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Author SHA1 Message Date
taodeng bfab362fd9 docs(changelog): correct contributor count — four of six PRs are @vvlasy-openclaw's, not two (release reviewer) 2026-07-21 21:18:49 +10:00
taodengandClaude <claude-opus-4-8> <noreply@anthropic.com> a87523004d chore(release): v3.24.0 — OpenAI multimodal vision + structured outputs, SPOT prompt budget, agentic-turn fix, OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS
Consolidates #179/#153/#154/#183/#181/#182 (merged since the v3.23.0 tag).
3.23.0 → 3.24.0.

Minor: four user-facing features (multimodal vision #154, structured outputs
#153, SPOT-derived prompt budget #179, OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS #182) + two fixes
(#183 agentic final-answer, #181 deep-reply-500). No breaking change; no new
endpoint; no new cli.js wire behavior. Two features from @vvlasy-openclaw.

Release-kit walk: new env vars all documented in-PR (CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL /
CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_* #154, OCP_STRUCTURED_MAX_ATTEMPTS #153, OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS #182 —
grepped present in README env table); ADR 0009 (#179) + ADR 0006 (B.1, #153/#154)
indexed; version from package.json only (no stale refs); the CHANGELOG Unreleased
section (which held #182) is retitled to v3.24.0 with the other five entries added.

Tag push v3.24.0 at this squash commit triggers release.yml.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-4-8> <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 21:15:02 +10:00
11 changed files with 38 additions and 405 deletions
+6 -13
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@@ -21,31 +21,24 @@ jobs:
- name: Extract CHANGELOG section
id: notes
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VERSION="${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}"
NOTES=/tmp/release-notes.md
# Extract section for this version from CHANGELOG.md
# Pattern: "## v${VERSION}" through the next "## " or EOF
if [ ! -f CHANGELOG.md ]; then
echo "No CHANGELOG.md found; using minimal release notes"
# MUST write the file, not just an output: the create step consumes a FILE, so an
# early exit here used to leave --notes-file pointing at a path that never existed,
# turning "degrade to minimal notes" into a failed release job (#202).
echo "Release v${VERSION}" > "$NOTES"
echo "notes_file=$NOTES" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "notes=Release v${VERSION}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
exit 0
fi
awk -v ver="v${VERSION}" '
$0 ~ "^## " ver { found=1; print; next }
found && /^## v/ { exit }
found { print }
' CHANGELOG.md > "$NOTES"
if [ ! -s "$NOTES" ]; then
' CHANGELOG.md > /tmp/release-notes.md
if [ ! -s /tmp/release-notes.md ]; then
echo "No matching section in CHANGELOG for v${VERSION}; using minimal notes"
echo "Release v${VERSION}" > "$NOTES"
echo "Release v${VERSION}" > /tmp/release-notes.md
fi
echo "--- release notes (${VERSION}) ---"; cat "$NOTES"
echo "notes_file=$NOTES" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "notes_file=/tmp/release-notes.md" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Create GitHub Release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -56,5 +49,5 @@ jobs:
fi
gh release create "v${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}" \
--title "v${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}" \
--notes-file "${{ steps.notes.outputs.notes_file }}" \
--notes-file /tmp/release-notes.md \
--latest
-27
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@@ -1,32 +1,5 @@
# Changelog
## v3.25.0 — 2026-07-27
Minor release. Headline: **Claude Opus 5** joins the model list and the `opus` alias now resolves to it. Alongside it, two `server.mjs` correctness fixes found by review rather than by users — a monotonic in-flight-counter leak, and cache keys that were hashing the alias string instead of the model it resolves to. The three TUI/prompt fixes that landed after v3.24.0 are included here too.
Every code PR carried an independent fresh-context reviewer (Iron Rule 10); #192 additionally went through the external codex gate, which is what surfaced the cache-key defect. No new endpoint, no new env var, no new `cli.js` wire behavior.
### Added
- **Claude Opus 5 (`claude-opus-5`) (#192).** New `models.json` entry — `/v1/models` goes 6 → 7 and OpenClaw picks it up on the next `ocp update` (via `scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs`). Verified against the installed CLI rather than assumed: the compiled `claude` 2.1.220 bundle carries `latest_per_family:{fable:"claude-fable-5",opus:"claude-opus-5",sonnet:"claude-sonnet-5",haiku:"claude-haiku-4-5"}`. Availability confirmed with a live `claude -p --model claude-opus-5` completion on the subscription pool. `claude-opus-4-8` is retained for pinning.
- `contextWindow` is deliberately **200000**, not Opus 5's native 1M. Two reasons, both verified: (1) `MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` is a **single global** budget — `derivePromptCharBudget` takes `max(contextWindow) × 3` across *all* entries (`lib/prompt.mjs`), so a 1M entry would raise the truncation ceiling to 3,000,000 chars for `claude-haiku-4-5` too, which is genuinely 200k native, converting clean OCP-side truncation into an upstream API rejection; (2) OpenClaw scales its history budget linearly off this value (`contextWindow × maxHistoryShare × SAFETY_MARGIN` = `× 0.6`, plus an oversized-message threshold at `× 0.5`, per `compaction-planning` in OpenClaw 2026.7.1), and its own bundled registry hardcodes 200000 for Claude — the upstream request to raise it to 1M ([openclaw#22979](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/issues/22979)) was closed *not planned*. A new regression test pins the invariant so a future 1M entry has to be a deliberate, reviewed change. Raising it for real needs per-model budgets — tracked separately, ADR-level.
### Changed
- **The `opus` alias now resolves to `claude-opus-5` instead of `claude-opus-4-8` (#192).** Every request that names `opus` — and OpenClaw's opus entry — moves to Opus 5 on upgrade. This mirrors what the CLI itself defaults to (`latest_per_family.opus` above), the same reasoning as #168's `sonnet``claude-sonnet-5` repoint in v3.23.0. **Pricing is unchanged** ($5/$25 per MTok; CLI registry `pricing:"tier_5_25"` for both Opus 4.8 and Opus 5), so this carries no cost change. Pin `claude-opus-4-8` explicitly to stay on the previous model.
### Fixed
- **Cache keys hashed the alias, not the model it resolves to (#194).** `model` enters `cacheHash` exactly as the client sent it, so a request for `"opus"` was cached under the literal `"opus"` — and since `models.json` is read once at boot while the SQLite `response_cache` outlives a restart, repointing an alias kept serving the **old model's** answers under it until TTL expiry. That would have silently defeated this release's own `opus` repoint for anyone running with the cache on. All three call sites now hash `Object.hasOwn(MODEL_MAP, model) ? MODEL_MAP[model] : model`, which fixes the normal, structured **and** single-flight keys at once and covers `legacyAliases` for free, with precise invalidation (only the repointed alias's entries change key) rather than a whole-cache flush. (`hasOwn` rather than a bare lookup: `MODEL_MAP` is a plain object, so `MODEL_MAP["__proto__"]` would return a truthy *object* and not even fall through to the `|| model` guard.) **Also closes a latent gap from #177:** the structured and dedup keys never passed `configEpoch` at all, so a `CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT` change — the original #176 scenario — kept serving structured answers composed under the old config, live since #153. Found by the external codex review of #192.
