Files
olp/lib/fallback/engine.mjs
T
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 30de965e8e fix+docs: D32 — round-4 cleanup batch (F2/F3/F4/F5/F7/F8/F9)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 4)

Round-4 cold-audit cleanup batch. 7 items grouped per IDR cleanup-batch
convention (D19/D20/D25/D26/D30/D31 precedent). 2 P2 + 3 ADR amendments
+ 2 small docs/code cleanups. F10 (P3 semantic edge case) filed
separately as GitHub issue #8.

Changes (8 files, +200 / -38):

**P2 fixes**

1. **F3 — README missing 6 provider auth env vars** (README.md):
   D30 fixed the `OLP_*` table but missed the auth-bearing env vars
   actually read by plugin code:
   - `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (anthropic.mjs:84) — highest-precedence
     override; bypasses keychain + .credentials.json file lookup
   - `OPENAI_CODEX_AUTH_PATH` (codex.mjs:163) — overrides full auth
     file path; when set, no other path tried
   - `CODEX_HOME` (codex.mjs:176) — overrides base dir; default auth
     path becomes `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json`
   - `MISTRAL_API_KEY` (mistral.mjs:260) — directly supplies API key;
     highest precedence per Mistral DOCS-2
   - `MISTRAL_VIBE_AUTH_PATH` (mistral.mjs:265) — overrides full .env
     path; evaluated only when MISTRAL_API_KEY absent
   - `VIBE_HOME` (mistral.mjs:277) — overrides Vibe base dir; default
     auth path becomes `$VIBE_HOME/.env`
   Real onboarding-blocker fix: new users couldn't run OLP without
   knowing about these env vars; README now documents them in a
   "Per-provider auth env vars" subsection.

2. **F8 — Early-return error paths missing X-OLP-* headers** (server.mjs):
   ADR 0004 § Observability + README claim "every response carries the
   5 X-OLP-* headers" but 503 (no-enabled-providers), 415 (wrong
   Content-Type), and early 400s (bad JSON, IR validation) emitted only
   Content-Type + Content-Length + X-OLP-Latency-Ms (D18 only wired the
   chain-exhausted path). Operators debugging these paths got less info
   than the ADR promised.
   New helper `olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model })` emits the canonical
   "no provider attempted" defaults:
     X-OLP-Provider-Used: 'none'
     X-OLP-Model-Used: model ?? 'unknown'
     X-OLP-Fallback-Hops: '0'
     X-OLP-Cache: 'bypass'
     X-OLP-Latency-Ms: <delta>
   6 sendError call sites updated: 415 / 400-bad-JSON / 400-IR-parse
   (model: undefined → 'unknown') + 503-no-providers / 503-provider-
   disappeared / 500-engine-programming (model: ir.model). The 502
   streaming-error-before-first-chunk path correctly stays on
   `olpHeaders(...)` since a provider WAS attempted.

**ADR amendments**

3. **F2 — ADR 0003 model-mapping example correction** (docs/adr/0003,
   Amendment 2): the § Required fields example claimed `claude-sonnet-4-6`
   → `claude-sonnet-4-6-20260301` mapping happens in the provider plugin.
   This was wrong: per D17 SPOT decision (commit cb86807), `irRequest.model`
   is passed verbatim to the CLI; each provider CLI accepts its own
   aliases natively. Both inline correction (in § Decision) AND new
   Amendment 2 (in § Amendments) added.

4. **F4 — OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR dead code removal** (base.mjs, engine.mjs):
   `PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES.OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR` and
   `HARD_TRIGGER_CODES.OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR = true` were registered but
   ZERO plugins emit OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR. ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy
   enumerates 4 hard-trigger categories (5xx, quota 4xx, exit-code,
   spawn-timeout) — OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR was a 5th never authorized by
   ADR. Removed from both enums with removal-reason comments for
   auditability. Re-add via ADR 0004 amendment if a future plugin
   surfaces parse failures (cheaper than authoring an amendment for
   dead code now).

5. **F5 — ADR 0002 Amendment 4 ratifying contractVersion** (docs/adr/0002):
   `lib/providers/base.mjs:76-81` enforces `p.contractVersion === '1.0'`
   and all 3 plugins declare it, but ADR 0002 § Provider contract field
   list never named it. Same governance-violation class as D11's
   `maxSpawnTimeMs` retroactive sync (Amendment 1). Amendment 4 ratifies
   contractVersion as a required v1.0 contract field; § Provider contract
   field list updated to 10 fields (was 9).

