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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
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7ef5510837 |
feat(cache): D23 — implement hints.cacheable + 10MB size cap (round-2 F3)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24
Round-2 cold-audit Finding 3 (P2 cache correctness). ADR 0005 § "Cache
write conditions" items 3 and 4 were documented but never wired in
code:
- Item 3: "The provider's hints.cacheable flag is not false"
- Item 4: "The response is below a size cap (default 10 MB; configurable)"
Grep verified zero matches for `cacheable` / `10485760` / size-cap
patterns in lib/ or server.mjs pre-D23.
Changes (9 files, +391 / -12):
1. docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md — Amendment 3 adds `cacheable`
to the Provider contract hints list (after D11's Amendment 1 added
maxSpawnTimeMs). Authority chain cites ADR 0005 § Cache write
conditions item 3 as the field's origin.
2. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md — Amendment 3 documents the
D23 implementation of items 3 + 4 + the D16-interaction edge case
(truncated > 10MB → no-op eviction, structurally bounded since
responses > 10MB are anomalous by ADR's own rationale).
3. lib/providers/base.mjs — ProviderHints typedef gains
`[cacheable]` (optional boolean); validateProvider rejects non-
boolean non-undefined values. Omission accepted (default = true).
4. 3 plugins (anthropic / codex / mistral) each declare
`cacheable: true` explicitly with citation comment.
5. lib/cache/store.mjs — CacheStore constructor accepts
`maxEntryBytes` (default 10 * 1024 * 1024 = 10_485_760) +
injectable `_warnFn`. `set()` computes
`Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(value))`; if exceeded, warns via
`_warnFn` and returns undefined (no persistence). `getOrCompute`
still returns the computed value to caller — cache write skipped
but caller gets data; subsequent identical requests re-spawn.
6. server.mjs — 4 sites coordinated for cacheable opt-out:
- `executeHopFn`: cacheable check before D13 shouldBypassCacheForHop
(permanent provider policy precedes per-request bypass condition)
- `cacheStore.peek` gate at line ~504: `cacheableForFirstHop`
short-circuit
- Real-streaming branch entry condition at line ~522:
`cacheableForFirstHop` added (so cacheable: false + stream falls
through to buffered path which honors the opt-out via executeHopFn)
- Both `cacheStore.set` sites in streaming branch wrapped in
`if (cacheableForFirstHop)` defensive guards (post-D23
restructure these are unreachable for cacheable: false, but the
guards make intent explicit and survive future refactors)
7. test-features.mjs — 13 new tests:
- 5 validator tests (Suite 4): explicit true/false, omitted, string
rejected, number rejected
- 5 size-cap unit tests (Suite 9): default 10MB, custom override,
oversize skip + warn capture, within-limit normal persistence,
getOrCompute oversize returns-but-doesn't-cache + re-spawn
- 3 cacheable integration tests (Suite 9e): non-streaming opt-out,
streaming opt-out (the regression case that pre-fold-in failed),
X-OLP-Cache header consistency on both paths
Tests: 335 → 348 (+13). All pass on Node 20.
Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D23 reviewer flagged 2 blocking issues**: (1) the cacheable opt-out
in initial implementation was only in `executeHopFn` (buffered path);
the D10 real-streaming branch in server.mjs bypassed the check
entirely — calling streamPlugin.spawn() directly and writing to
cacheStore.set() at 2 sites without consulting cacheable. (2) Suite
9e integration tests didn't cover stream: true so the leak wasn't
caught.
Both diff-review and the implementer focused on `executeHopFn`
because that's where the cold-audit reviewer pointed for Finding 3.
Same class of "narrow attention" miss as several earlier D-days.
Fold-in: compute `cacheableForFirstHop` once at request entry; add
`!cacheableForFirstHop` short-circuit to peek gate; add
`cacheableForFirstHop` to streaming-branch entry condition (forces
fall-through to buffered path which has the opt-out); add defensive
guards on both `cacheStore.set` call sites. Added a 3rd Suite 9e
test covering stream: true + cacheable: false (which pre-fold-in
would have failed by serving the second request from cache).
