Files
olp/lib/fallback/engine.mjs
T
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 994568a8fb feat+ci: D38 — maxConcurrent runtime enforcement (issue #1)
ADR 0002 Amendment 1 declared `hints.maxConcurrent` declarative-only at
v0.1 — type-validated at startup but with no runtime enforcement.
D38 wires the runtime enforcement via a per-provider in-flight spawn
counter with immediate-advancement on saturation.

Design choice: **immediate-advancement via fallback engine** (queue +
timeout DEFERRED). When a provider is at its maxConcurrent limit, the
spawn call synchronously fails with a new `CONCURRENCY_LIMIT` error
code; the fallback engine treats this as a hard trigger and advances
to the next chain hop. If the entire chain is saturated, the user
sees a chain-exhausted error (existing path).

Rationale for immediate-advancement over queue+timeout:

1. The fallback chain exists precisely for this kind of overflow —
   adding a queue layer would duplicate the advancement semantics.
2. Queue + timeout adds new config surface (timeout duration, queue
   depth bounds, queue eviction policy) that isn't needed at the
   personal/family scale OLP serves.
3. Head-of-line blocking risk: a long-running spawn would stall
   queued requests behind it even though other providers in the chain
   could serve them immediately.
4. Fail-fast latency aligns with the multi-provider proxy philosophy
   ("spread risk across providers, not within a provider").

Queue + timeout is deferred to a v1.x design ADR if real usage shows
demand. ADR 0002 Amendment 6 and ADR 0004 Amendment 4 capture the
decision explicitly.

Changes (8 files, +<delta>):

**Code**

1. **lib/providers/base.mjs** — add `CONCURRENCY_LIMIT` to
   `PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES`. JSDoc clarifies the code is synthesised by
   the orchestration layer, not thrown by provider plugins themselves.

2. **lib/providers/index.mjs** — new semaphore primitives:
   - `tryAcquireSpawn(providerName, maxConcurrent)` — atomic
     check-then-increment. Returns `true` on success, `false` if at
     limit. Atomicity rests on the JS single-threaded invariant
     (read + write synchronous, NO `await` between them); module-level
     comment block warns future maintainers against breaking this.
   - `releaseSpawn(providerName)` — decrement; throws on
     under-decrement (defensive bug guard for missing acquire / double
     release). Map.delete at zero for clean memory footprint.
   - `getActiveSpawnCount(providerName)` — returns current count
     (0 for unseen providers). For diagnostics + tests.
   - `DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS = 4` — defense-in-depth fallback
     matching the v0.1 plugin defaults (anthropic/codex/mistral all
     declare hints.maxConcurrent: 4). Also coerces non-integer / NaN
     / negative inputs to the default.
   - `__resetSpawnCounters()` — internal test seam.

3. **lib/fallback/engine.mjs** — `CONCURRENCY_LIMIT: true` added to
   `HARD_TRIGGER_CODES`. `classifyTrigger` and `evaluateHardTriggers`
   both pick it up via the same lookup. v0.1 live hard-trigger codes
   are now 5 (was 4 post-D34): SPAWN_FAILED, CLI_NOT_FOUND,
   AUTH_MISSING:false, SPAWN_TIMEOUT, CONCURRENCY_LIMIT.

4. **server.mjs** — gate the spawn call in handleChatCompletions at
   BOTH spawn call sites:
   - **Buffered path** (executeHopFn → collectAllChunks): acquire
     before provider.spawn; on failure synthesise
     `ProviderError(CONCURRENCY_LIMIT)` with providerName /
     maxConcurrent / activeSpawns diagnostic fields and throw —
     fallback engine catches and advances. On success, outer try/
     finally wraps the inner D16 truncation-salvage try/catch so
     releaseSpawn fires on EVERY exit path (return, D16 salvage
     return, re-throw).
   - **Streaming path** (single-hop real-SSE branch): acquire BEFORE
     the streaming branch entry. If acquire fails, branch is skipped
     and request falls through to buffered path (whose own gate
     surfaces chain-exhausted for single-hop chains). If acquire
     succeeds, existing streaming try/catch gains
     `finally { releaseSpawn(streamProvider) }` — slot releases on
     stop-chunk completion, generator exhaustion, abort, or any
     exception path. `releaseSpawn` fires at END of stream
     consumption, not when spawn() returns.