- **In-flight request counter leaked permanently on a pre-spawn throw (#193, reported by @konceptnet in #180).** `stats.activeRequests` was incremented ~40 lines before the child spawn, while its only decrement is reached through that process's events — so any synchronous throw in between (`buildCliArgs`, env assembly, the spawn decision, or `spawn()` itself) leaked `+1` forever, and `/health` and `/status` over-reported in-flight work monotonically. The increment now sits immediately after `activeProcesses.add(proc)`, structurally pairing it with the decrement; no reconciliation pass and no try/catch. Observability-only field, so no admission decision changes.
- **TUI: the host `CLAUDE.md` could leak into proxied turns (#187, contributed by @sumlin).** The TUI pane now spawns with `--safe-mode`.
- **TUI: `shift+tab to cycle` is accepted as an input-ready marker (#188, contributed by @sumlin).** Claude renders one of two ready-state footers depending on the build — the classic `? for shortcuts` hint, or `shift+tab to cycle` (as part of `⏵⏵ bypass permissions on (shift+tab to cycle)`) on newer 2.1.x. The matcher only knew the classic string, so on those builds it silently reported "never ready": every boot timed out with `tui_pane_not_ready`, and with the warm pool on, every pre-boot failed.
- **`OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS` no longer hard-codes a tool list in its wrapper (#191, closes #185).** The positive wrapper claimed a fixed set of tools regardless of `CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS`, so a narrowed tool surface was described inaccurately to the model.
### Testing
- The response-cache and counter fixes ship with **mutation-proven integration tests** built on the existing `ltBoot` child-process fixture (real `server.mjs`, fake `claude` binary, so no quota cost). The counter test reaches a synchronous fault *inside* `spawnClaudeProcess` from environment alone — no production fault hook — by running the child under `--stack-size=200` to lower the spread-throw threshold enough to fit Linux's `MAX_ARG_STRLEN`. Suite: **447 → 457** across this release (per PR: #188 +1, #187 +1, #191 +0, #194 +4, #192 +3, #193 +1).
## v3.24.0 — 2026-07-21
Minor release. Headline: two long-requested **OpenAI-compat features** land — **multimodal vision** (`image_url` parts) and **structured outputs** (`response_format` / JSON schema). Also: the prompt-char budget now derives from the model SPOT instead of a hand-set constant, an agentic-turn bug that dropped the model's final answer is fixed, and `OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS` supports the OpenClaw-backend use case. Four of the six landed from external contributors (@vvlasy-openclaw). Every code PR carried a fresh-context reviewer (Iron Rule 10); no new endpoint, no new `cli.js` wire behavior.
+5 -7
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@@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ node setup.mjs
`setup.mjs` verifies the Claude CLI, starts the proxy on port 3456, and installs auto-start (launchd on macOS, systemd on Linux). The `ocp` CLI lands at `~/ocp/ocp` — symlink it onto your PATH (`sudo ln -sf ~/ocp/ocp /usr/local/bin/ocp`, or `ln -sf ~/ocp/ocp ~/.local/bin/ocp`) or alias it (`alias ocp=~/ocp/ocp`); the rest of the docs assume `ocp` is on your PATH.
**Verify** — should list 7 models:
**Verify** — should list 6 models:
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models
# claude-opus-5, claude-opus-4-8, claude-opus-4-7, claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-5, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
# claude-opus-4-8, claude-opus-4-7, claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-5, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
```
**Connect one IDE** — point any OpenAI-compatible tool at the proxy, then reload your shell and start a tool (Cline / Continue / Cursor / OpenCode):
@@ -169,9 +169,8 @@ Any tool use happens server-side, under the `--allowedTools` set configured on t
| Model ID | Notes |
|----------|-------|
| `claude-opus-5` | Most capable (default for `opus` alias) |
| `claude-opus-4-8` | Previous Opus, retained for pinning |
| `claude-opus-4-7` | Older Opus, retained for pinning |
| `claude-opus-4-8` | Most capable (default for `opus` alias) |
| `claude-opus-4-7` | Previous Opus, retained for pinning |
| `claude-opus-4-6` | Older Opus, retained for pinning |
| `claude-sonnet-5` | Latest Sonnet (default for `sonnet` alias) |
| `claude-sonnet-4-6` | Previous Sonnet, retained for pinning |
@@ -388,7 +387,7 @@ curl -X DELETE http://127.0.0.1:3456/cache # clear all cached responses
ocp settings cacheTTL 0 # disable at runtime
```
Cache is **disabled by default** (`CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL=0`). All data is stored locally in `~/.ocp/ocp.db`. **Cache keys resolve model aliases as of v3.25.0:** a request for an alias (`opus`, `sonnet`, `haiku`, or a legacy alias like `claude-haiku-4-5`) is now keyed on the canonical model it resolves to, not on the string the client sent. Two consequences, both one-time and self-healing: rows written before the upgrade don't match the new lookups, so they orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — no migration script required; and an alias now correctly shares a cache slot with its canonical id, since both produce an identical spawn. Scope: for the **normal** cache only alias-addressed rows rekey — rows keyed on a literal model id keep matching, *unless* you run `OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS=1`, in which case the whole normal cache rekeys once because v3.25.0 also reworded that wrapper and the wrapper text feeds the config epoch. **Every structured-output row rekeys regardless**, since the same change folds the config epoch into the structured key, which it previously omitted. This is what makes an alias repoint (such as v3.25.0's `opus` → `claude-opus-5`) take effect immediately instead of being masked by the cache until TTL expiry. **Hash format upgrade in v3.13.0:** legacy `v1` cache rows don't match new `v2`-format lookups; they orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — no migration script required.
Cache is **disabled by default** (`CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL=0`). All data is stored locally in `~/.ocp/ocp.db`. **Hash format upgrade in v3.13.0:** legacy `v1` cache rows don't match new `v2`-format lookups; they orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — no migration script required.
## Structured Outputs (OpenAI `response_format`)
@@ -541,7 +540,6 @@ The simplest path: ask your AI — paste `Run `ocp doctor` and follow its `next_
- **A TUI session vanished right after upgrading OCP** — if a pre-3.21.1 and a post-3.21.1 instance ran on the same host at the same time during an upgrade, the new instance's one-time boot reap can, once, kill an old-format (`ocp-tui-<8hex>`) live TUI session belonging to the still-running old instance. Restart the affected session (`ocp restart` or re-run your TUI turn) and it returns under the new instance's port-scoped naming.
- **OpenClaw shows old models after `ocp update` (v3.10→v3.11 only)** — the running shell had the old `cmd_update` cached, so the sync hook doesn't fire on that single jump. Run once: `node ~/ocp/scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs && openclaw gateway restart`. Every future update syncs automatically.
- **Response-cache hit rate drops once after upgrading to v3.25.0** — only if you run with the cache on (`CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL > 0`; it is off by default). v3.25.0 keys the cache on the resolved model instead of the string the client sent, so alias-addressed rows (and *all* structured-output rows) orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup within one window. **No action required.** Details: [docs/troubleshooting.md#cache-rekey-v3250](docs/troubleshooting.md#cache-rekey-v3250).
