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cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24
Round-2 cold-audit Finding 3 (P2 cache correctness). ADR 0005 § "Cache
write conditions" items 3 and 4 were documented but never wired in
code:
- Item 3: "The provider's hints.cacheable flag is not false"
- Item 4: "The response is below a size cap (default 10 MB; configurable)"
Grep verified zero matches for `cacheable` / `10485760` / size-cap
patterns in lib/ or server.mjs pre-D23.
Changes (9 files, +391 / -12):
1. docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md — Amendment 3 adds `cacheable`
to the Provider contract hints list (after D11's Amendment 1 added
maxSpawnTimeMs). Authority chain cites ADR 0005 § Cache write
conditions item 3 as the field's origin.
2. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md — Amendment 3 documents the
D23 implementation of items 3 + 4 + the D16-interaction edge case
(truncated > 10MB → no-op eviction, structurally bounded since
responses > 10MB are anomalous by ADR's own rationale).
3. lib/providers/base.mjs — ProviderHints typedef gains
`[cacheable]` (optional boolean); validateProvider rejects non-
boolean non-undefined values. Omission accepted (default = true).
4. 3 plugins (anthropic / codex / mistral) each declare
`cacheable: true` explicitly with citation comment.
5. lib/cache/store.mjs — CacheStore constructor accepts
`maxEntryBytes` (default 10 * 1024 * 1024 = 10_485_760) +
injectable `_warnFn`. `set()` computes
`Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(value))`; if exceeded, warns via
`_warnFn` and returns undefined (no persistence). `getOrCompute`
still returns the computed value to caller — cache write skipped
but caller gets data; subsequent identical requests re-spawn.
6. server.mjs — 4 sites coordinated for cacheable opt-out:
- `executeHopFn`: cacheable check before D13 shouldBypassCacheForHop
(permanent provider policy precedes per-request bypass condition)
- `cacheStore.peek` gate at line ~504: `cacheableForFirstHop`
short-circuit
- Real-streaming branch entry condition at line ~522:
`cacheableForFirstHop` added (so cacheable: false + stream falls
through to buffered path which honors the opt-out via executeHopFn)
- Both `cacheStore.set` sites in streaming branch wrapped in
`if (cacheableForFirstHop)` defensive guards (post-D23
restructure these are unreachable for cacheable: false, but the
guards make intent explicit and survive future refactors)
7. test-features.mjs — 13 new tests:
- 5 validator tests (Suite 4): explicit true/false, omitted, string
rejected, number rejected
- 5 size-cap unit tests (Suite 9): default 10MB, custom override,
oversize skip + warn capture, within-limit normal persistence,
getOrCompute oversize returns-but-doesn't-cache + re-spawn
- 3 cacheable integration tests (Suite 9e): non-streaming opt-out,
streaming opt-out (the regression case that pre-fold-in failed),
X-OLP-Cache header consistency on both paths
Tests: 335 → 348 (+13). All pass on Node 20.
Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D23 reviewer flagged 2 blocking issues**: (1) the cacheable opt-out
in initial implementation was only in `executeHopFn` (buffered path);
the D10 real-streaming branch in server.mjs bypassed the check
entirely — calling streamPlugin.spawn() directly and writing to
cacheStore.set() at 2 sites without consulting cacheable. (2) Suite
9e integration tests didn't cover stream: true so the leak wasn't
caught.
Both diff-review and the implementer focused on `executeHopFn`
because that's where the cold-audit reviewer pointed for Finding 3.
Same class of "narrow attention" miss as several earlier D-days.
Fold-in: compute `cacheableForFirstHop` once at request entry; add
`!cacheableForFirstHop` short-circuit to peek gate; add
`cacheableForFirstHop` to streaming-branch entry condition (forces
fall-through to buffered path which has the opt-out); add defensive
guards on both `cacheStore.set` call sites. Added a 3rd Suite 9e
test covering stream: true + cacheable: false (which pre-fold-in
would have failed by serving the second request from cache).
This is now the FOURTH D-day where a doc-vs-code or path-coverage
gap was caught by the reviewer rather than the implementer. The
v1.6 § 10.x diff-review discipline continues to pay off.
Default behavior unchanged for 3 shipped plugins (all explicitly
`cacheable: true` → cache path identical to pre-D23).
