# Changelog

All notable changes to OLP land here. Per `CLAUDE.md` release_kit overlay, this file is the source of truth for GitHub release notes.

## Unreleased

### D47 — `bin/olp-keys.mjs` keygen CLI (Phase 2 functional scope closes)

Fourth Phase 2 implementation D-day. Closes ADR 0007 § 10 acceptance criterion #9 (bootstrap workflow must be reproducible without manual file editing) by shipping a minimal keygen CLI per § 9.1. **Phase 2 functional scope is complete with this D-day** — remaining work is Phase 2 close → v0.2.0 (maintainer-triggered, explicit per CLAUDE.md `release_kit.phase_close_trigger`).

- **New file `bin/olp-keys.mjs`** (~250 lines): subcommand CLI with three subcommands:
  - `keygen [--owner] [--name=<label>] [--tier=guest|owner] [--providers=<csv>] [--force]` — creates a key + prints plaintext token to stdout ONCE; manifest stores only SHA-256 hash. `--force` revokes existing owner keys before creating the new owner (recovery flow per ADR § 9.3). `--providers=*` (default) or comma-separated allowlist.
  - `list [--owner-only] [--include-revoked]` — lists keys with `token_hash` redacted (lib/keys.mjs `listKeys` already redacts).
  - `revoke --id=<key-id>` — marks the key's `revoked_at`; idempotent (already-revoked → no-op + status message); missing id → exit 2.
  - Common flag `--olp-home=<path>` overrides `~/.olp/`; defaults to `OLP_HOME` env or `~/.olp/`.
- **`package.json` `bin` field**: `olp-keys` → `./bin/olp-keys.mjs` so `npx olp-keys ...` resolves; also `npm run olp-keys ...` via scripts.
- **Module shape**: CLI exposes `runCli(argv, { out, err })` so tests can invoke it with synthetic argv + IO writers (no process spawn). Main guard auto-runs when invoked as entrypoint.
- **Plaintext token discipline**: per ADR § 5 + § 9.1, plaintext is printed exactly once on stdout. Never logged, never written to manifest, never written to audit. Operators must capture immediately; lost → `--force` revoke + regenerate.
- **`--force` async correctness**: `cmdKeygen` is async and `await`s each `revokeKey` (which is async — acquires per-key write lock per § 6.4). Sequence: revoke each existing owner manifest atomically → then `createKey` for new owner. Avoids the race where create-new runs before revoke-old completes.
- **Test surface (Suite 22, +20 tests — 524 → 544):**
  - 22a-1..5: parseArgv unit tests (`--flag=value`, `--flag value`, boolean, mixed positional)
  - 22b-1..5: keygen subcommand (owner default, name+providers, missing-name error, invalid-tier error, --force revoke-then-create flow with isolation tmpdir)
  - 22c-1..3: list subcommand (empty, populated with token_hash-redaction check, --owner-only filter)
  - 22d-1..4: revoke subcommand (valid id, idempotent re-revoke, missing-id error, nonexistent-id error)
  - 22e-1..3: top-level CLI behaviour (--help / no args / unknown subcommand exit codes)
- **Documentation:** AGENTS.md `lib/keys.mjs` marker promoted to ✅; new `bin/olp-keys.mjs` entry. Implementation-status-note + shipped-set updated. README.md Implementation Status table gains `bin/olp-keys.mjs` row; Known limitations note updated to "Phase 2 functional scope complete; close pending"; new "Bootstrap workflow" section with copy-pasteable npx commands + recovery flow.
- **Test count:** 524 → 544 (+20 D47 tests in Suite 22).
- **Authority:** ADR 0007 (multi-key auth — § 5 token format, § 9.1 minimal keygen command surface, § 9.3 recovery, § 10 acceptance criterion #9 covered); CLAUDE.md `release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode` — under Unreleased; standing autopilot grant.

### D46 — owner-vs-guest gating for `/health` + `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail` (Phase 2 closes header observability gap)

Third Phase 2 implementation D-day. Closes ADR 0007 § 10 acceptance criteria #4 (`/health` payload trimming for non-owner) + #5 (`X-OLP-Fallback-Detail` emission gating per `fallback_detail_header_policy`). Phase 2 server surface is now fully gated end-to-end; remaining D-days are keygen CLI surface (D47+) and Phase 2 close (v0.2.0, maintainer-triggered).

- **`server.mjs` `handleHealth` identity-aware payload** per ADR § 7.1:
  - Auth gate at top — `authenticate(req)` returns 401 for unauth + `allow_anonymous: false` (consistent with /v1/* routes); 200 with trimmed payload for anonymous / guest; 200 with full payload for owner.
  - Trim controlled by `_authConfig.owner_only_endpoints` — if `/health` is in the list, non-owner gets `{ ok: true, version }`; else (operator removes it) full payload to everyone (v0.1.1 opt-out knob).
  - `touchLastUsed` fired on `res.on('finish')` for filesystem identities (matches /v1/* pattern). No audit row on /health — high-volume monitoring endpoint, audit volume noise not justified at Phase 2 (would land with Phase 3 Dashboard if aggregate /health stats become needed).
- **`server.mjs` `withFallbackDetailHeader` identity-aware emission** per ADR § 7.2:
  - New helper `shouldEmitFallbackDetailHeader(olpIdentity)` reads `_authConfig.fallback_detail_header_policy`:
    - `'owner_only'` (default) → emit only when `olpIdentity.owner_tier === 'owner'`
    - `'all'` → emit unconditionally (v0.1.1 opt-back-in for operators who want the diagnostic header for all identities)
    - `'none'` → suppress unconditionally
  - When `olpIdentity` is null (pre-auth error paths), defaults to emit — preserves the v0.1.1 ungated behaviour for pre-auth errors where identity is unknown.
  - `withFallbackDetailHeader` signature gains a third `olpIdentity` argument; both call sites in `handleChatCompletions` updated to pass `olpIdentity`.
- **Test surface (Suite 21, +9 tests + 1 added in Suite 20 — 515 → 524):**
  - **20m** /health with no auth + `allow_anonymous=false` → 401 (consistency with /v1/* routes)
  - **21a-d** /health payload trimming (criterion #4): anonymous trimmed; guest trimmed; owner full; `owner_only_endpoints: []` opts out (guest gets full)
  - **21e-h** X-OLP-Fallback-Detail emission gating (criterion #5): `owner_only` + guest → header absent; `owner_only` + owner → header present + valid JSON; `'all'` + guest → header present (v0.1.1 opt-back); `'none'` + owner → header absent (full suppression). Tests use a 2-hop chain (anthropic primary fail + openai secondary) to produce non-empty `fallbackDetail` for the header content.
- **Test-mode setup updated:** the global `__setAuthConfig({ allow_anonymous: true })` was extended to also pass `owner_only_endpoints: []` + `fallback_detail_header_policy: 'all'` so pre-D46 tests (Suite 18, F5 /health tests, D40 fallback-detail tests, etc.) continue to pass without modification — Suite 21 explicitly overrides per-case to exercise the production-default-gated paths.
- **Documentation:** AGENTS.md `lib/keys.mjs` marker updated to reflect D46 ship; Implementation-status-note updated. README.md Implementation Status row + Known limitations "Multi-key auth" note rewritten to reflect D46 ship + remaining keygen CLI.
- **Test count:** 515 → 524 (+9 D46 tests).
- **Authority:** ADR 0007 (multi-key auth — §§ 7.1 + 7.2 implementation contracts + § 10 acceptance criteria #4 + #5 covered); ADR 0004 Amendment 5 (D40 ratification of "Phase 2 will re-introduce owner-vs-non-owner gating when `lib/keys.mjs` lands" — this D-day fulfils the deferral); CLAUDE.md `release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode` — under Unreleased; standing autopilot grant (`~/.cc-rules/memory/auto/standing_autopilot_phase_2.md` in cc-rules `bf0ed9a`).