**Small cleanups**

6. **F7 — README API Endpoints table 📋 markers** (README.md): added
   Status column with  Shipped (3 rows: /v1/chat/completions, /v1/models,
   /health) and 📋 Planned (3 rows: /cache/stats Phase 5, /v0/management/
   quota Phase 6, /dashboard Phase 6). Matches D20's Implementation
   Status table convention.

7. **F9 — Codex parser inline assumption labels** (codex.mjs): added 5
   inline `// A4:` comments on each defensive branch in `codexChunkToIR`.
   Pre-D32 these branches had only the top-of-function block comment;
   ALIGNMENT.md Speculative-Candidate condition 5 promises future
   implementers can grep assumption labels to find every speculative
   branch — D32 honors that promise for codex.mjs (mistral.mjs already
   had this pattern from D8).

**Tests** (test-features.mjs):
- 17g retitled + assertion expanded to full 5-header set (was partial)
- 17h new: 415 wrong Content-Type → 5 X-OLP-* headers with 'unknown' model
- 17i new: 503 no-enabled-providers → 5 X-OLP-* headers with ir.model
- OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR test removed (replaced with comment for audit trail)

Test count: 400 → 401 (-1 OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR + 2 new F8 + 1 retitled
existing = net +1).

**F10 filed as issue, NOT in D32**:
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/issues/8 — "Soft-skip + chain-
exhausted: X-OLP-Provider-Used semantics ambiguity". Semantic edge
case requiring soft trigger reactivation (deferred to v1.x per D22
Amendment 2); not a v0.1 user-affecting issue.

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D32 reviewer caught a doc-accuracy bug**: README's
  CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN row described the no-env fallback chain as
  "Searches keychain first, then `~/.claude/.credentials.json`" — but
  the actual code in anthropic.mjs:82-112 checks file FIRST, then
  keychain (darwin-only). Order was reversed. Folded in: corrected
  to "Searches `~/.claude/.credentials.json` first, then macOS
  keychain (darwin only)". Same class of doc-accuracy mistake as the
  D25 → D31 / D27 → D31 pattern: D-batch reviewer catches docs that
  contradict source.

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Independently verified:
- All 6 F3 env vars: precedence chains traced through plugin source
  (caught the anthropic reversed-order — folded in)
- F8 olpErrorHeaders helper correctly distinguishes "no provider"
  defaults from olpHeaders' "provider attempted" defaults
- F8: all 6 sendError call sites use the right model arg (undefined
  pre-IR-parse → 'unknown'; ir.model post-IR-parse)
- F8: 502 streaming-error stays on olpHeaders (provider was attempted)
- F4: OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR removed from both enums, zero plugin emit
  references remain, test cleanup is auditable
- F5: ADR 0002 Amendment 4 matches Amendment 1's retroactive-sync
  structure; contract field list now 10 items
- F2: D17 commit cb86807 verified to match the SPOT decision claim
- F7/F9: docs/code cleanups verified
- F10 issue #8 verified OPEN with correct title
- 401/401 tests pass

3 non-blocking suggestions (anthropic precedence column folded; F2
inline mistral `--model` caveat could be added; F4 wording asymmetry
between base.mjs and engine.mjs comments) — minor polish, not folded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24 17:28:42 +10:00

