 }); }
catch { threw = true; }
assert(threw, "must throw on empty timeout");
});
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "readTuiTranscript"`
Expected: FAIL — export not defined.
- [ ] **Step 3: Minimal implementation** (append)
```js
// Block until the session transcript is terminal (turn_duration / tool_use) or
// the wall-clock cap elapses, polling the file (no fs.watch — robust over NFS /
// editors). Returns the latest assistant text. On cap with text, returns the
// partial text; on cap with no text at all, throws.
//
// No quiescence heuristic by design: a long Opus thinking turn stalls transcript
// growth and a "file stable for N s" rule would false-abort it (spec §4.3).
export async function readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, wallclockMs = 120000, pollMs = 250 }) {
const deadline = Date.now() + wallclockMs;
let lastText = "";
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
if (existsSync(p)) {
const events = parseTranscriptLines(readFileSync(p, "utf8"));
lastText = extractLatestAssistantText(events) || lastText;
if (events.some(isTerminalLine)) return lastText;
}
await sleep(pollMs);
}
if (lastText) return lastText;
throw new Error("tui_transcript_timeout: no assistant text within wallclock cap");
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "readTuiTranscript"`
Expected: all 3 PASS.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add lib/tui/transcript.mjs test-features.mjs
git commit -m "feat(tui): polling transcript reader with wall-clock cap (no quiescence)"
```
---
## PR-2 — Session driver (`lib/tui/session.mjs`)
tmux lifecycle + the validated submission recipe. Cannot be unit-tested without a live authenticated `claude`; tested by a live-only guarded suite that runs on PI231.
### Task 4: `reapStaleTuiSessions` (prefix-scoped reaper)
**Files:**
- Create: `lib/tui/session.mjs`
- Test: `test-features.mjs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test** (pure — no live claude; inject a fake tmux runner)
```js
import { reapStaleTuiSessions, SESSION_PREFIX } from "./lib/tui/session.mjs";
test("reaper kills ONLY ocp-tui- sessions, never olp-tui-", () => {
const killed = [];
const fakeTmux = (args) => {
if (args[0] === "list-sessions") return { status: 0, stdout: "ocp-tui-aaaa\nolp-tui-bbbb\nmisc\nocp-tui-cccc\n" };
if (args[0] === "kill-session") { killed.push(args[args.indexOf("-t") + 1]); return { status: 0 }; }
return { status: 0, stdout: "" };
};
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux: fakeTmux });
assertEqual(SESSION_PREFIX, "ocp-tui-");
assertEqual(n, 2);
assertEqual(killed.join(","), "ocp-tui-aaaa,ocp-tui-cccc");
});
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "reaper kills"`
Expected: FAIL — module/export missing.
- [ ] **Step 3: Minimal implementation**
Create `lib/tui/session.mjs`:
```js
// TUI-mode session driver: hosts an interactive `claude` in tmux, submits one
// serialized prompt, awaits the transcript reader, tears down. OCP-specific.
//
// Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 interactive mode (no -p / no --output-format
// => cc_entrypoint=cli). Submission recipe + dialog handling validated by spikes
// T3/T6 on PI231. See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-30-tui-mode-production-design.md.
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { transcriptPath, readTuiTranscript } from "./transcript.mjs";
export const SESSION_PREFIX = "ocp-tui-"; // per-proxy namespace (coexistence rule)
const TMUX = process.env.OCP_TUI_TMUX_BIN || "tmux";
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
const defaultTmux = (args, opts = {}) => spawnSync(TMUX, args, { encoding: "utf8", ...opts });
// Kill ONLY our own stale sessions. Scoped to SESSION_PREFIX so a co-hosted
// OLP test instance's `olp-tui-*` sessions are never touched.
export function reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux = defaultTmux } = {}) {
const r = tmux(["list-sessions", "-F", "#{session_name}"]);
if (!r || r.status !== 0) return 0; // no tmux server / no sessions
let killed = 0;
for (const name of String(r.stdout || "").split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)) {
if (name.startsWith(SESSION_PREFIX)) { tmux(["kill-session", "-t", name]); killed++; }
}
return killed;
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "reaper kills"`
Expected: PASS.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add lib/tui/session.mjs test-features.mjs
git commit -m "feat(tui): prefix-scoped session reaper (ocp-tui-* only)"
```
### Task 5: `runTuiTurn` (boot → trust dialog → paste → Enter → read → teardown)
**Files:**
- Modify: `lib/tui/session.mjs`
- Test: `test-features.mjs` (live-only, guarded by `OCP_TUI_LIVE=1`)
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the live-only guarded test** (skipped in CI; run on PI231)
```js
// Live-only: requires an authenticated interactive `claude`. Skipped unless OCP_TUI_LIVE=1.
if (process.env.OCP_TUI_LIVE === "1") {
test("runTuiTurn drives a real interactive turn and returns text", async () => {
const { runTuiTurn } = await import("./lib/tui/session.mjs");
const out = await runTuiTurn({
prompt: "Reply with exactly the word PONG and nothing else.",
model: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
claudeBin: process.env.OCP_TUI_CLAUDE_BIN || "claude",
home: process.env.HOME,
cwd: `${process.env.HOME}/.ocp-tui/work`,
wallclockMs: 120000,
});
assert(/PONG/i.test(out), `expected PONG, got: ${out.slice(0, 200)}`);
});
} else {
test("runTuiTurn (live) — SKIPPED (set OCP_TUI_LIVE=1 on PI231 to run)", () => { assert(true); });
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails** (on a box, with the flag)
Run (PI231): `OCP_TUI_LIVE=1 node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "runTuiTurn"`
Expected: FAIL — `runTuiTurn` not exported yet.
- [ ] **Step 3: Implementation** (append to `lib/tui/session.mjs`)
```js
// Boot wait + dialog timing. Conservative defaults validated on PI231; env-tunable.
const BOOT_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_BOOT_MS || "3500", 10);
const DIALOG_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_DIALOG_MS || "1200", 10);
const PASTE_SETTLE_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_PASTE_MS || "1800", 10);
const shq = (s) => `'${String(s).replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`; // single-quote for sh -c
// Build interactive claude argv: NO -p, NO --output-format (=> cc_entrypoint=cli).
// MCP hard-disabled: --strict-mcp-config (no --mcp-config) is the only mechanism
// that stops account-attached managed MCP from connecting (spec §5.2 / T6),
// belt-and-braces with --disallowedTools "mcp__*".
function buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId) {
return [
shq(claudeBin),
"--model", shq(model),
"--session-id", sessionId,
"--strict-mcp-config",
"--disallowedTools", shq("mcp__*"),
].join(" ");
}
export async function runTuiTurn({
prompt, model, claudeBin, home, cwd,
wallclockMs = 120000, tmux = defaultTmux,
}) {
const sessionId = randomUUID();
const tmuxName = SESSION_PREFIX + sessionId.slice(0, 8);
if (!existsSync(cwd)) mkdirSync(cwd, { recursive: true });
const tmpDir = mkdtempSync(`${tmpdir()}/ocp-tui-`);
const promptFile = `${tmpDir}/prompt.txt`;
writeFileSync(promptFile, prompt, { mode: 0o600 });
const env = { ...process.env, CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_OFFICIAL_MARKETPLACE_AUTOINSTALL: "1" };
delete env.CLAUDECODE; delete env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY; delete env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL; delete env.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN;
if (home) env.HOME = home;
try {
// 1. Boot the interactive session inside tmux, in the dedicated scratch cwd.
tmux(["new-session", "-d", "-s", tmuxName, "-x", "220", "-y", "50", "-c", cwd,
buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId)], { env });
await sleep(BOOT_MS);
// 2. Answer the trust-folder dialog defensively. The seeded bypass flag (if any)
// suppresses the *bypass-permissions* dialog but NOT the trust-folder dialog;
// "1" = "Yes, proceed". Harmless if the dialog is absent (cwd already trusted).
tmux(["send-keys", "-t", tmuxName, "1"]);
tmux(["send-keys", "-t", tmuxName, "Enter"]);
await sleep(DIALOG_MS);
// 3. Submit the prompt. Body is pasted via `"$(cat file)"` so the content never
// touches the command line (no shell injection from prompt text), then a
// SEPARATE Enter key event submits it (Ink #15553: literal "\n" in a paste
// does not submit; the Enter key event does).
spawnSync("sh", ["-c",
`${shq(TMUX)} send-keys -t ${shq(tmuxName)} -- "$(cat ${shq(promptFile)})"`],
{ env, encoding: "utf8" });
await sleep(PASTE_SETTLE_MS);
tmux(["send-keys", "-t", tmuxName, "Enter"]);
// 4. Read the answer from the native transcript.
const tpath = transcriptPath(home || process.env.HOME, cwd, sessionId);
return await readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: tpath, wallclockMs });
} finally {
// 5. Teardown — always. Kill the session, remove the temp prompt dir.
try { tmux(["kill-session", "-t", tmuxName]); } catch { /* already gone */ }
try { rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
}
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes** (PI231, live)
Run (PI231): `OCP_TUI_LIVE=1 node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | grep -i "runTuiTurn"`
Expected: PASS — output contains `PONG`. Also confirm no orphan sessions: `tmux ls 2>/dev/null | grep ocp-tui- || echo "clean"``clean`.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add lib/tui/session.mjs test-features.mjs
git commit -m "feat(tui): runTuiTurn — interactive session driver (boot/trust/paste/Enter/read/teardown)"
```
---
## PR-3 — Wiring into `server.mjs`
Gate TUI-mode behind one env flag. Default path (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` unset) stays byte-for-byte identical.
### Task 6: env consts + `streamStringAsSSE` DRY refactor
**Files:**
- Modify: `server.mjs` (env consts near `:275`; refactor cache-replay block `:1524``:1539` into a helper near `:1023`)
- [ ] **Step 1: Add TUI env consts + import** (near the other `const ... = process.env...` at `server.mjs:258``:275`)
```js
import { runTuiTurn, reapStaleTuiSessions } from "./lib/tui/session.mjs";
// TUI-mode (subscription-pool bridge). Opt-in; default OFF keeps stream-json path.
// Authority: docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md.
const TUI_MODE = process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_MODE === "true";
const TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS = parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS || "120000", 10);
const TUI_CWD = process.env.OCP_TUI_CWD || `${process.env.HOME}/.ocp-tui/work`;
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Extract the chunked-SSE-replay into a reusable helper** (near `completionResponse` at `:1023`)
```js
// Replay a complete string as a chunked SSE stream (80 codepoints/chunk).
// Extracted from the cache-hit replay block so TUI-mode streaming reuses it.
function streamStringAsSSE(res, id, model, content) {
const created = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/event-stream", "Cache-Control": "no-cache", "Connection": "keep-alive", "X-Accel-Buffering": "no" });
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { role: "assistant" }, finish_reason: null }] });
const CHUNK = 80;
const codepoints = Array.from(content);
for (let i = 0; i < codepoints.length; i += CHUNK) {
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { content: codepoints.slice(i, i + CHUNK).join("") }, finish_reason: null }] });
}
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }] });
res.write("data: [DONE]\n\n");
res.end();
}
```
- [ ] **Step 3: Point the cache-hit streaming replay (`:1524``:1539`) at the helper** (DRY — behavior identical)
Replace the inline block inside `if (stream) { ... }` of the cache hit with:
```js
if (stream) {
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
streamStringAsSSE(res, id, model, cached.response);
return;
} else {
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run the full suite to verify no regression**
Run: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | tail -3`
Expected: all existing tests PASS (the refactor is behavior-preserving; cache-replay covered by existing D3 tests).
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add server.mjs
git commit -m "refactor(server): extract streamStringAsSSE helper + add TUI env consts"
```
### Task 7: `callClaudeTui` + dispatch gates
**Files:**
- Modify: `server.mjs` (new `callClaudeTui` near `callClaude:735`; gates at the buffered dispatch `:1563`/`:1594` and streaming dispatch `:1551`)
- [ ] **Step 1: Add `callClaudeTui`** (near `callClaude`, after `:800`)
```js
// TUI-mode upstream: drive an interactive claude session, return the assistant
// text as a string — same contract as callClaude(), so all downstream
// (singleflight, cache write-back, completionResponse) is unchanged.
// System messages are rendered inline as [System] blocks by messagesToPrompt;
// we deliberately do NOT pass --system-prompt in interactive mode to avoid any
// flag that could perturb cc_entrypoint classification.
function callClaudeTui(model, messages, conversationId, keyName) {
const cliModel = MODEL_MAP[model] || model;
const prompt = messagesToPrompt(messages); // includes system as [System] inline
recordModelRequest(cliModel, prompt.length);
return runTuiTurn({
prompt, model: cliModel, claudeBin: CLAUDE,
home: process.env.HOME, cwd: TUI_CWD, wallclockMs: TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS,
}).then((text) => {
recordModelSuccess(cliModel, 0);
return text;
}).catch((err) => {
recordModelError(cliModel, false);
throw err;
});
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Gate the buffered dispatch** — at `server.mjs:1563``:1597`, replace the two `callClaude(...)` call sites (inside the singleflight closure and the cache-disabled fallback) with a selected upstream:
Add once, just before the `if (CACHE_TTL > 0 && req._cacheHash)` block (~`:1563`):
```js
const upstreamCall = TUI_MODE ? callClaudeTui : callClaude;
```
Then change `await callClaude(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName)``await upstreamCall(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName)` at **both** sites (`:1572` and `:1594`).
- [ ] **Step 3: Gate the streaming dispatch** — at `server.mjs:1551``:1553`, branch TUI streaming to buffer-then-replay:
```js
if (stream) {
if (TUI_MODE) {
// TUI has no token stream; buffer the turn, write-back to cache, replay as chunked SSE.
const t0Usage = Date.now();
try {
const content = await callClaudeTui(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName);
if (CACHE_TTL > 0 && req._cacheHash) {
try { setCachedResponse(req._cacheHash, model, content); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "cache_write_failed", { error: e.message }); }
}
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
streamStringAsSSE(res, id, model, content);
try { recordUsage({ keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, model, promptChars: messages.reduce((a, m) => a + (typeof m.content === "string" ? m.content.length : JSON.stringify(m.content).length), 0), responseChars: content.length, elapsedMs: Date.now() - t0Usage, success: true }); } catch {}
return;
} catch (err) {
if (res.headersSent || res.writableEnded || res.destroyed) { try { res.end(); } catch {}; return; }
const safeMessage = (err.message || "Internal error").replace(/\/[\w/.\-]+/g, "[path]");
return jsonResponse(res, 500, { error: { message: safeMessage, type: "proxy_error" } });
}
}
// Default: real stream-json streaming, unchanged.
return callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, { keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, cacheHash: req._cacheHash });
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Verify default path is untouched + TUI path selected only by flag**
Run: `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE= node -e "process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_MODE; import('./server.mjs')" 2>&1 | head -1 || true`
Then the regression suite: `node test-features.mjs 2>&1 | tail -3`
Expected: all PASS (no test sets `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE`, so `upstreamCall === callClaude` and streaming uses `callClaudeStreaming` — identical to today).
Live end-to-end (PI231, after Task 8 setup): with `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` start OCP and `curl` both `stream:false` and `stream:true`:
```bash
curl -s localhost:3456/v1/chat/completions -H "Authorization: Bearer <key>" \
-d '{"model":"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"say PONG"}]}' | head
```
Expected: a normal OpenAI completion whose content contains `PONG`. Cross-check on PI231 that the spawned `claude` had no `-p`/`--output-format` (`ps -ef | grep claude`).
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add server.mjs
git commit -m "feat(tui): gate interactive TUI upstream behind CLAUDE_TUI_MODE (buffered + streaming)"
```
### Task 8: reaper hook at boot + ADR + README + CHANGELOG
**Files:**
- Modify: `server.mjs` (boot block — call `reapStaleTuiSessions()` once on startup when `TUI_MODE`)
- Create: `docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md`
- Modify: `README.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`
- [ ] **Step 1: Reaper on boot** (in the server start/`listen` block)
```js
if (TUI_MODE) {
try { const n = reapStaleTuiSessions(); if (n) logEvent("info", "tui_reaped_stale_sessions", { count: n }); } catch {}
console.log(` TUI-mode: ON (interactive claude → cc_entrypoint=cli). cwd=${TUI_CWD} wallclock=${TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS}ms`);
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Write ADR 0007**`docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md`
Context: 2026-06-15 billing split routes by `cc_entrypoint`; `-p`/`--output-format``sdk-cli` (Agent SDK credit pool, ~$20 on Pro = unusable). Decision: opt-in interactive driver ⇒ `cli` (subscription pool). Authority: spec §1/§4, claude v2.1.158. Scope: A-path single-user; MCP hard-disabled via `--strict-mcp-config`. Kill-switch: unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` → stream-json path restored. Consequences: no token streaming (buffered+replayed); grey-area, billing unmeasurable until 6/15; reaper + tmux-prefix coexistence rules.