### D45 — `server.mjs` auth integration + `lib/audit.mjs` (Phase 2 wire-up)

Second Phase 2 implementation D-day. Wires the D44 `lib/keys.mjs` identity layer into the request flow + lands `lib/audit.mjs` per ADR 0007 § 6.2 + § 8. Closes acceptance criteria #1 (per-key cache isolation, validation-side end-to-end), #2 (anonymous prod-default off), #3 (anonymous dev-mode on), #6 (post-revoke 401 within next request — full), #8 (audit ndjson round-trip), #10 (`OLP_OWNER_TOKEN` env override — full server-side), #11 (`providers_enabled` 403 scope). Owner-vs-guest gating for `/health` + `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail` (criteria #4, #5) remains in D46 scope.

- **New file `lib/audit.mjs`** (~75 lines): `appendAuditEvent(event, opts)` writes one JSON event per line to `~/.olp/logs/audit.ndjson` (file 0600, dir 0700). § 6.2 retry semantics: warn + 1 retry on first failure; per-process drop counter + warn on second failure; NEVER throws. Per-call `OLP_HOME` env resolution (matches `lib/keys.mjs`). Exports `getAuditDropCount` for future /health surface.
- **`lib/keys.mjs`** extended with `loadAuthConfigSync({ olpHome })` reading the `auth` block from `~/.olp/config.json` with defaults per ADR § 7.2 (`allow_anonymous: false`, `owner_only_endpoints: ['/health']`, `fallback_detail_header_policy: 'owner_only'`). Both `lib/keys.mjs` + `lib/audit.mjs` now resolve `OLP_HOME` env per call (precedence: opts.olpHome → process.env.OLP_HOME → ~/.olp) so tests and operator deployments can redirect without code edits.
- **`server.mjs` auth middleware integration:**
  - `extractToken(req)` parses `Authorization: Bearer <token>` first, then `x-api-key: <token>`.
  - `authenticate(req)` calls `validateKey(token, { allowAnonymous: _authConfig.allow_anonymous })`; returns identity on success, 401 `{ auth_required | invalid_or_revoked_key }` on failure.
  - `isProviderEnabled(olpIdentity, providerKey)` enforces `providers_enabled` allowlist (`'*'` = all).
  - `_authConfig` loaded at startup; warn `auth_allow_anonymous_enabled` fires if `allow_anonymous: true` so the relaxed posture is visible. Test seams `__setAuthConfig` / `__resetAuthConfig`.
  - `handleChatCompletions` and `handleModels` both gated by `authenticate(req)` at top. Audit ctx object built throughout the handler lifecycle; `res.on('finish')` appends the row + fires `touchLastUsed` async (best-effort).
  - **Identity-vs-credentials separation:** `olpIdentity` (the new validated identity) is consumed for cache namespacing + providers_enabled + audit; `authContext` passed to `provider.spawn()` REMAINS `null` so providers continue their own credential discovery (env / keychain / file). Per-provider per-key credential mapping is Phase 3+ scope per ADR § 12.
  - `handleChatCompletions` chain filtered by `chain.filter(hop => isProviderEnabled(olpIdentity, hop.provider))`; empty result returns 403 `key_no_provider_access` with helpful diagnostic message.
  - `keyId = olpIdentity.keyId` (replacing hardcoded `'__anonymous__'` at the cache call sites).
  - Audit captures fields throughout: post-auth (key_id, owner_tier); post-IR (model); post-chain-success (provider, fallback_hops, tried_providers, cache_status); post-chain-exhausted (error_code, providerUsed=chain[0], cache_status='miss'). Status code + latency populated on `res.on('finish')`.
- **Test surface (Suite 20, +15 tests, 499 → 514):**
  - 20a-d: header parsing + valid key happy paths (Bearer / x-api-key / invalid → 401)
  - 20e: revoked key 401 (closes criterion #6 end-to-end)
  - 20f: `OLP_OWNER_TOKEN` env override returns 200 (criterion #10 full coverage)
  - 20g: `allow_anonymous: true` + no header returns 200 (criterion #3)
  - 20h + 20h-extra: `providers_enabled: ['mistral']` for anthropic model → 403; `'*'` baseline returns 200 (criterion #11)
  - 20i: per-key cache namespace isolation — keys A/B with identical payload do not share cache (criterion #1 end-to-end)
  - 20j + 20j-401: audit.ndjson written with § 8 schema fields including PII guard; 401 path also appends (criterion #8)
  - 20k: filesystem key `last_used_at` populated after first successful request (D45 touchLastUsed wire)
  - 20l + 20l-200: `/v1/models` also enforces auth (consistent gating across `/v1/*`)
- **Test-mode setup:** test-features.mjs sets `process.env.OLP_HOME` to a tmpdir at module load so audit + key writes don't pollute `~/.olp/`. After the server.mjs import resolves, calls `__setAuthConfig({ allow_anonymous: true })` so pre-D45 HTTP integration tests (Suite 18 etc.) that don't pass an Authorization header continue to pass as anonymous; Suite 20 explicitly overrides per-case for production-default-off coverage.
- **Documentation:** AGENTS.md `lib/keys.mjs` 🟡 marker updated + new `lib/audit.mjs` entry; AGENTS.md Implementation-status-note + shipped-set updated. README.md Implementation Status table gains `lib/audit.mjs` row + `lib/keys.mjs` row updated; Known limitations "Multi-key auth" note rewritten to reflect D45 ship + D46 follow-up; new env-vars and config block surfaced for users.
- **Test count:** 499 → 515 (+15 initial Suite 20 tests + 1 fold-in regression test `20j-stream` covering opus-P1 streaming audit-fidelity).
- **Fold-in (CI-fail recovery + fresh-context opus reviewer findings, 1 CI + 1 P1 + 2 P2 + 1 P3):**
  - **CI Node 24 failure** — Suite 20 setup did not stub `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` before the mock spawn ran; lib/providers/anthropic.mjs `_spawnAndStream` checks for an OAuth token BEFORE invoking the (mock) spawn, so the AUTH_MISSING pre-check fired and every Suite 20 200-expecting test 502'd on CI Node 24 (local Node 22 had the env from the maintainer's claude install). Fixed by `ensureSuite20FakeOAuth` / `restoreSuite20OAuth` helpers in `makeSuite20Server` / `teardownSuite20`; matches the existing pattern used at Suite 9 line ~2154 (`test-fake-oauth-token-for-cache-tests`).
  - **P1 real-streaming audit fidelity** — single-hop streaming success path (server.mjs ~L1050+ `if (ir.stream && chain.length === 1 && !bypassCacheForFirstHop ...)`) did not populate `auditCtx.provider` / `tried_providers` / `cache_status`, so audit rows for the most common deployed shape carried `provider: null`. Fixed by stamping these fields at the top of the streaming branch (between the streamPlugin null-check and the `streamHeaders` build) and amending `error_code` on the two streaming failure exit paths (`streaming_error_after_first_chunk` + `streaming_error_before_first_chunk`). New regression test `20j-stream` makes a streaming request and asserts the audit row's `provider`, `cache_status`, and `tried_providers` fields are populated.
  - **P2 global test tmpdir cleanup** — `process.env.OLP_HOME = mkdtempSync(...)` at module load left a `/var/folders/.../olp-test-home-*` directory leak per `npm test` run. Fixed by `process.on('exit', () => rmSync(...))` registered immediately after the mkdtempSync. Best-effort; never throws at exit.
  - **P3 handleModels 401 lacks OLP diagnostic headers** — `handleChatCompletions` 401 path passes `olpErrorHeaders({ startMs })` but `handleModels` did not. Aligned by adding the same headers to the `handleModels` `authResult.ok=false` return.
  - **Deferred (acknowledged by reviewer as non-blocking):** P2 `tried_providers` semantics on `key_no_provider_access` 403 — schema currently reports filter-rejected hops as "tried" which a downstream Dashboard would misread; either ADR § 8 amendment (rename / add field) or D46+ semantic fix.
- **Authority:** ADR 0007 (multi-key auth — §§ 5/6.2/7/9.4 implementation contracts + § 10 acceptance criteria #1/#2/#3/#6/#8/#10/#11); CLAUDE.md `release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode` — under Unreleased; Phase 2 kickoff handoff (`~/.cc-rules/memory/handoffs/2026-05-25-phase-2-kickoff.md` in cc-rules `d9da966`); standing autopilot grant (`~/.cc-rules/memory/auto/standing_autopilot_phase_2.md` in cc-rules `bf0ed9a`).

