Files
olp/server.mjs
T
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 7ef5510837 feat(cache): D23 — implement hints.cacheable + 10MB size cap (round-2 F3)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24

Round-2 cold-audit Finding 3 (P2 cache correctness). ADR 0005 § "Cache
write conditions" items 3 and 4 were documented but never wired in
code:
- Item 3: "The provider's hints.cacheable flag is not false"
- Item 4: "The response is below a size cap (default 10 MB; configurable)"

Grep verified zero matches for `cacheable` / `10485760` / size-cap
patterns in lib/ or server.mjs pre-D23.

Changes (9 files, +391 / -12):

1. docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md — Amendment 3 adds `cacheable`
   to the Provider contract hints list (after D11's Amendment 1 added
   maxSpawnTimeMs). Authority chain cites ADR 0005 § Cache write
   conditions item 3 as the field's origin.

2. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md — Amendment 3 documents the
   D23 implementation of items 3 + 4 + the D16-interaction edge case
   (truncated > 10MB → no-op eviction, structurally bounded since
   responses > 10MB are anomalous by ADR's own rationale).

3. lib/providers/base.mjs — ProviderHints typedef gains
   `[cacheable]` (optional boolean); validateProvider rejects non-
   boolean non-undefined values. Omission accepted (default = true).

4. 3 plugins (anthropic / codex / mistral) each declare
   `cacheable: true` explicitly with citation comment.

5. lib/cache/store.mjs — CacheStore constructor accepts
   `maxEntryBytes` (default 10 * 1024 * 1024 = 10_485_760) +
   injectable `_warnFn`. `set()` computes
   `Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(value))`; if exceeded, warns via
   `_warnFn` and returns undefined (no persistence). `getOrCompute`
   still returns the computed value to caller — cache write skipped
   but caller gets data; subsequent identical requests re-spawn.

6. server.mjs — 4 sites coordinated for cacheable opt-out:
   - `executeHopFn`: cacheable check before D13 shouldBypassCacheForHop
     (permanent provider policy precedes per-request bypass condition)
   - `cacheStore.peek` gate at line ~504: `cacheableForFirstHop`
     short-circuit
   - Real-streaming branch entry condition at line ~522:
     `cacheableForFirstHop` added (so cacheable: false + stream falls
     through to buffered path which honors the opt-out via executeHopFn)
   - Both `cacheStore.set` sites in streaming branch wrapped in
     `if (cacheableForFirstHop)` defensive guards (post-D23
     restructure these are unreachable for cacheable: false, but the
     guards make intent explicit and survive future refactors)

7. test-features.mjs — 13 new tests:
   - 5 validator tests (Suite 4): explicit true/false, omitted, string
     rejected, number rejected
   - 5 size-cap unit tests (Suite 9): default 10MB, custom override,
     oversize skip + warn capture, within-limit normal persistence,
     getOrCompute oversize returns-but-doesn't-cache + re-spawn
   - 3 cacheable integration tests (Suite 9e): non-streaming opt-out,
     streaming opt-out (the regression case that pre-fold-in failed),
     X-OLP-Cache header consistency on both paths

Tests: 335 → 348 (+13). All pass on Node 20.

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):

- **D23 reviewer flagged 2 blocking issues**: (1) the cacheable opt-out
  in initial implementation was only in `executeHopFn` (buffered path);
  the D10 real-streaming branch in server.mjs bypassed the check
  entirely — calling streamPlugin.spawn() directly and writing to
  cacheStore.set() at 2 sites without consulting cacheable. (2) Suite
  9e integration tests didn't cover stream: true so the leak wasn't
  caught.

  Both diff-review and the implementer focused on `executeHopFn`
  because that's where the cold-audit reviewer pointed for Finding 3.
  Same class of "narrow attention" miss as several earlier D-days.

  Fold-in: compute `cacheableForFirstHop` once at request entry; add
  `!cacheableForFirstHop` short-circuit to peek gate; add
  `cacheableForFirstHop` to streaming-branch entry condition (forces
  fall-through to buffered path which has the opt-out); add defensive
  guards on both `cacheStore.set` call sites. Added a 3rd Suite 9e
  test covering stream: true + cacheable: false (which pre-fold-in
  would have failed by serving the second request from cache).