- [ ] **Step 3: README** — add `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE`, `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS`, `OCP_TUI_CWD` to the env-var table; add a "Subscription-pool (TUI) mode" section (what it is, opt-in, the 6/15 rationale, no-streaming caveat, the one-time `mkdir -p ~/.ocp-tui/work` + tmux dependency, and the `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` unset kill-switch).
- [ ] **Step 4: CHANGELOG** — Unreleased: `feat(tui): opt-in CLAUDE_TUI_MODE — serve via interactive claude (cc_entrypoint=cli / subscription pool); default stream-json path unchanged.`
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add server.mjs docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md README.md CHANGELOG.md
git commit -m "feat(tui): boot reaper + ADR 0007 + README + CHANGELOG (TUI-mode docs)"
```
---
## Integration & canary (post-implementation, on PI231)
1. Stop the OLP test instance (`:4567`) — clean shared OAuth + no tmux collision.
2. `git clone`/checkout this branch on PI231, `mkdir -p ~/.ocp-tui/work`, start OCP on `:3456` with `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true`.
3. Run the live driver suite: `OCP_TUI_LIVE=1 node test-features.mjs`.
4. End-to-end `curl` (buffered + streaming) through OCP; confirm spawned `claude` carries no `-p`/`--output-format`.
5. **Pre-6/15 deliverable = here.** Billing measurement waits for 6/15; document the kill-switch (unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE`).
---
## Self-Review (against spec + the OCP-first execution review)
- **Spec coverage:** transcript path formula (§4 → Task 1), parsing/terminal/extract (§4 → Task 2), polling reader + wall-clock cap + no-quiescence (§4.3 → Task 3), submission recipe file→paste→Enter (§5/T3 → Task 5), trust-dialog handling (§5.2 → Task 5), MCP disable `--strict-mcp-config` (§5.2/T6 → Tasks 5 & buildTuiCmd), string-contract drop-in (→ Tasks 67), kill-switch + default-path-sacred (→ Task 7 Step 4), coexistence prefix + reaper (→ Tasks 4 & 8). ✅
- **Review findings folded:** OCP-first string match (Task 7); no ephemeral-home, real-home + scratch cwd (scope §); reader-only sharing, driver forked (file table); tmux prefix + scoped reaper + never-both-on-OAuth (Task 4, Integration §1); `TIMEOUT=600000 > 120s` cap verified (no SIGKILL-mid-turn); `--strict-mcp-config` added (Task 5); provenance jaekwon-park (Why §). OLP-sync deferred. ✅
- **Placeholder scan:** none — every code step carries real code; every run step an exact command + expected output. ✅
- **Type consistency:** `runTuiTurn`/`reapStaleTuiSessions`/`SESSION_PREFIX` exported in Task 45 match imports in Task 68; `streamStringAsSSE(res, id, model, content)` defined Task 6, used Tasks 67; `callClaudeTui(model, messages, conversationId, keyName)` mirrors `callClaude`'s signature. ✅
- **Open item for integration:** confirm on PI231 that the seeded `~/.claude.json` is unnecessary for real-home A (onboarding already complete); if a bypass-permissions dialog *does* appear in real home, add a one-line seed step (`bypassPermissionsModeAccepted:true`) — but the driver already answers the trust dialog defensively, so the turn still completes.
+6 -2
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@
import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite";
import { randomBytes, createHash } from "node:crypto";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
import { mkdirSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs";
import { homedir } from "node:os";
const OCP_DIR = join(homedir(), ".ocp");
mkdirSync(OCP_DIR, { recursive: true });
mkdirSync(OCP_DIR, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
// Tighten the directory mode in case it already existed with broader permissions.
try { chmodSync(OCP_DIR, 0o700); } catch { /* ignore EPERM on pre-existing dirs */ }
const DB_PATH = join(OCP_DIR, "ocp.db");
let db;
@@ -18,6 +20,8 @@ export function getDb() {
db.exec("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL");
db.exec("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON");
initSchema();
// Tighten mode on the DB file (0600) after creation / first open.
try { chmodSync(DB_PATH, 0o600); } catch { /* ignore — same-user access still works */ }
}
return db;
}
+33
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@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
/**
* OCP shared constants — single source of truth.
*
* Any literal that appears in more than one place across server.mjs, setup.mjs,
* scripts/* belongs here so port-drift / URL-drift cascades cannot recur.
*
* Background: from 2026-05-08 (PR #71 dogfood accident) through 2026-05-13
* (v3.16.3) a single hardcoded "3478" in scripts/upgrade.mjs + scripts/doctor.mjs
* cascaded into every downstream config write, ultimately taking out the
* OpenClaw "大内总管" Telegram agent. See CHANGELOG v3.16.2 and v3.16.3.
*
* Adding a new constant: prefer ALL_CAPS_SNAKE_CASE. Document the consumers.
* If a literal is referenced from a shell script (ocp, ocp-connect, setup.sh)
* that can't import .mjs, add a `// keep in sync with lib/constants.mjs` note
* at the shell-script reference; CI grep prevents drift.
*/
// Default TCP port the OCP HTTP proxy listens on. Set by env CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT
// at runtime; this is the fallback when env is unset.
// Consumers: server.mjs, setup.mjs, scripts/upgrade.mjs, scripts/doctor.mjs,
// scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs. Shell scripts ocp / ocp-connect keep the literal
// "3456" in sync with this value (see CI gate in .github/workflows/alignment.yml).
export const DEFAULT_PORT = 3456;
// Localhost bind for client-side fetches (curl, health checks).
export const LOCAL_HOST = "127.0.0.1";
// OpenAI-compatible API base path appended to the proxy URL.
export const OPENAI_API_BASE = "/v1";
// Convenience: full local URL the OCP proxy listens on by default.
// scripts that want to probe locally can use this directly.
export const LOCAL_PROXY_URL = `http://${LOCAL_HOST}:${DEFAULT_PORT}`;
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+241
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@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
// TUI-mode session driver: hosts an interactive `claude` in tmux, submits one
// serialized prompt, awaits the transcript reader, tears down. OCP-specific.
//
// Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 interactive mode (no -p / no --output-format
// => cc_entrypoint=cli). Submission recipe validated by spikes T3/T6 on PI231.
// See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-30-tui-mode-production-design.md.
//
// Trust handling: rather than answer the trust-folder dialog interactively (which
// only appears on a cwd's FIRST encounter — sending a defensive "1" to an already
// trusted cwd would inject a stray prompt turn), we PRE-TRUST the scratch cwd by
// seeding <home>/.claude.json. Every turn then boots dialog-free and identical.
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, rmSync, statSync, renameSync, symlinkSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { readTuiTranscript } from "./transcript.mjs";
export const SESSION_PREFIX = "ocp-tui-"; // per-proxy namespace (coexistence rule)
const TMUX = process.env.OCP_TUI_TMUX_BIN || "tmux";
const defaultTmux = (args, opts = {}) =>
spawnSync(TMUX, args, { encoding: "utf8", ...opts });
// Kill ONLY our own stale sessions. Scoped to SESSION_PREFIX so a co-hosted
// OLP test instance's `olp-tui-*` sessions are never touched.
export function reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux = defaultTmux } = {}) {
const r = tmux(["list-sessions", "-F", "#{session_name}"]);
if (!r || r.status !== 0) return 0; // no tmux server / no sessions
let killed = 0;
for (const name of String(r.stdout || "").split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)) {
if (name.startsWith(SESSION_PREFIX)) {
tmux(["kill-session", "-t", name]);
killed++;
}
}
return killed;
}
// ── Task 5: runTuiTurn ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Boot + paste-settle timing. Conservative defaults validated on PI231; env-tunable.
const BOOT_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_BOOT_MS || "4000", 10);
const PASTE_SETTLE_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_PASTE_MS || "1800", 10);
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
// Single-quote escaper for sh -c arguments.
function shq(s) {
return `'${String(s).replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`;
}
// Pre-trust the scratch cwd by seeding the trust record in <home>/.claude.json so
// the trust-folder dialog never appears. Verified-live trust shape:
// projects["<cwd>"] = { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true, allowedTools: [], ... }
// Idempotent + best-effort: a missing/unreadable .claude.json must not abort a
// turn (a fresh cwd would then show the dialog once; the boot wait tolerates it).
// Must run BEFORE the session boots so claude reads the trusted record at startup.
export function ensureTuiCwdTrusted(home, cwd) {
if (!home || !cwd) return;
const path = `${home}/.claude.json`;
let j, mode;
try {
j = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));
mode = statSync(path).mode & 0o777;
} catch { return; }
j.projects = j.projects || {};
const entry = j.projects[cwd] || {};
if (entry.hasTrustDialogAccepted === true) return; // already trusted, no rewrite
entry.hasTrustDialogAccepted = true;
if (!Array.isArray(entry.allowedTools)) entry.allowedTools = [];
j.projects[cwd] = entry;
// Atomic write (temp + rename on the same fs), preserving mode, so a crash
// mid-write can never truncate the user's real ~/.claude.json. We seed ONLY the
// per-project trust flag — NOT bypassPermissionsModeAccepted: the driver never
// passes --dangerously-skip-permissions, so the bypass dialog cannot appear, and
// onboarding completion is an A-path precondition (the host already runs claude).
// NOTE: when the A-path moves to a dedicated scratch HOME (task #26), this writes
// a file we fully own, removing the real-config-mutation concern entirely.
try {
const tmp = `${path}.ocp-tui.${process.pid}.tmp`;
writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(j, null, 2), { mode });
renameSync(tmp, path);
} catch { /* best effort */ }
}
// Prepare the HOME claude runs under. Two modes:
// - real-home (tuiHome === realHome OR falsy): no isolation; just trust the cwd
// in the real ~/.claude.json. Opt in by setting OCP_TUI_HOME=$HOME.
// - scratch-home: a dedicated HOME that reuses the real OAuth via a SYMLINKED
// .credentials.json, with a seeded .claude.json (onboarded real config minus
// the user's project history; trusts only the scratch cwd) and its own
// projects/ dir — so the real ~/.claude is never mutated or polluted.
//
// ⚠️ CREDENTIAL CAVEAT (verified live): claude rewrites .credentials.json on token
// refresh, REPLACING the symlink with a regular-file copy → the scratch home then
// FORKS the OAuth credentials. Because OAuth refresh tokens rotate (single-use), a
// refresh in the scratch home can invalidate the token the user's real-home claude
// relies on. Therefore scratch-home is safe only with a DEDICATED OAuth or for
// ephemeral use; for a shared subscription prefer real-home (tuiHome===realHome),
// which shares one .credentials.json — identical to how OCP already spawns claude.
// Idempotent + best-effort: any failure degrades toward the dialog/cap, never
// corrupts. Run BEFORE the session boots.
export function prepareTuiHome(realHome, tuiHome, cwd) {
if (!tuiHome || tuiHome === realHome) { ensureTuiCwdTrusted(realHome, cwd); return; }
try {
const claudeDir = `${tuiHome}/.claude`;
mkdirSync(`${claudeDir}/projects`, { recursive: true });
// Symlink the real credentials (never copy the OAuth token); refresh if missing.
const link = `${claudeDir}/.credentials.json`;
if (!existsSync(link)) {
try { symlinkSync(`${realHome}/.claude/.credentials.json`, link); } catch { /* best effort */ }
}
// Seed .claude.json ONCE (if absent): start from the onboarded real config,
// drop the user's project history, trust only the scratch cwd. mode 0600.
const seedPath = `${tuiHome}/.claude.json`;
if (!existsSync(seedPath)) {
let base = {};
try { base = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${realHome}/.claude.json`, "utf8")); } catch { /* fresh */ }
base.hasCompletedOnboarding = true;
base.projects = { [cwd]: { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true, allowedTools: [] } };
writeFileSync(seedPath, JSON.stringify(base, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
}
} catch { /* best effort */ }
// Ensure the cwd is trusted in the scratch config (idempotent; atomic).
ensureTuiCwdTrusted(tuiHome, cwd);
}
// ── Billing-classifier labeling ─────────────────────────────────────────
// Resolve CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT on the spawn env per mode. ALWAYS deletes any
// inherited value first (so a stray entrypoint from OCP's own parent env can never
// leak into / mislabel the billing header). Then:
// "cli" (default) → set "cli": deterministic subscription-pool classification.
// HONEST ONLY because OCP's spawn is a genuine interactive PTY (tmux pane,
// no -p, stdout not redirected). Never set "cli" on a non-interactive spawn.
// "auto" → leave unset → claude self-classifies via its t$A (TTY → cli). Use to
// observe/diagnose the real TTY-derived value.
// "off" → leave the env exactly as inherited (diagnostics / honesty audit).
export function resolveTuiEntrypointEnv(env, mode = "cli") {
if (mode === "off") return env;
delete env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT;
if (mode === "cli") env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT = "cli";
return env;
}
// Build interactive claude argv: NO -p, NO --output-format (=> cc_entrypoint=cli).
// MCP hard-disabled: --strict-mcp-config (no --mcp-config) is the only mechanism
// that stops account-attached managed MCP from connecting (spec §5.2 / T6),
// belt-and-braces with --disallowedTools "mcp__*".
// A-PATH ONLY: built-in tools are left enabled (acceptable single-user). Deployment B
// (guest keys) MUST additionally pass --tools "" per spec §5.2(2) as the credential
// wall before this argv is reachable for owner_tier=guest — guard that in PR-3 wiring.
function buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId) {
return [
shq(claudeBin),
"--model", shq(model),
"--session-id", sessionId,
"--strict-mcp-config",
"--disallowedTools", shq("mcp__*"),
].join(" ");
}
// Full per-request TUI lifecycle:
// 1. Pre-trust the scratch cwd (no trust dialog will appear).
// 2. Write prompt to a 0600 temp file (no shell injection from prompt content).
// 3. Boot an interactive `claude` in a fresh tmux session in the scratch cwd.
// 4. Submit the prompt via `send-keys -- "$(cat file)"` + a SEPARATE Enter key
// event (spec §5 / T3: literal "\n" in paste does NOT submit; Enter token does).
// 5. Block on the native JSONL transcript (located by session-id) until terminal
// marker or wall-clock cap.
// 6. Always teardown: kill session + rm temp dir (even on throw).
export async function runTuiTurn({
prompt,
model,
claudeBin,
home,
realHome,
cwd,
wallclockMs = 120000,
entrypointMode = "cli",
tmux = defaultTmux,
}) {
const sessionId = randomUUID();
const tmuxName = SESSION_PREFIX + sessionId.slice(0, 8);
const ehome = home || process.env.HOME; // HOME claude runs under (scratch or real)
const rhome = realHome || process.env.HOME; // real home (OAuth + onboarded config source)
// Ensure scratch cwd exists, then prepare the (scratch or real) HOME + trust the
// cwd — before claude boots.
if (!existsSync(cwd)) mkdirSync(cwd, { recursive: true });
prepareTuiHome(rhome, ehome, cwd);
// Write prompt to a temp file (mode 0600) so the content never touches argv.
const tmpDir = mkdtempSync(`${tmpdir()}/ocp-tui-`);
const promptFile = `${tmpDir}/prompt.txt`;
writeFileSync(promptFile, prompt, { mode: 0o600 });
// Build the env: disable marketplace auto-install, strip any Anthropic / CC
// env vars that might interfere with interactive-mode classification.
const env = { ...process.env, CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_OFFICIAL_MARKETPLACE_AUTOINSTALL: "1" };
delete env.CLAUDECODE;
delete env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY;
delete env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL;
delete env.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN;
env.HOME = ehome; // claude reads credentials + writes the transcript under this HOME
resolveTuiEntrypointEnv(env, entrypointMode);
try {
// 1. Boot the interactive session inside tmux, rooted at the scratch cwd.