**Tests** (test-features.mjs): 431 → 447 (+16):

Suite 18 — D38 — maxConcurrent runtime enforcement:
- 18a: PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES.CONCURRENCY_LIMIT exists
- 18b: evaluateHardTriggers true for CONCURRENCY_LIMIT
- 18c: AUTH_MISSING regression guard (D38 did NOT flip it to hard)
- 18d.1-18d.4: semaphore unit (increment / saturate-no-increment /
  release / map-delete-at-zero)
- 18e: tryAcquireSpawn returns false without side-effect when at limit
- 18f: releaseSpawn throws on under-decrement
- 18g.1-18g.2: DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS applied for invalid
  inputs (undefined / NaN / negative / non-integer)
- 18h: __resetSpawnCounters clears state
- 18i: HTTP integration — 5 concurrent requests to single-hop
  chain w/ maxConcurrent=2 → peak in-flight exactly 2, 2 succeed,
  3 fail
- 18j: counter releases after buffered request (sequential test)
- 18k: 2-hop chain — saturated primary advances to fallback
- 18l: streaming counter releases at END of stream (not at spawn)

**ADR amendments**

5. **docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md** — Amendment 6 added.
   Removes "Declarative hint only at v0.1" caveat from the
   `maxConcurrent` description in the Provider contract section.
   Adds implementation reference + design-choice rationale (4 points).
   Lists all exported symbols.

6. **docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md** — Amendment 4 added.
   CONCURRENCY_LIMIT added to v0.1 hard-trigger taxonomy. Documents
   synthesis-vs-plugin-thrown distinction. Documents first-chunk
   safety (acquire before any res.write). v1.x re-evaluation triggers
   named.

**CHANGELOG**

7. **CHANGELOG.md** — Unreleased sentinel replaced with proper D38
   entry. Per CLAUDE.md release_kit phase_rolling_mode, this lands
   under Unreleased; promotion to ## v0.1.1 happens at the v0.1.1
   release. The D37 phase_rolling_mode gate now correctly fires if
   anyone tags v0.1.x with this content present without promotion —
   intentional.

Pre-commit fold-ins (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):

- **Reviewer Suggestion #1 (test 18c name mismatch)**: 18c is named
  "classifyTrigger returns hard for CONCURRENCY_LIMIT" but body tests
  AUTH_MISSING regression. Renamed header comment to
  "AUTH_MISSING regression guard" and clarified that
  CONCURRENCY_LIMIT classification is covered by 18b.

- **Reviewer Suggestion #3 (activeSpawns diagnostic field)**: server
  .mjs:532 set `concurrencyErr.activeSpawns = maxConcurrent` (the
  limit). Technically correct (since acquire just failed, live
  count == limit) but confuses future readers. Changed to query
  `getActiveSpawnCount(hopProvider)` directly. Added import of the
  new symbol to the lib/providers/index.mjs import block.

- **Reviewer Suggestion #5 (ADR overstatement)**: ADR 0002 Amendment 6
  said getActiveSpawnCount is "exported for /health, diagnostics,
  and tests" but /health integration is not wired at D38. Reworded to
  "exported for diagnostics and tests" + "/health integration
  deferred — when surfaced there will land at providers.status.<name>
  .activeSpawns; not wired at D38." Avoids overstating current state.

Two reviewer suggestions not folded:
- Suggestion #2 (streaming test 18l comment about branch entry
  conditions) — low priority; the test passes and the branch is
  taken (verified by reviewer). Future polish if confusion arises.
- Suggestion #4 (additional test for streaming-saturation → chain-
  exhausted) — code path is straightforward and intentional; 18i
  covers the buffered-path version directly. Defer.