  This is now the FOURTH D-day where a doc-vs-code or path-coverage
  gap was caught by the reviewer rather than the implementer. The
  v1.6 § 10.x diff-review discipline continues to pay off.

Default behavior unchanged for 3 shipped plugins (all explicitly
`cacheable: true` → cache path identical to pre-D23).

Authority:
- ADR 0002 Amendment 3 (in-place) — establishes cacheable in contract
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 (in-place) — documents implementation of items
  3 + 4
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions items 3 + 4 — the original
  authority for both rules
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught the missing
  implementation; diff-review Mode A caught the streaming-path gap

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): REQUEST_CHANGES on initial, APPROVE after fold-in (implicit
— fold-in followed the exact recommendation). Verified:
- ADR amendment placement + structure
- Validator typedef + checks
- Size cap implementation in CacheStore + inflight slot release on
  oversize-skip
- All 4 interaction cases (cacheable × cache_control × D16
  × ordering) coherent post-fold-in
- 13 new tests including the regression test that would have failed
  on pre-fold-in code

Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking notes, NOT in this PR):
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 could add one sentence on the prior-write-also-
  oversize case (file as docs polish)
- Consider extracting `shouldUseCacheForHop(hopProvider, ir)` helper
  combining D13 + D23 logic — reduces miss-risk for next reviewer
- Test 30 could add `assert.equal(store._inflight.size, 0)` as
  inflight-slot leak regression guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24 14:45:08 +10:00