This is now the FOURTH D-day where a doc-vs-code or path-coverage
gap was caught by the reviewer rather than the implementer. The
v1.6 § 10.x diff-review discipline continues to pay off.
Default behavior unchanged for 3 shipped plugins (all explicitly
`cacheable: true` → cache path identical to pre-D23).
Authority:
- ADR 0002 Amendment 3 (in-place) — establishes cacheable in contract
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 (in-place) — documents implementation of items
3 + 4
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions items 3 + 4 — the original
authority for both rules
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught the missing
implementation; diff-review Mode A caught the streaming-path gap
Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): REQUEST_CHANGES on initial, APPROVE after fold-in (implicit
— fold-in followed the exact recommendation). Verified:
- ADR amendment placement + structure
- Validator typedef + checks
- Size cap implementation in CacheStore + inflight slot release on
oversize-skip
- All 4 interaction cases (cacheable × cache_control × D16
× ordering) coherent post-fold-in
- 13 new tests including the regression test that would have failed
on pre-fold-in code
Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking notes, NOT in this PR):
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 could add one sentence on the prior-write-also-
oversize case (file as docs polish)
- Consider extracting `shouldUseCacheForHop(hopProvider, ir)` helper
combining D13 + D23 logic — reduces miss-risk for next reviewer
- Test 30 could add `assert.equal(store._inflight.size, 0)` as
inflight-slot leak regression guard
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
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1466d3a082 |
fix(providers): D21 — validateProvider enforces maxSpawnTimeMs contract field (round-2 F1)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24
Round-2 cold-audit Finding 1 (P2 contract drift). ADR 0002 Amendment 1
(D11, commit
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taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
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2cfd0b194e |
feat(phase-1): D10 P1 hardening — providers.enabled wiring + real streaming + spawn timeout
Folds in three production-blocking defects from external Codex review
round-3 of Phase 1 (D5+D6+D8+D9 already merged). Without these, OLP
returns 503 on every request even when `npm start` succeeds, streams
arrive as a single buffered burst after the spawn completes, and hung
CLIs block the engine forever despite ADR 0004 declaring spawn-timeout
a hard trigger.
P1.1 providers.enabled config wiring (ADR 0002 § Disable model):
- loadFallbackConfigSync() returns tri-field {chains, soft_triggers,
providersEnabled}; server.mjs reads _startupConfig.providersEnabled
and passes to loadProviders() at startup
- Empty / missing config → 0 enabled providers → 503 no_enabled_provider
(matches v0.1 0-Enabled posture per ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory)
- __setProvidersEnabled / __resetProvidersEnabled test seams; in-place
Map mutation preserves existing direct-mutation patterns in Suite 13
P1.2 Real SSE streaming on single-hop cache-miss (ADR 0003 entry adapter
pattern, OpenAI /v1/chat/completions stream=true contract):
- New handleChatCompletions branch when ir.stream === true && chain.length
=== 1 && !bypassCache && !preCheckHit
- for await (const irChunk of provider.spawn(...)) writes SSE per chunk
via res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(...)); accumulates streamedChunks for
cacheStore.set on stop
- First-chunk rule preserved: error-before-first-chunk → sendError(502);
error-after-first-chunk → truncated res.end(), no fallback
- Multi-hop chains (chain.length > 1) continue to use buffered
executeWithFallback to keep fallback safety semantics
P1.3 Spawn timeout hard trigger (ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4):
- SPAWN_TIMEOUT added to PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES (lib/providers/base.mjs)
and HARD_TRIGGER_CODES (lib/fallback/engine.mjs)
- All three plugins (anthropic.mjs / codex.mjs / mistral.mjs) wrap drain
loop with setTimeout (default 600_000ms, configurable via
hints.maxSpawnTimeMs); on fire: proc.kill('SIGTERM') + reject pending
drain promise with ProviderError(..., 'SPAWN_TIMEOUT')
- Timer cleared in finally; resolveNext/rejectNext atomically nulled in
push() + timer-fire path to prevent late-fire double-settle
Tests 277 → 288 (+11). Suite 14 (4 providers.enabled), Suite 15
(3 streaming cache-miss real-time, including arrival-count >= 2
assertion that architecturally proves real streaming), Suite 16
(4 spawn timeout, including 2-hop chain advancement from timed-out
primary). 288/288 pass on Node 20.20.2 + Node 25.8.0.