Authority:
- ADR 0002 Amendment 3 (in-place) — establishes cacheable in contract
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 (in-place) — documents implementation of items
3 + 4
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions items 3 + 4 — the original
authority for both rules
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught the missing
implementation; diff-review Mode A caught the streaming-path gap
Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): REQUEST_CHANGES on initial, APPROVE after fold-in (implicit
— fold-in followed the exact recommendation). Verified:
- ADR amendment placement + structure
- Validator typedef + checks
- Size cap implementation in CacheStore + inflight slot release on
oversize-skip
- All 4 interaction cases (cacheable × cache_control × D16
× ordering) coherent post-fold-in
- 13 new tests including the regression test that would have failed
on pre-fold-in code
Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking notes, NOT in this PR):
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 could add one sentence on the prior-write-also-
oversize case (file as docs polish)
- Consider extracting `shouldUseCacheForHop(hopProvider, ir)` helper
combining D13 + D23 logic — reduces miss-risk for next reviewer
- Test 30 could add `assert.equal(store._inflight.size, 0)` as
inflight-slot leak regression guard
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
819 lines
34 KiB
JavaScript
819 lines
34 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* server.mjs — OLP HTTP listener and request dispatcher
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*
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* Authority (entry surface): OpenAI Chat Completions API
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* https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create
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* Authority (IR): ADR 0003
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* Authority (provider dispatch): ADR 0002
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* Authority (cache layer): ADR 0005
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*
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* Design principles (OCP precedent, ESM/.mjs, http built-ins, no external deps):
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* - Node ESM, no build step, no bundler
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* - http built-in only (no Express/Fastify)
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* - Zero runtime npm dependencies in the proxy core
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*
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* Env vars:
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* OLP_PORT — listen port (default: 3456)
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*/
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import { createServer } from 'node:http';
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
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import { openAIToIR, BadRequestError } from './lib/ir/openai-to-ir.mjs';
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import {
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irChunkToOpenAISSE,
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irResponseToOpenAINonStream,
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generateRequestId,
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SSE_DONE,
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} from './lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs';
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import { loadProviders, listAllProviderNames } from './lib/providers/index.mjs';
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import { ProviderError } from './lib/providers/base.mjs';
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import { computeCacheKey, hasCacheControl, extractCacheControlMarkers } from './lib/cache/keys.mjs';
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import { CacheStore } from './lib/cache/store.mjs';
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import {
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evaluateHardTriggers,
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executeWithFallback,
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buildDefaultChain,
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loadFallbackConfigSync,
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} from './lib/fallback/engine.mjs';
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// ── Config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
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const VERSION = pkg.version;
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const PORT = parseInt(process.env.OLP_PORT ?? '3456', 10);
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const BODY_LIMIT = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB
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// ── Startup config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Read ~/.olp/config.json once at startup. Provides:
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// - providers.enabled → which providers are loaded (ADR 0002 § Disable model)
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// - routing.chains → fallback chain config (ADR 0004 § D9)
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// - routing.soft_triggers → soft trigger thresholds (ADR 0004)
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// If the file is absent or malformed, defaults are safe:
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// empty providersEnabled → all 503 (ALIGNMENT.md § v0.1 zero-Enabled-Providers posture)
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// empty chains/soft_triggers → single-hop mode
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const _startupConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();
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// ── Provider registry ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 unless
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// ~/.olp/config.json has providers.enabled.X = true.
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// ADR 0002 § Disable model: enabled toggle in config.json transitions Candidate → Enabled.
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const loadedProviders = loadProviders({ enabled: _startupConfig.providersEnabled ?? {} });
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// ── Fallback config ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Read ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains at startup. Empty at v0.1.
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// Per ADR 0004 § D9: fallback engine is wired; activates when user populates chains.
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// Tests may inject a synthetic fallbackConfig via __setFallbackConfig().
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let _fallbackConfig = _startupConfig;
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/** @internal — test seam: inject a synthetic fallback config (no file I/O) */
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export function __setFallbackConfig(config) {
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_fallbackConfig = config ?? { chains: {}, soft_triggers: {} };
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}
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/** @internal — reset to file-based config */
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export function __resetFallbackConfig() {
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_fallbackConfig = loadFallbackConfigSync();
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}
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/**
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* @internal — test seam: reload loadedProviders to match a given enabledMap.
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* Mirrors __setFallbackConfig. Allows tests to exercise the production
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* loadProviders() code path without touching the config file.
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*
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* Usage: __setProvidersEnabled({ anthropic: true }) before creating a server.
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* Reset: __resetProvidersEnabled() or __setProvidersEnabled({}) to clear all.
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*
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* @param {Record<string, boolean>} enabledMap
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*/
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export function __setProvidersEnabled(enabledMap) {
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const next = loadProviders({ enabled: enabledMap ?? {} });
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// Mutate the shared map in-place so existing references see the update.