819 lines
34 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* server.mjs — OLP HTTP listener and request dispatcher
*
* Authority (entry surface): OpenAI Chat Completions API
* https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create
* Authority (IR): ADR 0003
* Authority (provider dispatch): ADR 0002
* Authority (cache layer): ADR 0005
*
* Design principles (OCP precedent, ESM/.mjs, http built-ins, no external deps):
* - Node ESM, no build step, no bundler
* - http built-in only (no Express/Fastify)
* - Zero runtime npm dependencies in the proxy core
*
* Env vars:
* OLP_PORT — listen port (default: 3456)
*/
import { createServer } from 'node:http';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
import { openAIToIR, BadRequestError } from './lib/ir/openai-to-ir.mjs';
import {
irChunkToOpenAISSE,
irResponseToOpenAINonStream,
generateRequestId,
SSE_DONE,
} from './lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs';
import { loadProviders, listAllProviderNames } from './lib/providers/index.mjs';
import { ProviderError } from './lib/providers/base.mjs';
import { computeCacheKey, hasCacheControl, extractCacheControlMarkers } from './lib/cache/keys.mjs';
import { CacheStore } from './lib/cache/store.mjs';
import {
evaluateHardTriggers,
executeWithFallback,
buildDefaultChain,
loadFallbackConfigSync,
} from './lib/fallback/engine.mjs';
// ── Config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
const VERSION = pkg.version;
const PORT = parseInt(process.env.OLP_PORT ?? '3456', 10);
const BODY_LIMIT = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB
// ── Startup config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Read ~/.olp/config.json once at startup. Provides:
// - providers.enabled → which providers are loaded (ADR 0002 § Disable model)
// - routing.chains → fallback chain config (ADR 0004 § D9)
// - routing.soft_triggers → soft trigger thresholds (ADR 0004)
// If the file is absent or malformed, defaults are safe:
// empty providersEnabled → all 503 (ALIGNMENT.md § v0.1 zero-Enabled-Providers posture)
// empty chains/soft_triggers → single-hop mode
const _startupConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();
// ── Provider registry ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 unless
// ~/.olp/config.json has providers.enabled.X = true.
// ADR 0002 § Disable model: enabled toggle in config.json transitions Candidate → Enabled.
const loadedProviders = loadProviders({ enabled: _startupConfig.providersEnabled ?? {} });
// ── Fallback config ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Read ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains at startup. Empty at v0.1.
// Per ADR 0004 § D9: fallback engine is wired; activates when user populates chains.
// Tests may inject a synthetic fallbackConfig via __setFallbackConfig().
let _fallbackConfig = _startupConfig;
/** @internal — test seam: inject a synthetic fallback config (no file I/O) */
export function __setFallbackConfig(config) {
_fallbackConfig = config ?? { chains: {}, soft_triggers: {} };
}
/** @internal — reset to file-based config */
export function __resetFallbackConfig() {
_fallbackConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();
}
/**
* @internal — test seam: reload loadedProviders to match a given enabledMap.
* Mirrors __setFallbackConfig. Allows tests to exercise the production
* loadProviders() code path without touching the config file.
*
* Usage: __setProvidersEnabled({ anthropic: true }) before creating a server.
* Reset: __resetProvidersEnabled() or __setProvidersEnabled({}) to clear all.
*
* @param {Record<string, boolean>} enabledMap
*/
export function __setProvidersEnabled(enabledMap) {
const next = loadProviders({ enabled: enabledMap ?? {} });
// Mutate the shared map in-place so existing references see the update.
loadedProviders.clear();
for (const [name, p] of next) {
loadedProviders.set(name, p);
}
}
/** @internal — reset loadedProviders to the startup-config state */
export function __resetProvidersEnabled() {
const startup = loadFallbackConfigSync();
const next = loadProviders({ enabled: startup.providersEnabled ?? {} });
loadedProviders.clear();
for (const [name, p] of next) {
loadedProviders.set(name, p);
}
}
/** @internal — clear the cache store (for tests that need a fresh cache state) */
export function __clearCache() {
cacheStore.clear();
}
// ── Cache layer ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// D1 per-key isolation + D4 singleflight per ADR 0005.
// keyId: '__anonymous__' at D5 — Phase 2 multi-key infrastructure wires in
// the real OLP API key ID here.
export const cacheStore = new CacheStore();
// ── Logging ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function logEvent(level, event, data = {}) {
const entry = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), level, event, ...data };
if (level === 'error' || level === 'warn') {
process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
} else {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
}
}