### D44 — `lib/keys.mjs` core landed (multi-key auth, no server wire-up yet)

First Phase 2 implementation D-day. Lands the `lib/keys.mjs` module per ADR 0007 §§ 5/6.1/6.3/6.3.5/6.4/9.4. Identity / lifecycle layer for OLP API keys is now in-tree; `server.mjs` integration scheduled D45 (until then, requests still use the hardcoded `'__anonymous__'` cache namespace — no behavioural change at v0.1.1 / D44).

- **New file `lib/keys.mjs`** (~462 lines after fold-in) — public API surface:
  - `createKey({ name, owner_tier, providers_enabled, notes, olpHome })` — generates opaque `olp_<32-byte base64url>` token (47-char total), SHA-256 hashes it for manifest storage, atomically writes `keys/<id>/manifest.json` (mode 0600, dir 0700). Returns `{ id, plaintext_token, manifest }` — plaintext token is printed once and never persisted.
  - `validateKey(plaintext, { allowAnonymous, olpHome })` — three-tier resolution per § 5 / § 7 / § 9.4: env override (`OLP_OWNER_TOKEN` → `__env_owner__` synthetic identity) → anonymous (only when `allowAnonymous: true`, returns `__anonymous__` identity) → filesystem manifest lookup (constant-time hash compare via `crypto.timingSafeEqual`). Revoked manifests return null (caller produces 401). Per § 6.3.5 — MUST hit manifest every request; no in-process validation cache.
  - `revokeKey({ id, olpHome })` — idempotent; sets `revoked_at` via atomic write inside per-key write-lock.
  - `listKeys({ olpHome })` — returns manifest objects with `token_hash` redacted.
  - `touchLastUsed(id, { olpHome })` — async best-effort lazy update per § 6.3 revoke-dominates-touch: re-reads latest manifest inside the per-key lock, NO-OPs if `revoked_at` is non-null, otherwise merges `last_used_at` preserving all other fields. Failure logs warn and never throws.
- **§ 6.4 in-process per-key write-lock** — `Map<key-id, Promise>` chain; serializes intra-process writes. External (CLI) writes not lock-protected at Phase 2; atomic-rename + § 6.3 read-before-write give the `revoke dominates touch` safety property.
- **Test-only hooks** — `__setTouchInterleaveHook` (inject deterministic pause between touch's lock acquisition and read for race tests) + `__resetWriteLocks` (test cleanup).
- **What is NOT in D44 (split per ADR §§ 6.2 / 9.1 separation):** audit ndjson append (request-layer concern; D45 server glue); keygen CLI bootstrap surface (D45+); `server.mjs` integration replacing the hardcoded `'__anonymous__'` keyId at `server.mjs:502, :531` (D45); owner-vs-guest gating for `/health` and `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail` (D46).
- **Test count:** 468 → 496 (+28 tests in new Suite 19):
  - 19a-d token generation (§ 5)
  - 19e-j manifest write+read + chmod 0600/0700 + schema validation (§ 4, § 6.1)
  - 19k-p validateKey: filesystem / wrong / missing / anonymous / revoked / env override (§ 5, § 6.3.5, § 9.4)
  - 19q-r revokeKey idempotency + non-existent id
  - 19s-t listKeys empty + redaction
  - 19u-x touchLastUsed updates + NO-OP on revoked + NO-OP on anonymous/env identities + best-effort failure
  - **19y-1 to 19y-4 acceptance criterion #7 (concurrent revoke + touch race tests)**: revoke→touch, touch→revoke, interleaved external-revoke-via-hook (deterministically reproduces the § 6.3 race the maintainer's text review caught), 30-iteration concurrent-promise stress
- **Documentation:** AGENTS.md `lib/keys.mjs` 📋 marker → 🟡 "core landed at D44"; AGENTS.md Implementation-status-note + shipped-set updated to include `lib/keys.mjs`; README.md Implementation Status row + Known limitations "Multi-key auth" note updated to "core landed, server integration pending D45".
- **Fold-in (fresh-context opus reviewer findings, 2 P2 correctness + 2 P3 polish):**
  - **P2 #1 lock-map cleanup** (`lib/keys.mjs` `_withKeyLock`): prior version stored `prev.then(() => next)` as the Map tail, but the cleanup-identity check `_writeLocks.get(id) === next` could never match the derived promise — Map entries leaked one-per-unique-key-id. Bounded impact at family scale (~5–10 entries) but a real correctness bug. Fixed by storing `next` directly. New regression tests `19x-extra` (sequential) + `19x-extra-2` (concurrent 3-key × 3-touch contention) assert `__writeLockSize() === 0` post-drain.
  - **P2 #2 `validateKey` non-string defensive coding**: prior version threw `TypeError` when called with a non-string truthy plaintext (`validateKey(42)` / `validateKey({})`), reaching `hashToken(<non-string>)` → `createHash().update(<non-string>)`. Q2 promised "bad inputs return null." Fixed via top-of-function `if (plaintextToken != null && typeof plaintextToken !== 'string') return null;`. New test `19m-extra` covers number / object / array / `allowAnonymous: true` paths.
  - **P3 #3 19y-3 test scope comment**: test simulates external revoke landing BEFORE touch's read, not BETWEEN touch's read and write (which is currently unreachable because `touchLastUsed` has synchronous read→write — no await between `readManifest` and `writeManifestAtomic`). Added explanatory comment documenting the synchronous-read-write property as the satisfaction mechanism for ADR § 10 criterion #7 scenario 3, with a note that a post-read hook + matching test would be required if a future refactor introduces an await between read and write.
  - **P3 #4 CHANGELOG line count**: corrected `~330 lines` to `~462 lines after fold-in` (matches `wc -l lib/keys.mjs`).
- **Test count after fold-in:** 468 → 499 (+31 tests: 28 initial + 3 fold-in regression tests).
- **Authority:** ADR 0007 (multi-key auth — Decision: Option 2 filesystem manifest + opaque token; §§ 5/6.1/6.3/6.3.5/6.4/9.4 implementation contracts; § 10 acceptance criteria #6/#7 partially-covered by D44 tests, full coverage requires D45+ server integration); CLAUDE.md `release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode` — under Unreleased; Phase 2 kickoff handoff (`~/.cc-rules/memory/handoffs/2026-05-25-phase-2-kickoff.md` in cc-rules `d9da966`); PR #20 fresh-context opus reviewer findings.

### D43-B — ADR 0007 multi-key auth design draft (design-only, no code change)

Phase 2 mainline design ADR. Ratifies the storage / token / manifest / atomic-write / owner-gating / bootstrap / Node-baseline decisions ahead of D44+ implementation D-days. Pure design doc — no `.mjs` / no tests / 4 files touched.