Authorities:
- ADR 0002 § Disable model — config toggle, not plugin-removal
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md
- ADR 0003 § Translation direction model — entry adapter for await pattern
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0003-intermediate-representation.md
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy + § Fallback safety (first-chunk rule)
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md
- OpenAI /v1/chat/completions stream=true (server-sent events,
data: {chunk} per delta, terminator data: [DONE])
https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/streaming
Reviewer (Iron Rule 10): fresh-context opus, independent of drafter.
Verdict: APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Folded the one cheap minor before commit
(Suite 15a arrival-count assertion strengthened from chunks.length > 0
to arrivalTimestamps.length >= 2 — the prior assertion would have
admitted a buffered impl). Two remaining non-blocking notes deferred:
optional writeHead deferral (low value; single-hop guard makes pre-
content 200 + empty body safe), and version bump (Phase 1 ships as
v0.1.0 aggregate when D11–D16 land).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
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c175e8994c |
feat(phase-1): land Anthropic provider plugin (D4)
Phase 1 Day 2. Anthropic provider plugin code lands, plus contractVersion
field added across base.mjs and validated strictly. Anthropic stays
CANDIDATE per ALIGNMENT.md Provider Inventory — D5 flips to Enabled after
the real spawn E2E audit passes. POST /v1/chat/completions claude-* still
returns 503 until then.
Files:
NEW: lib/providers/anthropic.mjs (445 lines)
MOD: lib/providers/base.mjs (+8 lines — contractVersion enforcement)
MOD: lib/providers/index.mjs (+37 lines — STATIC_REGISTRY adds anthropic
+ getProviderByName helper)
MOD: models-registry.json — populates providers.anthropic with 3 models
opus-4-7 / sonnet-4-6 / haiku-4-5, alias map, candidate marker
MOD: test-features.mjs (+481 lines — Suite 6: 37 new tests covering
contract conformance, contractVersion enforcement, IR translation,
mock-spawn behaviour, healthCheck, estimateCost)
Authority citations (all verified by independent reviewer against actual
OCP byte offsets):
Spawn pattern: OCP server.mjs:542 stdio shape, port verbatim.
CLI args: OCP server.mjs:384-414 buildCliArgs pattern — -p, --model X,
--output-format text, --no-session-persistence (session-resume and
permissions branches stripped per OLP no-state architecture).
stdin write: OCP server.mjs:586-587 verbatim.
Stdout text handling: OCP server.mjs:735-748 raw d.toString per chunk
no JSON envelope, matches --output-format text.
Auth chain: OCP server.mjs:864-888 (env CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN ->
~/.claude/.credentials.json -> macOS keychain with both label formats
"claude-code-credentials" and "Claude Code-credentials") ported in
same priority order. One delta vs OCP: OLP guards keychain branch on
process.platform === darwin, OCP relies on try/catch on Linux. Both
behave identically; OLP avoids an unnecessary shell-out.
Env cleanup: OCP server.mjs:530-534 — delete CLAUDECODE, ANTHROPIC_
API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN. CLAUDECODE
clobbering pitfall inherited per memory.