Full manual — setup failures, env-var-not-taking-effect-after-restart (launchd bootout+bootstrap vs `kickstart -k`), stuck sessions, "OpenClaw registry out of sync", and the two-layer TUI-mode 401 root cause + fix: **[docs/troubleshooting.md](docs/troubleshooting.md)**.
+5 -6
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@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Run `ocp lan` to see your IP and ready-to-share instructions.
**Verify:**
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models
# Returns: claude-opus-5, claude-opus-4-8, claude-opus-4-7, claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-5, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
# Returns: claude-opus-4-8, claude-opus-4-7, claude-opus-4-6, claude-sonnet-5, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
```
### Headless install notes
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ Please follow https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/blob/main/README.md
installed and logged in (`claude auth status`). Install missing pieces
using my system's package manager.
2. git clone the repo, cd in, and run `node setup.mjs`.
3. Verify with `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` (should list 7 models).
3. Verify with `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` (should list 6 models).
4. Add `export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1` to my shell rc.
5. Tell me to reload my shell and try a tool like Cline / Continue / Cursor.
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ Please follow https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/blob/main/docs/lan-mode.md
5. Add OCP_ADMIN_KEY to my shell rc (~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc).
6. Run `ocp lan` to show me the LAN IP and connect command.
7. Optionally create example keys: `ocp keys add laptop`, `ocp keys add tablet`.
8. Verify: `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` returns 7 models.
8. Verify: `curl http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/models` returns 6 models.
Tell me each step before running it. On error, diagnose before retrying.
```
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ Please follow https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/blob/main/docs/lan-mode.md
chmod +x ocp-connect
2. Run `./ocp-connect <SERVER_IP>` (add `--key <KEY>` if you have one).
3. Follow any IDE-specific manual hints it prints.
4. Verify: `curl http://<SERVER_IP>:3456/v1/models` returns 7 models.
4. Verify: `curl http://<SERVER_IP>:3456/v1/models` returns 6 models.
5. Tell me to reload my shell + restart any IDE that was already running.
Don't auto-retry on error. Tell me the failure mode first.
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ OCP Connect v1.3.0
(set by admin via PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY; see issue #12 §14 Path A)
Testing API access...
✓ API accessible (7 models available)
✓ API accessible (6 models available)
Shell config:
✓ .bashrc
@@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ OCP Connect v1.3.0
✓ OpenClaw configured
Provider: ocp
Models:
• ocp/claude-opus-5
• ocp/claude-opus-4-8
• ocp/claude-opus-4-7
• ocp/claude-opus-4-6
-16
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@@ -116,22 +116,6 @@ openclaw gateway restart # so OpenClaw re-reads the config
Future `ocp update` invocations sync automatically.
<a id="cache-rekey-v3250"></a>
### Response-cache hit rate drops once after upgrading to v3.25.0
Only affects instances running with the response cache **on** (`CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL > 0`); it is off by default, so most installs see nothing.
v3.25.0 keys the cache on the **resolved** model rather than on the string the client sent, so rows written for an alias (`opus`, `sonnet`, `haiku`, or a legacy alias like `claude-haiku-4-5`) no longer match. Those rows orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — **no migration script, no action required**; expect one window of extra misses and then normal hit rates.
Two different scopes, worth being precise about:
- **Normal cache** — only *alias-addressed* rows rekey. Rows written under a literal model id (`claude-sonnet-5`) keep matching — **unless the instance runs `OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS=1`**, in which case the entire normal cache rekeys once. That is a separate mechanism: v3.25.0 also reworded the local-tools wrapper, and the wrapper text is one of the four inputs to `CONFIG_EPOCH`, which every normal cache key folds in (established behavior since v3.23.0, not new here).
- **Structured-output cache** — **every** row rekeys, alias or literal. The same change also folds the config epoch into the structured key, which it had never included; that gap meant a `CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT` change did not invalidate structured answers either. Structured caching only exists from v3.24.0, so there is at most one release worth of rows to orphan.
This is deliberate, and it is what makes an alias repoint take effect. Before v3.25.0, changing where an alias pointed (v3.25.0 itself repoints `opus` → `claude-opus-5`) left the cache serving the **old** model's answers under that alias until TTL expiry, because `models.json` is read once at boot while the SQLite cache survives the restart. If you were running with the cache on and repointed an alias in an earlier version, that is why it appeared not to take.
A side effect worth knowing: an alias and its canonical id now **share** a cache slot, since both produce an identical spawn. That is a small hit-rate improvement in steady state.
<a id="tui-401"></a>
### TUI-mode returns a permanent `Please run /login` 401 (re-login doesn't stick)
+1 -1
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Then restart OCP. At boot you will see (with the env token set, isolated home au
- **Callers see no API change.** The response is a normal OpenAI completion object or chunked SSE — identical wire format.
- **Real streaming is opt-in (`OCP_TUI_STREAM=1`), and off by default.** By default TUI-mode buffers the full response and replays it as chunked SSE — you see a delay, then the complete response. Set `OCP_TUI_STREAM=1` and `stream:true` turns emit real SSE `delta.content` chunks as `claude` renders them, sourced from `claude`'s own `MessageDisplay` hook (byte-faithful raw markdown, on the subscription pool, no `-p`). Two honest caveats: granularity is **block-level** — the hook fires once per rendered block, so a handful of chunks per answer, scaling with length, not token-by-token; and it moves the **first** byte, not the last, so a consumer that must parse a complete reply gains nothing. The transcript stays authoritative: every streamed turn is asserted against it at the end, and a turn whose stream disagrees is **failed rather than served** (watch `tui.streamDivergences` on `/health`). Evidence: [`plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/streaming-spike.md`](plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/streaming-spike.md).
- **Cache and singleflight work normally.** TUI-mode writes the buffered response to the cache on success; cache-hits skip the interactive turn entirely.
- **The host's `CLAUDE.md` / auto-memory is never injected.** OCP is a proxy — the proxied client (OpenClaw / your IDE) owns its own context and memory. TUI-mode runs `claude` with `--safe-mode`, which disables all host customizations (CLAUDE.md, skills, plugins, hooks, MCP servers) while leaving auth, model selection, built-in tools, and permissions untouched — so a `CLAUDE.md` on the OCP host can never leak into a proxied turn and steer the answer, and the session still bills the subscription pool (`cc_entrypoint=cli`, unlike `--bare`). The `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS` / `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY` env vars are kept as a fallback (see #4). Built-in tool schemas + the interactive system prompt remain (the inherent ~2035K context floor of interactive mode); MCP is hard-disabled. **Exception:** the two opt-in modes that deliberately need a customization `--safe-mode` would strip — real streaming (`OCP_TUI_STREAM`, which registers a `MessageDisplay` **hook** via `--settings`) and `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS` (which grants an **MCP** / skills surface) — run without `--safe-mode` and rely on the env-var suppression alone.
- **The host's `CLAUDE.md` / auto-memory is never injected.** OCP is a proxy — the proxied client (OpenClaw / your IDE) owns its own context and memory. TUI-mode always runs `claude` with `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS` + `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY`, so a `CLAUDE.md` on the OCP host can never leak into proxied turns (verified live; see #4). Built-in tool schemas + the interactive system prompt remain (the inherent ~2035K context floor of interactive mode); MCP is hard-disabled.