Authority:
- ADR 0002 Amendment 1 (declarative-only caveat) — superseded by
  Amendment 6
- ADR 0002 Amendment 6 (this commit) — runtime enforcement landed
- ADR 0004 Amendment 4 (this commit) — CONCURRENCY_LIMIT added to
  v0.1 hard-trigger taxonomy
- GitHub issue #1 — closed by this commit
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — independent fresh-context reviewer
- CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — no version
  bump; Unreleased entry written

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus,
independent of drafter): APPROVE. Critical depth checks:
- Atomicity in tryAcquireSpawn (lines 285-290 read+set with no
  intervening await) — confirmed; module-level invariant comment
  warns future maintainers
- Release on every exit path: buffered (outer finally wraps inner
  try/catch covering D16 salvage return + normal return + re-throw);
  streaming (try/finally covers stop-chunk return + loop exhaustion +
  catch paths). No double-release path identified.
- Streaming release timing: fires in finally after res.end() at all
  exit paths, never before stream consumption completes
- Counter leak: every code path traced — no orphan acquire identified
- 447/447 tests pass in reviewer's independent npm test run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24 21:02:40 +10:00

591 lines
24 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* lib/fallback/engine.mjs — OLP Fallback Engine
*
* Authority: ADR 0004 — Fallback Engine Semantics and Safety
*
* Implements:
* - Trigger taxonomy (Hard / Soft per ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy)
* - Chain advancement one-at-a-time (ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement)
* - First-chunk safety rule (ADR 0004 § Decision § Fallback safety)
* - Observability return values for header annotation (ADR 0004 § Decision § Observability headers)
* - No fallback for client-side errors (ADR 0004 § Decision § No fallback for client-side errors)
*
* Sealed at D9. Do NOT modify without an ADR 0004 amendment.
*/
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { ProviderError } from '../providers/base.mjs';
import { getProviderForModel } from '../providers/index.mjs';
import { computeIRRequestHash } from '../cache/keys.mjs';
// ── Hard-trigger evaluation ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Maps ProviderError codes to hard-trigger decisions.
*
* v0.1 live codes (per ADR 0004 Amendment 3 (D34 F7) + Amendment 4 (D38)):
* - SPAWN_FAILED → hard trigger (provider CLI failed)
* - CLI_NOT_FOUND → hard trigger (binary missing)
* - AUTH_MISSING → NOT a hard trigger (user-config failure; user must fix)
* - SPAWN_TIMEOUT → hard trigger (per ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4)
* - CONCURRENCY_LIMIT → hard trigger (D38 / issue #1, ADR 0004 Amendment 4):
* synthesized by server.mjs when a provider is at its
* hints.maxConcurrent in-flight limit. The chain
* advances immediately to the next hop instead of
* queueing — design rationale per ADR 0004 Amendment 4.
*
* QUOTA_EXHAUSTED and RATE_LIMITED removed (D34 F7 / ADR 0004 Amendment 3):
* no v0.1 plugin parses underlying-API HTTP status codes, so these codes
* are never emitted at v0.1. Re-add via ADR 0004 amendment when a plugin
* gains HTTP-status parsing capability.
* OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR removed earlier (D32 F4): no plugin emits it; dead code.
*
* @type {Record<string, boolean>}
*/
const HARD_TRIGGER_CODES = {
SPAWN_FAILED: true,
CLI_NOT_FOUND: true,
AUTH_MISSING: false, // user config problem — never fall over (ADR 0004 § Decision)
SPAWN_TIMEOUT: true, // ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4: spawn timeout is a hard trigger
CONCURRENCY_LIMIT: true, // ADR 0004 Amendment 4 (D38, issue #1): saturation → advance chain
};
/**
* HTTP status codes that are client errors and MUST NOT trigger fallback.
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § "No fallback for client-side errors":
* HTTP 400, 401, 403, 404, 422 from a provider are NOT fallback triggers.
*
* @type {Set<number>}
*/
const CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES = new Set([400, 401, 403, 404, 422]);
/**
* Classifies a thrown error into one of the trigger taxonomy categories
* per ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy (D28 round-3 F2). Used in log events
* so operators can pivot on the classification bucket.
*
* Note: 'soft' is not currently returnable from this function. Soft triggers
* are evaluated before spawn via evaluateSoftTriggers() and are deferred to
* v1.x (D22 Amendment 2). The 'soft' variant is listed in the JSDoc return
* type for forward-compatibility only.
*