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loadedProviders.clear();
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for (const [name, p] of next) {
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loadedProviders.set(name, p);
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}
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}
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/** @internal — reset loadedProviders to the startup-config state */
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export function __resetProvidersEnabled() {
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const startup = loadFallbackConfigSync();
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const next = loadProviders({ enabled: startup.providersEnabled ?? {} });
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loadedProviders.clear();
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for (const [name, p] of next) {
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loadedProviders.set(name, p);
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}
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}
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/** @internal — clear the cache store (for tests that need a fresh cache state) */
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export function __clearCache() {
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cacheStore.clear();
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}
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// ── Cache layer ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// D1 per-key isolation + D4 singleflight per ADR 0005.
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// keyId: '__anonymous__' at D5 — Phase 2 multi-key infrastructure wires in
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// the real OLP API key ID here.
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export const cacheStore = new CacheStore();
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// ── Logging ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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function logEvent(level, event, data = {}) {
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const entry = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), level, event, ...data };
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if (level === 'error' || level === 'warn') {
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process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
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} else {
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process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
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}
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}
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// ── Body reader ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Reads and JSON-parses the request body.
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* Enforces the 5MB body limit.
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* Throws on parse failure or oversized body.
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*
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* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
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* @returns {Promise<any>}
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*/
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function readJSON(req) {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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let body = '';
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let size = 0;
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req.on('data', chunk => {
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size += chunk.length;
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if (size > BODY_LIMIT) {
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reject(Object.assign(new Error('Request body too large (limit 5MB)'), { statusCode: 413 }));
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req.destroy();
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return;
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}
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body += chunk;
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});
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req.on('end', () => {
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try {
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resolve(JSON.parse(body));
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} catch {
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reject(Object.assign(new Error('Invalid JSON in request body'), { statusCode: 400 }));
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}
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});
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req.on('error', reject);
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});
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}
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// ── Response helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
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* @param {number} status
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* @param {object} body
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* @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders]
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*/
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function sendJSON(res, status, body, extraHeaders = {}) {
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const payload = JSON.stringify(body);
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res.writeHead(status, {
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
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...extraHeaders,
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});
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res.end(payload);
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}
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/**
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* OpenAI-format error response helper.
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* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
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* @param {number} status
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* @param {string} message
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* @param {string} type
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* @param {Record<string,string>} [extraHeaders] — optional extra headers (e.g. X-OLP-Latency-Ms)
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*/
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function sendError(res, status, message, type, extraHeaders = {}) {
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sendJSON(res, status, { error: { message, type } }, extraHeaders);
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}
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// ── OLP response headers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Returns the standard OLP diagnostic headers.
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* Per spec §4.7 and ADR 0004 § Observability headers:
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* X-OLP-Provider-Used, X-OLP-Model-Used, X-OLP-Fallback-Hops,
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* X-OLP-Cache, X-OLP-Latency-Ms.
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* Fallback-Hops reflects which chain index served the request (0=primary).
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* Cache reflects actual hit/miss/bypass status from the cache layer (ADR 0005).
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*
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* @param {object} opts
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* @param {string} opts.providerUsed
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* @param {string} opts.modelUsed
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* @param {number} opts.startMs
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* @param {'hit'|'miss'|'bypass'} [opts.cacheStatus='miss']
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* @param {number} [opts.fallbackHops=0] — from executeWithFallback result
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* @returns {Record<string,string>}
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*/
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function olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus = 'miss', fallbackHops = 0 }) {
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return {
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'X-OLP-Provider-Used': providerUsed,
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'X-OLP-Model-Used': modelUsed,
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'X-OLP-Fallback-Hops': String(fallbackHops),
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'X-OLP-Cache': cacheStatus,
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'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs),
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};
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}
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// ── Route handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* GET /health
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* Returns server health including count of loaded providers.
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*/
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function handleHealth(req, res) {
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const enabled = loadedProviders.size;
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const available = listAllProviderNames().length;
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sendJSON(res, 200, {
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ok: true,
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version: VERSION,
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providers: { enabled, available },
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});
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}
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/**
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* GET /v1/models
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* Returns the list of models served by all currently loaded (enabled) providers.
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* Per ADR 0002 § "Loading model" + OpenAI spec /v1/models:
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* Each entry: { id, object: 'model', created, owned_by }
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* - id: canonical model ID from the provider's models[] array
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* - object: literal 'model' (OpenAI spec)
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* - created: Unix epoch seconds (stable per request; computed once from Date.now())
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* - owned_by: provider.name (e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral')
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* Only canonical IDs are emitted (no aliases — per D17 SPOT decision).
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* Order: insertion order of loadedProviders, then insertion order of each provider's models[].