- **Authenticate via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` in a credential-isolated home (recommended).** tmux does not forward the parent process's env to the pane, so OCP sets the token explicitly on the spawned `claude` when `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is present. With the env token set and `OCP_TUI_HOME` unset, OCP runs claude in a **credential-isolated home** (`$HOME/.ocp-tui/home`) that has **no `credentials.json`** — so the env token is the only credential and is authoritative, and claude never runs the token-refresh path. This both stops a stale `credentials.json` from shadowing the token and ends the refresh-token corruption behind the permanent `Please run /login · API Error: 401` (full two-layer root cause, live proof, and fix in [Troubleshooting § the permanent TUI-mode 401](troubleshooting.md#tui-401)). Transcripts land under the same isolated home, so the answer-reader is unaffected. Without the env token, claude falls back to the real home's `credentials.json` (byte-for-byte the previous behaviour). (The token is visible in `ps` on the pane command — acceptable for the single-user A-path; the multi-user B-path is refused at boot.) See ADR 0007 PR-C / PR-D amendments.
- **Stale tmux sessions are reaped.** The pane's `claude` is a child of the tmux server (not OCP), so OCP cannot reap it directly; `claude` zombies can otherwise accumulate as `<defunct>` over a long-running host. OCP reaps them at boot and on a 15-min idle sweep by issuing `tmux kill-server` — but **only when no foreign tmux session remains** (it never disrupts a co-hosted `olp-tui-*` instance). See ADR 0007 PR-C amendment.
- **Default path unchanged.** Unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` and restart → `callClaude` / `callClaudeStreaming` are used again, byte-for-byte identical to today.
+6 -41
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@@ -182,13 +182,8 @@ function tuiCapturePane(tmux, tmuxName) {
}
// True once claude's input bar is rendered and ready for keystrokes.
// Two known ready-state footers across claude versions: the classic `? for shortcuts`
// hint, and the `shift+tab to cycle` hint (part of "⏵⏵ bypass permissions on (shift+tab
// to cycle)") that newer claude 2.1.x renders in its place. Match EITHER — a matcher that
// only knew the classic string silently reported "never ready" on those builds, timing out
// every boot (tui_pane_not_ready) and, with the warm pool on, failing every pre-boot.
function tuiInputReady(pane) {
return /\? for shortcuts|shift\+tab to cycle/.test(pane);
return /\? for shortcuts/.test(pane);
}
// True once the pasted prompt has POSITIVELY landed in the input box. We only trust
@@ -389,15 +384,9 @@ export function buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId, ehome, entrypointMode,
// CLAUDE.md and auto-memory must NEVER leak into the agent OCP runs on the user's behalf.
// Without these, claude loads the host's project/user CLAUDE.md + memory into every proxied
// turn — verified live 2026-06-02: a cwd CLAUDE.md ("end every reply with QUACKMARKER_42") was
// obeyed by the proxied turn until these flags were set, after which it was not. Mirrors the
// -p path's CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT vars. Harmless on hosts with no CLAUDE.md (they suppress nothing).
//
// These env vars stopped being sufficient on newer claude: they are present in the pane's
// environment yet the host CLAUDE.md is still injected into the turn's context, so a proxied
// turn again obeys the operator's private CLAUDE.md instead of the caller's prompt — a leak of
// the operator's private context into API responses. The robust suppression is the --safe-mode
// flag added to the argv below; these env vars are kept as belt-and-braces for the two argv
// paths that cannot take --safe-mode (see the safeModeArgs note near the return).
// obeyed by the proxied turn until these flags were set, after which it was not. Unconditional
// by design (not gated): proxy purity is not an opt-in. Harmless on hosts with no CLAUDE.md
// (the common case — they suppress nothing). Mirrors the -p path's CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT vars.
const sets = [
`HOME=${shq(ehome)}`,
"DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1",
@@ -488,32 +477,9 @@ export function buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId, ehome, entrypointMode,
// so the OFF argv is byte-for-byte the pre-streaming argv.
const settingsArgs = stream && stream.settings ? ["--settings", shq(stream.settings)] : [];
// --safe-mode: disable ALL customizations (host CLAUDE.md, skills, plugins, hooks, MCP
// servers, custom commands/agents, output styles, ...) while leaving auth, model selection,
// built-in tools, and permissions untouched (claude 2.1.216 --help). This is the robust
// replacement for the CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS / _AUTO_MEMORY env vars above, which no
// longer suppress the host CLAUDE.md on newer claude — so the operator's private CLAUDE.md
// could otherwise leak into a proxied API response. Unlike --bare, --safe-mode does NOT drop
// the interactive session off the subscription pool (it keeps auth + model selection), so the
// billing classifier stays cc_entrypoint=cli.
//
// NOT applied when the pane deliberately relies on a customization --safe-mode would strip,
// because those would break SILENTLY:
// - streaming (settingsArgs present): the MessageDisplay hook is a HOOK, which --safe-mode
// disables — every streamed turn would then fire zero deltas (tui.streamZeroDeltaTurns)
// and fall back to buffered, defeating OCP_TUI_STREAM.
// - OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS=1: grants an MCP / skills / agent surface (--mcp-config, ...) that
// --safe-mode disables wholesale.
// Those two opt-in paths keep the env-var suppression above as their best-effort fallback.
const safeModeArgs =
settingsArgs.length === 0 && process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS !== "1"
? ["--safe-mode"]
: [];
return [
envPrefix,
shq(claudeBin),
...safeModeArgs,
"--model", shq(model),
"--session-id", sessionId,
...toolArgs,
@@ -649,9 +615,8 @@ export async function bootTuiPane({
// A pooled pane is SINGLE-USE: it already carries its own fresh --session-id, it
// serves this one turn, and it is killed in the finally like any other pane.
// 2. On a MISS: pre-trust the scratch cwd, boot an interactive `claude` in a fresh tmux
// session in the scratch cwd, poll capture-pane until the input bar appears — see
// tuiInputReady for the ready-state footers matched (bootTuiPane). BOOT_MS is the max
// wait, not a fixed delay.
// session in the scratch cwd, poll capture-pane until the `? for shortcuts` input bar
// appears (bootTuiPane). BOOT_MS is the max wait, not a fixed delay.
// 3. Write prompt to a 0600 temp file (no shell injection from prompt content).
// 4. Paste the prompt via tmux load-buffer + paste-buffer -p (bracketed paste) —
// reliable for large multi-line prompts where send-keys -l is not (issue #130).