- `docs/adr/0007-multi-key-auth.md` (new, ~420 lines after fold-ins): 13 sections covering Context / Decision (Option 2 + opaque key) / Storage layout (`~/.olp/keys/<key-id>/manifest.json` + `~/.olp/logs/audit.ndjson`) / Manifest schema (schema_version, token_hash, owner_tier, providers_enabled) / Token format (`olp_<32-byte base64url>`, SHA-256 hash) / Atomic write & audit append (manifest lifecycle-only atomic via tmpfile+fsync+rename; audit per-request append, warn + 1 retry, no memory buffer at Phase 2) / Owner-vs-guest-vs-anonymous gating (config.json `auth.allow_anonymous` default false, no env auto-detection) / Audit ndjson schema (no PII) / Bootstrap & recovery (minimal keygen command surface + `OLP_OWNER_TOKEN` env override with stable `__env_owner__` keyId) / Acceptance criteria (11 test surfaces for D44+) / Node baseline (Option 1 SQLite port rejection rationale citing `engines >=18` + CI 20/24 vs `node:sqlite` v22.5.0 with flag) / Out of scope (Dashboard, quota enforcement, audit query, file locking deferred to Phase 3+) / Future forward (Option 3 hybrid migration trigger + preconditions).
- `docs/adr/README.md` index: added ADR 0007 row with one-paragraph summary.
- `docs/v1x-roadmap.md` #2: marked **PHASE 2 ACTIVE (no longer deferred)**; "Design ADR (NOT YET RATIFIED)" → "Design ADR (ratified) → ADR 0007"; trigger updated to "already fired 2026-05-25"; code anchors pinned to exact line numbers (cache/store.mjs:77-79/:287, server.mjs:502/:531/:392/:1072/:1101).
- `CHANGELOG.md` Unreleased: this entry.
- **Fold-in #1 (fresh-context opus reviewer findings, 2 P2 + 3 P3, all polish):** § 6.2 step 1 — pin audit serialization timing to after status_code + latency_ms are known (resolves §10 #2 testability gap); new § 6.3.5 — explicit "no in-process validation cache at Phase 2" rule (resolves §10 #6 implicit-contract gap); § 6.1 — document deliberate omission of directory fsync after rename (single-process trade-off); § 9.4 — token-collision policy between `OLP_OWNER_TOKEN` and filesystem keys declared undefined behaviour; §10 #4 — test rephrased to assert against config-driven `owner_only_endpoints` rather than hardcoded payload shape.
- **Fold-in #2 (maintainer text-review findings, 1 P1 + 1 P2 + 1 P3):** § 6.3 rewritten to `last_used_at` revoke-dominates-touch semantics (P1 — fixes safety bug where lazy touch could overwrite revoke and silently clear `revoked_at`, breaking acceptance criterion #6 under concurrent CLI revoke + in-flight server request); § 6.4 reframed from "both states are valid" / "observability-grade" to "revoke dominates touch" with §6.3 as the load-bearing discipline; § 10 criterion #7 expanded to test all three orderings (revoke→touch, touch→revoke, interleaved) with explicit MUST: `revoked_at` non-null after revoke regardless of ordering; § 11 forward path step (1) corrected Node version history — minimum non-flag-gated baseline is v22.13.0 (LTS) / v23.4.0 (current), RC since v25.7.0, stable TBD (previous wording "Node v22.5.0+ for unflagged but RC" was factually wrong per https://nodejs.org/download/release/v22.12.0/docs/api/sqlite.html and https://nodejs.org/api/sqlite.html); this CHANGELOG entry line-count corrected from "~270 lines" to "~420 lines after fold-ins".
- **Test count:** 468 → 468 (design-only, no test change).
- **Authority:** Phase 2 kickoff handoff (`~/.cc-rules/memory/handoffs/2026-05-25-phase-2-kickoff.md` in cc-rules `d9da966`); OLP v0.1 spec § 4.5 (planning authority for `~/.olp/` layout); OCP `keys.mjs` (prior-art for opaque-key + per-key isolation model); Node `node:sqlite` docs (https://nodejs.org/api/sqlite.html — Option 1 rejection rationale per ADR 0007 § 11); CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10 — fresh-context opus reviewer required for design ADR per Iron Rule 10.

### D43-A — Phase 2 doc alignment (no code change)

Phase 1 was closed at v0.1.1; this commit aligns documentation surfaces to the Phase 2 reality before D43-B (ADR 0007 draft) lands. Pure doc cleanup; no `.mjs` or test changes.

- `CLAUDE.md release_kit.current_phase` Phase 1 → Phase 2; `current_pre_release_identifier` `0.1.0-bootstrap` → `0.2.0-phase2`.
- `README.md` status header + Implementation Status + Phase plan rewritten to reflect actually-shipped reality (v0.1.0 + v0.1.1 bundled the three Tier-D plugins + cache + fallback into a single Phase 1 milestone, not one phase per plugin as the original v0.1 spec planned). `lib/keys.mjs` row + "Multi-key auth not yet implemented" note updated to "Phase 2 active per ADR 0007 (drafting at D43-B)".
- `AGENTS.md` § Key files to know — `lib/keys.mjs` 📋 marker updated to "Phase 2 active per ADR 0007 (drafting at D43-B)"; Implementation-status-note paragraph dated 2026-05-25 + reflects Phase 1 close + Phase 2 active scope.
- `ALIGNMENT.md` § Provider Inventory — added one-paragraph "Note on phase terminology" clarifying that "Phase" in the Provider Inventory tables + § One-shot Triggered Audits "OpenAI Codex ToS formal pin" refers to the original per-plugin enablement plan, orthogonal to the milestone phase numbering in README. Fold-in for D43-A reviewer P2 finding; no governance-text change, no Speculative-Candidate plugin reclassification.
- **Test count:** 468 → 468 (no test change).
- **Authority:** `CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode` — under Unreleased; Phase 2 kickoff handoff at `~/.cc-rules/memory/handoffs/2026-05-25-phase-2-kickoff.md`; ADR 0007 forthcoming at D43-B.

## v0.1.1 — 2026-05-25

### Phase 1 cleanup — pre-Phase-2 batch (D35–D42, closes 16 of 17 issues)

**Overview.** v0.1.1 closes the post-v0.1.0 cleanup batch covering all 17 pre-Phase-2 issues raised during the 6-round cold-audit cycle on the Phase 1 deliverable. 8 D-day commits (D35–D42) shipped between 2026-05-24 and 2026-05-25. 16 issues closed; issue #16 (streaming singleflight) stays OPEN as the v1.x tracker with its design ratified in ADR 0005 Amendment 8.

**Test count: 416 (v0.1.0) → 468 (v0.1.1).** +52 tests across the cleanup batch.

### D35 — pre-Phase-2 batch #1 (issues #4 #9 #10 #11 #12)

- **#4 — X-OLP-Latency-Ms uniform.** Audit confirmed already-correct via D32; D35 adds the `#4-audit` regression test pinning the 5-header invariant on the 503 no-provider sendError so future drift is caught immediately.
- **#9 — Streaming empty-then-clean-exit headers.** Zero-chunk streaming path now guards `!res.headersSent` and emits Content-Type=text/event-stream, Cache-Control=no-cache, Connection=keep-alive, X-Accel-Buffering=no, plus all 5 X-OLP-* headers via olpHeaders before writing `SSE_DONE`. Zero-chunk path correctly does NOT cache.
- **#10 — Streaming post-first-chunk error truncation marker.** Two sibling fixes: catch-block-firstChunkEmitted=true and error-chunk-after-first-chunk both now emit synthetic `{type:'stop', finish_reason:'length'}` via `irChunkToOpenAISSE` + `SSE_DONE` + `res.end()`. Per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety: post-first-chunk truncation surfaces as `length` finish, never a hang.
- **#11 — `validateIRRequest` irVersion strict check.** ADR 0003 IR contract pins irVersion to `'1.0'`. Validator now: `obj.irVersion !== undefined && obj.irVersion !== '1.0'` → rejection. Strict string match — `undefined` accepted (back-compat), `'1.0'` accepted, `'2.0'` rejected, numeric `1.0` rejected (`1.0 !== '1.0'`).
- **#12 — `alignment.yml` scripts/** trigger removal.** Removed from both `push.paths` and `pull_request.paths` since the `scripts/` directory does not currently exist (planned for Phase 7).
- **Test count:** 416 → 424 (+8).