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* Empty case: if no providers are enabled, data: [] is returned naturally.
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*/
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function handleModels(req, res) {
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const createdTs = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const data = [];
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for (const [providerName, provider] of loadedProviders) {
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for (const modelId of provider.models) {
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data.push({
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id: modelId,
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object: 'model',
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created: createdTs,
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owned_by: providerName,
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});
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}
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}
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sendJSON(res, 200, { object: 'list', data });
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}
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/**
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* POST /v1/chat/completions
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* Core dispatch path: OpenAI request → IR → fallback engine → provider.spawn → OpenAI response.
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*
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* D9: Fallback engine (ADR 0004) is wired between IR construction and provider.spawn.
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* Chain advancement, soft/hard trigger evaluation, and first-chunk safety are all
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* handled by executeWithFallback(). At v0.1 with empty routing.chains config, this
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* is a transparent single-hop pass-through. Multi-hop fallback activates when the
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* user populates ~/.olp/config.json.
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*
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* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
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* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
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*/
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async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
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const startMs = Date.now();
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// Require JSON content-type
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const ct = req.headers['content-type'] ?? '';
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if (!ct.includes('application/json')) {
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return sendError(res, 415, 'Content-Type must be application/json', 'invalid_request_error',
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{ 'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs) });
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}
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let body;
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try {
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body = await readJSON(req);
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} catch (e) {
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return sendError(res, e.statusCode ?? 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
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{ 'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs) });
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}
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// Translate OpenAI → IR (ADR 0003)
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let ir;
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try {
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ir = openAIToIR(body);
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} catch (e) {
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if (e instanceof BadRequestError) {
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return sendError(res, 400, e.message, 'invalid_request_error',
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{ 'X-OLP-Latency-Ms': String(Date.now() - startMs) });
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}
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throw e;
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}
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// Auth context is null at D5/D9 — providers fall back to their own credential
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// discovery (env var, keychain, credentials file). Phase 2 multi-key
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// infrastructure will pass a real authContext carrying the per-key OLP token.
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const authContext = null;
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// ── Fallback engine: build chain (ADR 0004) ─────────────────────────────
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// buildDefaultChain returns null if no enabled provider serves this model.
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// Per ADR 0004 § D9: at v0.1, chain is single-hop (no fallback) unless the
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// user has populated ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains.
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const chain = buildDefaultChain(
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ir.model,
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loadedProviders,
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_fallbackConfig.chains,
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_fallbackConfig.soft_triggers,
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);
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if (!chain) {
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// ALIGNMENT.md: 0 Enabled Providers at v0.1 → 503 per spec
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return sendError(
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res, 503,
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`No enabled providers for model ${ir.model}. See README § Supported Providers.`,
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'no_enabled_provider',
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);
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}
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const requestId = generateRequestId();
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// ── Cache layer (ADR 0005) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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// keyId: '__anonymous__' at D5/D9. Phase 2 multi-key infrastructure wires the
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// real OLP API key ID here for D1 per-key isolation.
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const keyId = '__anonymous__';
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// D2 bypass (per-hop, per ADR 0005 § D2):
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// cache_control markers bypass OLP's response cache ONLY when the active hop
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// provider is Anthropic. For non-Anthropic hops the markers are noop'd
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// (openai-to-ir already strips them from the IR before provider translation,
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// so they never reach a non-Anthropic plugin — no separate strip needed here).
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//
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// Pre-compute whether the raw request carries any cache_control markers at all.
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// The per-hop decision is: markers present AND hop is Anthropic → bypass.
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const hasCacheControlMarkers =
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hasCacheControl(ir) || extractCacheControlMarkers(body?.messages ?? []).length > 0;
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/**
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* Returns true if OLP's response cache should be bypassed for the given hop.
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* Per ADR 0005 § D2: bypass only when provider is Anthropic AND markers present.
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*
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* @param {string} hopProviderName — e.g. 'anthropic', 'openai', 'mistral'
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* @returns {boolean}
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*/
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function shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProviderName) {
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return hasCacheControlMarkers && hopProviderName === 'anthropic';
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}
|
|
|
|
// ── executeHopFn: per-hop spawn + cache wrapper ─────────────────────────
|
|
// This is the function executeWithFallback calls for each chain hop.
|
|
// Each hop gets its own (provider, model) cache key per ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation.
|
|
//
|
|
// First-chunk safety (ADR 0004 § Fallback safety):
|
|
// collectAllChunks fully buffers the provider response before returning.
|
|
// Therefore, if executeHopFn throws, zero bytes have been written to `res`.
|
|
// The fallback engine safely advances the chain on hard triggers.