+1 -9
View File
@@ -2,14 +2,6 @@
"$schema": "./models.schema.json",
"version": 1,
"models": [
{
"id": "claude-opus-5",
"displayName": "Claude Opus 5",
"openclawName": "Claude Opus 5 (via CLI)",
"reasoning": true,
"contextWindow": 200000,
"maxTokens": 16384
},
{
"id": "claude-opus-4-8",
"displayName": "Claude Opus 4.8",
@@ -60,7 +52,7 @@
}
],
"aliases": {
"opus": "claude-opus-5",
"opus": "claude-opus-4-8",
"sonnet": "claude-sonnet-5",
"haiku": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"
},
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "open-claude-proxy",
"version": "3.25.0",
"version": "3.24.0",
"description": "OCP (Open Claude Proxy) — use your Claude Pro/Max subscription as an OpenAI-compatible API for any IDE. Works with Cline, OpenCode, Aider, Continue.dev, OpenClaw, and more.",
"type": "module",
"bin": {
+5 -29
View File
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ const OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER = `You are accessed via the OCP HTTP proxy. You
// default wrapper above is byte-for-byte unchanged. Selecting the positive wrapper does NOT expand
// the tool surface (governed independently by --allowedTools/--disallowedTools) — it only changes the
// prompt — and is boot-gated below (multi/non-loopback/anon → refuse) mirroring OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS.
const OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS_WRAPPER = `You are accessed via the OCP HTTP proxy running on the operator's own machine. Unlike the shared-gateway posture, you may use your available local tools to act on the operator's machine as the task requires. Use only the tools you actually have — do not assume filesystem, shell, or other access beyond the tool set provided to you in this session.`;
const OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS_WRAPPER = `You are accessed via the OCP HTTP proxy running on the operator's own machine. You have full access to the local filesystem, working directory, and shell through your available tools (Bash, Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep, etc.). Use them as needed to complete the operator's requests.`;
// OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS is inert in TUI mode: the interactive (non-`-p`) path composes its own prompt via
// callClaudeTui/messagesToPrompt and never calls extractSystemPrompt, so the wrapper is only ever
@@ -1371,6 +1371,7 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlo
promptChars = stdinPayload.length;
}
stats.activeRequests++;
stats.totalRequests++;
stats.oneOffRequests++;
if (conversationId) {
@@ -1413,17 +1414,6 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlo
const proc = spawn(CLAUDE, cliArgs, spawnOpts);
activeProcesses.add(proc);
// Counter drift (#180, reported by @konceptnet): increment ONLY after the spawn has
// succeeded and the process is registered. Incrementing before the spawn (as this did) leaked
// +1 permanently on any synchronous throw in between — buildCliArgs, env assembly, the spawn
// decision, or spawn() itself — because nothing was yet attached that could undo it.
//
// cleanup() is the SOLE decrement site, but note how it is reached: only 'exit' is wired HERE
// (below); 'close' and 'error' are wired by each CALLER (callClaude / callClaudeStreaming).
// That caller wiring is REQUIRED, not belt-and-braces — a FAILED spawn emits 'error' and
// 'close' but never 'exit', so without it a spawn failure would never decrement. A future
// third caller of spawnClaudeProcess must wire them too.
stats.activeRequests++;
const t0 = Date.now();
let gotFirstByte = false;
@@ -2814,20 +2804,6 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
const messages = parsed.messages || parsed.input || [{ role: "user", content: parsed.prompt || "" }];
const model = parsed.model || modelsConfig.aliases.sonnet;
// Cache keys must hash the RESOLVED model, never the string the client happened to use.
// `model` is whatever was sent — a canonical id, an alias ("opus"), or a legacyAlias
// ("claude-opus-4"). MODEL_MAP carries all three, and models.json is read once at boot, so
// repointing an alias only takes effect on restart — while the SQLite response_cache outlives
// it. Hashing the raw string would therefore keep serving the OLD model's answers under that
// alias until TTL expiry, silently defeating the repoint (the #176 hazard, for aliases).
// Resolving first also means "opus" and "claude-opus-5" correctly share one slot: identical
// spawn, identical answer. Only the cache KEY is resolved — `model` is still echoed back to
// the client verbatim, so the wire response is unchanged.
// hasOwn, not a bare lookup: MODEL_MAP is a plain object, so `MODEL_MAP["constructor"]`
// would return an inherited FUNCTION. Unreachable today (the VALID_MODELS gate below 400s
// first, and it is built from Object.keys so it holds only own keys), but a bare lookup
// would hand cacheHash a function the day anyone widens that gate or moves this binding.
const cacheModel = Object.hasOwn(MODEL_MAP, model) ? MODEL_MAP[model] : model;
const stream = parsed.stream;
// Validate model against known models
@@ -2924,7 +2900,7 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
const promptCharsS = messages.reduce((a, m) => a + contentToText(m.content).length, 0);
let structuredHash = null;
if (CACHE_TTL > 0 && !conversationId && !hasCacheControl(messages)) {
structuredHash = cacheHash(cacheModel, messages, { keyId: req._authKeyId, temperature: parsed.temperature, max_tokens: parsed.max_tokens, top_p: parsed.top_p, structured, configEpoch: CONFIG_EPOCH });
structuredHash = cacheHash(model, messages, { keyId: req._authKeyId, temperature: parsed.temperature, max_tokens: parsed.max_tokens, top_p: parsed.top_p, structured });
try {
const cached = getCachedResponse(structuredHash, CACHE_TTL);
if (cached) {
@@ -2943,7 +2919,7 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
// one-off structured request (not stateful sessions / client-side prompt caching), independent of
// whether OCP response caching is enabled; when caching IS on, the same key gates cache read/write.
const dedupKey = (!conversationId && !hasCacheControl(messages))
? cacheHash(cacheModel, messages, { keyId: req._authKeyId, temperature: parsed.temperature, max_tokens: parsed.max_tokens, top_p: parsed.top_p, structured, configEpoch: CONFIG_EPOCH })
? cacheHash(model, messages, { keyId: req._authKeyId, temperature: parsed.temperature, max_tokens: parsed.max_tokens, top_p: parsed.top_p, structured })
: null;
const runStructured = async () => {
const c = await runStructuredCompletion(upstreamCall, model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName, res, structured);
@@ -2992,7 +2968,7 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
} else {
// D1: include keyId in hash to isolate per-key cache pools (v2 format).
// configEpoch (#176): any boot-config change that shapes answers invalidates the cache.
const hash = cacheHash(cacheModel, messages, { keyId: req._authKeyId, temperature: parsed.temperature, max_tokens: parsed.max_tokens, top_p: parsed.top_p, configEpoch: CONFIG_EPOCH });
const hash = cacheHash(model, messages, { keyId: req._authKeyId, temperature: parsed.temperature, max_tokens: parsed.max_tokens, top_p: parsed.top_p, configEpoch: CONFIG_EPOCH });
req._cacheHash = hash; // store for later write-back
try {
const cached = getCachedResponse(hash, CACHE_TTL);
+8 -255
View File
@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ test("appendOperatorPrompt: operator value is trimmed before appending", () => {
console.log("\nOCP_LOCAL_TOOLS wrapper + safety gate:");
const NEG = "You do NOT have access to any local filesystem";
const POS = "you may use your available local tools";
const POS = "You have full access to the local filesystem";
test("selectPromptWrapper: default (disabled) returns the negative wrapper BYTE-IDENTICAL", () => {
// Mutation-proof: flip the ternary and the default path leaks the positive wrapper.