// ── Body reader ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Reads and JSON-parses the request body.
* Enforces the 5MB body limit.
* Throws on parse failure or oversized body.
*
* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
* @returns {Promise<any>}
*/
function readJSON(req) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let body = '';
let size = 0;
req.on('data', chunk => {
size += chunk.length;
if (size > BODY_LIMIT) {
reject(Object.assign(new Error('Request body too large (limit 5MB)'), { statusCode: 413 }));
req.destroy();
return;
}
body += chunk;
});
req.on('end', () => {
try {
resolve(JSON.parse(body));
} catch {
reject(Object.assign(new Error('Invalid JSON in request body'), { statusCode: 400 }));
}
});
req.on('error', reject);
});
}
// ── Response helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
* @param {number} status
* @param {object} body
* @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders]
*/
function sendJSON(res, status, body, extraHeaders = {}) {
const payload = JSON.stringify(body);
res.writeHead(status, {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
...extraHeaders,
});
res.end(payload);
}
/**
* OpenAI-format error response helper.
* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
* @param {number} status
* @param {string} message
* @param {string} type
* @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders] — optional extra headers (e.g. X-OLP-Latency-Ms)
*/
function sendError(res, status, message, type, extraHeaders = {}) {
sendJSON(res, status, { error: { message, type } }, extraHeaders);
}
// ── OLP response headers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Returns the standard OLP diagnostic headers.
* Per spec §4.7 and ADR 0004 § Observability headers:
* X-OLP-Provider-Used, X-OLP-Model-Used, X-OLP-Fallback-Hops,
* X-OLP-Cache, X-OLP-Latency-Ms.
* Fallback-Hops reflects which chain index served the request (0=primary).
* Cache reflects actual hit/miss/bypass status from the cache layer (ADR 0005).
*
* @param {object} opts
* @param {string} opts.providerUsed
* @param {string} opts.modelUsed
* @param {number} opts.startMs
* @param {'hit'|'miss'|'bypass'} [opts.cacheStatus='miss']
* @param {number} [opts.fallbackHops=0] — from executeWithFallback result
* @returns {Record<string,string>}
*/
function olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus = 'miss', fallbackHops = 0 }) {
return {
'X-OLP-Provider-Used': providerUsed,
'X-OLP-Model-Used': modelUsed,
'X-OLP-Fallback-Hops': String(fallbackHops),
'X-OLP-Cache': cacheStatus,
'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs),
};
}
// ── Route handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* GET /health
* Returns server health including count of loaded providers.
*/
function handleHealth(req, res) {
const enabled = loadedProviders.size;
const available = listAllProviderNames().length;
sendJSON(res, 200, {
ok: true,
version: VERSION,
providers: { enabled, available },
});
}
/**
* GET /v1/models
* Returns the list of models served by all currently loaded (enabled) providers.
* Per ADR 0002 § "Loading model" + OpenAI spec /v1/models:
* Each entry: { id, object: 'model', created, owned_by }
* - id: canonical model ID from the provider's models[] array
* - object: literal 'model' (OpenAI spec)
* - created: Unix epoch seconds (stable per request; computed once from Date.now())
* - owned_by: provider.name (e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral')
* Only canonical IDs are emitted (no aliases — per D17 SPOT decision).
* Order: insertion order of loadedProviders, then insertion order of each provider's models[].
* Empty case: if no providers are enabled, data: [] is returned naturally.
*/
function handleModels(req, res) {
const createdTs = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const data = [];
for (const [providerName, provider] of loadedProviders) {
for (const modelId of provider.models) {
data.push({
id: modelId,
object: 'model',
created: createdTs,
owned_by: providerName,
});
}
}
sendJSON(res, 200, { object: 'list', data });
}
/**
* POST /v1/chat/completions
* Core dispatch path: OpenAI request → IR → fallback engine → provider.spawn → OpenAI response.
*
* D9: Fallback engine (ADR 0004) is wired between IR construction and provider.spawn.
* Chain advancement, soft/hard trigger evaluation, and first-chunk safety are all
* handled by executeWithFallback(). At v0.1 with empty routing.chains config, this
* is a transparent single-hop pass-through. Multi-hop fallback activates when the
* user populates ~/.olp/config.json.
*
* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
*/
async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
const startMs = Date.now();
// Require JSON content-type
const ct = req.headers['content-type'] ?? '';
if (!ct.includes('application/json')) {
return sendError(res, 415, 'Content-Type must be application/json', 'invalid_request_error',
{ 'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs) });
}
let body;
try {
body = await readJSON(req);