// Capture the result: if tmux new-session fails (status !== 0) there is no
// PTY, no interactive spawn — abort BEFORE the boot sleep rather than paste
// into a non-existent session or issue a billing request without a verified
// interactive context. The finally teardown is still harmless (kill-session
// is a no-op when the session never existed).
const spawnResult = tmux(
["new-session", "-d", "-s", tmuxName, "-x", "220", "-y", "50", "-c", cwd,
buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId)],
{ env },
);
if (!spawnResult || spawnResult.status !== 0) {
throw new Error("tui_spawn_failed: tmux session not created");
}
await sleep(BOOT_MS);
// 2. Submit prompt body via `"$(cat file)"` — byte-safe for any content —
// then settle, then send a SEPARATE Enter key event to submit the line.
spawnSync(
"sh",
["-c", `${shq(TMUX)} send-keys -t ${shq(tmuxName)} -- "$(cat ${shq(promptFile)})"`],
{ env, encoding: "utf8" },
);
await sleep(PASTE_SETTLE_MS);
tmux(["send-keys", "-t", tmuxName, "Enter"]);
// 3. Block on the native transcript (resolved by session-id) until terminal.
return await readTuiTranscript({ home: ehome, sessionId, wallclockMs });
} finally {
// 4. Teardown — always, even on throw.
try { tmux(["kill-session", "-t", tmuxName]); } catch { /* already gone */ }
try { rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
}
}
+123
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
// Transcript reader for TUI-mode. Reads claude's native JSONL session transcript
// and returns the latest assistant turn's text once the turn is terminal.
//
// Authority: claude CLI v2.1.157 — interactive session transcript at
// <HOME>/.claude/projects/<CWD with every "/" -> "-">/<--session-id>.jsonl
// Completion marker: a line {"type":"system","subtype":"turn_duration",...}.
// See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-30-tui-mode-production-design.md §4.
import { readFileSync, existsSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
// Project-dir encoding: claude replaces every "/" AND every "." with "-".
// Verified live (claude v2.1.158): cwd /home/u/.ocp-tui/work is stored under
// projects/-home-u--ocp-tui-work/ (the "." in ".ocp-tui" becomes "-", yielding
// the double dash). The earlier "/"-only rule was wrong for dotted paths; the
// fixture cwd /tmp/tui-test happened to have no dots so it never surfaced.
// NOTE: prefer findTranscriptPath() (glob by session-id) for resolution — it is
// immune to the exact encoding rule. This helper is kept for the known-path case.
export function encodeCwd(cwd) {
return cwd.replace(/[/.]/g, "-");
}
export function transcriptPath(home, cwd, sessionId) {
return `${home}/.claude/projects/${encodeCwd(cwd)}/${sessionId}.jsonl`;
}
// Locate a session's transcript by its UUID across every projects subdir, without
// reconstructing the encoded cwd. Robust to whatever encoding claude applies.
// Returns the path, or null if not present yet (it appears once the turn starts).
export function findTranscriptPath(home, sessionId) {
if (!home || !sessionId) return null;
const root = `${home}/.claude/projects`;
let dirs;
try { dirs = readdirSync(root); } catch { return null; }
for (const d of dirs) {
const candidate = `${root}/${d}/${sessionId}.jsonl`;
if (existsSync(candidate)) return candidate;
}
return null;
}
// Parse NDJSON text into objects; skip blank lines and partial/forming lines
// (the live transcript is read mid-write, so the last line may be incomplete).
export function parseTranscriptLines(text) {
const out = [];
for (const line of text.split("\n")) {
const t = line.trim();
if (!t) continue;
try { out.push(JSON.parse(t)); } catch { /* partial line being written */ }
}
return out;
}
// A line marks the assistant turn complete when it is the turn_duration system
// event, or an assistant message that stopped to hand off to a tool.
export function isTerminalLine(obj) {
if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object") return false;
if (obj.type === "system" && obj.subtype === "turn_duration") return true;
const sr = (obj.message && obj.message.stop_reason) || obj.stop_reason;
return sr === "tool_use";
}
// Text of the LAST assistant turn: concatenate its text content blocks
// (ignore thinking/tool_use blocks). Later assistant entries overwrite earlier.
// Fixture-confirmed shape: top-level type:"assistant", message.content[] array.
//
// Scoping: this returns the FINAL text-bearing assistant entry in the whole file,
// not "text since the matching user line" (spec §4.2). Those are equivalent ONLY
// under OCP's one-session-per-request model (a fresh --session-id => a fresh
// transcript holding one logical exchange). If a future warm-pool ever reuses a
// session WITHOUT a fresh session-id / clear, earlier-turn text could leak — that
// author must add user-line scoping here. See spec §7.2.
export function extractLatestAssistantText(events) {
let text = "";
for (const ev of events) {
if (!ev || ev.type !== "assistant") continue;
const content = ev.message && ev.message.content;
if (!Array.isArray(content)) continue;
const parts = content
.filter((b) => b && b.type === "text" && typeof b.text === "string")
.map((b) => b.text);
if (parts.length) text = parts.join("");
}
return text;
}
// Returns the entrypoint string from the turn_duration line (e.g. "cli"),
// or null if absent. Lets callers assert the subscription-classified path.
// Fixture-confirmed: entrypoint field lives directly on the turn_duration line.
export function verifyEntrypoint(events) {
for (const ev of events) {
if (ev && ev.type === "system" && ev.subtype === "turn_duration") {
return ev.entrypoint != null ? ev.entrypoint : null;
}
}
return null;
}
// Block until the session transcript is terminal (turn_duration / tool_use) or
// the wall-clock cap elapses, polling the file (no fs.watch — robust over NFS /
// editors). Returns the latest assistant text. On cap with text, returns the
// partial text; on cap with no text at all, throws.
//
// No quiescence heuristic by design: a long Opus thinking turn stalls transcript
// growth and a "file stable for N s" rule would false-abort it (spec §4.3).
// Resolution: pass an explicit `transcriptPath` (used by unit tests), OR pass
// `home` + `sessionId` to resolve by glob each poll (production) — the transcript
// file does not exist until the turn starts, so resolution happens inside the loop.
export async function readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, home, sessionId, wallclockMs = 120000, pollMs = 250 }) {
const deadline = Date.now() + wallclockMs;
let lastText = "";
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
const resolved = p || findTranscriptPath(home, sessionId);
if (resolved && existsSync(resolved)) {
const events = parseTranscriptLines(readFileSync(resolved, "utf8"));
lastText = extractLatestAssistantText(events) || lastText;
if (events.some(isTerminalLine)) return lastText;
}
await sleep(pollMs);
}
if (lastText) return lastText;
throw new Error("tui_transcript_timeout: no assistant text within wallclock cap");
}
+9 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@
"$schema": "./models.schema.json",
"version": 1,
"models": [
{
"id": "claude-opus-4-8",
"displayName": "Claude Opus 4.8",
"openclawName": "Claude Opus 4.8 (via CLI)",
"reasoning": true,
"contextWindow": 200000,
"maxTokens": 16384
},
{
"id": "claude-opus-4-7",
"displayName": "Claude Opus 4.7",
@@ -36,7 +44,7 @@
}
],
"aliases": {
"opus": "claude-opus-4-7",
"opus": "claude-opus-4-8",
"sonnet": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"haiku": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"
},
+87 -46
View File
@@ -8,21 +8,18 @@ set -euo pipefail
PROXY="http://127.0.0.1:3456"
# Auth header for multi-key mode: reads from OCP_ADMIN_KEY env or ~/.ocp/admin-key file
_AUTH_HEADER=""
# Auth args for multi-key mode: reads from OCP_ADMIN_KEY env or ~/.ocp/admin-key file
# Using a bash array preserves word boundaries — no eval needed.
_AUTH_ARGS=()
if [[ -n "${OCP_ADMIN_KEY:-}" ]]; then
_AUTH_HEADER="-H \"Authorization: Bearer $OCP_ADMIN_KEY\""
_AUTH_ARGS=(-H "Authorization: Bearer $OCP_ADMIN_KEY")
elif [[ -f "$HOME/.ocp/admin-key" ]]; then
_AUTH_HEADER="-H \"Authorization: Bearer $(cat "$HOME/.ocp/admin-key")\""
_AUTH_ARGS=(-H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat "$HOME/.ocp/admin-key")")
fi
# Wrapper: curl with optional auth
_curl() {
if [[ -n "$_AUTH_HEADER" ]]; then
eval curl "$_AUTH_HEADER" "$@"
else
curl "$@"
fi
curl "${_AUTH_ARGS[@]}" "$@"
}
_json() { python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null || cat; }
@@ -695,25 +692,35 @@ for e in d.get('errors', []):
# ── update ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
cmd_update_help() {
cat <<'EOF'
ocp update — Update OCP to the latest version
ocp update — Smart upgrade dispatcher
Pulls the latest code from GitHub, restarts the proxy service,
and optionally syncs the plugin to the OpenClaw extensions directory.
Runs `ocp doctor` internally to choose the right path:
• Patch bump (same minor): light path (git pull + npm install + restart)
• Cross-minor (e.g. v3.10→v3.14): full path with snapshot + post-flight
• Old version (< v3.4.0): fresh-install (asks first; AI passes --yes)
Usage:
ocp update Pull latest and restart
ocp update --check Check for updates without applying
ocp update Smart auto-pick path
ocp update --check Show available updates, don't apply
ocp update --dry-run Preview the plan, don't mutate
ocp update --target v3.13.0 Pin a specific version
ocp update --yes Skip y/N prompts (AI agents pass this)
ocp update --rollback Restore the most recent upgrade snapshot
ocp update --rollback --list List available snapshots
ocp update --rollback <path> Restore a specific snapshot
ocp update --rollback --dry-run Preview rollback plan
ocp update --rollback --gc Delete old snapshots (keep last 5, or <30 days)
ocp update --rollback --gc --dry-run Preview what would be deleted
EOF
}
cmd_update() {
local script_dir self
self="${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"
# Resolve symlinks (e.g. ~/.local/bin/ocp → real location)
while [[ -L "$self" ]]; do self="$(readlink "$self")"; done
script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "$self")" && pwd)"
# Check-only mode
# Pass through --check fast path (existing behaviour)
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--check" ]]; then
cd "$script_dir"
git fetch origin main --quiet 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -730,71 +737,104 @@ cmd_update() {
echo " Status: ✓ Up to date"
else
echo " Status: $behind commit(s) behind"
echo ""
echo " Run 'ocp update' to apply."
fi
return 0
fi
echo "Updating OCP..."
echo ""
# Rollback path
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--rollback" ]]; then
shift
exec node "$script_dir/scripts/upgrade.mjs" --rollback "$@"
fi
# 1. Pull latest
# Doctor-driven path selection
local kind
kind=$(node "$script_dir/scripts/doctor.mjs" --json 2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['next_action']['kind'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
case "$kind" in
noop)
echo "Already at latest. Nothing to do."
return 0
;;
update)
_cmd_update_light "$script_dir"
;;
upgrade|fresh_install)
exec node "$script_dir/scripts/upgrade.mjs" "$@"
;;
fix_oauth|fix_service)
echo "Pre-upgrade check failed: $kind"
echo "Run \`ocp doctor\` for details and ai_executable steps."
return 1
;;
*)
echo "Unknown doctor kind: $kind. Run \`ocp doctor --json\` to inspect."
return 1
;;
esac
}
# Existing light-path body extracted into a helper so cmd_update can call it conditionally.
_cmd_update_light() {
local script_dir="$1"
echo "Updating OCP (light path)..."
cd "$script_dir"
local old_ver
local old_ver new_ver
old_ver=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('package.json'))['version'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "?")
echo " Pulling latest from GitHub..."
if ! git pull origin main --ff-only 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ /'; then
echo " ✗ Git pull failed. Resolve conflicts manually in: $script_dir"
return 1
fi
local new_ver
new_ver=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('package.json'))['version'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "?")
if [[ "$old_ver" == "$new_ver" ]]; then
echo " ✓ Already at latest (v$new_ver)"
else
echo " ✓ Updated v$old_ver → v$new_ver"
fi
# 2. Sync plugin to extensions dir
# Sync plugin (existing logic preserved)
local ext_dir="$HOME/.openclaw/extensions/ocp"
if [[ -d "$ext_dir" && -d "$script_dir/ocp-plugin" ]]; then
echo ""
echo " Syncing OCP plugin..."
cp "$script_dir/ocp-plugin/index.js" "$ext_dir/index.js" 2>/dev/null
cp "$script_dir/ocp-plugin/package.json" "$ext_dir/package.json" 2>/dev/null
cp "$script_dir/ocp-plugin/openclaw.plugin.json" "$ext_dir/openclaw.plugin.json" 2>/dev/null
echo " ✓ Plugin synced to $ext_dir"
echo " ✓ Plugin synced"
fi
# 3. Sync OpenClaw registry from models.json (non-fatal)
if command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1 && [[ -f "$script_dir/scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs" ]]; then
echo ""
echo " Syncing OpenClaw registry..."
if ! node "$script_dir/scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ /'; then
echo " ⚠ OpenClaw sync failed (non-fatal, continuing)"
fi
node "$script_dir/scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ /' || echo " ⚠ OpenClaw sync failed (non-fatal)"
fi
# 4. Restart proxy
echo ""
echo " Restarting proxy..."
cmd_restart > /dev/null 2>&1
sleep 2
}
if curl -sf --max-time 5 "$PROXY/health" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
local running_ver
running_ver=$(curl -sf --max-time 5 "$PROXY/health" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read())['version'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "?")
echo " ✓ Proxy running (v$running_ver)"
else
echo " ⚠ Proxy not responding — check: ocp health"
fi
cmd_doctor_help() {
cat <<'EOF'
ocp doctor — Health & upgrade-readiness check
echo ""
echo "Done."
Runs a series of checks (Node version, git state, service health,
OAuth token, plist customisation, OpenClaw provider) and emits either
human-readable PASS/WARN/FAIL output or a JSON next_action that
AI agents can execute.
Usage:
ocp doctor Human-readable output
ocp doctor --json JSON for AI agents and ocp update internal use
ocp doctor --check oauth Fast path: OAuth check only
EOF
}
cmd_doctor() {
local script_dir self
self="${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"
while [[ -L "$self" ]]; do self="$(readlink "$self")"; done
script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "$self")" && pwd)"
exec node "$script_dir/scripts/doctor.mjs" "$@"
}
# ── help ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -862,6 +902,7 @@ case "$subcmd" in
lan) cmd_lan ;;
connect) cmd_connect "$@" ;;
restart) cmd_restart "${1:-}" ;;
update) cmd_update "${1:-}" ;;
doctor) cmd_doctor "$@" ;;
update) cmd_update "$@" ;;
*) echo "Unknown command: $subcmd"; echo ""; cmd_help; exit 1 ;;
esac
+13 -3
View File
@@ -582,11 +582,19 @@ print(k if k else '')
if [[ "${SHELL:-}" == */fish ]]; then
echo " Note: fish shell detected. Writing to ~/.bashrc — add to fish config manually."
rc_files+=("$HOME/.bashrc")
elif $is_mac; then
# macOS: default shell since Catalina (2019) is zsh.
# Always write ~/.zshrc (create if absent — zsh tolerates an empty file).
# Only write ~/.bashrc if it already exists (don't surprise users with new files).
[[ -f "$HOME/.bashrc" ]] && rc_files+=("$HOME/.bashrc")
# zshrc: always include on macOS; create the file if it doesn't exist yet
[[ -f "$HOME/.zshrc" ]] || touch "$HOME/.zshrc"
rc_files+=("$HOME/.zshrc")
else
# Always write both on macOS (default shell is zsh but some tools source bashrc)
# Linux / other: write to whichever rc files already exist or match current shell
[[ -f "$HOME/.bashrc" || "${SHELL:-}" == */bash ]] && rc_files+=("$HOME/.bashrc")
[[ -f "$HOME/.zshrc" || "${SHELL:-}" == */zsh ]] && rc_files+=("$HOME/.zshrc")
# If neither exists, create for current shell
# If neither exists, fall back to creating one for the current shell
[[ ${#rc_files[@]} -eq 0 ]] && rc_files+=("$HOME/.${SHELL##*/}rc")
fi
@@ -705,7 +713,9 @@ PYEOF
echo ""
echo " Done. Reload your shell to apply:"
echo " source $rc_file"
for rc_file in "${rc_files[@]}"; do
echo " source $rc_file"
done
}
main "$@"
+13 -3
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
/**
* OCP Plugin — registers /ocp as a native slash command in OpenClaw gateway.
* Calls the local claude-proxy at http://127.0.0.1:3456 and formats the response.
* Calls the local claude-proxy and formats the response.