576 lines
23 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* lib/fallback/engine.mjs — OLP Fallback Engine
*
* Authority: ADR 0004 — Fallback Engine Semantics and Safety
*
* Implements:
* - Trigger taxonomy (Hard / Soft per ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy)
* - Chain advancement one-at-a-time (ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement)
* - First-chunk safety rule (ADR 0004 § Decision § Fallback safety)
* - Observability return values for header annotation (ADR 0004 § Decision § Observability headers)
* - No fallback for client-side errors (ADR 0004 § Decision § No fallback for client-side errors)
*
* Sealed at D9. Do NOT modify without an ADR 0004 amendment.
*/
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { ProviderError } from '../providers/base.mjs';
import { getProviderForModel } from '../providers/index.mjs';
import { computeIRRequestHash } from '../cache/keys.mjs';
// ── Hard-trigger evaluation ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Maps ProviderError codes to hard-trigger decisions.
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy — Hard triggers:
* - QUOTA_EXHAUSTED → hard trigger
* - RATE_LIMITED → hard trigger
* - SPAWN_FAILED → hard trigger (provider CLI failed)
* - CLI_NOT_FOUND → hard trigger (binary missing)
* - AUTH_MISSING → NOT a hard trigger (user-config failure; user must fix)
* - OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR → removed (D32 F4): no plugin emits it; dead code.
* Re-add via ADR 0004 amendment if needed.
*
* @type {Record<string, boolean>}
*/
const HARD_TRIGGER_CODES = {
QUOTA_EXHAUSTED: true,
RATE_LIMITED: true,
SPAWN_FAILED: true,
CLI_NOT_FOUND: true,
AUTH_MISSING: false, // user config problem — never fall over (ADR 0004 § Decision)
SPAWN_TIMEOUT: true, // ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4: spawn timeout is a hard trigger
};
/**
* HTTP status codes that are client errors and MUST NOT trigger fallback.
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § "No fallback for client-side errors":
* HTTP 400, 401, 403, 404, 422 from a provider are NOT fallback triggers.
*
* @type {Set<number>}
*/
const CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES = new Set([400, 401, 403, 404, 422]);
/**
* Classifies a thrown error into one of the trigger taxonomy categories
* per ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy (D28 round-3 F2). Used in log events
* so operators can pivot on the classification bucket.
*
* Note: 'soft' is not currently returnable from this function. Soft triggers
* are evaluated before spawn via evaluateSoftTriggers() and are deferred to
* v1.x (D22 Amendment 2). The 'soft' variant is listed in the JSDoc return
* type for forward-compatibility only.
*
* @param {Error|null|undefined} error
* @returns {'hard' | 'soft' | 'auth_missing' | 'client_error' | 'non_trigger' | null}
*/
function classifyTrigger(error) {
if (!error) return null;
if (error instanceof ProviderError && error.code) {
if (error.code === 'AUTH_MISSING') return 'auth_missing';
if (HARD_TRIGGER_CODES[error.code] === true) return 'hard';
return 'non_trigger';
}
const status = error.statusCode ?? error.status ?? null;
if (status !== null && typeof status === 'number') {
if (CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status)) return 'client_error';
if (status >= 500) return 'hard';
if (status >= 400) return 'hard'; // quota-exhaustion 4xx (e.g. 429, 529)
}
return 'non_trigger';
}
/**
* Returns true if `status` is a client-side error that must NOT trigger fallback.
* Exported for tests.
*
* @param {number} status
* @returns {boolean}
*/
export function isClientError(status) {
return CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status);
}
/**
* Evaluates whether an error from a provider qualifies as a Hard trigger.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy — Hard triggers:
* HTTP 5xx and quota-exhaustion 4xx (surfaced via ProviderError codes)
* trigger mandatory chain advancement.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § "No fallback for client-side errors":
* Client-side HTTP errors (400/401/403/404/422) are NOT hard triggers.
* AUTH_MISSING is also not a hard trigger (user must fix their config).
*
* @param {Error} error — the error thrown by executeHopFn
* @param {object} [_providerHints] — reserved for future hints-based logic
* @returns {boolean} — true if this error should trigger chain advancement
*/
export function evaluateHardTriggers(error, _providerHints = {}) {
if (!error) return false;
// ProviderError with a code: map via HARD_TRIGGER_CODES lookup.
// AUTH_MISSING is explicitly false in the table — do not fall over.
if (error instanceof ProviderError && error.code) {
return HARD_TRIGGER_CODES[error.code] === true;
}
// HTTP status code present on the error object.
const status = error.statusCode ?? error.status ?? null;
if (status !== null && typeof status === 'number') {
// Client-side errors: never fall over (ADR 0004 § No fallback for client-side errors)
if (CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status)) {
return false;
}
// 5xx: always a hard trigger (ADR 0004 § Hard triggers: HTTP 5xx from provider)
if (status >= 500) {
return true;
}