* @param {Error|null|undefined} error
* @returns {'hard' | 'soft' | 'auth_missing' | 'client_error' | 'non_trigger' | null}
*/
function classifyTrigger(error) {
if (!error) return null;
if (error instanceof ProviderError && error.code) {
if (error.code === 'AUTH_MISSING') return 'auth_missing';
if (HARD_TRIGGER_CODES[error.code] === true) return 'hard';
return 'non_trigger';
}
const status = error.statusCode ?? error.status ?? null;
if (status !== null && typeof status === 'number') {
if (CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status)) return 'client_error';
if (status >= 500) return 'hard';
if (status >= 400) return 'hard'; // quota-exhaustion 4xx (e.g. 429, 529)
}
return 'non_trigger';
}
/**
* Returns true if `status` is a client-side error that must NOT trigger fallback.
* Exported for tests.
*
* @param {number} status
* @returns {boolean}
*/
export function isClientError(status) {
return CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status);
}
/**
* Evaluates whether an error from a provider qualifies as a Hard trigger.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy — Hard triggers:
* HTTP 5xx and quota-exhaustion 4xx (surfaced via ProviderError codes)
* trigger mandatory chain advancement.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § "No fallback for client-side errors":
* Client-side HTTP errors (400/401/403/404/422) are NOT hard triggers.
* AUTH_MISSING is also not a hard trigger (user must fix their config).
*
* @param {Error} error — the error thrown by executeHopFn
* @param {object} [_providerHints] — reserved for future hints-based logic
* @returns {boolean} — true if this error should trigger chain advancement
*/
export function evaluateHardTriggers(error, _providerHints = {}) {
if (!error) return false;
// ProviderError with a code: map via HARD_TRIGGER_CODES lookup.
// AUTH_MISSING is explicitly false in the table — do not fall over.
if (error instanceof ProviderError && error.code) {
return HARD_TRIGGER_CODES[error.code] === true;
}
// HTTP status code present on the error object.
// NOTE (ADR 0004 Amendment 3, D34 F7): these HTTP-status branches are
// forward-compat reserved code. v0.1 plugins never attach statusCode to
// thrown errors — they throw ProviderError with codes (SPAWN_FAILED,
// SPAWN_TIMEOUT, CLI_NOT_FOUND, AUTH_MISSING) and never surface underlying-API
// HTTP status. When a future plugin gains HTTP-status parsing, it will attach
// statusCode to the thrown error and these branches will activate. Until then,
// this path is unreachable in production. Left in place as intent signal.
const status = error.statusCode ?? error.status ?? null;
if (status !== null && typeof status === 'number') {
// Client-side errors: never fall over (ADR 0004 § No fallback for client-side errors)
if (CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status)) {
return false;
}
// 5xx: always a hard trigger (ADR 0004 § Hard triggers: HTTP 5xx from provider)
if (status >= 500) {
return true;
}
// Non-client 4xx (e.g. 429 / 529): hard trigger (quota exhaustion semantics)
if (status >= 400) {
return true;
}
}
// Unknown error type — conservative default: do NOT trigger fallback.
// Per ADR 0004 § Alternatives considered (a): "any error" fallback was rejected.
return false;
}
// ── Soft-trigger evaluation ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Evaluates whether a chain hop's soft triggers fire against the current
* quota snapshot for that provider.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy — Soft triggers:
* - credit_pool_percent_threshold: fires when percentUsed >= threshold
* - daily_request_count_threshold: fires when dailyCount >= threshold
* - five_hour_window_percent_threshold: fires when fiveHourWindowPercent >= threshold
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Consequences/Negative (Mitigations):
* null quotaStatus → treat as "don't fire" — degrade gracefully.
*
* @param {object|null|undefined} triggerConfig — per-hop soft-trigger config, e.g.
* { credit_pool_percent_threshold: 90, daily_request_count_threshold: 1000 }
* @param {object|null|undefined} quotaSnapshot — from provider.quotaStatus(), e.g.
* { percentUsed: 95, dailyCount: 500, fiveHourWindowPercent: 80 }
* May be null if the provider cannot retrieve quota.
* @returns {boolean} — true if any configured soft trigger fires
*/
export function evaluateSoftTriggers(triggerConfig, quotaSnapshot) {
// No trigger config at all → soft triggers never fire
if (!triggerConfig || typeof triggerConfig !== 'object') return false;
// Per ADR 0004 § Consequences/Negative: null quotaStatus → don't fire
if (quotaSnapshot == null) return false;
// credit_pool_percent_threshold: fires when percentUsed >= threshold