@@ -959,8 +959,7 @@ test("localToolsSafetyError: multi is checked before loopback/anon (most severe
// a request — and boot-gate refusals are asserted by the process exit code. Without these, the
// wiring (extractSystemPrompt using SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER, the boot gate, the epoch fold) can be
// silently reverted with the unit suite still green — the maintainer's #1 rejection pattern.
import { spawn as _ltSpawn, execFileSync as _ltExecFile } from "node:child_process";
import { createServer as _ltNetServer } from "node:net";
import { spawn as _ltSpawn } from "node:child_process";
import { writeFileSync as _ltWrite, chmodSync as _ltChmod, readFileSync as _ltRead, existsSync as _ltExists, rmSync as _ltRm, mkdtempSync as _ltMkdtemp } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir as _ltTmp } from "node:os";
import { fileURLToPath as _ltF2P } from "node:url";
@@ -968,7 +967,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath as _ltF2P } from "node:url";
const LT_SERVER = _ltF2P(new URL("./server.mjs", import.meta.url));
const LT_POSIX = process.platform !== "win32"; // fake is a /bin/sh script; CI is POSIX
const LT_NEG_MARK = "You do NOT have access to any local filesystem";
const LT_POS_MARK = "you may use your available local tools";
const LT_POS_MARK = "You have full access to the local filesystem";
// Fake claude: record the --system-prompt it was spawned with, bump an optional spawn counter,
// then emit a minimal valid stream-json response so the request completes (and caches).
const LT_FAKE = `#!/bin/sh
@@ -985,8 +984,8 @@ exit 0
function ltMkdir() { return _ltMkdtemp(join(_ltTmp(), "ocp-lt-")); }
function ltFake(dir) { const p = join(dir, "claude"); _ltWrite(p, LT_FAKE); _ltChmod(p, 0o755); return p; }
function ltBoot(env, dir, nodeArgs = []) {
const child = _ltSpawn(process.execPath, [...nodeArgs, LT_SERVER], {
function ltBoot(env, dir) {
const child = _ltSpawn(process.execPath, [LT_SERVER], {
env: { ...process.env, NODE_ENV: "test", OCP_DIR_OVERRIDE: dir, OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST: "1",
CLAUDE_BIND: "127.0.0.1", CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE: "none", CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL: "0", CLAUDE_TIMEOUT: "4000", ...env },
stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
@@ -1105,195 +1104,6 @@ test("integration: toggling OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS invalidates the standard response ca
} finally { _ltRm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
// ── active-request counter is paired to the process lifecycle (#180 / #193) ──
// The counter used to be incremented ~40 lines before the spawn, while its only decrement
// (cleanup()) is wired to that proc's events — so any SYNCHRONOUS throw in between leaked +1
// permanently. Driving that fault needs no production hook and no test double: buildCliArgs
// does `args.push("--allowedTools", ...ALLOWED_TOOLS)`, and a spread of enough elements throws
// RangeError synchronously, right inside the window.
//
// Getting there on Linux needs one more turn of the screw. The spread's cost is per ELEMENT,
// so the naive form needs ~124k elements ≈ 250KB in one env var — and Linux caps a single env
// string at MAX_ARG_STRLEN (32 * PAGE_SIZE = 131072 on x86-64), so execve rejects it (E2BIG).
// Encoding around it fails too: empty items are 1 byte each, but `.filter(Boolean)`
// (server.mjs:355) strips them, so ALLOWED_TOOLS ends up empty and the spread branch is never
// entered at all.
//
// The lever is the stack: the throw threshold scales with it, and ltBoot spawns the server, so
// the test owns its argv. Running the child under --stack-size=200 drops the threshold ~5x
// (~24k elements ≈ 48KB), which fits Linux's limit with room to spare.
//
// The threshold is DISCOVERED, in a child under the SAME --stack-size (measuring it in this
// process would report the parent's stack, which is not the one that matters), then taken with
// 1.5x margin and hard-asserted under MAX_ARG_STRLEN. A hard-coded count would silently stop
// triggering on another machine and the test would pass vacuously.
const LT_STACK = 200; // child V8 stack (KB); lowers the spread-throw threshold
const LT_MAX_ARG_STRLEN = 131072; // Linux, x86-64: 32 * 4096
function ltSpreadThrowCount(stackKb) {
// Binary-search the smallest element count whose spread throws, inside a child running with
// the stack the server will actually use.
const src = `const t=n=>{try{const a=[];a.push("--allowedTools",...Array(n).fill("x"));return false}catch{return true}};` +
`let lo=500,hi=400000;if(!t(hi)){console.log(0)}else{while(lo<hi){const m=(lo+hi)>>1;t(m)?hi=m:lo=m+1}console.log(lo)}`;
try {
return Number(String(_ltExecFile(process.execPath, [`--stack-size=${stackKb}`, "-e", src], { encoding: "utf8" })).trim()) || 0;
} catch { return 0; }
}
async function ltFreePort() {
const srv = _ltNetServer();
await new Promise(r => srv.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
const p = srv.address().port;
await new Promise(r => srv.close(r));
return p;
}
async function ltPostStatus(port, body) {
try {
const r = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/v1/chat/completions`, {
method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
return { status: r.status, text: await r.text() };
} catch { return { status: 0, text: "" }; }
}
console.log("\nactive-request counter pairing (#180 / #193):");
test("integration: a synchronous pre-spawn throw must not leak stats.activeRequests", async () => {
if (!LT_POSIX) return;
const thr = ltSpreadThrowCount(LT_STACK);
assert.ok(thr > 0, `no spread-throw threshold found under --stack-size=${LT_STACK}`);
const n = Math.ceil(thr * 1.5); // margin over the measured threshold
const entry = Array(n).fill("x").join(",");
const bytes = Buffer.byteLength(entry);
// Hard gate: if this ever stops fitting, fail loudly rather than regress to an E2BIG skip.
assert.ok(bytes <= LT_MAX_ARG_STRLEN,
`env entry ${bytes}B exceeds MAX_ARG_STRLEN ${LT_MAX_ARG_STRLEN}B — lower LT_STACK`);
const port = await ltFreePort();
const dir = ltMkdir(); const fake = ltFake(dir);
const { child, buf } = ltBoot({
CLAUDE_BIN: fake, CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT: String(port), CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS: entry,
}, dir, [`--stack-size=${LT_STACK}`]);
let spawnErr = null;
child.on("error", e => { spawnErr = e; });
try {
const up = await ltWait(() => buf.out.includes("listening on") || spawnErr, 20000);
assert.ok(up && !spawnErr, `did not start: ${spawnErr ? spawnErr.message : buf.err.slice(0, 300)}`);
const req = { model: "haiku", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "leak-probe" }] };
const res = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) res.push(await ltPostStatus(port, req));
// Non-vacuous on two axes: the requests must actually fail, AND the failure must be the
// stack overflow from the --allowedTools spread — not some unrelated 500 that a small
// stack happened to produce. Without the second check a different fault would still leave
// the counter at 0 and the test would "pass" for the wrong reason.
assert.deepEqual(res.map(r => r.status), [500, 500, 500],
`expected the pre-spawn throw to surface as 500s, got ${res.map(r => r.status)}`);
assert.ok(res.every(r => /call stack size exceeded/i.test(r.text)),
`500s must come from the spread's RangeError; got: ${res[0].text.slice(0, 200)}`);
const r = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/status`);
const active = (await r.json()).requests.active;
assert.equal(active, 0,
`3 requests threw before their spawn; the counter must be back to 0, got ${active} (this is the #180 leak)`);
} finally { child.kill("SIGKILL"); _ltRm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
// ── Cache keys hash the RESOLVED model, not the alias string (#194) ──────────
// models.json is read once at boot, so repointing an alias only takes effect on restart —
// while the SQLite response_cache outlives it. Hashing the raw string would keep serving the
// OLD model's answers under that alias until TTL expiry. Rather than mutate models.json
// mid-suite, these assert the equivalent observable: an alias and its canonical target must
// land on the SAME cache slot, which is true only if the key is resolved before hashing.