*
* Port resolution (in priority order):
* 1. OCP_PROXY_URL env (full URL, e.g. http://10.0.0.5:3456)
* 2. CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT env (port only; localhost assumed)
* 3. Fallback: http://127.0.0.1:3456 (OCP server source default since v1.0)
*
* If a particular host's OCP plist injects a non-default CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT,
* the OpenClaw launchd plist for that host must also inject the same
* CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT into the plugin's env, or the plugin will fall back to
* 3456 and miss the server.
*/
const PROXY = "http://127.0.0.1:3456";
const PROXY = process.env.OCP_PROXY_URL
|| (process.env.CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT ? `http://127.0.0.1:${process.env.CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT}` : "http://127.0.0.1:3456");
// Wrap output in monospace code block for Telegram/Discord alignment
function mono(text) { return "```\n" + text + "\n```"; }
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"id": "ocp",
"name": "OCP Commands",
"description": "Slash commands for the OpenClaw Proxy — /ocp usage, /ocp settings, /ocp health, etc.",
"version": "3.12.0",
"version": "3.16.2",
"configSchema": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
"proxyUrl": {
"type": "string",
"default": "http://127.0.0.1:3456",
"description": "URL of the Claude proxy"
"description": "URL of the Claude proxy. Overridable via OCP_PROXY_URL or CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT env."
}
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "open-claude-proxy",
"version": "3.13.0",
"version": "3.17.0",
"description": "OCP (Open Claude Proxy) — use your Claude Pro/Max subscription as an OpenAI-compatible API for any IDE. Works with Cline, OpenCode, Aider, Continue.dev, OpenClaw, and more.",
"type": "module",
"bin": {
+301
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* scripts/doctor.mjs — OCP health & upgrade-readiness check.
*
* Usage:
* ocp doctor human-readable PASS/WARN/FAIL
* ocp doctor --json machine-readable JSON for AI agents + ocp update
* ocp doctor --check oauth fast path: only OAuth check
*
* Exit codes:
* 0 all PASS or WARN-only
* 1 any FAIL
*/
import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { DEFAULT_PORT } from "../lib/constants.mjs";
const SCHEMA_VERSION = "1";
function semverParts(v) {
const m = String(v).replace(/^v/, "").match(/^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)/);
if (!m) return null;
return { major: +m[1], minor: +m[2], patch: +m[3] };
}
function semverCompare(a, b) {
const A = semverParts(a), B = semverParts(b);
if (!A || !B) return 0;
if (A.major !== B.major) return A.major - B.major;
if (A.minor !== B.minor) return A.minor - B.minor;
return A.patch - B.patch;
}
export async function runDoctor(opts = {}) {
const checks = [];
const push = (id, level, message, extra = {}) =>
checks.push({ id, level, message, ...extra });
// --- fast path: --check oauth ---
if (opts.checkOnly === "oauth") {
return runOauthOnly(opts, checks, push);
}
// --- version detection ---
const ocpDir = opts.ocpDir || join(homedir(), "ocp");
let currentVersion = opts.mockVersion;
if (!currentVersion) {
try {
const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(ocpDir, "package.json"), "utf8"));
currentVersion = `v${pkg.version}`;
} catch {
currentVersion = "unknown";
}
}
// Resolve latest from origin/main (cheap: `git show origin/main:package.json`).
// Falls back to current_version when network/git unavailable, so kind = noop instead
// of recommending a downgrade against a stale hardcoded value.
let latestVersion = opts.mockLatest;
if (!latestVersion) {
try {
const out = execSync(`git -C ${ocpDir} show origin/main:package.json 2>/dev/null`, { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] }).toString();
const remotePkg = JSON.parse(out);
latestVersion = `v${remotePkg.version}`;
} catch {
latestVersion = currentVersion;
}
}
push("current_version", "PASS", `current=${currentVersion}`);
// --- from-version supported? ---
const fromSupported = !!semverParts(currentVersion) && semverCompare(currentVersion, "v3.4.0") >= 0;
push("from_version_supported", fromSupported ? "PASS" : "FAIL",
fromSupported ? "≥ v3.4.0" : `${currentVersion} < v3.4.0; in-place upgrade not supported`);
// --- service health check (mockable) ---
let healthOk = true, oauthOk = true;
if (!opts.skipNetwork) {
let health;
if (opts.mockHealth !== undefined) {
health = opts.mockHealth;
} else {
try {
const port = process.env.CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT || String(DEFAULT_PORT);
const out = execSync(`curl -sf --max-time 3 http://127.0.0.1:${port}/health`, { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] }).toString();
health = { status: 200, body: JSON.parse(out) };
} catch (e) {
health = { error: String(e.message || e) };
}
}
if (health.error || health.status !== 200) {
healthOk = false;
push("service_running", "FAIL", `service unreachable: ${health.error || `status ${health.status}`}`);
} else if (!health.body || typeof health.body !== "object") {
healthOk = false;
push("service_running", "FAIL", "service /health returned 200 but empty/non-JSON body");
} else {
push("service_running", "PASS", "service responding on /health");
const authOk = health.body?.auth?.ok;
if (!authOk) {
oauthOk = false;
push("oauth_ok", "FAIL", `auth.ok=false: ${health.body?.auth?.message || "unknown"}`);
} else {
push("oauth_ok", "PASS", "OAuth token valid");
}
}
}
// --- determine next_action.kind (priority: fresh_install > fix_service > fix_oauth > noop > update > upgrade) ---
let kind;
if (!fromSupported) {
kind = "fresh_install";
} else if (!opts.skipNetwork && !healthOk) {
kind = "fix_service";
} else if (!opts.skipNetwork && !oauthOk) {
kind = "fix_oauth";
} else {
const cur = semverParts(currentVersion), lat = semverParts(latestVersion);
if (!cur) {
kind = "fresh_install";
} else if (semverCompare(currentVersion, latestVersion) === 0) {
kind = "noop";
} else if (lat && cur.major === lat.major && cur.minor === lat.minor) {
kind = "update";
} else {
kind = "upgrade";
}
}
// --- next_action shape ---
let next_action;
if (kind === "fresh_install") {
next_action = {
kind,
human_required: ["claude auth login (only if OAuth becomes invalid after reinstall)"],
ai_executable: [
`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/ai.openclaw.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`,
`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`,
`mv ${join(homedir(), ".ocp")} ${join(homedir(), ".ocp.backup-")}$(date +%s) 2>/dev/null || true`,
`rm -rf ${ocpDir}`,
`git clone https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp ${ocpDir}`,
`cd ${ocpDir} && npm install --no-audit --no-fund && node setup.mjs`,
`${ocpDir}/ocp doctor`
],
verify: "ocp doctor expects PASS on all checks"
};
} else if (kind === "noop") {
next_action = { kind, human_required: [], ai_executable: [], verify: "already at latest" };
} else if (kind === "fix_oauth") {
next_action = {
kind,
human_required: [],
ai_executable: [
`cd "$(npm root -g)/@anthropic-ai/claude-code" && node install.cjs`,
`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`,
`launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ${join(homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist")}`,
`${ocpDir}/ocp doctor`
],
verify: "ocp doctor expects oauth_ok=PASS",
reference: "~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/ocp_claude_native_binary_postinstall.md"
};
} else if (kind === "fix_service") {
next_action = {
kind,
human_required: [],
ai_executable: [
`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`,
`launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ${join(homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist")}`,
`${ocpDir}/ocp doctor`
],
verify: "ocp doctor expects service_running=PASS"
};
} else {
next_action = {
kind,
human_required: [],
ai_executable: [`${ocpDir}/ocp update --yes`],
verify: "ocp doctor expects PASS on all checks"
};
}
const fail_count = checks.filter(c => c.level === "FAIL").length;
const warn_count = checks.filter(c => c.level === "WARN").length;
return {
schema_version: SCHEMA_VERSION,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
ready_to_upgrade: fail_count === 0,
current_version: currentVersion,
latest_version: latestVersion,
from_version_supported: fromSupported,
fail_count,
warn_count,
checks,
next_action
};
}
function runOauthOnly(opts, checks, push) {
let healthOk = true, oauthOk = true;
let health;
if (opts.mockHealth !== undefined) {
health = opts.mockHealth;
} else {
try {
const port = process.env.CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT || String(DEFAULT_PORT);
const out = execSync(`curl -sf --max-time 3 http://127.0.0.1:${port}/health`, { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] }).toString();
health = { status: 200, body: JSON.parse(out) };
} catch (e) {
health = { error: String(e.message || e) };
}
}
if (health.error || health.status !== 200) {
healthOk = false;
push("oauth_ok", "FAIL", `service unreachable: ${health.error || `status ${health.status}`}`);
} else if (!health.body || typeof health.body !== "object") {
healthOk = false;
push("oauth_ok", "FAIL", "service /health returned 200 but empty/non-JSON body");
} else if (!health.body?.auth?.ok) {
oauthOk = false;
push("oauth_ok", "FAIL", `auth.ok=false: ${health.body?.auth?.message || "unknown"}`);
} else {
push("oauth_ok", "PASS", "OAuth token valid");
}
const kind = !healthOk ? "fix_service" : !oauthOk ? "fix_oauth" : "noop";
let next_action;
const ocpDir = opts.ocpDir || join(homedir(), "ocp");
if (kind === "noop") {
next_action = { kind, human_required: [], ai_executable: [], verify: "OAuth healthy" };
} else if (kind === "fix_oauth") {
next_action = {
kind,
human_required: [],
ai_executable: [
`cd "$(npm root -g)/@anthropic-ai/claude-code" && node install.cjs`,
`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`,
`launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ${join(homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist")}`,
`${ocpDir}/ocp doctor --check oauth`
],
verify: "ocp doctor --check oauth expects PASS",
reference: "~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/ocp_claude_native_binary_postinstall.md"
};
} else {
next_action = {
kind,
human_required: [],
ai_executable: [
`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`,
`launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ${join(homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist")}`,
`${ocpDir}/ocp doctor --check oauth`
],
verify: "ocp doctor --check oauth expects service_running=PASS"
};
}
const fail_count = checks.filter(c => c.level === "FAIL").length;
// "skipped" = --check oauth fast path intentionally omits version detection.
// AI agents should NOT semver-compare against current_version/latest_version when
// either equals "skipped"; the full path provides those fields when needed.
return {
schema_version: SCHEMA_VERSION,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
ready_to_upgrade: fail_count === 0,
current_version: opts.mockVersion || "skipped",
latest_version: opts.mockLatest || "skipped",
from_version_supported: true,
fail_count,
warn_count: 0,
checks,
next_action
};
}
// CLI entrypoint — use fileURLToPath + realpath to handle symlinked install paths
// (e.g. /tmp/ → /private/tmp/ on macOS would otherwise miss the guard).
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
function _isMain() {
if (!process.argv[1]) return false;
try {
return realpathSync(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) === realpathSync(process.argv[1]);
} catch { return false; }
}
if (_isMain()) {
const wantJson = process.argv.includes("--json");
const checkIdx = process.argv.indexOf("--check");
const checkOnly = checkIdx !== -1 ? process.argv[checkIdx + 1] : undefined;
const result = await runDoctor({ checkOnly });
if (wantJson) {
console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
} else {
console.log(`OCP doctor — ${result.current_version}${result.latest_version}`);
for (const c of result.checks) console.log(` [${c.level}] ${c.id}: ${c.message}`);
console.log(`\nSummary: ${result.fail_count} FAIL, ${result.warn_count} WARN`);
console.log(`Next action: ${result.next_action.kind}`);
}
process.exit(result.fail_count === 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
+86
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@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
// scripts/lib/plist-merge.mjs
//
// Preserves user-customised env vars when setup.mjs rewrites the unit file.
//
// Rule:
// - keys present in NEW template → template value wins (template is source of truth)
// - keys ONLY in EXISTING (not in template) → preserved verbatim
//
// No new dependencies — regex-based, plist <key>X</key><string>Y</string> shape
// is stable enough for our hand-written templates in setup.mjs.
const PLIST_KV_RE = /<key>([^<]+)<\/key>\s*<string>([^<]*)<\/string>/g;
export function parsePlistEnv(plistContent) {
if (!plistContent) return {};
if (Buffer.isBuffer(plistContent)) plistContent = plistContent.toString("utf8");
// Restrict to the EnvironmentVariables dict to avoid catching Label, etc.
const envBlock = plistContent.match(/<key>EnvironmentVariables<\/key>\s*<dict>([\s\S]*?)<\/dict>/);
if (!envBlock) return {};
const out = {};
let m;
PLIST_KV_RE.lastIndex = 0;
while ((m = PLIST_KV_RE.exec(envBlock[1])) !== null) {
out[m[1]] = m[2];
}
return out;
}
export function mergePlistEnv(existing, template) {
if (!existing) return template;
const existingEnv = parsePlistEnv(existing);
const templateEnv = parsePlistEnv(template);
const KNOWN = new Set(Object.keys(templateEnv));
const preserved = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(existingEnv)) {
if (!KNOWN.has(k)) preserved[k] = v;
}
if (Object.keys(preserved).length === 0) return template;
const lines = Object.entries(preserved)
.map(([k, v]) => ` <key>${k}</key>\n <string>${v}</string>`)
.join("\n");
// Inject before the closing </dict> of EnvironmentVariables
return template.replace(
/(<key>EnvironmentVariables<\/key>\s*<dict>[\s\S]*?)(\n\s*<\/dict>)/,
`$1\n${lines}$2`
);
}
const SYSTEMD_KV_RE = /^Environment=([^=]+)=(.*)$/gm;
export function parseSystemdEnv(serviceContent) {
if (!serviceContent) return {};
if (Buffer.isBuffer(serviceContent)) serviceContent = serviceContent.toString("utf8");
const out = {};
let m;
SYSTEMD_KV_RE.lastIndex = 0;
while ((m = SYSTEMD_KV_RE.exec(serviceContent)) !== null) {
out[m[1]] = m[2];
}
return out;
}
export function mergeSystemdEnv(existing, template) {
if (!existing) return template;
const existingEnv = parseSystemdEnv(existing);
const templateEnv = parseSystemdEnv(template);
const KNOWN = new Set(Object.keys(templateEnv));
const preservedLines = Object.entries(existingEnv)
.filter(([k]) => !KNOWN.has(k))
.map(([k, v]) => `Environment=${k}=${v}`);
if (preservedLines.length === 0) return template;
// Guard: if template has no Environment= anchor, cannot inject — return template as-is.
// (In practice the OCP systemd template always has Environment= lines.)
if (!/^Environment=/m.test(template)) return template;
// Inject after the last existing Environment= line in the template
return template.replace(
/(^Environment=[^\n]+\n)((?!Environment=).*$)/ms,
`$1${preservedLines.join("\n")}\n$2`
);
}
+115
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@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, copyFileSync, existsSync, readdirSync, statSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
export function writeSnapshot({ homeDir, fromCommit, fromVersion, toVersion, extraFiles = [] }) {
const ts = new Date().toISOString().replace(/\.\d+Z$/, "Z");
const root = join(homeDir, ".ocp", `upgrade-snapshot-${ts}`);
mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
// Standard manifest files
writeFileSync(join(root, "from-commit.txt"), fromCommit + "\n");
writeFileSync(join(root, "from-version.txt"), fromVersion + "\n");
writeFileSync(join(root, "to-version.txt"), toVersion + "\n");
// Optional captures (best-effort, never fatal)
const tryCopy = (src, dst) => {
try {
if (existsSync(src)) copyFileSync(src, dst);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[snapshot] warn: could not copy ${src} (${err.code || err.message})`);
}
};
tryCopy(join(homeDir, "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist"), join(root, "plist"));
tryCopy(join(homeDir, ".config", "systemd", "user", "ocp-proxy.service"), join(root, "service"));
tryCopy(join(homeDir, ".ocp", "ocp.db"), join(root, "db.bak"));
tryCopy(join(homeDir, ".ocp", "admin-key"), join(root, "admin-key"));
tryCopy(join(homeDir, ".openclaw", "openclaw.json"), join(root, "openclaw.json"));
for (const { src, name } of extraFiles) tryCopy(src, join(root, name));
return root;
}
export function readSnapshot(snapshotPath) {
const read = (n) => {
try { return readFileSync(join(snapshotPath, n), "utf8").trim(); } catch { return null; }
};
return {
path: snapshotPath,
fromCommit: read("from-commit.txt"),
fromVersion: read("from-version.txt"),
toVersion: read("to-version.txt")
};
}
export function listSnapshots(homeDir) {
const root = join(homeDir, ".ocp");
if (!existsSync(root)) return [];
return readdirSync(root)
.filter(name => name.startsWith("upgrade-snapshot-"))
.map(name => ({ name, path: join(root, name), mtime: statSync(join(root, name)).mtimeMs }))
.sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name));
}
/**
* Garbage-collect old upgrade snapshots.