### D36 — pre-Phase-2 batch #2 (issues #2 #5 #6 #13 #14 #15)

- **#2 — cache_control partial-noop debug log.** `server.mjs handleChatCompletions` fires `logEvent('debug', 'cache_control_partial_noop', { chain, marker_count })` at most once per request when markers present AND chain has at least one non-Anthropic hop. Per ADR 0005 § D2.
- **#5 — ADR 0002 vibe.mjs → mistral.mjs.** § Decision filesystem layout corrected to match the shipped file naming convention (file named after provider key, not CLI binary). Amendment 5 documents the correction + makes the convention statement explicit for future contributors.
- **#6 — mistral.mjs A5 flip + ALIGNMENT.md table update.** Header A5 (model flag) flipped from `UNPINNED-D-later-verifies` to `CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE` with DeepWiki citation; ALIGNMENT.md Speculative-Candidate table mistral row updated to remove A5.
- **#13 — /v1/models alias governance.** ALIGNMENT.md gains "Controlled deviations (entry-surface scope)" subsection documenting the alias surface as a controlled Rule 2(b) deviation; `docs/openai-spec-pin.md` gains the alias-surfacing subsection with full 4-field contract table.
- **#14 — cache_control slot determinism regression test.** 4 tests in test-features.mjs construct hand-built IRs with synthetic markers (bypassing openAIToIR which strips them at v0.1) and verify the cache key SHA-256 is deterministic. Per ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 (No Invention), no `sortMarkers` helper shipped — the slot is dead-code at v0.1.
- **#15 — Anthropic v2.1.89 transcript artifact.** New file `docs/provider-audits/anthropic.md` as a single living version-capture artifact. Records observed `claude --version` (2.1.132 at capture date 2026-05-24), pinned version (v2.1.89 from D4), drift note, sample invocation, flag-surface table for 5 OLP-consumed flags. Closes the circular ALIGNMENT.md ↔ plugin header citation by anchoring on an external artifact.
- **Test count:** 424 → 431 (+7).

### D37 — release.yml phase_rolling_mode gate (issue #17)

- **CI gate enforcing phase_rolling_mode promotion discipline.** New "Enforce phase_rolling_mode (Unreleased must be promoted)" step in `release.yml` between the version-match check and the CHANGELOG extraction step. Awk extracts content between `## Unreleased` and the next `## ` heading; sed strips blank lines and parenthetical-sentinel-only lines. Non-trivial remaining content fails the workflow with `::error::` instructing the maintainer to promote Unreleased → `## v<version>` per CLAUDE.md release_kit.phase_rolling_mode.
- **Dry-run validated against 4 cases:** current sentinel-only Unreleased → PASS; synthetic non-trivial Unreleased → FIRES with offending lines reported; no Unreleased section → PASS; multi-sentinel + blank lines → PASS.
- **Gate is purely additive** — fires only on tag push to `v*.*.*`, does not affect normal push/PR CI.
- **Test count:** 431 → 431 (no test change — CI workflow only).

### D38 — maxConcurrent runtime enforcement (issue #1)

- **Spawn lifecycle gate** — `hints.maxConcurrent` is now enforced at runtime per ADR 0002 Amendment 6: `lib/providers/index.mjs` exports a per-provider `tryAcquireSpawn` / `releaseSpawn` / `getActiveSpawnCount` semaphore; `server.mjs` gates both the buffered and streaming spawn call sites in `handleChatCompletions` with a try/finally release. Saturation surfaces as `ProviderError(CONCURRENCY_LIMIT)` which the fallback engine treats as a hard trigger (ADR 0004 Amendment 4) — the chain advances to the next hop instead of queueing. If the entire chain is saturated, the user receives a chain-exhausted error via the existing exhaustion path. Closes #1. Queue+timeout deferred (see ADR 0002 Amendment 6 § Design choice). Test count 431 → 447.

- **Spawn lifecycle gate** — `hints.maxConcurrent` is now enforced at runtime per ADR 0002 Amendment 6: `lib/providers/index.mjs` exports a per-provider `tryAcquireSpawn` / `releaseSpawn` / `getActiveSpawnCount` semaphore; `server.mjs` gates both the buffered and streaming spawn call sites in `handleChatCompletions` with a try/finally release. Saturation surfaces as `ProviderError(CONCURRENCY_LIMIT)` which the fallback engine treats as a hard trigger (ADR 0004 Amendment 4) — the chain advances to the next hop instead of queueing. If the entire chain is saturated, the user receives a chain-exhausted error via the existing exhaustion path. Closes #1. Queue+timeout deferred (see ADR 0002 Amendment 6 § Design choice). Test count 431 → 447.

### D39 — D16 follow-ups (issue #3): explicit cache delete + eviction log + SPAWN_TIMEOUT asymmetry doc

- **Part 1 — `CacheStore.delete(keyId, cacheKey)`** — adds an explicit eviction primitive to `lib/cache/store.mjs`. Returns `boolean` (true if entry present and removed; false otherwise) and removes empty per-keyId namespace `Map` entries from the outer store for memory hygiene (matches the D38 `_activeSpawns` pattern). `server.mjs` D16 salvage path replaces `cacheStore.set(..., ttlMs=0)` (lazy tombstone that lived in the namespace `Map` until the next `get`/`peek` purged it) with `cacheStore.delete(...)` (immediate removal). Cache semantics unchanged — truncated responses still don't persist. ADR 0005 § "Cache write conditions" item 1 authority.
- **Part 2 — `cache_evicted_truncated` observability log** — adds an `info`-level structured log event fired immediately after the D16 eviction in `executeHopFn`. Carries `{ provider, model }` so dashboards can surface salvage frequency per (provider, model) pair. P3 polish; no semantic change.
- **Part 3 — sticky-cache regression test** — defense-in-depth test asserting two consecutive identical buffered requests that both trigger SPAWN_FAILED-with-chunks salvage each invoke a fresh spawn (spawnCount=2 across the two requests; second request reports `X-OLP-Cache: miss`). Catches any future regression where the eviction is dropped or the gate condition flips.
- **Part 4 — SPAWN_TIMEOUT salvage asymmetry documented (no code change)** — ADR 0004 Amendment 1 gains a new sub-section "Why SPAWN_TIMEOUT is excluded from salvage" with a 4-point rationale: (1) SPAWN_FAILED is a terminal signal, SPAWN_TIMEOUT is a deadline signal; (2) the next hop is a different provider with different speed characteristics, plausibly full-response-soon-after-T; (3) the "user paid for partial" framing applies to SPAWN_FAILED only — for SPAWN_TIMEOUT the user paid for "result within T"; (4) code inspection confirms the catch block matches only `code === 'SPAWN_FAILED'`. Includes hard-trigger-taxonomy completeness note and v1.x re-evaluation trigger (opt-in salvage-on-timeout for long deadlines).
- **Authority:** ADR 0005 § Cache layer / CacheStore API extension (Part 1); ADR 0004 Amendment 1 (Part 4); GitHub issue #3 — closed by this commit; D16 commit `bafa6d1` non-blocking suggestions — batched here.
- **Test count:** 447 → 452 (3 unit tests for `CacheStore.delete` + 1 log-event integration test + 1 sticky-cache regression test).

### D40 — `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail` header (issue #7)

- **New debug header on responses with a non-empty failure trail** — `lib/fallback/engine.mjs#executeWithFallback` now returns a `fallbackDetail` array of per-hop tuples on every code path. `server.mjs` emits `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail: <JSON-stringified array>` on any response where at least one hop failed before the chain resolved or exhausted (chain-exhausted, non-trigger-error, client-error, AUTH_MISSING, and success-with-prior-failure paths). Header is absent on clean primary success (no failure trail to report).
- **Tuple schema** — `{ hop, provider, model, code, error_message, trigger_type }` per failed hop. `code` is the `ProviderError` code or `'UNKNOWN'` for non-`ProviderError` exceptions; `error_message` is truncated to 200 chars with a U+2026 ellipsis on truncation; `trigger_type` matches D28's `classifyTrigger` output (`'hard'` / `'soft'` / `'auth_missing'` / `'client_error'` / `'non_trigger'`). Field shapes reuse D28's per-hop structured log event keys so logs and the header pivot on the same surface.
- **4KB UTF-8 byte cap** — if the JSON-stringified array exceeds 4096 bytes, tail tuples are dropped and a `{ truncated: true, omitted_hops: N }` sentinel is appended such that the total fits under the cap. Cap calculation uses `Buffer.byteLength('utf8')`, not string length.
- **RFC 7230 hygiene** — non-ASCII code points (e.g. the em dash in the D38 `CONCURRENCY_LIMIT` synthesised error message) are escaped as `\uXXXX` so the header value is pure ASCII. Node's HTTP header validator rejects multi-byte UTF-8 in field values; without this step, em-dash-bearing error messages would crash `res.writeHead`. `JSON.parse` round-trips the escaped form correctly.
- **Gating posture — ungated at v0.1** — the original ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 4 specified owner-only gating. Per the maintainer decision in issue #7, v0.1 ships the header **ungated** (single-tenant family-scale per ALIGNMENT.md; no PII risk in error details). **Phase 2 will re-introduce owner-vs-non-owner gating when `lib/keys.mjs` lands** — explicit follow-up tracked in AGENTS.md § Key files to know and ADR 0004 Amendment 5.
- **Authority:** ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement step 4 (original promise — D40 fulfils it); ADR 0004 Amendment 5 (D40 ratification); D18 (5 standard X-OLP-* headers; D40 builds on the convention); D28 (per-hop structured log fields; D40 reuses the field shapes); GitHub issue #7 — closed by this commit.
- **Test count:** 452 → 468 (7 engine-level tuple-shape tests + 6 serialiser unit tests including the 4KB cap + non-ASCII regression + 3 HTTP integration tests).