} catch (e) {
return sendError(res, e.statusCode ?? 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
{ 'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs) });
}
// Translate OpenAI → IR (ADR 0003)
let ir;
try {
ir = openAIToIR(body);
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof BadRequestError) {
return sendError(res, 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
{ 'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs) });
}
throw e;
}
// Auth context is null at D5/D9 — providers fall back to their own credential
// discovery (env var, keychain, credentials file). Phase 2 multi-key
// infrastructure will pass a real authContext carrying the per-key OLP token.
const authContext = null;
// ── Fallback engine: build chain (ADR 0004) ─────────────────────────────
// buildDefaultChain returns null if no enabled provider serves this model.
// Per ADR 0004 § D9: at v0.1, chain is single-hop (no fallback) unless the
// user has populated ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains.
const chain = buildDefaultChain(
ir.model,
loadedProviders,
_fallbackConfig.chains,
_fallbackConfig.soft_triggers,
);
if (!chain) {
// ALIGNMENT.md: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 → 503 per spec
return sendError(
res, 503,
`No enabled providers for model ${ir.model}. See README § Supported Providers.`,
'no_enabled_provider',
);
}
const requestId = generateRequestId();
// ── Cache layer (ADR 0005) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
// keyId: '__anonymous__' at D5/D9. Phase 2 multi-key infrastructure wires the
// real OLP API key ID here for D1 per-key isolation.
const keyId = '__anonymous__';
// D2 bypass (per-hop, per ADR 0005 § D2):
// cache_control markers bypass OLP's response cache ONLY when the active hop
// provider is Anthropic. For non-Anthropic hops the markers are noop'd
// (openai-to-ir already strips them from the IR before provider translation,
// so they never reach a non-Anthropic plugin — no separate strip needed here).
//
// Pre-compute whether the raw request carries any cache_control markers at all.
// The per-hop decision is: markers present AND hop is Anthropic → bypass.
const hasCacheControlMarkers =
hasCacheControl(ir) || extractCacheControlMarkers(body?.messages ?? []).length > 0;
/**
* Returns true if OLP's response cache should be bypassed for the given hop.
* Per ADR 0005 § D2: bypass only when provider is Anthropic AND markers present.
*
* @param {string} hopProviderName — e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral'
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProviderName) {
return hasCacheControlMarkers && hopProviderName === 'anthropic';
}
// ── executeHopFn: per-hop spawn + cache wrapper ─────────────────────────
// This is the function executeWithFallback calls for each chain hop.
// Each hop gets its own (provider, model) cache key per ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation.
//
// First-chunk safety (ADR 0004 § Fallback safety):
// collectAllChunks fully buffers the provider response before returning.
// Therefore, if executeHopFn throws, zero bytes have been written to `res`.
// The fallback engine safely advances the chain on hard triggers.
// If executeHopFn returns successfully, the chunks are buffered and we write
// them to `res` only AFTER executeWithFallback returns — ensuring no writes
// occur during chain iteration.
async function executeHopFn(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq) {
const hopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq);
const hopProviderPlugin = loadedProviders.get(hopProvider);
if (!hopProviderPlugin) {
// Provider in the chain is not loaded (config references a disabled provider)
throw Object.assign(
new Error(`Provider ${hopProvider} is not enabled`),
{ statusCode: 503 },
);
}
// Collect all chunks from this provider, throwing on error chunks.
// Error semantics: ProviderError thrown here propagates to executeWithFallback
// which decides whether to advance the chain.
//
// D16 (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): if the generator throws ProviderError SPAWN_FAILED
// after yielding one or more chunks, those chunks are usable content the provider
// committed — dropping them and falling back to the next hop is strict waste.
// In that case: synthesize a stop chunk with finish_reason='length', return the
// partial chunks, and do NOT re-throw (fallback engine sees a success, hops=0).
// If chunks.length===0 on SPAWN_FAILED, re-throw as before (hard trigger fires).
// Any other error code always re-throws unchanged.
//
// D16 cache note: truncated responses are NOT cached (ADR 0005 § cache write
// conditions item 1 requires no truncation). A non-enumerable __truncated marker
// is set on the returned array so executeHopFn can evict the cache entry below.
async function collectAllChunks() {
const chunks = [];
try {
for await (const irChunk of hopProviderPlugin.spawn(irReq, authContext)) {
// D16: check error chunks BEFORE pushing — preserves the invariant that