*
* Retention rule (a snapshot is KEPT if any of these is true):
* - It is among the last `keepCount` snapshots (sorted oldest→newest)
* - Its timestamp is within `keepDays` of `now`
* - It is the single most-recent snapshot (always-keep safety net)
*
* @param {string} homeDir - Root containing ~/.ocp/
* @param {object} opts
* @param {number} [opts.keepCount=5] - Minimum count to keep
* @param {number} [opts.keepDays=30] - Keep snapshots newer than N days
* @param {boolean} [opts.dryRun=false] - If true, report plan but don't delete
* @param {Date} [opts.now=new Date()] - Override clock for testing
* @returns {{kept: Array, removed: Array, dryRun: boolean}}
*/
export function gcSnapshots(homeDir, opts = {}) {
const keepCount = opts.keepCount ?? 5;
const keepDays = opts.keepDays ?? 30;
const dryRun = !!opts.dryRun;
const now = opts.now || new Date();
const all = listSnapshots(homeDir); // sorted oldest→newest
if (all.length === 0) return { kept: [], removed: [], dryRun };
if (all.length === 1) return { kept: all, removed: [], dryRun }; // always keep most recent
const cutoffMs = now.getTime() - keepDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
const lastN = new Set(all.slice(-keepCount).map(s => s.path));
const kept = [], removed = [];
for (let i = 0; i < all.length; i++) {
const s = all[i];
const isMostRecent = i === all.length - 1;
const isInLastN = lastN.has(s.path);
const isWithinDays = parseSnapshotTimestamp(s.name) >= cutoffMs;
if (isMostRecent || isInLastN || isWithinDays) {
kept.push(s);
} else {
removed.push(s);
}
}
if (!dryRun) {
for (const s of removed) {
try {
rmSync(s.path, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[snapshot] warn: could not remove ${s.path} (${err.code || err.message})`);
}
}
}
return { kept, removed, dryRun };
}
function parseSnapshotTimestamp(name) {
// upgrade-snapshot-2026-05-11T08:30:00Z → epoch ms
const m = name.match(/upgrade-snapshot-(.+)$/);
if (!m) return 0;
const t = Date.parse(m[1]);
return Number.isFinite(t) ? t : 0;
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, copyFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join, dirname } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { DEFAULT_PORT, LOCAL_HOST, OPENAI_API_BASE } from "../lib/constants.mjs";
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const REPO_ROOT = join(__dirname, "..");
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ if (!config.models.providers) config.models.providers = {};
if (!config.models.providers[PROVIDER_NAME]) {
// First-time registration
config.models.providers[PROVIDER_NAME] = {
baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1",
baseUrl: `http://${LOCAL_HOST}:${DEFAULT_PORT}${OPENAI_API_BASE}`,
api: "openai-completions",
authHeader: false,
models: desiredModels,
+345
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@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* scripts/upgrade.mjs — OCP unified upgrade dispatcher.
*
* Paths:
* noop current == latest, exit 0
* light same major.minor, patch bump only (existing fast path; delegated to bash)
* full cross-minor (snapshot + setup.mjs + post-flight)
* fresh_install from-version < v3.4.0 (--yes required for non-interactive)
* rollback restore from snapshot
*/
import { runDoctor } from "./doctor.mjs";
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { existsSync, copyFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { writeSnapshot, listSnapshots, readSnapshot, gcSnapshots } from "./lib/snapshot.mjs";
import { DEFAULT_PORT } from "../lib/constants.mjs";
export async function runUpgrade(opts = {}) {
const dryRun = !!opts.dryRun;
const yes = !!opts.yes;
// yes is reserved for Bundle 3 (fresh-install / rollback interactive gate); not used in upgrade-path here.
const plan = [];
// --- rollback path (no doctor needed; snapshot is authoritative) ---
if (opts.rollback) {
return await runRollback(opts);
}
// --- doctor pre-flight ---
const doctor = opts.mockDoctor || await runDoctor();
if (!doctor.ready_to_upgrade && doctor.next_action.kind !== "fresh_install") {
throw new Error(`doctor FAIL: ${doctor.next_action.kind} (run "ocp doctor" for details)`);
}
const kind = doctor.next_action.kind;
plan.push(`[doctor] from=${doctor.current_version} to=${doctor.latest_version} kind=${kind}`);
// --- noop ---
if (kind === "noop") {
plan.push(`[noop] already at latest (${doctor.latest_version})`);
return { path: "noop", executed: true, changed: false, plan };
}
// --- dry-run early exit ---
if (dryRun) {
plan.push(`[plan] would proceed with ${kind} path`);
if (kind === "upgrade") {
plan.push(`[plan] phase 1: snapshot to ~/.ocp/upgrade-snapshot-<ts>/`);
plan.push(`[plan] phase 2: git checkout ${doctor.latest_version} && npm install`);
plan.push(`[plan] phase 3: node setup.mjs`);
plan.push(`[plan] phase 4: launchctl bootout/bootstrap`);
plan.push(`[plan] phase 5: post-flight /health + /v1/models`);
} else if (kind === "update") {
plan.push(`[plan] light path: git pull + npm install + restart`);
} else if (kind === "fresh_install") {
plan.push(`[plan] fresh-install ai_executable[]:`);
for (const cmd of doctor.next_action.ai_executable) plan.push(` - ${cmd}`);
}
return { path: kind, executed: false, plan };
}
// --- non-dry-run paths ---
if (kind === "update") {
return { path: "update", executed: true, changed: true, plan: [...plan, "[light] delegated to bash cmd_update existing logic"] };
}
if (kind === "upgrade") {
return await runFullUpgrade({ doctor, opts });
}
if (kind === "fresh_install") {
return await runFreshInstall({ doctor, opts });
}
throw new Error(`path ${kind} not yet implemented`);
}
async function runFullUpgrade({ doctor, opts }) {
const phases = [];
let snapshotPath = null;
const exec = (cmd, label) => {
if (opts.mockExec) {
phases.push({ name: label, cmd, status: "skipped-mock" });
return "";
}
try {
const out = execSync(cmd, { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] }).toString();
phases.push({ name: label, cmd, status: "ok" });
return out;
} catch (err) {
const detail = err.stderr?.toString().trim();
phases.push({ name: label, cmd, status: "fail", stderr: detail });
throw Object.assign(
new Error(`phase ${label} failed: ${detail || err.message}`),
{ phases, cmd }
);
}
};
const ocpDir = opts.ocpDir || join(homedir(), "ocp");
try {
// phase 1: pre-flight (doctor already passed; just record)
phases.push({ name: "pre-flight", status: "ok", note: `kind=upgrade from=${doctor.current_version} to=${doctor.latest_version}` });
// phase 2: snapshot
const fromCommit = opts.mockExec
? "mock-commit"
: execSync(`git -C ${ocpDir} rev-parse HEAD`).toString().trim();
snapshotPath = opts.mockExec
? "/tmp/mock-snapshot"
: writeSnapshot({ homeDir: homedir(), fromCommit, fromVersion: doctor.current_version, toVersion: doctor.latest_version });
phases.push({ name: "snapshot", path: snapshotPath, status: "ok" });
// phase 3: fetch + install
exec(`git -C ${ocpDir} fetch --tags --quiet`, "fetch+install");
exec(`git -C ${ocpDir} checkout ${doctor.latest_version}`, "fetch+install");
exec(`npm --prefix ${ocpDir} install --no-audit --no-fund`, "fetch+install");
// phase 4: reconfigure
exec(`node ${ocpDir}/setup.mjs`, "reconfigure");
// phase 5: restart (heads-up note printed before invoking)
if (!opts.mockExec) {
console.error(`[heads-up] restarting OCP service in 3s — expect ~510s blip on requests in flight.`);
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 3000));
}
if (process.platform === "darwin") {
exec(`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`, "restart");
exec(`launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ${join(homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist")}`, "restart");
} else {
exec(`systemctl --user restart ocp-proxy.service`, "restart");
}
// phase 6: post-flight (10s budget; skipped under mockExec)
if (!opts.mockExec) {
const port = process.env.CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT || String(DEFAULT_PORT);
let ok = false;
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
try {
const out = execSync(`curl -sf --max-time 2 http://127.0.0.1:${port}/health`).toString();
const body = JSON.parse(out);
if (body.auth?.ok === true) { ok = true; break; }
} catch { /* retry */ }
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 1000));
}
if (!ok) {
phases.push({ name: "post-flight", status: "fail", message: "health did not return auth.ok=true within 10s" });
throw new Error("post-flight failed");
}
execSync(`curl -sf --max-time 3 http://127.0.0.1:${port}/v1/models > /dev/null`);
phases.push({ name: "post-flight", status: "ok" });
} else {
phases.push({ name: "post-flight", status: "skipped-mock" });
}
// Auto-GC old snapshots after successful upgrade (best-effort, never throws).
try {
const gc = gcSnapshots(homedir(), { keepCount: 5, keepDays: 30 });
if (gc.removed.length > 0) {
console.error(`[gc] removed ${gc.removed.length} old snapshots; kept ${gc.kept.length}`);
}
} catch (e) {
console.error(`[gc] warn: snapshot GC failed: ${e.message}`);
}
return { path: "upgrade", executed: true, changed: true, snapshotPath, phases };
} catch (err) {
if (snapshotPath && !err.snapshotPath) {
Object.assign(err, {
snapshotPath,
phases,
hint: "Working tree may be at new version. Run `ocp update --rollback` to restore from snapshot."
});
}
throw err;
}
}
async function runFreshInstall({ doctor, opts }) {
if (!opts.yes) {
throw new Error("fresh_install requires --yes for non-interactive execution (or run interactively and answer y)");
}
const steps = [];
for (const cmd of doctor.next_action.ai_executable) {
if (opts.mockExec) {
steps.push({ cmd, status: "skipped-mock" });
} else {
try {
execSync(cmd, { stdio: "inherit" });
steps.push({ cmd, status: "ok" });
} catch (e) {
const detail = e.stderr?.toString().trim() || e.message;
steps.push({ cmd, status: "fail", error: String(detail) });
throw Object.assign(new Error(`fresh_install step failed: ${cmd}${detail}`), { steps });
}
}
}
return { path: "fresh_install", executed: true, changed: true, steps };
}
async function runRollback(opts) {
const homeDir = opts.homeDir || homedir();
const snapshots = opts.mockSnapshots ?? listSnapshots(homeDir);
if (opts.gc) {
const result = gcSnapshots(homeDir, { dryRun: opts.dryRun });
return { path: opts.dryRun ? "rollback-gc-dry-run" : "rollback-gc", ...result };
}
if (opts.list) {
return { path: "rollback-list", snapshots };
}
if (snapshots.length === 0) {
throw new Error("no upgrade snapshots found in ~/.ocp/upgrade-snapshot-*");
}
const target = opts.snapshotPath
? snapshots.find(s => s.path === opts.snapshotPath)
: snapshots[snapshots.length - 1];
if (!target) throw new Error(`snapshot not found: ${opts.snapshotPath} (must be inside ~/.ocp/upgrade-snapshot-*)`);
const meta = opts.mockSnapshotMeta ?? readSnapshot(target.path);
if (!meta.fromCommit) throw new Error(`snapshot ${target.path} has no from-commit.txt`);
const phases = [];
if (opts.dryRun) {
return {
path: "rollback-dry-run",
executed: false,
target: target.path,
plan: [
`git checkout ${meta.fromCommit}`,
`cp ${target.path}/plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ocp.proxy.plist`,
`cp ${target.path}/db.bak ~/.ocp/ocp.db`,
`launchctl bootout/bootstrap`,
`ocp doctor`
]
};
}
if (!opts.yes) throw new Error("rollback requires --yes for non-interactive execution");
const exec = (cmd, label) => {
if (opts.mockExec) {
phases.push({ name: label, cmd, status: "skipped-mock" });
return "";
}
try {
execSync(cmd, { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] });
phases.push({ name: label, cmd, status: "ok" });
} catch (err) {
const detail = err.stderr?.toString().trim();
phases.push({ name: label, cmd, status: "fail", stderr: detail });
throw Object.assign(
new Error(`rollback phase ${label} failed: ${detail || err.message}`),
{ phases, target: target.path }
);
}
};
const ocpDir = opts.ocpDir || join(homedir(), "ocp");
exec(`git -C ${ocpDir} checkout ${meta.fromCommit}`, "git-checkout");
if (!opts.mockExec) {
const tryCopy = (src, dst) => {
try {
if (existsSync(src)) copyFileSync(src, dst);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[rollback] warn: could not restore ${src}${dst} (${err.code || err.message})`);
}
};
tryCopy(join(target.path, "plist"), join(homeDir, "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist"));
tryCopy(join(target.path, "service"), join(homeDir, ".config", "systemd", "user", "ocp-proxy.service"));
tryCopy(join(target.path, "db.bak"), join(homeDir, ".ocp", "ocp.db"));
tryCopy(join(target.path, "admin-key"), join(homeDir, ".ocp", "admin-key"));
phases.push({ name: "restore-files", status: "ok" });
} else {
phases.push({ name: "restore-files", status: "skipped-mock" });
}
exec(`npm --prefix ${ocpDir} install --no-audit --no-fund`, "npm-install");
if (!opts.mockExec) {
console.error(`[heads-up] restarting OCP service in 3s — expect ~510s blip on requests in flight.`);
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 3000));
}
if (process.platform === "darwin") {
exec(`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy 2>/dev/null || true`, "restart");
exec(`launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ${join(homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", "dev.ocp.proxy.plist")}`, "restart");
} else {
exec(`systemctl --user restart ocp-proxy.service`, "restart");
}
return { path: "rollback", executed: true, changed: true, target: target.path, phases };
}
// CLI entrypoint — use fileURLToPath + realpath to handle symlinked install paths.
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
function _isMain() {
if (!process.argv[1]) return false;
try {
return realpathSync(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) === realpathSync(process.argv[1]);
} catch { return false; }
}
if (_isMain()) {
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
const dryRun = args.includes("--dry-run");
const yes = args.includes("--yes");
const rollback = args.includes("--rollback");
const list = args.includes("--list");
const gc = args.includes("--gc");
const targetIdx = args.indexOf("--target");
const target = targetIdx !== -1 ? args[targetIdx + 1] : undefined;
// First non-flag positional after --rollback is the snapshot path
let snapshotPath;
if (rollback) {
const rb = args.indexOf("--rollback");
const cand = args[rb + 1];
if (cand && !cand.startsWith("--")) snapshotPath = cand;
}
try {
const result = await runUpgrade({ dryRun, yes, rollback, list, gc, snapshotPath, target });
if (result.plan) for (const line of result.plan) console.log(line);
if (result.phases) for (const p of result.phases) console.log(`[${p.name}] ${p.status}${p.cmd ? `: ${p.cmd}` : ""}`);
if (result.steps) for (const s of result.steps) console.log(` ${s.status === "ok" ? "✓" : s.status === "skipped-mock" ? "·" : "✗"} ${s.cmd}`);
if (result.snapshots) {
console.log(`Found ${result.snapshots.length} snapshots:`);
for (const s of result.snapshots) console.log(` ${s.name}`);
}
if (result.removed && result.kept) {
console.log(`Snapshots: kept ${result.kept.length}, ${result.dryRun ? "would remove" : "removed"} ${result.removed.length}`);
for (const s of result.removed) console.log(` - ${s.name}`);
}
process.exit(0);
} catch (e) {
console.error(`${e.message}`);
if (e.snapshotPath) console.error(` snapshot: ${e.snapshotPath}`);
if (e.target) console.error(` target: ${e.target}`);
if (e.hint) console.error(` hint: ${e.hint}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
+556 -129
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/**
* openclaw-claude-proxy — OpenAI-compatible proxy for Claude CLI
*
* Translates OpenAI chat/completions requests into `claude -p` CLI calls,
* Translates OpenAI chat/completions requests into `claude --output-format stream-json` CLI calls,
* letting you use your Claude Pro/Max subscription as an OpenClaw model provider.
*
* Timeout design: single CLAUDE_TIMEOUT (default 600s / 10 min).
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* This matches LiteLLM, OpenAI SDK, and other major LLM proxies.