if (
triggerConfig.credit_pool_percent_threshold !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.percentUsed !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.percentUsed !== null &&
quotaSnapshot.percentUsed >= triggerConfig.credit_pool_percent_threshold
) {
return true;
}
// daily_request_count_threshold: fires when dailyCount >= threshold
if (
triggerConfig.daily_request_count_threshold !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.dailyCount !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.dailyCount !== null &&
quotaSnapshot.dailyCount >= triggerConfig.daily_request_count_threshold
) {
return true;
}
// five_hour_window_percent_threshold: fires when fiveHourWindowPercent >= threshold
if (
triggerConfig.five_hour_window_percent_threshold !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.fiveHourWindowPercent !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.fiveHourWindowPercent !== null &&
quotaSnapshot.fiveHourWindowPercent >= triggerConfig.five_hour_window_percent_threshold
) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
// ── Fallback engine ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* @typedef {Object} ChainHop
* @property {string} provider — provider name (e.g. 'anthropic')
* @property {string} model — model string for this hop
* @property {object} [softTriggers] — optional soft-trigger config for this hop
* @property {object|null} [quotaSnapshot] — optional pre-fetched quota snapshot
*/
/**
* @typedef {Object} FallbackResult
* @property {Array<object>|null} chunks — IR chunk array on success; null if exhausted
* @property {string} providerUsed — provider name that served the request (or first that failed)
* @property {string} modelUsed — model string that served (or first that failed)
* @property {number} fallbackHops — chain index of the serving hop (0=primary, 1=first fallback, etc.)
* @property {Error|null} originalError — first-hop error if exhausted; null on success
* @property {string[]} triedProviders — all providers tried, in chain order
*/
/**
* Executes a provider chain with fallback semantics.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement (one-at-a-time):
* 1. Try each hop in order.
* 2. Before calling executeHopFn: evaluate soft triggers. If fired, skip this hop.
* 3. On error: check for client error / AUTH_MISSING (stop immediately).
* Otherwise evaluate hard triggers. If hard-triggered, advance to next hop.
* 4. If chain exhausted: return first-hop's originalError (not last).
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule:
* At D9, executeHopFn is collectAllChunks() — fully buffered before return.
* An exception from executeHopFn means zero bytes were written to the client.
* First-chunk safety is trivially satisfied by the buffering pattern.
*
* @param {ChainHop[]} chain — ordered list of hops
* @param {object} irRequest — IR request object (ADR 0003)
* @param {function} executeHopFn — async (provider, model, ir) => IR chunk array; throws on failure
* @param {object} [options]
* @param {function} [options.logEvent] — optional structured logger (level, event, data)
* @returns {Promise<FallbackResult>}
*/
export async function executeWithFallback(chain, irRequest, executeHopFn, options = {}) {
const { logEvent = () => {} } = options;
if (!Array.isArray(chain) || chain.length === 0) {
throw new Error('executeWithFallback: chain must be a non-empty array');
}
// D28 round-3 F2: per-request fingerprints for log correlation.
// chain_id is unique per executeWithFallback invocation; ir_request_hash
// is provider-agnostic so it groups all hops from the same logical request.
const chainId = randomBytes(8).toString('hex'); // 16-char hex
const irRequestHash = computeIRRequestHash(irRequest);
const triedProviders = [];
let originalError = null; // Per ADR 0004: first-hop error is the canonical signal
let firstErrorRecorded = false;
for (let i = 0; i < chain.length; i++) {
const hop = chain[i];
const { provider, model, softTriggers = null, quotaSnapshot = null } = hop;
// ── Soft-trigger check (BEFORE spawn) ──────────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision: soft triggers evaluated before spawn;
// if fired, advance without attempting this provider at all.
//
// Note on `triedProviders` semantics (D9 review-2 finding): we push the
// provider name onto triedProviders even when soft-skipped (no spawn).
// ADR 0004 § Observability headers describes X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted as
// "tried" providers; per ADR 0004 § Soft triggers a soft-fired hop is
// counted as tried-and-skipped (the proxy advances to the next chain