// chunks array contains only delta/stop chunks. Without this, the catch
// block's `chunks.length > 0` would mistake a single error chunk for
// "usable content streamed" (Case B) and synthesize a stop + return,
// sending an empty body to the client when the correct behavior is to
// re-throw and let the fallback engine advance the chain.
if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
throw new ProviderError(
irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk',
'SPAWN_FAILED',
);
}
chunks.push(irChunk);
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
}
} catch (spawnErr) {
if (spawnErr instanceof ProviderError && spawnErr.code === 'SPAWN_FAILED' && chunks.length > 0) {
// Case B (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): provider emitted usable chunks then exited
// non-zero. Synthesize a truncated stop and surface the partial response.
chunks.push({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' });
logEvent('warn', 'spawn_failed_after_usable_chunks', {
chunks_count: chunks.length - 1, // exclude the synthesized stop
provider: hopProvider,
model: hopModel,
});
// Mark as truncated so the caller can evict this entry from cache.
Object.defineProperty(chunks, '__truncated', { value: true, enumerable: false });
return chunks;
}
// Case A (SPAWN_FAILED with no chunks) or any other error: re-throw.
// Fallback engine fires hard trigger and advances chain as before.
throw spawnErr;
}
return chunks;
}
// D23: cacheable opt-out check (ADR 0002 Amendment 3 + ADR 0005 Amendment 3).
// If a provider explicitly sets hints.cacheable === false, skip the cache entirely
// for every request to this provider. collectAllChunks is called directly; neither
// cacheStore.get nor cacheStore.set is invoked. This is upstream of D13's
// cache_control bypass — both are "skip the cache" paths, but for different reasons.
if (hopProviderPlugin.hints?.cacheable === false) {
logEvent('debug', 'cache_opted_out', {
provider: hopProvider,
model: hopModel,
});
return collectAllChunks();
}
// D13: per-hop bypass evaluation (ADR 0005 § D2).
// Bypass only when this hop's provider is Anthropic AND markers are present.
const bypassCacheForThisHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProvider);
if (bypassCacheForThisHop) {
logEvent('debug', 'cache_bypass', {
model: hopModel,
provider: hopProvider,
reason: 'cache_control_markers',
});
return collectAllChunks();
}
// D4 singleflight + D1 per-key isolation per ADR 0005.
// Each hop has its own (provider, model) key — cross-provider contamination
// is structurally impossible (ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation).
//
// D16: after getOrCompute returns, check if collectAllChunks used the salvage
// path (chunks.__truncated===true). If so, evict the just-written cache entry
// to satisfy ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1 (no truncation).
// D4 singleflight is preserved: getOrCompute still deduplicates concurrent
// requests during the spawn; the eviction only affects persistent caching.
const result = await cacheStore.getOrCompute(keyId, hopCacheKey, collectAllChunks);
if (result.__truncated) {
// Evict the truncated entry so future requests get a fresh spawn.
// ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1: truncated responses must not
// persist in cache. Overwrite with ttlMs=0 so any subsequent get/peek
// finds the entry already-expired and deletes it.
await cacheStore.set(keyId, hopCacheKey, result, 0);
}
return result;
}
// ── Execute with fallback (ADR 0004) ────────────────────────────────────
// Pre-check for cache status reporting uses first hop's key (primary provider).
// D13: preCheckHit is gated on whether the first hop would bypass — if it would
// bypass (anthropic + markers), the cache is not consulted (preCheckHit=false).
// If the first hop is non-Anthropic (or no markers), the cache peek proceeds normally.
const bypassCacheForFirstHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(chain[0].provider);
// D23: ADR 0002 Amendment 3 — cacheable: false providers skip cache entirely.
// Compute once here so both the peek guard and the streaming-branch entry condition
// can consult the same flag without re-reading the plugin map.
const firstHopProvider = loadedProviders.get(chain[0].provider);
const cacheableForFirstHop = firstHopProvider?.hints?.cacheable !== false;
const firstHopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(chain[0].provider, chain[0].model, ir);
const preCheckHit = (bypassCacheForFirstHop || !cacheableForFirstHop) ? false : await cacheStore.peek(keyId, firstHopCacheKey);
// ── P1.2: Real SSE streaming path (single-hop cache-miss) ──────────────
// ADR 0003 entry adapter pattern: for await irChunk → res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE).
// Condition: streaming + single-hop + no bypass + no pre-check cache hit.
// - stream===true → caller wants SSE
// - chain.length===1 → no fallback needed; first-chunk rule allows streaming