*
* Env vars:
* CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT — listen port (default: 3456)
* CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT — listen port (default: DEFAULT_PORT from lib/constants.mjs)
* CLAUDE_BIN — path to claude binary (default: auto-detect)
* CLAUDE_TIMEOUT — per-request timeout in ms (default: 600000)
* CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS — comma-separated tools to allow (default: expanded set)
@@ -30,19 +30,61 @@
import { createServer } from "node:http";
import { spawn, execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
import { readFileSync, accessSync, existsSync, constants } from "node:fs";
import { readFileSync, readdirSync, accessSync, existsSync, constants, chmodSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { validateKey, recordUsage, getUsageByKey, getUsageTimeline, getRecentUsage, createKey, listKeys, revokeKey, closeDb, checkQuota, updateKeyQuota, getKeyQuota, findKey, cacheHash, getCachedResponse, setCachedResponse, clearCache, getCacheStats, hasCacheControl, singleflight, getInflightStats } from "./keys.mjs";
import { DEFAULT_PORT } from "./lib/constants.mjs";
import { runTuiTurn, reapStaleTuiSessions } from "./lib/tui/session.mjs";
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const _pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"));
const modelsConfig = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, "models.json"), "utf8"));
// ── Resolve claude binary ───────────────────────────────────────────────
// Priority: CLAUDE_BIN env > well-known paths > which lookup
// Fail-fast if not found — never start with an unresolvable binary.
// Priority: CLAUDE_BIN env > well-known paths > nvm/fnm/asdf user-local
// installs > which lookup. Fail-fast if not found — never start with an
// unresolvable binary.
function _listVersionDirs(parent) {
try { return readdirSync(parent); } catch { return []; }
}
function _collectNodeManagerCandidates(home) {
if (!home) return [];
const out = [];
// nvm: $HOME/.nvm/versions/node/<version>/bin/claude
const nvmRoot = join(home, ".nvm/versions/node");
for (const v of _listVersionDirs(nvmRoot)) {
out.push(join(nvmRoot, v, "bin/claude"));
}
// nvm default alias: resolve $HOME/.nvm/aliases/default if it points to a version
try {
const aliasFile = join(home, ".nvm/aliases/default");
const aliasVer = readFileSync(aliasFile, "utf8").trim();
if (aliasVer) {
const direct = join(nvmRoot, aliasVer, "bin/claude");
if (!out.includes(direct)) out.unshift(direct);
}
} catch {}
// fnm: $HOME/.fnm/node-versions/<version>/installation/bin/claude
const fnmRoot = join(home, ".fnm/node-versions");
for (const v of _listVersionDirs(fnmRoot)) {
out.push(join(fnmRoot, v, "installation/bin/claude"));
}
// asdf: $HOME/.asdf/installs/nodejs/<version>/bin/claude
const asdfRoot = join(home, ".asdf/installs/nodejs");
for (const v of _listVersionDirs(asdfRoot)) {
out.push(join(asdfRoot, v, "bin/claude"));
}
// npm prefix-relocated: $HOME/.npm-global/bin/claude
out.push(join(home, ".npm-global/bin/claude"));
return out;
}
function resolveClaude() {
if (process.env.CLAUDE_BIN) {
try {
@@ -54,11 +96,13 @@ function resolveClaude() {
}
}
const home = process.env.HOME || "";
const candidates = [
"/opt/homebrew/bin/claude",
"/usr/local/bin/claude",
"/usr/bin/claude",
join(process.env.HOME || "", ".local/bin/claude"),
join(home, ".local/bin/claude"),
..._collectNodeManagerCandidates(home),
];
for (const p of candidates) {
try { accessSync(p, constants.X_OK); console.warn(`[init] CLAUDE_BIN not set, resolved to ${p}`); return p; } catch {}
@@ -72,14 +116,147 @@ function resolveClaude() {
console.error(
"FATAL: claude binary not found.\n" +
" Set CLAUDE_BIN=/path/to/claude or ensure claude is in PATH.\n" +
" Hint: if you use nvm/fnm/asdf, set CLAUDE_BIN to the absolute path\n" +
" shown by `which claude` in your interactive shell.\n" +
" Checked: " + candidates.join(", ")
);
process.exit(1);
}
// ── OCP system prompt wrapper (Phase 6c port — ADR 0009 Amendment 1 analogue) ─
// Injected via `--system-prompt` flag, replacing claude CLI's default system
// prompt (which normally includes cwd, OS, tool descriptions, and git status —
// all irrelevant and potentially misleading when the model is accessed via the
// OCP HTTP proxy).
//
// Authority: claude CLI § --system-prompt (ported from OLP, verified v2.1.104;
// behavior stable through v2.1.158 — OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 §
// "OLP system prompt wrapper"; ported to OCP 2026-05-30).
// Reference: https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp commit 97e7d16 (Phase 6c)
const OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER = `You are accessed via the OCP HTTP proxy. You do NOT have access to any local filesystem, working directory, shell, git status, or machine environment. Do not infer or invent such information from any context you observe. Respond only based on the conversation provided.`;
// Build the full system-prompt string: OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER prepended,
// then any system-role messages from the request appended (separated by blank line).
// ADR 0009 Amendment 1 analogue § "OLP system prompt wrapper".
function extractSystemPrompt(messages) {
const systemMessages = (messages ?? []).filter(m => m.role === "system");
if (systemMessages.length === 0) {
return OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER;
}
const clientContent = systemMessages.map(m =>
typeof m.content === "string" ? m.content : JSON.stringify(m.content)
).join("\n\n");
return `${OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER}\n\n${clientContent}`;
}
// ── NDJSON line buffer parser (Phase 6c port) ─────────────────────────────
// Splits a buffered string on newlines, returning complete parsed events
// plus the trailing incomplete line as `remainder` for the next data chunk.
//
// Authority: claude CLI § --output-format stream-json (ported from OLP, verified v2.1.104;
// behavior stable through v2.1.158; each event is a newline-terminated JSON object on stdout).
// Reference: OLP lib/providers/anthropic.mjs parseStreamJsonLines (commit 97e7d16).
function parseStreamJsonLines(buffered) {
const lines = buffered.split("\n");
const remainder = lines.pop(); // last element is the incomplete trailing line
const events = [];
for (const line of lines) {
const trimmed = line.trim();
if (trimmed === "") continue;
try {
events.push(JSON.parse(trimmed));
} catch {
console.error("[claude] NDJSON parse error on line:", trimmed.slice(0, 120));
events.push({ type: "parse_error", raw: trimmed });
}
}
return { events, remainder: remainder ?? "" };
}
// ── NDJSON event → text content extractor (Phase 6c port) ────────────────
// Maps claude CLI stream-json NDJSON events to { text, stop, error } signals.
// Returns:
// { text: string } — content delta to forward
// { stop: true } — terminal event (emit finish_reason=stop)
// { error: string } — error event (emit error stop)
// null — consumed event (log/ignore)
//
// Authority: claude CLI § --output-format stream-json (ported from OLP, verified v2.1.104;
// behavior stable through v2.1.158).
// Reference: OLP lib/providers/anthropic.mjs anthropicStreamJsonEventToIR (commit 97e7d16).
//
// @param {object} event — parsed NDJSON event
// @param {boolean} isFirstDelta — true if no content has been yielded yet
function parseStreamJsonEvent(event, isFirstDelta) {
const t = event?.type;
// system/* — first-event init + other system meta (api_retry etc.)
if (t === "system") return null;
// user — echo of user message; consumed
if (t === "user") return null;
// stream_event — contains nested content_block_delta
if (t === "stream_event") {
const inner = event.event ?? event;
if (inner?.type === "content_block_delta" && inner.delta?.type === "text_delta") {
return { text: inner.delta.text ?? "" };
}
// Other stream_event sub-types (content_block_start, message_delta, etc.) — consumed
return null;
}
// assistant — aggregate message (fallback when no prior content_block_delta seen)
// Empirically (claude CLI without --include-partial-messages, verified v2.1.104 through v2.1.158): fast/short
// responses may emit ONLY the aggregate assistant event, no content_block_delta events.
// If isFirstDelta is true, extract text here; otherwise it's a duplicate, ignore.
// Reference: OLP commit 65f945c (assistant-aggregate fallback, fold-in).
if (t === "assistant") {
if (isFirstDelta) {
const blocks = event.message?.content;
if (Array.isArray(blocks)) {
const text = blocks
.filter(b => b && b.type === "text" && typeof b.text === "string")
.map(b => b.text)
.join("");
if (text) return { text };
}
}
return null;
}
// result — terminal event
if (t === "result") {
if (event.is_error === true) {
return { error: event.error_message ?? event.result ?? "claude returned is_error" };
}
return { stop: true };
}
// rate_limit_event / usage — log for observability, don't forward
if (t === "rate_limit_event" || t === "usage") {
logEvent("info", "claude_stream_event", { type: t, data: JSON.stringify(event).slice(0, 200) });
return null;
}
// control_request — per Anthropic stream-json docs
if (t === "control_request") {
console.error("[claude] stream_json control_request event (ignored):", JSON.stringify(event).slice(0, 120));
return null;
}
// parse_error — already logged by parseStreamJsonLines
if (t === "parse_error") return null;
// Unknown event type — log + skip; future-proof for new claude CLI events
if (t !== undefined) {
console.error("[claude] unknown stream_json event type:", t);
}
return null;
}
// ── Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Settings marked with `let` can be changed at runtime via PATCH /settings.
const PORT = parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT || "3456", 10);
const PORT = parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT || String(DEFAULT_PORT), 10);
const CLAUDE = resolveClaude();
let TIMEOUT = parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_TIMEOUT || "600000", 10);
const PROXY_API_KEY = process.env.PROXY_API_KEY || "";
@@ -102,6 +279,34 @@ const AUTH_MODE = process.env.CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE || (PROXY_API_KEY ? "shared" : "n
const ADMIN_KEY = process.env.OCP_ADMIN_KEY || "";
const PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY = process.env.PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY || "";
let CACHE_TTL = parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL || "0", 10); // 0 = disabled, value in ms
// ── TUI-mode (subscription-pool bridge) — opt-in; default OFF ───────────
// When ON: requests are served by spawning interactive `claude` (no -p / no
// --output-format) so cc_entrypoint=cli (subscription pool). Responses are
// buffered then replayed as chunked SSE. Streaming is always buffered here.
// Authority: docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md
// SECURITY: TUI-mode is SINGLE-USER ONLY. Never enable on a multi-user OCP
// (guest prompts would run claude with operator filesystem access).
const TUI_MODE = process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_MODE === "true";
const TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS = parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS || "120000", 10);
const TUI_CWD = process.env.OCP_TUI_CWD || `${process.env.HOME}/.ocp-tui/work`;
const TUI_HOME = process.env.OCP_TUI_HOME || process.env.HOME;
const TUI_ENTRYPOINT = process.env.OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT || "cli"; // cli|auto|off — see ADR 0007
// SECURITY fail-loud: TUI-mode is incompatible with multi-user auth. Under TUI a
// guest/anonymous prompt would run interactive claude with the OPERATOR's full
// filesystem access (home is NOT isolation). Refuse to boot until B-path isolation
// (tools-off + per-key ephemeral home + sandbox) lands. See ADR 0007.
if (TUI_MODE && AUTH_MODE === "multi") {
console.error(
"FATAL: CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true is incompatible with CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=multi.\n" +
" TUI runs interactive claude with the operator's filesystem access, so a guest/anonymous\n" +
" prompt could read operator data. TUI-mode is single-user only until B-path isolation lands.\n" +
" See docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md. Refusing to start."
);
process.exit(1);
}
if (PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY && AUTH_MODE !== "multi") {
console.warn("WARNING: PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY is set but AUTH_MODE is not 'multi' — anonymous key will be ignored");
}
@@ -123,6 +328,44 @@ function logEvent(level, event, data = {}) {
}
}
// ── Startup file-mode reconciliation ───────────────────────────────────
// Idempotently tightens OCP credential-bearing files to 700/600 so that
// existing installs (created before this fix) are hardened on next restart.
// Wrapped in try/catch — chmod failure must never crash startup.
// Does NOT touch systemd units or launchd plists; those are managed by setup.mjs.
function _tightenFileModesIfPossible() {
const ocpDir = join(homedir(), ".ocp");
const targets = [
{ path: ocpDir, mode: 0o700, label: "~/.ocp (dir)" },
{ path: join(ocpDir, "admin-key"), mode: 0o600, label: "~/.ocp/admin-key" },
{ path: join(ocpDir, "ocp.db"), mode: 0o600, label: "~/.ocp/ocp.db" },
];
let tightened = 0;
let alreadyOk = 0;
for (const { path, mode, label } of targets) {
try {
const st = statSync(path);
const current = st.mode & 0o777;
if (current !== mode) {
chmodSync(path, mode);
tightened++;
} else {
alreadyOk++;
}
} catch (e) {
if (e.code !== "ENOENT") {
// File exists but chmod failed (e.g. EPERM) — log and move on
logEvent("warn", "file_mode_tighten_failed", { path: label, error: e.message });
}
// ENOENT is fine — file doesn't exist yet
}
}
if (tightened > 0) {
logEvent("info", "file_modes_tightened", { tightened, alreadyOk });
}
}
_tightenFileModesIfPossible();
// ── Circuit breaker (DISABLED) ──────────────────────────────────────────
// Disabled: CLI proxy has its own retry logic, and the breaker was causing
// cascading failures — once API got briefly slow, ALL agents lost connectivity
@@ -158,25 +401,36 @@ const MODEL_MAP = Object.fromEntries([
const MODELS = modelsConfig.models.map(m => ({ id: m.id, name: m.displayName }));
// ── Session management ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Maps conversation IDs (from caller) to Claude CLI session UUIDs.
// Maps namespaced session keys to Claude CLI session UUIDs.
// Key format: "${keyName}|${conversationId}" — prevents cross-key collision
// when two callers (different API keys or anon + authenticated) use the same
// session_id string. Anonymous callers use "anon"; admin uses "admin".
// Enables --resume for multi-turn conversations, reducing token waste.
const sessions = new Map(); // conversationId → { uuid, messageCount, lastUsed, model }
const sessions = new Map(); // `${keyName}|${conversationId}` → { uuid, messageCount, lastUsed, model }
// Build the namespaced key used for all sessions Map operations.
// Returns null when conversationId is falsy (one-off requests bypass session tracking).
function _sessionKey(conversationId, keyName) {
return conversationId ? `${keyName || "anon"}|${conversationId}` : null;
}
const sessionCleanupInterval = setInterval(() => {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [id, s] of sessions) {
const idleMs = now - s.lastUsed;
const ageMs = s.firstSeen ? now - s.firstSeen : null;
// id is "${keyName}|${conversationId}"; strip prefix for log output
const convIdShort = id.includes("|") ? id.slice(id.indexOf("|") + 1, id.indexOf("|") + 13) : id.slice(0, 12);
if (idleMs > SESSION_TTL) {
sessions.delete(id);
console.log(`[session] expired ${id.slice(0, 12)}... (idle ${Math.round(idleMs / 60000)}m)`);
logEvent("info", "session_expired", { conversationId: id.slice(0, 12) + "...", idleMs, ageMs });
console.log(`[session] expired ${convIdShort}... (idle ${Math.round(idleMs / 60000)}m)`);
logEvent("info", "session_expired", { conversationId: convIdShort + "...", idleMs, ageMs });
} else if (ageMs !== null && ageMs > 4 * SESSION_TTL) {
// #42 evidence-gathering: a session whose firstSeen is more than 4× TTL old
// but whose lastUsed keeps getting bumped (never idle long enough to expire)
// is the suspected bug. Log without action so the pattern can be confirmed
// in /logs. Do NOT enforce an absolute age cap here speculatively.
logEvent("warn", "session_long_lived", { conversationId: id.slice(0, 12) + "...", idleMs, ageMs });
logEvent("warn", "session_long_lived", { conversationId: convIdShort + "...", idleMs, ageMs });
}
}
}, 60000);
@@ -287,17 +541,29 @@ checkAuth();
const authCheckInterval = setInterval(checkAuth, 600000);
// ── Build CLI arguments ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
function buildCliArgs(cliModel, sessionInfo) {
const args = ["-p", "--model", cliModel, "--output-format", "text"];
// Session handling
if (sessionInfo?.resume) {
args.push("--resume", sessionInfo.uuid);
} else if (sessionInfo?.uuid) {
args.push("--session-id", sessionInfo.uuid);
} else {
args.push("--no-session-persistence");
}
// Phase 6c port (2026-05-30): removed `-p` / `--output-format text`.