// Non-client 4xx (e.g. 429 / 529): hard trigger (quota exhaustion semantics)
if (status >= 400) {
return true;
}
}
// Unknown error type — conservative default: do NOT trigger fallback.
// Per ADR 0004 § Alternatives considered (a): "any error" fallback was rejected.
return false;
}
// ── Soft-trigger evaluation ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Evaluates whether a chain hop's soft triggers fire against the current
* quota snapshot for that provider.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy — Soft triggers:
* - credit_pool_percent_threshold: fires when percentUsed >= threshold
* - daily_request_count_threshold: fires when dailyCount >= threshold
* - five_hour_window_percent_threshold: fires when fiveHourWindowPercent >= threshold
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Consequences/Negative (Mitigations):
* null quotaStatus → treat as "don't fire" — degrade gracefully.
*
* @param {object|null|undefined} triggerConfig — per-hop soft-trigger config, e.g.
* { credit_pool_percent_threshold: 90, daily_request_count_threshold: 1000 }
* @param {object|null|undefined} quotaSnapshot — from provider.quotaStatus(), e.g.
* { percentUsed: 95, dailyCount: 500, fiveHourWindowPercent: 80 }
* May be null if the provider cannot retrieve quota.
* @returns {boolean} — true if any configured soft trigger fires
*/
export function evaluateSoftTriggers(triggerConfig, quotaSnapshot) {
// No trigger config at all → soft triggers never fire
if (!triggerConfig || typeof triggerConfig !== 'object') return false;
// Per ADR 0004 § Consequences/Negative: null quotaStatus → don't fire
if (quotaSnapshot == null) return false;
// credit_pool_percent_threshold: fires when percentUsed >= threshold
if (
triggerConfig.credit_pool_percent_threshold !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.percentUsed !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.percentUsed !== null &&
quotaSnapshot.percentUsed >= triggerConfig.credit_pool_percent_threshold
) {
return true;
}
// daily_request_count_threshold: fires when dailyCount >= threshold
if (
triggerConfig.daily_request_count_threshold !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.dailyCount !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.dailyCount !== null &&
quotaSnapshot.dailyCount >= triggerConfig.daily_request_count_threshold
) {
return true;
}
// five_hour_window_percent_threshold: fires when fiveHourWindowPercent >= threshold
if (
triggerConfig.five_hour_window_percent_threshold !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.fiveHourWindowPercent !== undefined &&
quotaSnapshot.fiveHourWindowPercent !== null &&
quotaSnapshot.fiveHourWindowPercent >= triggerConfig.five_hour_window_percent_threshold
) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
// ── Fallback engine ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* @typedef {Object} ChainHop
* @property {string} provider — provider name (e.g. 'anthropic')
* @property {string} model — model string for this hop
* @property {object} [softTriggers] — optional soft-trigger config for this hop
* @property {object|null} [quotaSnapshot] — optional pre-fetched quota snapshot
*/
/**
* @typedef {Object} FallbackResult
* @property {Array<object>|null} chunks — IR chunk array on success; null if exhausted
* @property {string} providerUsed — provider name that served the request (or first that failed)
* @property {string} modelUsed — model string that served (or first that failed)
* @property {number} fallbackHops — chain index of the serving hop (0=primary, 1=first fallback, etc.)
* @property {Error|null} originalError — first-hop error if exhausted; null on success
* @property {string[]} triedProviders — all providers tried, in chain order
*/
/**
* Executes a provider chain with fallback semantics.
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement (one-at-a-time):
* 1. Try each hop in order.
* 2. Before calling executeHopFn: evaluate soft triggers. If fired, skip this hop.
* 3. On error: check for client error / AUTH_MISSING (stop immediately).
* Otherwise evaluate hard triggers. If hard-triggered, advance to next hop.
* 4. If chain exhausted: return first-hop's originalError (not last).
*
* Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule:
* At D9, executeHopFn is collectAllChunks() — fully buffered before return.
* An exception from executeHopFn means zero bytes were written to the client.
* First-chunk safety is trivially satisfied by the buffering pattern.
*
* @param {ChainHop[]} chain — ordered list of hops
* @param {object} irRequest — IR request object (ADR 0003)
* @param {function} executeHopFn — async (provider, model, ir) => IR chunk array; throws on failure
* @param {object} [options]
* @param {function} [options.logEvent] — optional structured logger (level, event, data)
* @returns {Promise<FallbackResult>}
*/
export async function executeWithFallback(chain, irRequest, executeHopFn, options = {}) {
const { logEvent = () => {} } = options;
if (!Array.isArray(chain) || chain.length === 0) {
throw new Error('executeWithFallback: chain must be a non-empty array');
}
// D28 round-3 F2: per-request fingerprints for log correlation.
// chain_id is unique per executeWithFallback invocation; ir_request_hash