### D41 — `X-OLP-Provider-Used` semantics documented (issue #8)

- **Doc-only clarification.** On a chain-exhausted response, `X-OLP-Provider-Used` identifies the chain's configured primary entry (`chain[0].provider`), not necessarily the first hop where `spawn()` was actually invoked. At v0.1 this is unobservable because soft triggers are deferred (ADR 0004 Amendment 2) — every hop is attempted in order, so chain-origin and first-attempted are equivalent. When soft triggers reactivate in v1.x, a soft-skipped hop 0 followed by hard-failed hops 1+N would still report `providerUsed=chain[0]` despite chain[0] never being spawned.
- **Option B (document chain-origin) chosen over Option A (track `firstAttemptedProvider`).** Rationale: Option A would add state to `executeWithFallback` for an unreachable v0.1 code path (ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 — No Invention). The D40 `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail` header already carries precise per-hop spawn history (including soft-skip records with `trigger_type: 'soft'`), so the disambiguation channel exists on the wire without needing `providerUsed` to handle it.
- **Updates:** ADR 0004 Amendment 6 documents the semantics; `README.md` § Observability headers replaces "which provider's plugin served the request" with the chain-origin wording; `lib/fallback/engine.mjs` chain-exhausted return site gains an inline comment citing the amendment and the v1.x re-evaluation note.
- **No code-behavior change. No new tests** — the relevant scenario is dead-by-config at v0.1; the v1.x soft-trigger reactivation work should add a test that exercises the soft-skip + chain-exhausted edge case and pins whichever option the v1.x maintainer chooses (the amendment names Option A as the likely v1.x preference).
- **Authority:** ADR 0004 Amendment 6 (this commit); ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement step 4; ADR 0004 Amendment 2 (soft triggers deferred — precondition); ADR 0004 Amendment 5 (per-hop attribution channel via `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail`); ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 (No Invention rationale); GitHub issue #8 — closed by this commit.
- **Test count:** 468 → 468 (no test change).

### D42 — Streaming singleflight design ADR + v1.x roadmap (issue #16)

- **Design-only ratification of the v1.x streaming singleflight implementation.** ADR 0005 Amendment 6 (D34) had deferred this work with a "design alone warrants a dedicated ADR" note. D42 fulfils the note as ADR 0005 Amendment 8, ratifying the `cacheStore.getOrComputeStreaming(...)` API shape, per-(keyId, cacheKey) inflight Map, tee fan-out with bounded per-client backpressure queues, late-joiner replay buffer, AbortController propagation on all-disconnect, D38 `tryAcquireSpawn` coordination (only the first caller's spawn counts against the semaphore), cache TTL race handling, the new `STREAM_BACKPRESSURE` error code (NOT a hard trigger), and the new `X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight: source | attached | solo` header. Implementation acceptance criteria are enumerated in Amendment 8 §13.
- **Multi-layer safeguards to ensure the v1.x work is not forgotten.** New file `docs/v1x-roadmap.md` is a single living landing page for every Phase-1 deferral (streaming SF, multi-key auth, soft-trigger reactivation, `/health` activeSpawns, provider-level `cacheKeyFields`, streaming-path SPAWN_FAILED salvage, D40 AUTH_MISSING tuple test). Each entry names the ratifying ADR, the load-bearing code anchor, and a concrete trigger to start. Cross-references added at: `lib/cache/store.mjs#getOrCompute` JSDoc (sibling API TODO), `server.mjs` streaming-branch entry (~line 810, the peek+spawn pattern Amendment 8 replaces), `README.md § Known limitations` (user-facing surface), and `docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md` Amendment 8 § "Cross-references and safeguards".
- **Issue #16 status.** STAYS OPEN as the v1.x implementation tracker. The body of the issue is updated post-D42 to reference Amendment 8 and clarify scope ("design ratified; implementation pending"). DO NOT close the issue until Amendment 8 §13's test surface is green against an actual implementation.
- **No code-behavior change. No new tests.** Amendment 8 is design-only. The implementation will go through full Iron Rule 10 (fresh-context opus reviewer + acceptance-criteria-gated test pass) when the v1.x sprint kicks off.
- **Authority:** ADR 0005 Amendment 8 (this commit); ADR 0005 Amendment 6 (D34 — original deferral note); GitHub issue #16 (round-6 F13 — sibling TOCTOU); ADR 0002 Amendment 6 (D38 — `tryAcquireSpawn` semantics that §7 coordination builds on); ADR 0004 Amendment 5 (D40 — observability pattern §11 extends); `CLAUDE.md` release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — under Unreleased; CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x (design-only amendment; fresh-context reviewer not required per the Iron Rule 10 implementation-phase scope, documented in the amendment's procedural mechanism).
- **Test count:** 468 → 468 (no test change — design-only).

### Phase 1 cleanup release_kit checklist

- [x] All 8 D-day deliverables landed on main (D35-D42)
- [x] CI green on every D-day commit + on this release commit's head
- [x] Cold-audit round 7 (fresh-context opus full-pass) — PASS_WITH_MINOR, 0 P1/P2 findings
- [x] 16 of 17 pre-Phase-2 GitHub issues closed (#1-#15 and #17); #16 stays OPEN as v1.x tracker
- [x] Issue #16 status comment posted referencing ADR 0005 Amendment 8 design ratification
- [x] CHANGELOG "Unreleased" promoted to "## v0.1.1 — 2026-05-25" with D35-D42 entries
- [x] `package.json` bumped from 0.1.0 → 0.1.1
- [x] `docs/v1x-roadmap.md` created — 7 deferred items with anchors + start triggers
- [ ] Tag pushed (next step in this PR's lifecycle)
- [ ] `release.yml` triggered + GitHub Release created (auto on tag push; D37 phase_rolling_mode gate will pass because Unreleased is now sentinel-only)

### Known limitations carried to v1.x

Full list with code anchors + start triggers in [`docs/v1x-roadmap.md`](./docs/v1x-roadmap.md):
- Streaming-path singleflight (issue #16, ADR 0005 Amendment 8 design ratified)
- Multi-key auth (`lib/keys.mjs`)
- Soft-trigger reactivation (ADR 0004 Amendment 2)
- `/health` activeSpawns integration (ADR 0002 Amendment 6 forward note)
- Provider-level `cacheKeyFields` mask (ADR 0005 Amendment 7 forward note)
- Streaming-path SPAWN_FAILED salvage (bundled with #1 in v1.x)
- D40 AUTH_MISSING tuple test coverage (test polish)

## v0.1.0 — 2026-05-24

### Phase 1 Close — Multi-provider proxy core

**Overview.** Phase 1 delivers the OLP minimum-viable multi-provider proxy: OpenAI-compatible HTTP entry surface, plugin architecture for 3 Tier-D providers (Anthropic Claude / OpenAI Codex / Mistral Vibe), cache layer (D1 per-key isolation + D4 buffered-path singleflight + size cap + cacheable opt-out), fallback engine with first-chunk safety + spawn-timeout hard trigger + structured per-hop log observability, IR↔OpenAI translation honoring the Rule 2(b) no-invention constraint, and a 416-test suite covering all of it.