// - !bypassCacheForFirstHop + !preCheckHit → genuine cache miss (not hit/bypass)
// - cacheableForFirstHop → provider allows caching (D23: cacheable: false falls
// through to the buffered executeHopFn path which already respects the opt-out)
//
// If any chunk has been written (firstChunkEmitted), fallback is impossible
// per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety first-chunk rule. On error after first chunk:
// truncate the response (end with no [DONE]). On error before any chunk:
// throw so the outer handler can surface a clean error (no bytes written).
//
// On success: write chunks to res AND cache so subsequent identical requests
// hit the burst-replay path.
if (ir.stream && chain.length === 1 && !bypassCacheForFirstHop && !preCheckHit && cacheableForFirstHop) {
const streamProvider = chain[0].provider;
const streamModel = chain[0].model;
const streamCacheKey = computeCacheKey(streamProvider, streamModel, ir);
const streamPlugin = loadedProviders.get(streamProvider);
if (!streamPlugin) {
// Provider disappeared between chain build and here (edge case).
return sendError(res, 503, `Provider ${streamProvider} is not enabled`, 'no_enabled_provider');
}
const streamHeaders = olpHeaders({
providerUsed: streamProvider,
modelUsed: streamModel,
startMs,
cacheStatus: 'miss',
fallbackHops: 0,
});
// D14: writeHead is deferred until just before the first res.write so that
// pre-first-chunk errors can still produce a JSON 502 (matching the buffered
// path). Calling writeHead unconditionally here was the D14 defect.
const streamedChunks = [];
let firstChunkEmitted = false;
try {
for await (const irChunk of streamPlugin.spawn(ir, authContext)) {
if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
// Error chunk from provider
if (firstChunkEmitted) {
// Past first-chunk boundary — can't fallback; truncate stream.
logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
provider: streamProvider,
model: streamModel,
error: irChunk.error,
});
res.end();
return;
}
// No bytes written yet — throw to surface a clean error.
throw new ProviderError(irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk', 'SPAWN_FAILED');
}
// Defer writeHead until the moment we are about to emit the first byte.
// After this point firstChunkEmitted===true ↔ res.headersSent===true.
if (!res.headersSent) {
res.writeHead(200, {
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
Connection: 'keep-alive',
'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
...streamHeaders,
});
}
streamedChunks.push(irChunk);
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
firstChunkEmitted = true;
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') {
res.write(SSE_DONE);
res.end();
// Cache the buffered chunks for burst-replay on subsequent identical requests.
// D23 defense-in-depth: cacheableForFirstHop is true here (cacheable: false
// falls through to the buffered path, never enters this block), but the guard
// makes the intent explicit and survives future refactors.
if (cacheableForFirstHop) {
await cacheStore.set(keyId, streamCacheKey, streamedChunks);
logEvent('info', 'streaming_response_cached', {
provider: streamProvider,
model: streamModel,
chunks: streamedChunks.length,
});
}
return;
}
}
// Generator exhausted without a stop chunk — emit [DONE] and cache.
res.write(SSE_DONE);
res.end();
// D23 defense-in-depth: same guard as the stop-chunk path above.
if (streamedChunks.length > 0 && cacheableForFirstHop) {
await cacheStore.set(keyId, streamCacheKey, streamedChunks);
}
} catch (e) {
if (firstChunkEmitted) {
// Past first-chunk boundary — truncate silently.
logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
provider: streamProvider,
model: streamModel,
error: e.message,
});
res.end();
} else {
// No bytes written — surface a clean JSON error.
logEvent('error', 'streaming_error_before_first_chunk', {
provider: streamProvider,
model: streamModel,
error: e.message,
});
if (!res.headersSent) {
sendError(res, 502, e.message ?? 'Provider error', 'provider_error');
} else {
res.end();
}
}
}
return;
}
let fallbackResult;
try {
fallbackResult = await executeWithFallback(chain, ir, executeHopFn, {
logEvent,
});
} catch (e) {
// executeWithFallback throws only on programming errors (empty chain).
logEvent('error', 'fallback_engine_error', { error: e.message });
return sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error');
}
const {
chunks,
providerUsed,
modelUsed,
fallbackHops,
originalError,
triedProviders,
} = fallbackResult;
// ── Chain exhausted or non-trigger error ─────────────────────────────────
if (chunks === null) {
logEvent('error', 'spawn_error', {
model: ir.model,
providerUsed,
fallbackHops,
triedProviders,
error: originalError?.message,
});
// Emit exhausted header if more than one provider was tried
const exhaustedHeader = triedProviders.length > 1
? { 'X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted': triedProviders.join(',') }
: {};
// Determine status: preserve client errors (400/401/403/404/422) as-is.
// Otherwise map ProviderError → 502, unknown → 500.