// is provider-agnostic so it groups all hops from the same logical request.
const chainId = randomBytes(8).toString('hex'); // 16-char hex
const irRequestHash = computeIRRequestHash(irRequest);
const triedProviders = [];
let originalError = null; // Per ADR 0004: first-hop error is the canonical signal
let firstErrorRecorded = false;
for (let i = 0; i < chain.length; i++) {
const hop = chain[i];
const { provider, model, softTriggers = null, quotaSnapshot = null } = hop;
// ── Soft-trigger check (BEFORE spawn) ──────────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision: soft triggers evaluated before spawn;
// if fired, advance without attempting this provider at all.
//
// Note on `triedProviders` semantics (D9 review-2 finding): we push the
// provider name onto triedProviders even when soft-skipped (no spawn).
// ADR 0004 § Observability headers describes X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted as
// "tried" providers; per ADR 0004 § Soft triggers a soft-fired hop is
// counted as tried-and-skipped (the proxy advances to the next chain
// entry without attempting the primary at all). The header therefore
// includes soft-skipped hops. A future enhancement could split into
// `triedProviders` + `softSkippedProviders` for finer-grained debug
// visibility; D9 keeps them unified per ADR-0004 spec.
if (evaluateSoftTriggers(softTriggers, quotaSnapshot)) {
logEvent('info', 'fallback_soft_trigger', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
trigger_type: 'soft',
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: chain[i + 1]?.provider ?? null,
reason: 'soft_trigger_fired',
});
triedProviders.push(provider);
// Record a synthetic originalError for the first fired soft trigger.
// `code: 'SOFT_TRIGGER'` is a fallback-engine-internal marker, NOT a
// member of PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES (base.mjs) — those are provider
// plugin error codes. Downstream consumers inspecting originalError.code
// should treat 'SOFT_TRIGGER' as engine-synthetic. D9 review-2 noted
// this; documented here so future readers do not try to add SOFT_TRIGGER
// to the PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES closed enum.
if (!firstErrorRecorded) {
originalError = Object.assign(
new Error(`Soft trigger fired for provider ${provider}: quota threshold exceeded`),
{ code: 'SOFT_TRIGGER', provider },
);
firstErrorRecorded = true;
}
continue;
}
// ── Execute hop ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
triedProviders.push(provider);
try {
const chunks = await executeHopFn(provider, model, irRequest);
// Per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule:
// executeHopFn returned successfully = chunks buffered = no client writes
// blocked = safe to return. Any retry attempt after this point would be
// post-first-chunk and is therefore forbidden. We return immediately.
logEvent('info', 'fallback_hop_success', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
trigger_type: null,
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: null,
triedProviders,
};
} catch (err) {
// Record FIRST hop error as the canonical signal
// Per ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 4: return first error, not last.
if (!firstErrorRecorded) {
originalError = err;
firstErrorRecorded = true;
}
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_hop_error', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
error: err.message,
code: err.code ?? null,
trigger_type: classifyTrigger(err),
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: chain[i + 1]?.provider ?? null,
});
// ── Client error: stop immediately ─────────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § "No fallback for client-side errors"
const status = err.statusCode ?? err.status ?? null;
if (status !== null && CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES.has(status)) {
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_client_error_no_fallback', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
status,
trigger_type: 'client_error',
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: err,
triedProviders,
};
}
// ── AUTH_MISSING: stop immediately ─────────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision: AUTH_MISSING = HARD_TRIGGER_CODES[AUTH_MISSING]=false.
// Silently masking it by trying next provider prevents user from discovering
// the misconfiguration.
if (err instanceof ProviderError && err.code === 'AUTH_MISSING') {
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_auth_missing_no_fallback', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
trigger_type: 'auth_missing',
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: err,
triedProviders,
};
}
// ── Hard-trigger check: advance chain ──────────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule:
// At D9, executeHopFn threw, so zero chunks were emitted.
// Fallback is eligible if the error is a hard trigger.
if (evaluateHardTriggers(err)) {
logEvent('info', 'fallback_hard_trigger', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
model,
error: err.message,
code: err.code ?? null,
advance_to_hop: i + 1,
trigger_type: classifyTrigger(err),
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: chain[i + 1]?.provider ?? null,
});
continue; // advance to next hop