// Now uses `--output-format stream-json --verbose --no-session-persistence
// --system-prompt <OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER + client system messages>`.
//
// Authority: claude CLI § --output-format stream-json, § --verbose,
// § --no-session-persistence, § --system-prompt (ported from OLP, verified v2.1.104;
// behavior stable through v2.1.158).
// Reference: OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 + commit 97e7d16.
//
// Session flags (--resume, --session-id) are dropped: they are incompatible
// with stream-json mode without -p. OCP always passes full conversation context
// via stdin instead (messagesToPrompt), preserving multi-turn correctness.
// CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT env var is absorbed into the system prompt via
// extractSystemPrompt() at the caller level; APPEND_SYSTEM_PROMPT no longer used.
// Note: ALLOWED_TOOLS / SKIP_PERMISSIONS / MCP_CONFIG are preserved as before.
function buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt) {
const args = [
"--model", cliModel,
"--output-format", "stream-json",
"--verbose",
"--no-session-persistence",
"--system-prompt", systemPrompt,
];
// Permissions
if (SKIP_PERMISSIONS) {
@@ -306,11 +572,6 @@ function buildCliArgs(cliModel, sessionInfo) {
args.push("--allowedTools", ...ALLOWED_TOOLS);
}
// System prompt
if (SYSTEM_PROMPT) {
args.push("--append-system-prompt", SYSTEM_PROMPT);
}
// MCP config
if (MCP_CONFIG) {
args.push("--mcp-config", MCP_CONFIG);
@@ -381,9 +642,16 @@ function getModelTier(cliModel) {
}
// ── Spawn claude CLI (shared setup) ─────────────────────────────────────
// Resolves session logic, builds CLI args, spawns the process, and sets up
// timeouts. Returns context object or throws synchronously.
function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId) {
// Builds CLI args, spawns the process, and sets up timeouts.
// Returns context object or throws synchronously.
//
// Phase 6c port (2026-05-30): session resume (--resume / --session-id) is
// dropped because it is incompatible with stream-json mode without -p.
// OCP now always passes the full serialized conversation via stdin
// (messagesToPrompt), so multi-turn correctness is preserved without sessions.
// The sessions Map is retained for stats/logging but no longer drives --resume.
// Reference: OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 + commit 97e7d16.
function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName) {
if (stats.activeRequests >= MAX_CONCURRENT) {
throw new Error(`concurrency limit reached (${stats.activeRequests}/${MAX_CONCURRENT})`);
}
@@ -395,40 +663,22 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId) {
stats.activeRequests++;
stats.totalRequests++;
let sessionInfo = null;
let prompt;
// Phase 6c: always serialize full conversation via stdin (no session resume).
// System messages are extracted and passed via --system-prompt; the remaining
// messages (user/assistant/tool) are serialized by messagesToPrompt.
const systemPrompt = extractSystemPrompt(messages);
// ── Session logic ──
if (conversationId && sessions.has(conversationId)) {
const session = sessions.get(conversationId);
session.lastUsed = Date.now();
sessionInfo = { uuid: session.uuid, resume: true };
stats.sessionHits++;
// messagesToPrompt skips system messages now that they go via --system-prompt.
// Filter them out before calling to avoid double-injection.
const nonSystemMessages = messages.filter(m => m.role !== "system");
const prompt = messagesToPrompt(nonSystemMessages);
const lastUserMsg = [...messages].reverse().find((m) => m.role === "user");
prompt = lastUserMsg
? (typeof lastUserMsg.content === "string" ? lastUserMsg.content : JSON.stringify(lastUserMsg.content))
: "";
session.messageCount = messages.length;
console.log(`[session] resume conv=${conversationId.slice(0, 12)}... uuid=${session.uuid.slice(0, 8)}... msgs=${messages.length} prompt_chars=${prompt.length}`);
} else if (conversationId) {
const uuid = randomUUID();
const now = Date.now();
sessions.set(conversationId, { uuid, messageCount: messages.length, firstSeen: now, lastUsed: now, model: cliModel });
sessionInfo = { uuid, resume: false };
stats.sessionMisses++;
prompt = messagesToPrompt(messages);
console.log(`[session] new conv=${conversationId.slice(0, 12)}... uuid=${uuid.slice(0, 8)}... msgs=${messages.length}`);
} else {
stats.oneOffRequests++;
prompt = messagesToPrompt(messages);
stats.oneOffRequests++;
if (conversationId) {
console.log(`[session] stateless conv=${conversationId.slice(0, 12)}... key=${keyName || "anon"} msgs=${messages.length} prompt_chars=${prompt.length}`);
}
const cliArgs = buildCliArgs(cliModel, sessionInfo);
const cliArgs = buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt);
const env = { ...process.env };
delete env.CLAUDECODE;
@@ -466,15 +716,10 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId) {
proc.once("exit", cleanup);
function handleSessionFailure() {
if (sessionInfo?.resume && conversationId) {
console.warn(`[session] resume failed for ${conversationId.slice(0, 12)}..., removing stale session`);
logEvent("warn", "session_failure", { mode: "resume", conversationId: conversationId.slice(0, 12) + "...", action: "deleted" });
sessions.delete(conversationId);
} else if (sessionInfo && !sessionInfo.resume && conversationId) {
// #41 evidence-gathering: session-create failures currently leave a stale entry
// in the sessions map. Log without action so the staleness pattern can be
// confirmed in /logs before any code change. Do NOT delete here speculatively.
logEvent("warn", "session_failure", { mode: "create", conversationId: conversationId.slice(0, 12) + "...", action: "kept" });
// Phase 6c: session resume (--resume/--session-id) is no longer used;
// OCP always passes full context via stdin. No session state to clean up.
if (conversationId) {
logEvent("warn", "session_failure", { mode: "stateless", conversationId: conversationId.slice(0, 12) + "...", action: "none" });
}
}
@@ -510,25 +755,48 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId) {
}
// ── Call claude CLI (non-streaming) ─────────────────────────────────────
// On-demand spawning: each request spawns a fresh `claude -p` process.
// On-demand spawning: each request spawns a fresh claude process.
// No pool = no crash loops, no stale workers, no degraded states.
// Stdin is written immediately so there's no 3s stdin timeout issue.
function callClaude(model, messages, conversationId) {
//
// Phase 6c port (2026-05-30): stdout is now NDJSON (stream-json format).
// We accumulate full text across all content_block_delta events plus the
// assistant-aggregate fallback, then resolve with the assembled string.
// Reference: OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 + commit 97e7d16.
function callClaude(model, messages, conversationId, keyName) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let ctx;
try {
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId);
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName);
} catch (err) {
return reject(err);
}
const { proc, cliModel, conversationId: convId, t0, cleanup, handleSessionFailure, markFirstByte } = ctx;
let stdout = "";
let lineBuffer = "";
let assembledText = "";
let isFirstDelta = true;
let resultEventSeen = false;
let stderr = "";
proc.stdout.on("data", (d) => {
markFirstByte();
stdout += d;
lineBuffer += d.toString();
const { events, remainder } = parseStreamJsonLines(lineBuffer);
lineBuffer = remainder;
for (const event of events) {
const parsed = parseStreamJsonEvent(event, isFirstDelta);
if (!parsed) continue;
if (parsed.text !== undefined) {
assembledText += parsed.text;
isFirstDelta = false;
} else if (parsed.stop) {
resultEventSeen = true;
} else if (parsed.error) {
// is_error result — treat as process error
reject(new Error(parsed.error));
}
}
});
proc.stderr.on("data", (d) => (stderr += d));
@@ -536,17 +804,19 @@ function callClaude(model, messages, conversationId) {
activeProcesses.delete(proc);
const elapsed = Date.now() - t0;
cleanup();
if (code !== 0) {
// Tolerate null exit code when result event was seen (sandbox-wrap noise, same
// as OLP commit 2864275 — bwrap shell exits null after model completes).
if (code !== 0 && !resultEventSeen) {
recordModelError(cliModel, false);
logEvent("error", "claude_exit", { model: cliModel, code, signal: signal || "none", elapsed, stderr: stderr.slice(0, 300) });
trackError(stderr.slice(0, 300) || stdout.slice(0, 300) || `claude exit ${code}`);
trackError(stderr.slice(0, 300) || assembledText.slice(0, 300) || `claude exit ${code}`);
handleSessionFailure();
reject(new Error(stderr.slice(0, 300) || stdout.slice(0, 300) || `claude exit ${code}`));
reject(new Error(stderr.slice(0, 300) || assembledText.slice(0, 300) || `claude exit ${code}`));
} else {
recordModelSuccess(cliModel, elapsed);
breakerRecordSuccess(cliModel);
logEvent("info", "claude_ok", { model: cliModel, chars: stdout.length, elapsed, session: convId ? convId.slice(0, 12) + "..." : "none" });
resolve(stdout.trim());
logEvent("info", "claude_ok", { model: cliModel, chars: assembledText.length, elapsed, session: convId ? convId.slice(0, 12) + "..." : "none" });
resolve(assembledText);
}
});
@@ -560,6 +830,37 @@ function callClaude(model, messages, conversationId) {
});
}
// ── TUI-mode upstream (interactive claude, cc_entrypoint=cli) ───────────
// Drop-in replacement for callClaude when TUI_MODE is ON.
// Same signature and Promise<string> contract so all downstream
// (singleflight → setCachedResponse → completionResponse) is unchanged.
// System messages are rendered inline as [System] blocks by messagesToPrompt;
// we deliberately do NOT pass --system-prompt in interactive mode to avoid any
// flag that could perturb cc_entrypoint classification.
// Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 interactive mode (cc_entrypoint=cli).
// SECURITY: A-path single-user ONLY — home is NOT isolation (see ADR 0007).
function callClaudeTui(model, messages, _conversationId, _keyName) {
const cliModel = MODEL_MAP[model] || model;
const prompt = messagesToPrompt(messages); // includes system as [System] inline
recordModelRequest(cliModel, prompt.length);
return runTuiTurn({
prompt,
model: cliModel,
claudeBin: CLAUDE,
home: TUI_HOME,
realHome: process.env.HOME,
cwd: TUI_CWD,
wallclockMs: TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS,
entrypointMode: TUI_ENTRYPOINT,
}).then((text) => {
recordModelSuccess(cliModel, 0); // elapsed not measurable here; wallclock at reader level
return text;
}).catch((err) => {
recordModelError(cliModel, false);
throw err;
});
}
// ── SSE heartbeat (opt-in idle watchdog) ────────────────────────────────
// Emits `: keepalive\n\n` SSE comment frames during silent windows on the
// streaming response. Design: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-25-47-sse-heartbeat-design.md
@@ -588,16 +889,21 @@ function startHeartbeat(res, intervalMs, sessionId) {
}
// ── Call claude CLI (real streaming) ─────────────────────────────────────
// Pipes stdout from the claude process directly to SSE chunks as they arrive.
// Each data chunk becomes a proper SSE event with delta content in real time.
// Pipes stdout from the claude process as SSE chunks as they arrive.
// Each NDJSON content_block_delta text event becomes one SSE delta.
// TODO(cache-singleflight-stream): streaming-path singleflight is out of scope for v3.13.0; see spec D4 streaming caveat.
//
// Phase 6c port (2026-05-30): stdout is now NDJSON (stream-json format).
// We parse line-by-line and forward content_block_delta text events as SSE.
// The result event triggers the stop/[DONE] sequence.
// Reference: OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 + commits 97e7d16, 65f945c.
function callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, authInfo = {}) {
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
const created = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
let ctx;
try {
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId);
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, authInfo.keyName);
} catch (err) {
return jsonResponse(res, 500, { error: { message: err.message, type: "proxy_error" } });
}
@@ -607,6 +913,9 @@ function callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, authInfo = {}
let headersSent = false;
let totalChars = 0;
let cachedContent = ""; // accumulate for cache write-back
let lineBuffer = "";
let isFirstDelta = true;
let resultEventSeen = false;
function ensureHeaders() {
if (res.writableEnded || res.destroyed) return false;
@@ -627,27 +936,63 @@ function callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, authInfo = {}
}
// D4 (spec 2026-04-25): eagerly send SSE headers post-spawn so the
// heartbeat started in the next statement (Task 1.3) covers the
// pre-first-byte silent window. Behavior change: the `code !== 0`
// before-first-byte branch at server.mjs:610-611 becomes effectively
// unreachable in the common case — the post-headers SSE-stop path
// (612-619) handles it instead.
// heartbeat started in the next statement covers the pre-first-byte silent window.
ensureHeaders();
const hb = startHeartbeat(res, HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL, convId);
proc.stdout.on("data", (d) => {
markFirstByte();
const text = d.toString();
totalChars += text.length;
if (CACHE_TTL > 0) cachedContent += text;
lineBuffer += d.toString();
const { events, remainder } = parseStreamJsonLines(lineBuffer);
lineBuffer = remainder;
if (!ensureHeaders()) return;
for (const event of events) {
const parsed = parseStreamJsonEvent(event, isFirstDelta);
if (!parsed) continue;
// Stream each chunk as it arrives from the CLI process
sendSSE(res, {
id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model,
choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { content: text }, finish_reason: null }],
}, hb);
if (parsed.text !== undefined) {
// content_block_delta text — forward as SSE delta
const text = parsed.text;
totalChars += text.length;
if (CACHE_TTL > 0) cachedContent += text;
isFirstDelta = false;
if (!ensureHeaders()) continue;
sendSSE(res, {
id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model,
choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { content: text }, finish_reason: null }],
}, hb);
} else if (parsed.stop) {
// result event — emit stop and [DONE] immediately
resultEventSeen = true;
if (!ensureHeaders()) continue;
sendSSE(res, {
id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model,
choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }],
}, hb);
if (!res.writableEnded && !res.destroyed) {
res.write("data: [DONE]\n\n");
res.end();
}
} else if (parsed.error) {
// is_error result — emit error stop
resultEventSeen = true;
logEvent("error", "claude_result_error", { model: cliModel, error: parsed.error.slice(0, 200) });
trackError(parsed.error.slice(0, 200));
if (!headersSent && !res.writableEnded && !res.destroyed) {
jsonResponse(res, 500, { error: { message: parsed.error, type: "provider_error" } });
} else if (!res.writableEnded && !res.destroyed) {
sendSSE(res, {
id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model,
choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }],
}, hb);
res.write("data: [DONE]\n\n");
res.end();
}
}
}
});
proc.stderr.on("data", (d) => (stderr += d));
@@ -658,7 +1003,9 @@ function callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, authInfo = {}
cleanup();
const elapsed = Date.now() - t0;
if (code !== 0) {
// Tolerate null exit code when result event was seen (sandbox-wrap noise, same
// as OLP commit 2864275 — bwrap shell exits null after model completes).
if (code !== 0 && !resultEventSeen) {
recordModelError(cliModel, false);
try { recordUsage({ keyId: authInfo.keyId, keyName: authInfo.keyName, model, promptChars: messages.reduce((a, m) => a + (typeof m.content === "string" ? m.content.length : JSON.stringify(m.content).length), 0), responseChars: 0, elapsedMs: elapsed, success: false }); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "usage_record_failed", { error: e.message }); }
logEvent("error", "claude_exit", { model: cliModel, code, signal: signal || "none", elapsed, stderr: stderr.slice(0, 300) });
@@ -685,14 +1032,18 @@ function callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, authInfo = {}
try { setCachedResponse(authInfo.cacheHash, model, cachedContent); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "cache_write_failed", { error: e.message }); }
}
if (!headersSent) ensureHeaders();
if (!res.writableEnded && !res.destroyed) {
sendSSE(res, {
id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model,
choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }],
}, hb);
res.write("data: [DONE]\n\n");
res.end();
// If result event already closed the response, nothing more to do.
// Otherwise emit a synthetic stop (version drift safety net, same as OLP).
if (!resultEventSeen) {
if (!headersSent) ensureHeaders();
if (!res.writableEnded && !res.destroyed) {
sendSSE(res, {
id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model,
choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }],
}, hb);
res.write("data: [DONE]\n\n");
res.end();
}
}
}
});
@@ -741,6 +1092,24 @@ function completionResponse(res, id, model, content) {
});
}
// Replay a complete string as a chunked SSE stream (80 codepoints/chunk).
// Used by: (a) cache-hit replay on the streaming path; (b) TUI-mode streaming
// (buffered response replayed as SSE so clients get the same wire format).