Architectural decisions:
1. Anthropic stays Candidate at D4. STATIC_REGISTRY.length === 1 but
loadProviders({}) returns empty Map. Suite 7 HTTP integration tests
continue to verify 503 with no_enabled_provider for any claude-*
model. D5 changes the config default to enable: { anthropic: true }
and adds the real E2E spawn test.
2. contractVersion === 1.0 strictly enforced (F3 fold-in from D3
review). validateProvider in base.mjs rejects providers missing or
having any other version string. Suite 6 includes 4 tests covering
missing / 0.9 / 1.0 / undefined cases.
3. quotaStatus returns null at D4 with a TODO comment pointing at the
ALIGNMENT.md 2026-06-16 one-shot audit. Anthropic Agent SDK Credit
pool balance API has not been pinned; verification scheduled for
2026-06-16 per OLP one-shot audits.
4. estimateCost returns shape but usd: null. Per-million-token rates
not pinned at D4. Lands when models-registry.json gains a pricing
field in a later phase.
5. Lossy translations explicitly documented in anthropic.mjs file
header per ADR 0003 § Lossy-translation documentation requirement.
Includes response_format json_object (system-prompt augmented),
top_p (no --top-p flag), tool_choice required (no flag), and
request-level tools[] + assistant tool_calls + tool_call_id
(text-in/text-out CLI cannot consume structured tool wire format).
The tools[] documentation gap was a reviewer non-blocking finding;
folded in this commit.
Mocking discipline: no real claude -p spawn in any D4 test. spawn-path
coverage uses __setSpawnImpl injection of fake child_process. No real
OAuth tokens or API keys in fixtures — all use placeholder strings
fake-oauth-token / fake-token. Auth path computed via
path.join(homedir(), .claude, .credentials.json), no hardcoded
/Users/<name> literal.
Reviewer chain (Iron Rule 10):
Implementer: sonnet (general-purpose).
Fresh-context reviewer: opus (ecc:code-reviewer). Verdict
APPROVE_WITH_MINOR.
Reviewer ran npm test (98/98 pass) and verified all five OCP citations
at the actual byte offsets in /Users/taodeng/ocp/server.mjs. All
citations confirmed accurate.
Reviewer non-blocking findings:
1. tools[] and tool_calls lossy-translation undocumented — FOLDED IN
this commit (anthropic.mjs header rewritten with full lossy list).
2. with type json import attribute Node 20 compat — DEFERRED to CI
verification. The syntax is stable on Node 20.10+ and the CI
setup-node@v4 with node-version 20 resolves to latest 20.x. If
CI Node 20 leg fails, mitigation is bump engines.node to >=20.10
or swap both import-attribute lines for readFileSync + JSON.parse.
3. CLI_NOT_FOUND error code declared but never thrown — DEFERRED to
a future commit. Pure cosmetic; could distinguish ENOENT from
generic spawn errors but no functional impact.
Test count: 61 -> 98 (+37 D4 tests).
Verification:
node --check on all touched files: clean.
npm test on Node 25.8.0: 98/98 pass in 209ms.
Reviewer-run npm test independently: 98/98 pass.
loadProviders({}) returns empty Map (verified by orchestrator and
reviewer): Anthropic Candidate gate holds.
hygiene grep: no personal names, no /Users/<name>/ literals, no real
OAuth tokens or API keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
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taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
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e2e67de23a |
feat(phase-1): land IR + plugin loader + server skeleton (D3)
Phase 1 Day 1. First executable code lands. Zero providers wired yet
(per ALIGNMENT.md "v0.1 ships 0 Enabled Providers"); the server starts
clean and POST /v1/chat/completions returns 503 with no_enabled_provider.