}
// ── Non-trigger error: surface immediately ──────────────────────
// Per ADR 0004 § Alternatives considered (a): "any error" fallback rejected.
logEvent('warn', 'fallback_non_trigger_error', {
chain_id: chainId,
hop: i,
provider,
error: err.message,
code: err.code ?? null,
trigger_type: classifyTrigger(err),
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: provider,
modelUsed: model,
fallbackHops: i,
originalError: err,
triedProviders,
};
}
}
// Chain exhausted
// Per ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement step 4:
// "return A's original error (not B's, not C's)"
logEvent('error', 'fallback_chain_exhausted', {
chain_id: chainId,
chain: chain.map(h => h.provider),
triedProviders,
trigger_type: null,
ir_request_hash: irRequestHash,
next_provider: null,
});
return {
chunks: null,
providerUsed: chain[0].provider,
modelUsed: chain[0].model,
fallbackHops: chain.length,
originalError,
triedProviders,
};
}
// ── Chain builder ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Builds the execution chain for a given model string from config.
*
* Per D9 implementation notes:
* - If fallbackChainConfig has an explicit entry for this model, use it.
* - Otherwise, use a single-hop chain with the first matched provider (no fallback).
* - v0.1 ships with empty chain config; fallback activates only when the user
* populates ~/.olp/config.json's routing.chains.
*
* @param {string} modelString — user-requested model string
* @param {Map<string, object>} loadedProviders — name → provider plugin
* @param {object} [fallbackChainConfig] — routing.chains from config.json
* @param {object} [softTriggerConfig] — routing.soft_triggers from config.json
* @returns {ChainHop[]|null} — ordered chain, or null if no provider found for model
*/
export function buildDefaultChain(
modelString,
loadedProviders,
fallbackChainConfig = {},
softTriggerConfig = {},
) {
// Check for explicit chain in config for this model
const explicitChain = fallbackChainConfig[modelString];
if (explicitChain && Array.isArray(explicitChain) && explicitChain.length > 0) {
return explicitChain.map(hop => ({
provider: hop.provider,
model: hop.model ?? modelString,
softTriggers: softTriggerConfig[hop.provider] ?? null,
// quotaSnapshot stays null at v0.1 — soft triggers deferred to v1.x per
// ADR 0004 Amendment 2. evaluateSoftTriggers correctly short-circuits to
// false when quotaSnapshot is null. The polling path is not wired in v0.1.
quotaSnapshot: null,
}));
}
// No explicit chain: use getProviderForModel (SPOT for alias-aware routing).
// D17 Finding 13 fix: replaced the duplicated inline scan loop with this
// single call so alias resolution and provider lookup live in one place.
// result.canonicalModel carries the canonical ID even when user passed an
// alias. The canonical ID flows into: cache key (computeCacheKey arg),
// X-OLP-Model-Used header, and structured log events — so identical requests
// differing only in alias-vs-canonical now hit the same cache entry.
// provider.spawn continues to receive irRequest.model (the user's original
// input); each provider CLI accepts its own aliases natively per its docs,
// so no in-IR rewrite is needed for spawn correctness.
const match = getProviderForModel(loadedProviders, modelString);
if (match) {
return [{
provider: match.name,
model: match.canonicalModel,
softTriggers: softTriggerConfig[match.name] ?? null,
// quotaSnapshot stays null at v0.1 — soft triggers deferred to v1.x per
// ADR 0004 Amendment 2. evaluateSoftTriggers correctly short-circuits to
// false when quotaSnapshot is null. The polling path is not wired in v0.1.
quotaSnapshot: null,
}];
}
// No provider found for this model
return null;
}
// ── Config loader ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Default path for the OLP config file.
* @returns {string}
*/
function defaultConfigPath() {
return join(homedir(), '.olp', 'config.json');
}
/**
* Loads the full OLP config from ~/.olp/config.json (or the given path).
*
* Per D9 implementation notes:
* v0.1 ships with no config file. Fallback engine is wired but single-hop
* until the user populates routing.chains.
*
* Per ADR 0002 § Disable model: providers.enabled is the toggle that transitions
* a Candidate provider to Enabled. Missing entries default to false (disabled).
*
* Returns empty config (no chains, no soft triggers, no enabled providers) if the
* file is absent, unreadable, or malformed.
*
* @param {string} [configPath] — override path (for testing — do NOT write to ~/.olp/config.json in tests)
* @returns {{ chains: object, soft_triggers: object, providersEnabled: Record<string, boolean> }}
*/
export function loadFallbackConfigSync(configPath) {
try {
const path = configPath ?? defaultConfigPath();
const raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
const routing = parsed?.routing ?? {};
const providers = parsed?.providers ?? {};
return {
chains: routing.chains ?? {},
soft_triggers: routing.soft_triggers ?? {},
providersEnabled: providers.enabled ?? {},
};
} catch {
// File absent, unreadable, or malformed → no fallback config (single-hop mode)
// Empty providersEnabled → all providers disabled → 503 per ALIGNMENT.md v0.1 posture.
return { chains: {}, soft_triggers: {}, providersEnabled: {} };
}
}