// Behaviour is byte-for-byte identical to the original inline cache-replay block.
function streamStringAsSSE(res, id, model, content) {
const created = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/event-stream", "Cache-Control": "no-cache", "Connection": "keep-alive", "X-Accel-Buffering": "no" });
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { role: "assistant" }, finish_reason: null }] });
const CHUNK = 80;
const codepoints = Array.from(content);
for (let i = 0; i < codepoints.length; i += CHUNK) {
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { content: codepoints.slice(i, i + CHUNK).join("") }, finish_reason: null }] });
}
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }] });
res.write("data: [DONE]\n\n");
res.end();
}
// ── Plan usage probe ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ── Plan usage probe ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ALIGNMENT: mirrors Claude Code cli.js vE4 rate-limit header extraction.
@@ -1233,20 +1602,9 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
if (cached) {
logEvent("info", "cache_hit", { model, hash: hash.slice(0, 12), hits: cached.hits });
if (stream) {
// D3: replay cached content as chunked SSE stream (80 codepoints/chunk)
const CACHE_REPLAY_CHUNK_SIZE = 80;
// D3: replay cached content as chunked SSE stream — delegated to streamStringAsSSE (DRY).
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
const created = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/event-stream", "Cache-Control": "no-cache", "Connection": "keep-alive", "X-Accel-Buffering": "no" });
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { role: "assistant" }, finish_reason: null }] });
const codepoints = Array.from(cached.response);
for (let i = 0; i < codepoints.length; i += CACHE_REPLAY_CHUNK_SIZE) {
const chunk = codepoints.slice(i, i + CACHE_REPLAY_CHUNK_SIZE).join("");
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { content: chunk }, finish_reason: null }] });
}
sendSSE(res, { id, object: "chat.completion.chunk", created, model, choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }] });
res.write("data: [DONE]\n\n");
res.end();
streamStringAsSSE(res, id, model, cached.response);
return;
} else {
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
@@ -1260,13 +1618,39 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
}
if (stream) {
// Real streaming: pipe stdout from claude process directly as SSE chunks
if (TUI_MODE) {
// TUI-mode: no real token stream — buffer the full turn via callClaudeTui,
// optionally write-back to cache, then replay as chunked SSE.
// Default path (TUI_MODE===false) falls through to callClaudeStreaming below,
// which is byte-for-byte unchanged from before this gate was added.
const t0TuiStream = Date.now();
const promptCharsTuiStream = messages.reduce((a, m) => a + (typeof m.content === "string" ? m.content.length : JSON.stringify(m.content).length), 0);
try {
const content = await callClaudeTui(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName);
if (CACHE_TTL > 0 && req._cacheHash) {
try { setCachedResponse(req._cacheHash, model, content); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "cache_write_failed", { error: e.message }); }
}
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
streamStringAsSSE(res, id, model, content);
try { recordUsage({ keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, model, promptChars: promptCharsTuiStream, responseChars: content.length, elapsedMs: Date.now() - t0TuiStream, success: true }); } catch {}
return;
} catch (err) {
if (res.headersSent || res.writableEnded || res.destroyed) { try { res.end(); } catch {} return; }
const safeMessage = (err.message || "Internal error").replace(/\/[\w/.\-]+/g, "[path]");
return jsonResponse(res, 500, { error: { message: safeMessage, type: "proxy_error" } });
}
}
// Default: real stream-json streaming, unchanged.
return callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, { keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, cacheHash: req._cacheHash });
}
const t0Usage = Date.now();
const promptChars = messages.reduce((a, m) => a + (typeof m.content === "string" ? m.content.length : JSON.stringify(m.content).length), 0);
// Select upstream based on TUI_MODE flag. With TUI_MODE===false (default),
// upstreamCall===callClaude — identical to the pre-TUI code path.
const upstreamCall = TUI_MODE ? callClaudeTui : callClaude;
// Non-streaming path with stampede protection: wrap the upstream call in singleflight
// when cache is enabled and a hash is present. Concurrent identical requests share
// one upstream spawn; followers receive the same promise. Streaming-path dedup is
@@ -1280,7 +1664,7 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
// will re-read the freshly-populated cache entry here rather than spawning.
const recheck = getCachedResponse(req._cacheHash, CACHE_TTL);
if (recheck) return recheck.response;
const c = await callClaude(model, messages, conversationId);
const c = await upstreamCall(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName);
try { setCachedResponse(req._cacheHash, model, c); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "cache_write_failed", { error: e.message }); }
return c;
});
@@ -1302,7 +1686,7 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
// Fallback: cache disabled (CACHE_TTL=0) or no _cacheHash — original path untouched.
try {
const content = await callClaude(model, messages, conversationId);
const content = await upstreamCall(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName);
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
completionResponse(res, id, model, content);
try { recordUsage({ keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, model, promptChars, responseChars: content.length, elapsedMs: Date.now() - t0Usage, success: true }); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "usage_record_failed", { error: e.message }); }
@@ -1436,8 +1820,10 @@ const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
const uptimeMs = Date.now() - START_TIME;
const sessionList = [];
for (const [id, s] of sessions) {
// id is "${keyName}|${conversationId}"; expose only the public-facing conversationId
const convId = id.includes("|") ? id.slice(id.indexOf("|") + 1) : id;
sessionList.push({
id: id.slice(0, 12) + "...",
id: convId.slice(0, 12) + "...",
model: s.model,
messages: s.messageCount,
idleMs: Date.now() - s.lastUsed,
@@ -1482,7 +1868,9 @@ const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
if (req.url === "/sessions" && req.method === "GET") {
const list = [];
for (const [id, s] of sessions) {
list.push({ id, uuid: s.uuid, model: s.model, messages: s.messageCount, lastUsed: new Date(s.lastUsed).toISOString() });
// id is "${keyName}|${conversationId}"; expose only the public-facing conversationId
const convId = id.includes("|") ? id.slice(id.indexOf("|") + 1) : id;
list.push({ id: convId, uuid: s.uuid, model: s.model, messages: s.messageCount, lastUsed: new Date(s.lastUsed).toISOString() });
}
return jsonResponse(res, 200, { sessions: list });
}
@@ -1572,14 +1960,45 @@ const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
}
if (req.url?.startsWith("/api/usage") && req.method === "GET") {
if (!isAdmin) return jsonResponse(res, 403, { error: "Admin access required" });
// Least-privilege scope rules (security audit follow-up):
// - non-admin authenticated key → only own rows
// - anonymous (PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY) → only "anonymous" rows; ?all=true ignored
// - admin without ?all=true → only own ("admin") rows
// - admin with ?all=true → full byKey/recent (legacy behavior); audited
// Authenticated callers are required (anyone reaching here passed the auth gate above);
// remote+no-auth requests would have been rejected before this point.
const url = new URL(req.url, `http://${BIND_ADDRESS}:${PORT}`);
const since = url.searchParams.get("since");
const until = url.searchParams.get("until");
const wantAll = url.searchParams.get("all") === "true";
const callerName = req._authKeyName;
// Anonymous callers may never opt into all-keys view, even if they pass ?all=true.
const isAnonCaller = callerName === "anonymous";
const fullScope = isAdmin && wantAll && !isAnonCaller;
// scopeName === null when fullScope is true (no filter); otherwise the key_name to filter by.
const scopeName = fullScope ? null : callerName;
if (fullScope) {
logEvent("info", "admin_usage_full_scope", { caller: callerName, ip: req.socket.remoteAddress || null });
}
const byKeyAll = getUsageByKey({ since, until });
const recentAll = getRecentUsage(Math.min(parseInt(url.searchParams.get("limit") || "50", 10), 500));
const timeline = getUsageTimeline({
keyName: scopeName || undefined,
hours: Math.min(parseInt(url.searchParams.get("hours") || "24", 10), 720),
});
const byKey = scopeName ? byKeyAll.filter((row) => row.key_name === scopeName) : byKeyAll;
const recent = scopeName ? recentAll.filter((row) => row.key_name === scopeName) : recentAll;
return jsonResponse(res, 200, {
byKey: getUsageByKey({ since, until }),
timeline: getUsageTimeline({ hours: Math.min(parseInt(url.searchParams.get("hours") || "24", 10), 720) }),
recent: getRecentUsage(Math.min(parseInt(url.searchParams.get("limit") || "50", 10), 500)),
byKey,
timeline,
recent,
scope: { self: scopeName, all: fullScope },
});
}
@@ -1686,9 +2105,17 @@ server.listen(PORT, BIND_ADDRESS, () => {
if (NO_CONTEXT) console.log(`Context: suppressed (CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT=true — no CLAUDE.md, no auto-memory)`);
if (CACHE_TTL > 0) console.log(`Cache: enabled (TTL=${CACHE_TTL / 1000}s)`);
else console.log(`Cache: disabled (set CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL to enable)`);
if (TUI_MODE) {
console.warn(`⚠️ TUI-mode ON — single-user only; do NOT enable on a multi-user OCP (guest prompts would run claude with operator filesystem access). See ADR 0007.`);
console.log(` TUI-mode: ON home=${TUI_HOME} cwd=${TUI_CWD} wallclock=${TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS}ms`);
try {
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions();
if (n) logEvent("info", "tui_reaped_stale_sessions", { count: n });
} catch {}
}
console.log(`---`);
console.log(`Coexistence: This proxy does NOT conflict with Claude Code interactive mode.`);
console.log(` OCP uses: localhost:${PORT} (HTTP) → claude -p (per-request process)`);
console.log(` OCP uses: localhost:${PORT} (HTTP) → claude --output-format stream-json (per-request process)`);
console.log(` CC uses: MCP protocol (in-process) → persistent session`);
console.log(` Both can run simultaneously on the same machine.`);
+78 -9
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
* OCP (Open Claude Proxy) setup
*
* Automatically configures OpenClaw to use Claude CLI as a model provider.
* Run: node setup.mjs [--port 3456] [--default-model opus|sonnet|haiku] [--dry-run]
* Run: node setup.mjs [--port N] [--default-model opus|sonnet|haiku] [--dry-run]
* (default port = DEFAULT_PORT from lib/constants.mjs)
*
* What it does:
* 1. Verifies claude CLI is installed and authenticated
@@ -12,11 +13,13 @@
* 4. Creates start.sh for easy launch
* 5. Optionally starts the proxy
*/
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, unlinkSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, unlinkSync, readdirSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs";
import { mergePlistEnv, mergeSystemdEnv } from "./scripts/lib/plist-merge.mjs";
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { join, dirname } from "node:path";
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { DEFAULT_PORT } from "./lib/constants.mjs";
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const HOME = homedir();
@@ -31,7 +34,7 @@ const opt = (name, fallback) => {
return i >= 0 && args[i + 1] ? args[i + 1] : fallback;
};
const PORT = parseInt(opt("port", "3456"), 10);
const PORT = parseInt(opt("port", String(DEFAULT_PORT)), 10);
const DEFAULT_MODEL = opt("default-model", "opus"); // opus | sonnet | haiku
const DRY_RUN = flag("dry-run");
const SKIP_START = flag("no-start");
@@ -39,6 +42,29 @@ const PROVIDER_NAME = opt("provider-name", "claude-local");
const BIND_ADDRESS = opt("bind", "127.0.0.1");
const AUTH_MODE_CONFIG = opt("auth-mode", "none");
// ── Service-env injection: CLAUDE_BIN, OCP_ADMIN_KEY, PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY ──
// These are read from the user's shell env at install time and written into
// the service unit (plist / systemd) so the daemon picks them up on boot.
// CLAUDE_BIN — detect at install time; omit if not found (server.mjs fallback)
let CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT = null;
if (process.env.CLAUDE_BIN) {
CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT = process.env.CLAUDE_BIN;
} else {
try {
const detected = execSync("which claude 2>/dev/null", { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim();
if (detected && existsSync(detected)) {
CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT = detected;
}
} catch { /* which not available or claude not on PATH — omit */ }
}
// OCP_ADMIN_KEY — omit entirely when empty/unset; don't write empty string
const OCP_ADMIN_KEY_INJECT = process.env.OCP_ADMIN_KEY || null;
// PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY — same pattern
const PROXY_ANON_KEY_INJECT = process.env.PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY || null;
// ── Models: derived from models.json (single source of truth) ──────────
const modelsConfig = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, "models.json"), "utf-8"));
@@ -286,6 +312,29 @@ banner.push(`╚═════════════════════
console.log("\n" + banner.join("\n") + "\n");
// ── Step 7: Install auto-start on boot ──────────────────────────────────
// Log service-env injection plan (shown in both dry-run and live mode)
console.log("\n🔧 Service unit env vars to inject:\n");
if (CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT) {
log(`CLAUDE_BIN: ${CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT}`);
} else {
log(`CLAUDE_BIN: (not found — server.mjs will auto-detect at runtime)`);
}
if (OCP_ADMIN_KEY_INJECT) {
log(`OCP_ADMIN_KEY: injected (length: ${OCP_ADMIN_KEY_INJECT.length})`);
} else {
log(`OCP_ADMIN_KEY: (unset — admin endpoints disabled)`);
}
if (PROXY_ANON_KEY_INJECT) {
log(`PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY: injected (set)`);
} else {
log(`PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY: (unset — anonymous access disabled)`);
}
if (DRY_RUN) {
console.log("\n [dry-run] would write service unit with above env vars\n");
}
if (!DRY_RUN) {
console.log("\n🔄 Installing auto-start on login...\n");
@@ -358,7 +407,13 @@ if (!DRY_RUN) {
<key>CLAUDE_BIND</key>
<string>${BIND_ADDRESS}</string>
<key>CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE</key>
<string>${AUTH_MODE_CONFIG}</string>
<string>${AUTH_MODE_CONFIG}</string>${CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT ? `
<key>CLAUDE_BIN</key>
<string>${CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT}</string>` : ""}${OCP_ADMIN_KEY_INJECT ? `
<key>OCP_ADMIN_KEY</key>
<string>${OCP_ADMIN_KEY_INJECT}</string>` : ""}${PROXY_ANON_KEY_INJECT ? `
<key>PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY</key>
<string>${PROXY_ANON_KEY_INJECT}</string>` : ""}
</dict>
<key>RunAtLoad</key>
<true/>
@@ -372,8 +427,15 @@ if (!DRY_RUN) {
</plist>
`;
writeFileSync(plistPath, plistXml);
log(`Plist written: ${plistPath}`);
const existingPlist = existsSync(plistPath) ? readFileSync(plistPath, "utf8") : null;
const finalPlistXml = mergePlistEnv(existingPlist, plistXml);
writeFileSync(plistPath, finalPlistXml);
chmodSync(plistPath, 0o600);
if (existingPlist && finalPlistXml !== plistXml) {
log(`Plist written: ${plistPath} (mode 600, preserved user env vars)`);
} else {
log(`Plist written: ${plistPath} (mode 600)`);
}
// Bootout first (in case it was already loaded) then bootstrap
try { execSync(`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) "${plistPath}" 2>/dev/null`); } catch { /* ignore */ }
@@ -396,7 +458,7 @@ After=network.target
ExecStart=${nodeBin} ${serverPath}
Environment=CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT=${PORT}
Environment=CLAUDE_BIND=${BIND_ADDRESS}
Environment=CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=${AUTH_MODE_CONFIG}
Environment=CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=${AUTH_MODE_CONFIG}${CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT ? `\nEnvironment=CLAUDE_BIN=${CLAUDE_BIN_INJECT}` : ""}${OCP_ADMIN_KEY_INJECT ? `\nEnvironment=OCP_ADMIN_KEY=${OCP_ADMIN_KEY_INJECT}` : ""}${PROXY_ANON_KEY_INJECT ? `\nEnvironment=PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY=${PROXY_ANON_KEY_INJECT}` : ""}
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
StandardOutput=append:${logPath}
@@ -406,8 +468,15 @@ StandardError=append:${logPath}
WantedBy=default.target
`;
writeFileSync(servicePath, serviceUnit);
log(`Service file written: ${servicePath}`);
const existingService = existsSync(servicePath) ? readFileSync(servicePath, "utf8") : null;
const finalServiceUnit = mergeSystemdEnv(existingService, serviceUnit);
writeFileSync(servicePath, finalServiceUnit);
chmodSync(servicePath, 0o600);
if (existingService && finalServiceUnit !== serviceUnit) {
log(`Service file written: ${servicePath} (mode 600, preserved user env vars)`);
} else {
log(`Service file written: ${servicePath} (mode 600)`);
}
execSync(`systemctl --user daemon-reload`);
execSync(`systemctl --user enable ocp-proxy`);
+1086
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