|
|
// If executeHopFn returns successfully, the chunks are buffered and we write
|
|
// them to `res` only AFTER executeWithFallback returns — ensuring no writes
|
|
// occur during chain iteration.
|
|
async function executeHopFn(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq) {
|
|
const hopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(hopProvider, hopModel, irReq);
|
|
const hopProviderPlugin = loadedProviders.get(hopProvider);
|
|
|
|
if (!hopProviderPlugin) {
|
|
// Provider in the chain is not loaded (config references a disabled provider)
|
|
throw Object.assign(
|
|
new Error(`Provider ${hopProvider} is not enabled`),
|
|
{ statusCode: 503 },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Collect all chunks from this provider, throwing on error chunks.
|
|
// Error semantics: ProviderError thrown here propagates to executeWithFallback
|
|
// which decides whether to advance the chain.
|
|
//
|
|
// D16 (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): if the generator throws ProviderError SPAWN_FAILED
|
|
// after yielding one or more chunks, those chunks are usable content the provider
|
|
// committed — dropping them and falling back to the next hop is strict waste.
|
|
// In that case: synthesize a stop chunk with finish_reason='length', return the
|
|
// partial chunks, and do NOT re-throw (fallback engine sees a success, hops=0).
|
|
// If chunks.length===0 on SPAWN_FAILED, re-throw as before (hard trigger fires).
|
|
// Any other error code always re-throws unchanged.
|
|
//
|
|
// D16 cache note: truncated responses are NOT cached (ADR 0005 § cache write
|
|
// conditions item 1 requires no truncation). A non-enumerable __truncated marker
|
|
// is set on the returned array so executeHopFn can evict the cache entry below.
|
|
async function collectAllChunks() {
|
|
const chunks = [];
|
|
try {
|
|
for await (const irChunk of hopProviderPlugin.spawn(irReq, authContext)) {
|
|
// D16: check error chunks BEFORE pushing — preserves the invariant that
|
|
// chunks array contains only delta/stop chunks. Without this, the catch
|
|
// block's `chunks.length > 0` would mistake a single error chunk for
|
|
// "usable content streamed" (Case B) and synthesize a stop + return,
|
|
// sending an empty body to the client when the correct behavior is to
|
|
// re-throw and let the fallback engine advance the chain.
|
|
if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
|
|
throw new ProviderError(
|
|
irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk',
|
|
'SPAWN_FAILED',
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
chunks.push(irChunk);
|
|
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (spawnErr) {
|
|
if (spawnErr instanceof ProviderError && spawnErr.code === 'SPAWN_FAILED' && chunks.length > 0) {
|
|
// Case B (ADR 0004 Amendment 1): provider emitted usable chunks then exited
|
|
// non-zero. Synthesize a truncated stop and surface the partial response.
|
|
chunks.push({ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' });
|
|
logEvent('warn', 'spawn_failed_after_usable_chunks', {
|
|
chunks_count: chunks.length - 1, // exclude the synthesized stop
|
|
provider: hopProvider,
|
|
model: hopModel,
|
|
});
|
|
// Mark as truncated so the caller can evict this entry from cache.
|
|
Object.defineProperty(chunks, '__truncated', { value: true, enumerable: false });
|
|
return chunks;
|
|
}
|
|
// Case A (SPAWN_FAILED with no chunks) or any other error: re-throw.
|
|
// Fallback engine fires hard trigger and advances chain as before.
|
|
throw spawnErr;
|
|
}
|
|
return chunks;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// D23: cacheable opt-out check (ADR 0002 Amendment 3 + ADR 0005 Amendment 3).
|
|
// If a provider explicitly sets hints.cacheable === false, skip the cache entirely
|
|
// for every request to this provider. collectAllChunks is called directly; neither
|
|
// cacheStore.get nor cacheStore.set is invoked. This is upstream of D13's
|
|
// cache_control bypass — both are "skip the cache" paths, but for different reasons.
|
|
if (hopProviderPlugin.hints?.cacheable === false) {
|
|
logEvent('debug', 'cache_opted_out', {
|
|
provider: hopProvider,
|
|
model: hopModel,
|
|
});
|
|
return collectAllChunks();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// D13: per-hop bypass evaluation (ADR 0005 § D2).
|
|
// Bypass only when this hop's provider is Anthropic AND markers are present.
|
|
const bypassCacheForThisHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(hopProvider);
|
|
if (bypassCacheForThisHop) {
|
|
logEvent('debug', 'cache_bypass', {
|
|
model: hopModel,
|
|
provider: hopProvider,
|
|
reason: 'cache_control_markers',
|
|
});
|
|
return collectAllChunks();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// D4 singleflight + D1 per-key isolation per ADR 0005.