Released under `phase_rolling_mode` (CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay): 25 D-day commits accumulated on `main` between 2026-05-23 and 2026-05-24 before this version bump + tag.

**Provider posture.** Three Tier D plugins ship as **Candidate** (per ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory) — runnable via `providers.enabled` config but not Enabled by default. Five additional Tier B/C plugin slots exist in `models-registry.json` as Speculative-Candidate / candidate stubs awaiting CLI authority pins. Zero Enabled providers at v0.1; transition to Enabled requires Phase audit + primary-source pin per ADR 0002.

### What landed (D10–D34 commit index)

The per-commit detail is in the git log; this index summarizes the deliverables.

**Phase 1 core hardening:**
- **D10** (`2cfd0b1`) — P1 round-3: providers.enabled config wiring + real SSE streaming on single-hop cache-miss + spawn-timeout hard trigger across all 3 plugins.

**Round-1 fold-in batch (cold audit caught 17 findings):**
- **D11** (`f659e29`) — ADR 0002 Amendment 1: `maxSpawnTimeMs` ratified into Provider contract hints.
- **D12** (`4b1a9c8`) — IR translator Rule 2(b) compliance: removed invented top-level `error` field on `chat.completion` shapes.
- **D13** (`f34b690`) — Per-hop `cache_control` bypass evaluation (was request-global).
- **D14** (`a7085d9`) — Defer `res.writeHead(200)` until first chunk; early-error returns 502 JSON instead of 200 empty SSE.
- **D15** (`8ae77c3`) — ADR 0005 Amendment 2: cache key includes `max_tokens` / `top_p` / `stop` / `tool_choice`.
- **D16** (`bafa6d1`) — ADR 0004 Amendment 1: SPAWN_FAILED-with-chunks salvage (don't discard partial responses).
- **D17** (`cb86807`) — Alias routing SPOT via `models-registry.json`; `getProviderForModel` canonicalizes.
- **D18** (`82ff007`) — `/v1/models` populated from registry; 5 standard X-OLP-* headers on error responses.
- **D19** (`ed82e65`) — Cleanup batch: finish_reason validator, dead alignment.yml KNOWN_PROVIDERS removal, unused imports.
- **D20** (`d85a2dc`) — Docs drift: README/AGENTS/ADR forward-references annotated `📋 Planned`.

**Round-2 fold-in batch (13 findings):**
- **D21** (`1466d3a`) — `validateProvider` enforces `maxSpawnTimeMs` contract field.
- **D22** (`e10b7d7`) — ADR 0004 Amendment 2: soft triggers deferred to v1.x.
- **D23** (`7ef5510`) — `hints.cacheable` opt-out + 10MB cache entry size cap (ADR 0002 Amendment 3, ADR 0005 Amendment 3).
- **D24** (`f8348ad`) — Spawn-timeout race fix: post-loop `if (spawnTimedOut) throw SPAWN_TIMEOUT` closes the rejectNext-null window across all 3 plugins.
- **D25** (`cd391b1`) — Round-2 P3 docs batch.

**Round-3 fold-in batch (13 findings):**
- **D26** (`a281d3e`) — Soft-trigger startup warning, stderr propagation on error-chunk SPAWN_FAILED (codex+mistral), anthropic D4-observation header, streaming truncation marker.
- **D27** (`c3ba751`) — IR validator response_format + tool_choice checks, ADR 0005 Amendment 4 (cache_control IR vs body), `/v1/models` alias surfacing.
- **D28** (`4a238c9`) — Per-hop log observability: `chain_id`, `trigger_type`, `ir_request_hash`, `next_provider` on all 8 fallback log events.
- **D29** (`de9f3ca`) — Suite 17 port-collision flake fix: 16 test sites switched to OS-assigned `listen(0)`.
- **D30** (`5119b42`) — README env vars correctness, `docs/openai-spec-pin.md` v0.1 baseline.
- **D31** (`d6347e3`) — ADR amendment trio: F5 (ADR 0003 Amendment 1 substitute test strategy), F11 (ADR 0005 Amendment 5 Anthropic wire limitation), F13+F14 (ALIGNMENT.md Speculative-Candidate exception class).

**Round-4 fold-in batch (10 findings):**
- **D32** (`30de965`) — Provider auth env vars in README, X-OLP-* on early-return paths, ADR 0002 Amendment 4 ratifying `contractVersion`, dead OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR removal, codex parser inline assumption labels.

**Round-5 fold-in batch (12 findings):**
- **D33** (`f784fdb`) — ALIGNMENT mistral `--output streaming` pin correction, deterministic `function_call` ID (cache key stability), `/health` per-provider snapshot, fallback-hop cache-hit X-OLP-Cache correctness, `CLAUDE.md` `phase_rolling_mode` policy formalization, `/v1/models` stable `created` timestamps.

**Round-6 final batch (14 findings; 4 closed, 9 filed as issues):**
- **D34** (`60570ef`) — ADR 0005 Amendment 6 (streaming singleflight v1.x deferral), array-field cache key normalization (`tools:[]` / `stop:[]` now collide with omitted), QUOTA_EXHAUSTED + RATE_LIMITED dead code removal (ADR 0004 Amendment 3), ADR 0005 Amendment 7 (conservative cache-key v0.1 trade-off).

### ADRs in scope

- **ADR 0001** — Project founding (Phase 1 founding doc; no amendments)
- **ADR 0002** — Plugin architecture (4 amendments — `maxSpawnTimeMs`, `cacheable`, `contractVersion` ratifications)
- **ADR 0003** — IR design (1 amendment — `__irRoundTripTest` removal + substitute test strategy)
- **ADR 0004** — Fallback engine (3 amendments — SPAWN_FAILED salvage, soft trigger deferral, hard-trigger taxonomy narrowing)
- **ADR 0005** — Cache layer (7 amendments — cache key expansions, cache_control IR-vs-body, cacheable + size cap, Anthropic wire limitation, streaming singleflight deferral, conservative cache-key v0.1 trade-off)
- **ADR 0006** — Provider inclusion (Tier framework; no amendments)
- **ALIGNMENT.md** — Speculative-Candidate plugin Rule 4 exception class added (D31)
- **CLAUDE.md** — `phase_rolling_mode` overlay added (D33)
- **`docs/openai-spec-pin.md`** — v0.1 baseline pinned (D30)

### Test growth

277 (pre-D10) → 416 (post-D34). 6 cold audit rounds reviewed code against ADR claims. Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x dual-mode review discipline (Diff Review + Cold Audit) caught 78+ findings of which ~50 closed via implementation and ~28 deferred to GitHub issues.

### Known limitations carried to v1.x

17 GitHub issues filed for follow-up. Notably:
- **Streaming singleflight** (#16) — multi-concurrent identical streaming requests each spawn fresh CLI; buffered path participates in D4, streaming path doesn't (deferred via ADR 0005 Amendment 6).
- **maxConcurrent runtime enforcement** (#1) — declarative-only at v0.1.
- **X-OLP-Fallback-Detail debug header** (#7) — documented in ADR 0004, never emitted.
- **Soft triggers** (per ADR 0004 Amendment 2) — evaluation code exists but `quotaStatus()` polling not wired; configured thresholds inert at v0.1.

### Migration from OCP

OLP supersedes OCP per ADR 0001. The `scripts/migrate-from-ocp.mjs` migration tool is 📋 Planned (Phase 7).

## v0.1.0-bootstrap — 2026-05-23

### Phase 0 — Repo bootstrap (founding + post-codex-review hardening)

This is the founding commit set of OLP (Open LLM Proxy), a personal- and family-scale multi-provider LLM proxy that supersedes OCP. The trigger was Anthropic's 2026-05-14 announcement (effective 2026-06-15) splitting `claude -p` / Agent SDK / third-party agent traffic out of the Pro/Max subscription pool into a separate fixed monthly Agent SDK Credit pool.