Files added:
lib/ir/types.mjs - IR v1.0 schema + validators (ADR 0003)
lib/ir/openai-to-ir.mjs - OpenAI Chat Completions to IR
lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs - IR chunks to OpenAI SSE / non-stream
lib/providers/base.mjs - Provider contract + validateProvider + ProviderError
lib/providers/index.mjs - Static empty registry stub (ADR 0002)
server.mjs - HTTP listener with createOlpServer factory + main guard
test-features.mjs - 61 tests across 7 suites (IR / provider / HTTP)
Files modified:
package.json - main and scripts.start/test added back; targets now exist.
Authority citations:
IR fields and translation direction: ADR 0003 sections Decision and
Translation direction model.
Provider contract (9 fields): ADR 0002 section Provider contract v1.0
interface.
Entry surface routes (health, v1/models, v1/chat/completions): OLP v0.1
spec section 4.1 single-protocol entry; ALIGNMENT.md Authority 2.
Zero-Enabled-Providers behaviour: ALIGNMENT.md Provider Inventory.
Architectural decisions worth recording:
1. server.mjs uses a createOlpServer factory plus an import.meta.url
main guard. The factory returns an unbound http.Server; only the
main-script invocation calls .listen(). Tests import the real
server.mjs and exercise the real router. No parallel implementation
in the test file.
This pattern was a fold-in from the orchestration step. The initial
sonnet draft put a top-level server.listen call in server.mjs, which
forced test-features.mjs to reimplement the router inline (a false-
confidence trap because the real server logic would never be tested).
Refactored before reviewer dispatch.
2. lib/providers/index.mjs ships an empty STATIC_REGISTRY array, not a
placeholder with dummy entries. ALIGNMENT.md Provider Inventory says
v0.1 ships zero Enabled Providers; the registry honors that exactly.
Phase 1 Day 2 adds the first import (Anthropic) when its plugin lands.
3. BadRequestError lives in openai-to-ir.mjs and ProviderError in
base.mjs. Reviewer suggested relocating to a shared lib/errors.mjs
once the count exceeds two; deferred to Phase 1 Day 2 to ship with
the third typed error class.
4. contractVersion: '1.0' on each provider plugin: not enforced at D3
because no providers exist yet. Reviewer flagged for Phase 1 Day 2
tightening when the first provider lands.
Reviewer chain (Iron Rule 10):
Initial implementer: sonnet (general-purpose).
Refactor (createOlpServer + main guard) by the orchestrator after
catching the inline-router parallel-implementation issue.
Fresh-context reviewer: opus (ecc:code-reviewer). Verdict
APPROVE_WITH_MINOR.
Reviewer's two non-blocking findings folded in:
F1: removed unused createServer import from test-features.mjs line 12,
left over from the refactor.
F2: replaced finish_reason value 'error' with 'stop' in both the
streaming error chunk path (lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs line 72) and
the non-streaming error aggregation path (lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs
line 153). The 'error' value is not in OpenAI's documented
finish_reason enum (stop / length / tool_calls / content_filter /
function_call / null), so emitting it would violate ALIGNMENT.md
Rule 2 (b). Provider errors are now surfaced via a top-level
response.error object plus an inline content marker. The matching
test assertion at test-features.mjs line 325 was updated to verify
finish_reason stays within the OpenAI enum.
Note on the F2 fold-in:
Reviewer pointed only at the streaming path (line 72). After applying
that fix I ran grep across lib/ and test-features.mjs for the same
invention pattern and caught a second hit at line 153 (non-streaming
aggregation). This is the "fold-in must grep the full repo, not only
the file the reviewer named" discipline from
~/.cc-rules/memory/feedback/evidence_first_under_speed_pressure.md.
Both hits are fixed in this commit.
Verification:
node --check on all 7 new files plus modified package.json plus
server.mjs plus lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs - all clean.
npm test - 61/61 pass in 209ms, no flakes, no skipped.
OLP_PORT=14001 node server.mjs followed by curl /health returns
proper JSON; curl /v1/models returns 200 empty list; server shuts
down cleanly on signal.
grep "finish_reason.*error" returns zero hits across lib/ and tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
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