|
|
// Each hop has its own (provider, model) key — cross-provider contamination
|
|
// is structurally impossible (ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation).
|
|
//
|
|
// D16: after getOrCompute returns, check if collectAllChunks used the salvage
|
|
// path (chunks.__truncated===true). If so, evict the just-written cache entry
|
|
// to satisfy ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1 (no truncation).
|
|
// D4 singleflight is preserved: getOrCompute still deduplicates concurrent
|
|
// requests during the spawn; the eviction only affects persistent caching.
|
|
const result = await cacheStore.getOrCompute(keyId, hopCacheKey, collectAllChunks);
|
|
if (result.__truncated) {
|
|
// Evict the truncated entry so future requests get a fresh spawn.
|
|
// ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1: truncated responses must not
|
|
// persist in cache. Overwrite with ttlMs=0 so any subsequent get/peek
|
|
// finds the entry already-expired and deletes it.
|
|
await cacheStore.set(keyId, hopCacheKey, result, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Execute with fallback (ADR 0004) ────────────────────────────────────
|
|
// Pre-check for cache status reporting uses first hop's key (primary provider).
|
|
// D13: preCheckHit is gated on whether the first hop would bypass — if it would
|
|
// bypass (anthropic + markers), the cache is not consulted (preCheckHit=false).
|
|
// If the first hop is non-Anthropic (or no markers), the cache peek proceeds normally.
|
|
const bypassCacheForFirstHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(chain[0].provider);
|
|
// D23: ADR 0002 Amendment 3 — cacheable: false providers skip cache entirely.
|
|
// Compute once here so both the peek guard and the streaming-branch entry condition
|
|
// can consult the same flag without re-reading the plugin map.
|
|
const firstHopProvider = loadedProviders.get(chain[0].provider);
|
|
const cacheableForFirstHop = firstHopProvider?.hints?.cacheable !== false;
|
|
const firstHopCacheKey = computeCacheKey(chain[0].provider, chain[0].model, ir);
|
|
const preCheckHit = (bypassCacheForFirstHop || !cacheableForFirstHop) ? false : await cacheStore.peek(keyId, firstHopCacheKey);
|
|
|
|
// ── P1.2: Real SSE streaming path (single-hop cache-miss) ──────────────
|
|
// ADR 0003 entry adapter pattern: for await irChunk → res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE).
|
|
// Condition: streaming + single-hop + no bypass + no pre-check cache hit.
|
|
// - stream===true → caller wants SSE
|
|
// - chain.length===1 → no fallback needed; first-chunk rule allows streaming
|
|
// - !bypassCacheForFirstHop + !preCheckHit → genuine cache miss (not hit/bypass)
|
|
// - cacheableForFirstHop → provider allows caching (D23: cacheable: false falls
|
|
// through to the buffered executeHopFn path which already respects the opt-out)
|
|
//
|
|
// If any chunk has been written (firstChunkEmitted), fallback is impossible
|
|
// per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety first-chunk rule. On error after first chunk:
|
|
// truncate the response (end with no [DONE]). On error before any chunk:
|
|
// throw so the outer handler can surface a clean error (no bytes written).
|
|
//
|
|
// On success: write chunks to res AND cache so subsequent identical requests
|
|
// hit the burst-replay path.
|
|
if (ir.stream && chain.length === 1 && !bypassCacheForFirstHop && !preCheckHit && cacheableForFirstHop) {
|
|
const streamProvider = chain[0].provider;
|
|
const streamModel = chain[0].model;
|
|
const streamCacheKey = computeCacheKey(streamProvider, streamModel, ir);
|
|
const streamPlugin = loadedProviders.get(streamProvider);
|
|
|
|
if (!streamPlugin) {
|
|
// Provider disappeared between chain build and here (edge case).
|
|
return sendError(res, 503, `Provider ${streamProvider} is not enabled`, 'no_enabled_provider');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const streamHeaders = olpHeaders({
|
|
providerUsed: streamProvider,
|
|
modelUsed: streamModel,
|
|
startMs,
|
|
cacheStatus: 'miss',
|
|
fallbackHops: 0,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// D14: writeHead is deferred until just before the first res.write so that
|
|
// pre-first-chunk errors can still produce a JSON 502 (matching the buffered
|
|
// path). Calling writeHead unconditionally here was the D14 defect.