**What lands at v0.1.0-bootstrap (final state on `main` as of 2026-05-23):**

- `ALIGNMENT.md` — OLP constitution. Three concurrent authorities (per-provider CLI / OpenAI spec / IR contract), 5 Rules, 4-tier Risk Tier Framework, Candidate-vs-Enabled provider inventory, one-shot triggered audits (2026-06-16 Anthropic post-split; 90-day Antigravity primary-source pin).
- `AGENTS.md` — multi-tool agent guidelines (inherits `~/.cc-rules/AGENTS.md`).
- `CLAUDE.md` — Claude-Code-specific session instructions + machine-readable `release_kit` overlay (Iron Rule 5.5).
- `README.md` — phase-aware skeleton with Candidate-vs-Enabled provider tables, API endpoint table, environment-variables table, response-headers spec, architecture overview, phase plan, migration-from-OCP outline. Placeholder content marked as such per phase.
- `docs/adr/` — 6 founding ADRs:
  - `0001-project-founding.md` — Mission, non-mission, narrow-scope supersession of OCP ADR 0005 (single-provider-sufficiency premise only; BYOK / no-spawn parts of ADR 0005 not inherited).
  - `0002-plugin-architecture.md` — `lib/providers/<name>.mjs` plug-in model with the Provider contract (name / models / auth / spawn / estimateCost / quotaStatus / healthCheck / hints). 8 candidate providers declared, 0 Enabled at v0.1.
  - `0003-intermediate-representation.md` — OLP-internal canonical IR between OpenAI-compat entry and provider plugins.
  - `0004-fallback-engine.md` — Trigger taxonomy (Hard / Soft / Deterministic-deferred / Cost-aware-deferred), idempotent-failure safety (first-chunk rule), chain advancement one-at-a-time, observability headers.
  - `0005-cache-cross-provider.md` — Cache key composition over `(provider, model, messages, ...)`, D1+D2+D3+D4 port from OCP v3.13.0.
  - `0006-provider-inclusion.md` — 4-tier Risk Framework, Candidate-vs-Enabled distinction, 8-provider candidate classification, Antigravity Tier A (evidence-backed, pending primary-source pin) — exclusion rests on (named prohibition + no cost advantage + reinstatement friction) combination; primary-source URL not yet pinned, follow-up tracked.
- `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md` — 8-radio Change Type taxonomy + per-type Authority Evidence sections + Iron Rule 10 reviewer checklist.
- `.github/workflows/alignment.yml` — CI blacklist (transitive `api.anthropic.com/api/oauth/usage` from OCP 2026-04-11 drift; Antigravity provider exclusion enforcement) + `models-registry.json` validator + commit-citation soft check (process-substitution form, no Bash subshell trap).
- `.github/workflows/release.yml` — Auto-release on tag push with `package.json`-vs-tag version match check (Iron Rule 5).
- `.github/workflows/test.yml` — Node 20/24 matrix; tolerates bootstrap-phase absence of `test-features.mjs` AND `scripts.test`.
- `models-registry.json` — minimal v0.1 stub with empty `providers: {}`, matching the 0-Enabled posture; populated by Phase audits as providers transition Candidate → Enabled.
- `package.json` — minimal: no `main`, no `scripts.test`, no `scripts.start` (those entries land alongside the real files in Phase 1).
- `.gitignore`, `LICENSE` (MIT), `CHANGELOG.md` — standard project boilerplate.

**Provider posture at v0.1.0-bootstrap (per ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory):**

| Tier | Anticipated providers | v0.1 default state |
|---|---|---|
| D (eligible-for-default-enabled) | Anthropic, OpenAI Codex, Mistral Vibe | Candidate (transition gate: authority pin + plugin + Phase audit) |
| C (opt-in) | xAI Grok, Moonshot Kimi | Candidate |
| B (opt-in + consent) | MiniMax, Zhipu GLM, Alibaba Qwen | Candidate |
| A (excluded by default; constitutional-amendment-only re-inclusion) | Google Antigravity | Excluded; pending primary-source pin |

**Total Enabled at v0.1.0-bootstrap: 0.** Enablement is a Phase audit deliverable, not a bootstrap claim. This explicit zero is intentional and codified — a constitution that names providers as "default-enabled" while their CLI versions, output shapes, auth artifacts, and exit-code semantics are still TBD would violate Rules 1 (Cite First) and 3 (Match the Implementation).

**Review history for this version:**

1. **Initial internal review (Claude Opus, fresh-context, Iron Rule 10).** Verdict: APPROVE_WITH_MINOR — 2 minor items (alignment.yml heredoc indent breaking bash parse on failure path; AGENTS.md cross-reference to ADR 0003 imprecise). Both folded in before the founding commit.

2. **External review #1 (OpenAI Codex CLI, no spec framing).** Verdict: 6 substantive findings beyond internal review.
   - Provider Inventory split into Candidate vs Enabled (the v0.1 constitution had declared `anthropic` / `openai` / `mistral` as Tier D default-enabled while their Authority pins were still `TBD at Phase N spawn` — direct violation of Rule 1 / Rule 3 against the constitution's own text).
   - Antigravity Tier A downgraded to "evidence-backed, pending primary-source pin" (secondary reports disagree on blast radius; Google FAQ URL not yet primary-source-pinned).
   - ADR 0001 supersession scope narrowed (OLP rejects ADR 0005's "BYOK + no spawn" qualifiers, which originally applied to a commercial pivot; OLP is non-commercial and spawn-binary by design).
   - Anthropic post-2026-06-15 one-shot audit scheduled (annual May 14 audit would leave Anthropic re-eval ~year late after the split takes effect).
   - Tier A "permanent" language unified across docs (constitution and ADR 0006 had disagreed).
   - OpenAI Tier D wording softened ("maintainer signal indicates low risk; formal ToS pin pending" — Discussion #8338 is a posture statement, not a formal ToS blessing).

3. **External review #2 (OpenAI Codex CLI, second pass after review #1 fold-in).** Verdict: 6 additional substantive findings — the self-consistency trap recurred when fold-in of review #1 was scoped only to files codex explicitly named. Round #2 caught:
   - ADR 0002 still claimed "three default-enabled" while ALIGNMENT.md said zero Enabled — accepted ADR contradicting constitution.
   - `release.yml` would publish stale `## v0.1.0-bootstrap` notes that ignored the "Unreleased" amendments — fixed by consolidating amendments into the v0.1.0-bootstrap section (this entry).
   - `package.json` advertised `main` / `scripts.test` / `scripts.start` for files that don't exist — `npm test` / `npm start` failed locally. Removed all three; will return in Phase 1 alongside the real files.
   - `models-registry.json` documented as SPOT but missing — minimal stub added.
   - `alignment.yml` commit-citation soft check had a Bash subshell trap (`while` in pipe loses `WARN=1` mutation) — fixed via process substitution `< <(...)`.
   - Tier A "permanent" wording still inconsistent across `alignment.yml` workflow text, ADR 0006 Consequences section, and the rest of the docs — unified throughout.

   All 6 round-#2 findings folded in this consolidated v0.1.0-bootstrap state.

**Reviewer framing learning (recorded permanently in `~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/ai_reviewer_self_consistency_trap.md`):** Internal AI reviewers framed on a shared source-of-truth miss bugs in the source-of-truth itself. The self-consistency trap recurred during the fold-in of round #1 — when an external reviewer surfaces findings, the fold-in must grep the entire repo for the same concept, not only edit the files the reviewer named. Round #2 caught what round #1's fold-in missed for exactly this reason. Both lessons updated in the cross-machine memory.

**Iron Rule 10 status:** Satisfied. Initial reviewer = internal opus (independent from drafters). Round #1 reviewer = external codex (independent from drafters and from internal opus). Round #2 reviewer = external codex (independent from the round #1 fold-in implementer). The maintainer's role across all three reviews was approver, not author. The drafting agents and fold-in agents were never the same as the reviewers for any of the three passes.

**Next:** Phase 1 lands `server.mjs` skeleton + IR + Anthropic provider plugin + cache D1+D4 port from OCP. At that point, `package.json` regains `main` + `scripts.test` + `scripts.start`, `test-features.mjs` lands, `models-registry.json` populates its first `providers.anthropic` entry, and Anthropic transitions Candidate → Enabled. Per spec §6 phase plan.