// Mutation: change `cacheModel` back to `model` at the three cacheHash call sites in
// server.mjs and both tests go red (2 spawns instead of 1).
// Fake that emits schema-valid JSON, so the structured path caches a VALIDATED result
// (the stock LT_FAKE returns "OK", which fails validation → refusal → never cached).
const LT_FAKE_JSON = `#!/bin/sh
if [ -n "$SP_COUNTER" ]; then c=$(cat "$SP_COUNTER" 2>/dev/null || echo 0); echo $((c+1)) > "$SP_COUNTER"; fi
printf '%s\\n' '{"type":"assistant","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\\"ok\\":true}"}]}}'
printf '%s\\n' '{"type":"result"}'
exit 0
`;
function ltFakeJson(dir) { const p = join(dir, "claude-json"); _ltWrite(p, LT_FAKE_JSON); _ltChmod(p, 0o755); return p; }
const LT_SCHEMA = { type: "object", properties: { ok: { type: "boolean" } }, required: ["ok"], additionalProperties: false };
console.log("\nCache key resolves the model alias (#194):");
test("integration: an alias and its canonical target share ONE cache slot (normal path)", async () => {
if (!LT_POSIX) return;
const dir = ltMkdir(); const fake = ltFake(dir); const counter = join(dir, "spawns.txt");
const { child, buf } = ltBoot({ CLAUDE_BIN: fake, CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT: "39360", CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL: "60000", SP_COUNTER: counter }, dir);
try {
assert.ok(await ltWait(() => buf.out.includes("listening on")), `did not start: ${buf.err.slice(0, 200)}`);
_ltWrite(counter, "0");
const msgs = [{ role: "user", content: "alias-resolution-probe" }];
await ltPost(39360, { model: "sonnet", messages: msgs }); // miss → spawn
await ltWait(() => (Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0) >= 1, 3000);
await ltPost(39360, { model: "claude-sonnet-5", messages: msgs }); // same resolved model → HIT
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 600));
assert.equal(Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0, 1,
"the canonical id must hit the slot the alias populated — a 2nd spawn means the key still hashes the raw alias");
} finally { child.kill("SIGKILL"); _ltRm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
test("integration: an alias and its canonical target share ONE cache slot (STRUCTURED path)", async () => {
if (!LT_POSIX) return;
const dir = ltMkdir(); const fake = ltFakeJson(dir); const counter = join(dir, "spawns.txt");
const { child, buf } = ltBoot({ CLAUDE_BIN: fake, CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT: "39361", CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL: "60000", SP_COUNTER: counter }, dir);
try {
assert.ok(await ltWait(() => buf.out.includes("listening on")), `did not start: ${buf.err.slice(0, 200)}`);
_ltWrite(counter, "0");
const rf = { type: "json_schema", json_schema: { name: "probe", schema: LT_SCHEMA } };
const msgs = [{ role: "user", content: "structured-alias-probe" }];
await ltPost(39361, { model: "sonnet", messages: msgs, response_format: rf });
await ltWait(() => (Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0) >= 1, 4000);
await ltPost(39361, { model: "claude-sonnet-5", messages: msgs, response_format: rf });
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 600));
assert.equal(Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0, 1,
"structured cache key must resolve the alias too — this is the path the epoch-only fix missed");
} finally { child.kill("SIGKILL"); _ltRm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
// MODEL_MAP is models[] + aliases + legacyAliases, so resolving covers legacyAliases for free.
// The three tests above all use `sonnet` (a plain alias); this pins the legacyAlias leg explicitly
// rather than leaving it covered only by construction.
test("integration: a legacyAlias shares ONE cache slot with its canonical target", async () => {
if (!LT_POSIX) return;
const dir = ltMkdir(); const fake = ltFake(dir); const counter = join(dir, "spawns.txt");
const { child, buf } = ltBoot({ CLAUDE_BIN: fake, CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT: "39364", CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL: "60000", SP_COUNTER: counter }, dir);
try {
assert.ok(await ltWait(() => buf.out.includes("listening on")), `did not start: ${buf.err.slice(0, 200)}`);
_ltWrite(counter, "0");
const msgs = [{ role: "user", content: "legacy-alias-probe" }];
await ltPost(39364, { model: "claude-haiku-4-5", messages: msgs }); // legacyAlias
await ltWait(() => (Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0) >= 1, 3000);
await ltPost(39364, { model: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001", messages: msgs }); // canonical
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 600));
assert.equal(Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0, 1,
"legacyAliases live in MODEL_MAP too — resolving must collapse them onto the canonical slot");
} finally { child.kill("SIGKILL"); _ltRm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
test("integration: a config change invalidates the STRUCTURED cache too (closes the #177 gap)", async () => {
if (!LT_POSIX) return;
const dir = ltMkdir(); const fake = ltFakeJson(dir); const counter = join(dir, "spawns.txt");
const rf = { type: "json_schema", json_schema: { name: "probe", schema: LT_SCHEMA } };
const req = { model: "sonnet", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "structured-epoch-probe" }], response_format: rf };
const bootOnce = async (env, port) => {
const { child, buf } = ltBoot({ CLAUDE_BIN: fake, CLAUDE_PROXY_PORT: String(port), CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL: "60000", SP_COUNTER: counter, ...env }, dir);
try {
assert.ok(await ltWait(() => buf.out.includes("listening on")), `did not start: ${buf.err.slice(0, 200)}`);
_ltWrite(counter, "0");
await ltPost(port, req);
await ltWait(() => (Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0) >= 1, 4000);
return Number(_ltRead(counter, "utf8")) || 0;
} finally { child.kill("SIGKILL"); }
};
try {
const off = await bootOnce({}, 39362); // caches under epoch(negative wrapper)
const on = await bootOnce({ OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS: "1" }, 39363); // same DB, epoch differs → must re-spawn
assert.equal(off, 1, "first structured request (cache empty) must spawn claude");
assert.equal(on, 1, "structured cache must honor CONFIG_EPOCH — before #194 it omitted the epoch entirely and served the stale answer");
} finally { _ltRm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
// ── Upgrade Tests ──
import { runUpgrade, postFlightOk } from "./scripts/upgrade.mjs";
@@ -2399,32 +2209,10 @@ console.log("\nTUI command construction (proxy-purity / #4):");
test("buildTuiCmd suppresses host CLAUDE.md + auto-memory (proxy purity, #4)", () => {
const cmd = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "claude-haiku", "sid-1", "/home/u", "cli");
// OCP is a proxy: the host's CLAUDE.md / auto-memory must never leak into the proxied turn.