|
|
|
|
const streamedChunks = [];
|
|
let firstChunkEmitted = false;
|
|
try {
|
|
for await (const irChunk of streamPlugin.spawn(ir, authContext)) {
|
|
if (irChunk.type === 'error') {
|
|
// Error chunk from provider
|
|
if (firstChunkEmitted) {
|
|
// Past first-chunk boundary — can't fallback; truncate stream.
|
|
logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
|
|
provider: streamProvider,
|
|
model: streamModel,
|
|
error: irChunk.error,
|
|
});
|
|
res.end();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
// No bytes written yet — throw to surface a clean error.
|
|
throw new ProviderError(irChunk.error ?? 'Provider emitted error chunk', 'SPAWN_FAILED');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Defer writeHead until the moment we are about to emit the first byte.
|
|
// After this point firstChunkEmitted===true ↔ res.headersSent===true.
|
|
if (!res.headersSent) {
|
|
res.writeHead(200, {
|
|
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
|
|
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
|
|
Connection: 'keep-alive',
|
|
'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
|
|
...streamHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
streamedChunks.push(irChunk);
|
|
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
|
|
firstChunkEmitted = true;
|
|
|
|
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') {
|
|
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
|
res.end();
|
|
// Cache the buffered chunks for burst-replay on subsequent identical requests.
|
|
// D23 defense-in-depth: cacheableForFirstHop is true here (cacheable: false
|
|
// falls through to the buffered path, never enters this block), but the guard
|
|
// makes the intent explicit and survives future refactors.
|
|
if (cacheableForFirstHop) {
|
|
await cacheStore.set(keyId, streamCacheKey, streamedChunks);
|
|
logEvent('info', 'streaming_response_cached', {
|
|
provider: streamProvider,
|
|
model: streamModel,
|
|
chunks: streamedChunks.length,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generator exhausted without a stop chunk — emit [DONE] and cache.
|
|
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
|
res.end();
|
|
// D23 defense-in-depth: same guard as the stop-chunk path above.
|
|
if (streamedChunks.length > 0 && cacheableForFirstHop) {
|
|
await cacheStore.set(keyId, streamCacheKey, streamedChunks);
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
if (firstChunkEmitted) {
|
|
// Past first-chunk boundary — truncate silently.
|
|
logEvent('warn', 'streaming_error_after_first_chunk', {
|
|
provider: streamProvider,
|
|
model: streamModel,
|
|
error: e.message,
|
|
});
|
|
res.end();
|
|
} else {
|
|
// No bytes written — surface a clean JSON error.
|
|
logEvent('error', 'streaming_error_before_first_chunk', {
|
|
provider: streamProvider,
|
|
model: streamModel,
|
|
error: e.message,
|
|
});
|
|
if (!res.headersSent) {
|
|
sendError(res, 502, e.message ?? 'Provider error', 'provider_error');
|
|
} else {
|
|
res.end();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let fallbackResult;
|
|
try {
|
|
fallbackResult = await executeWithFallback(chain, ir, executeHopFn, {
|
|
logEvent,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
// executeWithFallback throws only on programming errors (empty chain).
|
|
logEvent('error', 'fallback_engine_error', { error: e.message });
|
|
return sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const {
|
|
chunks,
|
|
providerUsed,
|
|
modelUsed,
|
|
fallbackHops,
|
|
originalError,
|
|
triedProviders,
|
|
} = fallbackResult;
|
|
|
|
// ── Chain exhausted or non-trigger error ─────────────────────────────────
|
|
if (chunks === null) {
|
|
logEvent('error', 'spawn_error', {
|
|
model: ir.model,
|
|
providerUsed,
|
|
fallbackHops,
|
|
triedProviders,
|
|
error: originalError?.message,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Emit exhausted header if more than one provider was tried
|
|
const exhaustedHeader = triedProviders.length > 1
|
|
? { 'X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted': triedProviders.join(',') }
|
|
: {};
|
|
|
|
// Determine status: preserve client errors (400/401/403/404/422) as-is.
|
|
// Otherwise map ProviderError → 502, unknown → 500.
|
|
let errStatus = 502;
|
|
if (originalError) {
|
|
const httpStatus = originalError.statusCode ?? originalError.status ?? null;
|
|
if (httpStatus !== null) {
|
|
errStatus = httpStatus;
|
|
} else if (!(originalError instanceof ProviderError)) {
|
|
errStatus = 500;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: all responses (including errors) carry
|
|
// the standard 5-header set. On the exhausted/error path the engine returns
|
|
// values per ADR 0004 step 4 ("preserve A's identity — return the FIRST hop's
|
|
// provider/model and original error to the user"):
|
|
// - providerUsed: chain[0].provider on chain-exhausted (the primary that
|
|
// first failed); set to 'none' only if engine somehow returned null
|
|
// - modelUsed: chain[0].model on chain-exhausted, or the original request
|
|
// model if engine state is unknown
|
|
// - cacheStatus: 'miss' — all hops were attempted (bypass is per-hop, not relevant
|
|
// when the whole chain exhausted)
|
|
// - fallbackHops: number of hops actually attempted before exhaustion
|
|
// X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted is preserved as an additional flag on top of these.