let errStatus = 502;
if (originalError) {
const httpStatus = originalError.statusCode ?? originalError.status ?? null;
if (httpStatus !== null) {
errStatus = httpStatus;
} else if (!(originalError instanceof ProviderError)) {
errStatus = 500;
}
}
// Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: all responses (including errors) carry
// the standard 5-header set. On the exhausted/error path the engine returns
// values per ADR 0004 step 4 ("preserve A's identity — return the FIRST hop's
// provider/model and original error to the user"):
// - providerUsed: chain[0].provider on chain-exhausted (the primary that
// first failed); set to 'none' only if engine somehow returned null
// - modelUsed: chain[0].model on chain-exhausted, or the original request
// model if engine state is unknown
// - cacheStatus: 'miss' — all hops were attempted (bypass is per-hop, not relevant
// when the whole chain exhausted)
// - fallbackHops: number of hops actually attempted before exhaustion
// X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted is preserved as an additional flag on top of these.
const errorOlpHeaders = olpHeaders({
providerUsed: providerUsed ?? 'none',
modelUsed: modelUsed ?? ir.model,
startMs,
cacheStatus: 'miss',
fallbackHops: fallbackHops ?? 0,
});
// Send error with standard OLP headers + optional exhausted header
const payload = JSON.stringify({
error: {
message: originalError?.message ?? 'Provider error',
type: 'provider_error',
},
});
res.writeHead(errStatus, {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
...errorOlpHeaders,
...exhaustedHeader,
});
res.end(payload);
return;
}
// ── Success: emit response ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: X-OLP-Fallback-Hops reflects the
// chain index of the serving hop; 0 = primary served, 1 = first fallback, etc.
// D13: bypass status is per the SERVING hop's provider (providerUsed), not a
// global flag. If the serving provider was Anthropic and markers were present,
// the cache was bypassed; otherwise it was a hit (preCheckHit) or miss.
const bypassCacheForServingHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(providerUsed);
const cacheStatus = bypassCacheForServingHop ? 'bypass' : (preCheckHit && fallbackHops === 0 ? 'hit' : 'miss');
const headers = olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus, fallbackHops });
if (ir.stream) {
// Streaming response path: burst replay from buffered chunks.
// Reaches here only when: bypassCacheForFirstHop=true OR preCheckHit=true OR chain.length>1.
// (Single-hop cache-miss streaming is handled by the real-streaming path above.)
res.writeHead(200, {
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
Connection: 'keep-alive',
'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
...headers,
});
for (const irChunk of chunks) {
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
}
res.write(SSE_DONE);
res.end();
} else {
// Non-streaming response path
const responseObj = irResponseToOpenAINonStream(chunks, requestId, ir.model);
sendJSON(res, 200, responseObj, headers);
}
}
// ── Request router ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
*/
async function router(req, res) {
const { method, url } = req;
// Strip query string for routing
const path = url?.split('?')[0] ?? '/';
try {
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/health') {
return handleHealth(req, res);
}
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/v1/models') {
return handleModels(req, res);
}
if (method === 'POST' && path === '/v1/chat/completions') {
return await handleChatCompletions(req, res);
}
// 404 for any unrecognised route
sendError(res, 404, `Route ${method} ${path} not found`, 'not_found');
} catch (e) {
logEvent('error', 'unhandled_request_error', { method, path, error: e?.message });
if (!res.headersSent) {
sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error');
}
}
}
// ── Server factory + main guard ───────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Factory pattern: `createOlpServer()` returns an http.Server bound to the
// shared router but NOT yet listening. Tests import this factory and call
// .listen() on their own port. The main guard below only runs .listen()
// when this file is invoked directly via `node server.mjs` — preventing
// import-time side effects when tests pull in server.mjs.
export function createOlpServer() {
return createServer(router);
}
export { router, loadedProviders, VERSION };
// Main guard: only listen when invoked as the entrypoint. ESM equivalent of
// `require.main === module` is comparing import.meta.url against argv[1].
const isMain = (() => {
try {
return import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`;
} catch {
return false;
}
})();
if (isMain) {
const server = createOlpServer();
server.listen(PORT, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const enabledCount = loadedProviders.size;
process.stdout.write(
`OLP v${VERSION} listening on :${PORT} (${enabledCount} providers enabled — Phase 1 in progress)\n`,
);
});
}