// Primary mechanism is --safe-mode (env vars alone stopped suppressing on newer claude);
// the env vars remain as belt-and-braces.
assert.ok(/(^| )--safe-mode( |$)/.test(cmd), "default pane must pass --safe-mode (disables host CLAUDE.md/skills/plugins/hooks)");
assert.ok(/(^| )CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS=1( |$)/.test(cmd), "must disable CLAUDE.md injection");
assert.ok(/(^| )CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY=1( |$)/.test(cmd), "must disable auto-memory injection");
});
test("buildTuiCmd omits --safe-mode when a customization it would strip is in use", () => {
const save = process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS;
try {
delete process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS;
// streaming registers a MessageDisplay HOOK via --settings; --safe-mode would kill the hook
// (zero deltas), so it must be omitted on the streaming pane.
const streaming = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "sid-s", "/home/u", "cli", { file: "/d/sid-s.jsonl", settings: "/d/s.json" });
assert.ok(!/--safe-mode/.test(streaming), "streaming pane must NOT pass --safe-mode (would disable the MessageDisplay hook)");
assert.ok(streaming.includes("--settings '/d/s.json'"), "streaming pane keeps its --settings hook");
// OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS grants an MCP/skills surface --safe-mode disables wholesale.
process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS = "1";
const full = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "sid-f", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(!/--safe-mode/.test(full), "full-tools pane must NOT pass --safe-mode (would disable MCP/skills)");
} finally {
if (save === undefined) delete process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS; else process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS = save;
}
});
test("buildTuiCmd keeps version pin + entrypoint label + MCP wall", () => {
const cli = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "sid-2", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(cli.includes("DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1"), "version pin retained");
@@ -3716,7 +3504,7 @@ if (process.env.OCP_TUI_LIVE === "1") {
// Replicates tuiInputReady, tuiPromptLanded verbatim from lib/tui/session.mjs.
// Keep in sync with the definitions there.
function _tuiInputReady(pane) {
return /\? for shortcuts|shift\+tab to cycle/.test(pane);
return /\? for shortcuts/.test(pane);
}
function _tuiPromptLanded(pane, prompt) {
const flatPane = pane.replace(/\s+/g, " ");
@@ -3734,12 +3522,7 @@ const TUI_READY_PANE = ` Try "how does <filepath> work?"
const TUI_LANDED_PANE = ` Reply with exactly: PONG_TEST
? for shortcuts · ← for agents`;
// Newer claude 2.1.x renders the input bar with a `shift+tab to cycle` footer instead of
// `? for shortcuts` — the matcher must accept it too, or the pane reads as never-ready.
const TUI_READY_PANE_SHIFT_TAB = ` Try "how does <filepath> work?"
bypass permissions on (shift+tab to cycle)`;
// Welcome splash shown before input bar is rendered — neither ready-state footer.
// Welcome splash shown before input bar is rendered — no `? for shortcuts`.
const TUI_BOOT_PANE = `╭─ Claude Code v2.1.114 ─ Welcome back Tao! ─╮\n│ Tips for getting started │`;
console.log("\nTUI readiness + paste-verify predicates (issue #130):");
@@ -3750,9 +3533,6 @@ test("tuiInputReady(READY_PANE) === true (input bar rendered)", () => {
test("tuiInputReady(LANDED_PANE) === true (input bar still present after paste)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiInputReady(TUI_LANDED_PANE), true);
});
test("tuiInputReady(READY_PANE_SHIFT_TAB) === true (newer claude `shift+tab to cycle` footer)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiInputReady(TUI_READY_PANE_SHIFT_TAB), true);
});
test("tuiInputReady(BOOT_PANE) === false (welcome splash, no input bar yet)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiInputReady(TUI_BOOT_PANE), false);
});
@@ -4257,10 +4037,6 @@ test("models.json aliases.sonnet === 'claude-sonnet-5' (default-request-model SP
assert.equal(_spotModels.aliases.sonnet, "claude-sonnet-5");
});
test("models.json aliases.opus === 'claude-opus-5' (opus-alias SPOT)", () => {
assert.equal(_spotModels.aliases.opus, "claude-opus-5");
});
// ── Referential integrity (PR #152 review) ──────────────────────────────────
// The value-mirror assertions above only prove the alias equals a string literal —
// they pass even if that literal points at a model that does not exist in
@@ -4274,25 +4050,6 @@ test("models.json: claude-sonnet-5 is present in models[] (the entry this PR add
assert.ok(_spotModelIds.has("claude-sonnet-5"), "claude-sonnet-5 must exist as a models[].id");
});
test("models.json: claude-opus-5 is present in models[] (the entry this PR adds)", () => {
assert.ok(_spotModelIds.has("claude-opus-5"), "claude-opus-5 must exist as a models[].id");
});
// The prompt-char budget is GLOBAL (max across every entry × 3 chars/token), not
// per-model — see lib/prompt.mjs derivePromptCharBudget. An entry declaring a native 1M
// window would therefore raise the truncation ceiling for claude-haiku-4-5 too (genuinely
// 200k), turning OCP-side truncation into an upstream API rejection.
//
// Asserts the MAX, deliberately, not every entry: ADR 0009 states the budget "scales
// automatically — no code change", so a future entry with a SMALLER window (say a 128k
// model) must stay legal and must not fail this suite. Only raising the ceiling is the
// hazard, and that is an ADR-level decision requiring per-model budgets first.
test("models.json: max contextWindow is 200000 (global prompt-budget ceiling)", () => {
const windows = _spotModels.models.map(m => m.contextWindow);
assert.equal(Math.max(...windows), 200000,
`max contextWindow re-scales MAX_PROMPT_CHARS for ALL models incl. the 200k-native haiku (see lib/prompt.mjs + ADR 0009)`);
});
test("models.json: every aliases value resolves to a real models[].id (referential integrity)", () => {
for (const [name, target] of Object.entries(_spotModels.aliases)) {
assert.ok(_spotModelIds.has(target), `aliases.${name} -> '${target}' is a dangling alias (no matching models[].id)`);
@@ -4766,17 +4523,13 @@ test("stream: sink path is keyed by session_id (concurrent panes cannot interlea
assert.ok(A.endsWith("/aaaa-1111.jsonl"));
});
test("stream: buildTuiCmd — streaming ON adds env + --settings and drops --safe-mode (hook survives)", () => {
test("stream: buildTuiCmd — OFF is byte-for-byte the pre-streaming argv; ON adds only env + --settings", () => {
const off = buildTuiCmd("/bin/claude", "m", "SID", "/h", "cli");
assert.ok(!off.includes("--settings"), "no --settings when streaming is off");
assert.ok(!off.includes("OCP_TUI_STREAM_FILE"), "no sink env when streaming is off");
assert.ok(off.includes("--safe-mode"), "the non-streaming pane carries --safe-mode");
const on = buildTuiCmd("/bin/claude", "m", "SID", "/h", "cli", { file: "/d/SID.jsonl", settings: "/d/s.json" });
assert.ok(on.includes("OCP_TUI_STREAM_FILE='/d/SID.jsonl'"), "sink delivered via the pane env");
assert.ok(on.includes("--settings '/d/s.json'"));
// --safe-mode would disable the MessageDisplay hook registered by --settings, so the
// streaming pane must NOT carry it (it keeps the env-var suppression instead).
assert.ok(!on.includes("--safe-mode"), "streaming pane omits --safe-mode so the hook fires");
// must not regress the MCP wall or the pinned effort (#156)
assert.ok(on.includes("--strict-mcp-config") && on.includes("--disallowedTools 'mcp__*'"), "MCP wall intact");
assert.ok(on.includes("--effort low"), "OCP_TUI_EFFORT default intact");