// entry without attempting the primary at all). The header therefore
// includes soft-skipped hops. A future enhancement could split into
// `triedProviders` + `softSkippedProviders` for finer-grained debug
// visibility; D9 keeps them unified per ADR-0004 spec.
if (evaluateSoftTriggers(softTriggers, quotaSnapshot)) {
logEvent('info', 'fallback_soft_trigger', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
trigger_type: 'soft',
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: chain[i + 1]?.provider ?? null,
reason: 'soft_trigger_fired',
});
triedProviders.push(provider);
// Record a synthetic originalError for the first fired soft trigger.
// `code: 'SOFT_TRIGGER'` is a fallback-engine-internal marker, NOT a
// member of PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES (base.mjs) — those are provider
// plugin error codes. Downstream consumers inspecting originalError.code
// should treat 'SOFT_TRIGGER' as engine-synthetic. D9 review-2 noted
// this; documented here so future readers do not try to add SOFT_TRIGGER
// to the PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES closed enum.
if (!firstErrorRecorded) {
originalError = Object.assign(
new Error(`Soft trigger fired for provider ${provider}: quota threshold exceeded`),
{ code: 'SOFT_TRIGGER', provider },
);
firstErrorRecorded = true;
}
continue;
}
// ── Execute hop ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
triedProviders.push(provider);
try {
const chunks = await executeHopFn(provider, model, irRequest);
// Per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule:
// executeHopFn returned successfully = chunks buffered = no client writes
// blocked = safe to return. Any retry attempt after this point would be
// post-first-chunk and is therefore forbidden. We return immediately.
logEvent('info', 'fallback_hop_success', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
trigger_type: null,
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: null,
triedProviders,
};
} catch (err) {
// Record FIRST hop error as the canonical signal
// Per ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 4: return first error, not last.
if (!firstErrorRecorded) {
originalError = err;
firstErrorRecorded = true;
}
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_hop_error', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
error: err.message,
code: err.code ?? null,
trigger_type: classifyTrigger(err),
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: chain[i + 1]?.provider ?? null,
});
// ── Client error: stop immediately ─────────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § "No fallback for client-side errors"
const status = err.statusCode ?? err.status ?? null;
if (status !== null && CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status)) {
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_client_error_no_fallback', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
status,
trigger_type: 'client_error',
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: err,
triedProviders,
};
}
// ── AUTH_MISSING: stop immediately ─────────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision: AUTH_MISSING = HARD_TRIGGER_CODES[AUTH_MISSING]=false.
// Silently masking it by trying next provider prevents user from discovering
// the misconfiguration.
if (err instanceof ProviderError && err.code === 'AUTH_MISSING') {
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_auth_missing_no_fallback', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
trigger_type: 'auth_missing',
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: err,
triedProviders,
};
}
// ── Hard-trigger check: advance chain ──────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule:
// At D9, executeHopFn threw, so zero chunks were emitted.
// Fallback is eligible if the error is a hard trigger.
if (evaluateHardTriggers(err)) {
logEvent('info', 'fallback_hard_trigger', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
error: err.message,
code: err.code ?? null,
advance_to_hop: i + 1,
trigger_type: classifyTrigger(err),
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: chain[i + 1]?.provider ?? null,
});
continue; // advance to next hop
}
// ── Non-trigger error: surface immediately ──────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Alternatives considered (a): "any error" fallback rejected.
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_non_trigger_error', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
error: err.message,
code: err.code ?? null,
trigger_type: classifyTrigger(err),
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: err,
triedProviders,
};
}
}
// Chain exhausted
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement step 4:
// "return A's original error (not B's, not C's)"
logEvent('error', 'fallback_chain_exhausted', {
chain_id: chainId,
chain: chain.map(h => h.provider),
triedProviders,
trigger_type: null,
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: chain[0].provider,
modelUsed: chain[0].model,
fallbackHops: chain.length,
originalError,
triedProviders,
};
}
// ── Chain builder ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Builds the execution chain for a given model string from config.
*
* Per D9 implementation notes:
* - If fallbackChainConfig has an explicit entry for this model, use it.
* - Otherwise, use a single-hop chain with the first matched provider (no fallback).
* - v0.1 ships with empty chain config; fallback activates only when the user
* populates ~/.olp/config.json's routing.chains.
*
* @param {string} modelString — user-requested model string
* @param {Map<string, object>} loadedProviders — name → provider plugin
* @param {object} [fallbackChainConfig] — routing.chains from config.json
* @param {object} [softTriggerConfig] — routing.soft_triggers from config.json
* @returns {ChainHop[]|null} — ordered chain, or null if no provider found for model
*/
export function buildDefaultChain(
modelString,
loadedProviders,
fallbackChainConfig = {},
softTriggerConfig = {},
) {
// Check for explicit chain in config for this model
const explicitChain = fallbackChainConfig[modelString];
if (explicitChain && Array.isArray(explicitChain) && explicitChain.length > 0) {
return explicitChain.map(hop => ({
provider: hop.provider,
model: hop.model ?? modelString,
softTriggers: softTriggerConfig[hop.provider] ?? null,
// quotaSnapshot stays null at v0.1 — soft triggers deferred to v1.x per
// ADR 0004 Amendment 2. evaluateSoftTriggers correctly short-circuits to
// false when quotaSnapshot is null. The polling path is not wired in v0.1.
quotaSnapshot: null,
}));
}
// No explicit chain: use getProviderForModel (SPOT for alias-aware routing).
// D17 Finding 13 fix: replaced the duplicated inline scan loop with this
// single call so alias resolution and provider lookup live in one place.
// result.canonicalModel carries the canonical ID even when user passed an
// alias. The canonical ID flows into: cache key (computeCacheKey arg),
// X-OLP-Model-Used header, and structured log events — so identical requests
// differing only in alias-vs-canonical now hit the same cache entry.
// provider.spawn continues to receive irRequest.model (the user's original
// input); each provider CLI accepts its own aliases natively per its docs,
// so no in-IR rewrite is needed for spawn correctness.
const match = getProviderForModel(loadedProviders, modelString);
if (match) {
return [{
provider: match.name,
model: match.canonicalModel,
softTriggers: softTriggerConfig[match.name] ?? null,
// quotaSnapshot stays null at v0.1 — soft triggers deferred to v1.x per
// ADR 0004 Amendment 2. evaluateSoftTriggers correctly short-circuits to
// false when quotaSnapshot is null. The polling path is not wired in v0.1.
quotaSnapshot: null,
}];
}
// No provider found for this model
return null;
}
// ── Config loader ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Default path for the OLP config file.
* @returns {string}
*/
function defaultConfigPath() {
return join(homedir(), '.olp', 'config.json');
}
/**
* Loads the full OLP config from ~/.olp/config.json (or the given path).
*
* Per D9 implementation notes:
* v0.1 ships with no config file. Fallback engine is wired but single-hop
* until the user populates routing.chains.
*
* Per ADR 0002 § Disable model: providers.enabled is the toggle that transitions
* a Candidate provider to Enabled. Missing entries default to false (disabled).
*
* Returns empty config (no chains, no soft triggers, no enabled providers) if the
* file is absent, unreadable, or malformed.
*
* @param {string} [configPath] — override path (for testing — do NOT write to ~/.olp/config.json in tests)
* @returns {{ chains: object, soft_triggers: object, providersEnabled: Record<string, boolean> }}
*/
export function loadFallbackConfigSync(configPath) {
try {
const path = configPath ?? defaultConfigPath();
const raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
const routing = parsed?.routing ?? {};
const providers = parsed?.providers ?? {};
return {
chains: routing.chains ?? {},
soft_triggers: routing.soft_triggers ?? {},
providersEnabled: providers.enabled ?? {},
};
} catch {
// File absent, unreadable, or malformed → no fallback config (single-hop mode)
// Empty providersEnabled → all providers disabled → 503 per ALIGNMENT.md v0.1 posture.
return { chains: {}, soft_triggers: {}, providersEnabled: {} };
}
}