|
|
const errorOlpHeaders = olpHeaders({
|
|
providerUsed: providerUsed ?? 'none',
|
|
modelUsed: modelUsed ?? ir.model,
|
|
startMs,
|
|
cacheStatus: 'miss',
|
|
fallbackHops: fallbackHops ?? 0,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Send error with standard OLP headers + optional exhausted header
|
|
const payload = JSON.stringify({
|
|
error: {
|
|
message: originalError?.message ?? 'Provider error',
|
|
type: 'provider_error',
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
res.writeHead(errStatus, {
|
|
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
|
|
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
|
|
...errorOlpHeaders,
|
|
...exhaustedHeader,
|
|
});
|
|
res.end(payload);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Success: emit response ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
// Per ADR 0004 § Observability headers: X-OLP-Fallback-Hops reflects the
|
|
// chain index of the serving hop; 0 = primary served, 1 = first fallback, etc.
|
|
// D13: bypass status is per the SERVING hop's provider (providerUsed), not a
|
|
// global flag. If the serving provider was Anthropic and markers were present,
|
|
// the cache was bypassed; otherwise it was a hit (preCheckHit) or miss.
|
|
const bypassCacheForServingHop = shouldBypassCacheForHop(providerUsed);
|
|
const cacheStatus = bypassCacheForServingHop ? 'bypass' : (preCheckHit && fallbackHops === 0 ? 'hit' : 'miss');
|
|
const headers = olpHeaders({ providerUsed, modelUsed, startMs, cacheStatus, fallbackHops });
|
|
|
|
if (ir.stream) {
|
|
// Streaming response path: burst replay from buffered chunks.
|
|
// Reaches here only when: bypassCacheForFirstHop=true OR preCheckHit=true OR chain.length>1.
|
|
// (Single-hop cache-miss streaming is handled by the real-streaming path above.)
|
|
res.writeHead(200, {
|
|
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
|
|
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
|
|
Connection: 'keep-alive',
|
|
'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
|
|
...headers,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
for (const irChunk of chunks) {
|
|
res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(irChunk, requestId, ir.model));
|
|
if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;
|
|
}
|
|
res.write(SSE_DONE);
|
|
res.end();
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Non-streaming response path
|
|
const responseObj = irResponseToOpenAINonStream(chunks, requestId, ir.model);
|
|
sendJSON(res, 200, responseObj, headers);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Request router ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
|
|
* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
|
|
*/
|
|
async function router(req, res) {
|
|
const { method, url } = req;
|
|
|
|
// Strip query string for routing
|
|
const path = url?.split('?')[0] ?? '/';
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/health') {
|
|
return handleHealth(req, res);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/v1/models') {
|
|
return handleModels(req, res);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (method === 'POST' && path === '/v1/chat/completions') {
|
|
return await handleChatCompletions(req, res);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 404 for any unrecognised route
|
|
sendError(res, 404, `Route ${method} ${path} not found`, 'not_found');
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
logEvent('error', 'unhandled_request_error', { method, path, error: e?.message });
|
|
if (!res.headersSent) {
|
|
sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error', 'internal_error');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Server factory + main guard ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
//
|
|
// Factory pattern: `createOlpServer()` returns an http.Server bound to the
|
|
// shared router but NOT yet listening. Tests import this factory and call
|
|
// .listen() on their own port. The main guard below only runs .listen()
|
|
// when this file is invoked directly via `node server.mjs` — preventing
|
|
// import-time side effects when tests pull in server.mjs.
|
|
|
|
export function createOlpServer() {
|
|
return createServer(router);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export { router, loadedProviders, VERSION };
|
|
|
|
// Main guard: only listen when invoked as the entrypoint. ESM equivalent of
|
|
// `require.main === module` is comparing import.meta.url against argv[1].
|
|
const isMain = (() => {
|
|
try {
|
|
return import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
})();
|
|
|
|
if (isMain) {
|
|
const server = createOlpServer();
|
|
server.listen(PORT, '127.0.0.1', () => {
|
|
const enabledCount = loadedProviders.size;
|
|
process.stdout.write(
|
|
`OLP v${VERSION} listening on :${PORT} (${enabledCount} providers enabled — Phase 1 in progress)\n`,
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|