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2963547a98c5f2a79f05a9e99109fe3832252640
12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  taodengandClaude <claude-opus-4-8> <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2963547a98 |
docs(providers): fix review-noted comment nits (dup token + OCP line-ref 783-784)
Independent review (Iron Rule 10) findings 1+2, both non-blocking comment-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-4-8> <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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taodengandClaude <claude-sonnet-4-6> <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a503441ea3 |
fix(providers): guard stdin EPIPE on fast-failing CLI spawn (P1 crash-hardening)
Adds `proc.stdin.on('error', ...)` guard in anthropic.mjs, codex.mjs, and
mistral.mjs before any stdin.write() / stdin.end() call. Prevents a
fast-failing CLI (auth error, bad model, oversized prompt) from crashing the
single-process daemon via an unhandled EPIPE on the Node stdin Writable.
The ChildProcess 'error' event fires on the spawned process itself; it does
NOT catch errors on the stdin Writable. The stdin Writable emits its own
'error' event which, without a listener, propagates as an unhandled exception
and crashes the daemon.
Authority (ALIGNMENT.md Rule 1 + Rule 5):
- anthropic: claude CLI v2.1.104 observed behaviour — fast-failing spawn
(e.g. auth error, bad model) closes stdin before OLP finishes writing;
Node stdin Writable surfaces EPIPE. ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2: no CLI operation
changed; guard is a Node stream safety net only.
Port source: OCP server.mjs:777-784.
- codex: Codex CLI reference https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli/reference
— same mechanism; stdin path via `-` positional documented in reference
§ "Use '-' to pipe the prompt from stdin." ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 applies.
- mistral: Mistral Vibe CLI https://docs.mistral.ai/mistral-vibe/terminal/quickstart
— vibe --prompt reads from args not stdin, but stdin.end() can still
surface EPIPE if the process exits before the fd is flushed.
ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2: no CLI operation changed.
A `typeof proc.stdin.on === 'function'` guard is included to protect
test-injected mock stdin objects (plain objects without .on()) from
breaking the EventEmitter call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-sonnet-4-6> <noreply@anthropic.com>
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dtzp555-maxandGitHub
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7019294c63 |
feat(sandbox): Phase 7 Solution 1 implementation + opus 4.8 (#68)
Implements ADR 0014 Amendment 1 (4-layer Solution 1) + ADR 0002 Amendment 9 (Provider ISOLATION contract) + opus 4.8 model. Fresh-context opus reviewer APPROVE_WITH_MINOR; 2 nit fold-ins applied. 813 unit tests pass. Known deferred coverage: Suite 44 PI231 E2E tests are placeholders under describe.skip pending Task #9 (PI231 prod-target validation). The load-bearing negative test ('in-sandbox cat ~/.olp/keys.json MUST fail') will be validated when Task #9 runs against the merged code. PR-B outer-bwrap superseded; archive at phase-7-pr-b-outer-bwrap-snapshot branch. |
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6edf6e0b94 |
fix+release(v0.4.2): D75 — codex CLI v0.133.0 schema + per-hop model override (#47)
Patch release fixing 5 bugs caught by real-machine E2E testing on PI231 +
Mac mini (2026-05-26 session). Prior D-day reviewers + the post-v0.4.0
maintainer review all missed these because they reviewed against spec text
and against the local OLP install's cached codex CLI shape, not against a
fresh `npm install -g @openai/codex` on a remote operator host getting
v0.133.0 for the first time.
F1 — codex auth.json schema pin (lib/providers/codex.mjs readAuthArtifact)
Real codex CLI v0.133.0 nests the access token under `tokens.access_token`,
not at top-level access_token / token / accessToken. Pre-D75 readAuthArtifact
returned null → OLP reported "auth artifact missing" even for fully
logged-in users. Fix: prepend creds?.tokens?.access_token to the precedence
chain at both override + default branches. Legacy fields preserved as
fallback. Authority: codex CLI v0.133.0 on-disk auth.json shape verified
empirically on PI231 2026-05-26 E2E session.
F2 — codex spawn args + --skip-git-repo-check (lib/providers/codex.mjs irToCodex)
codex CLI v0.133.0 trusted-directory sandbox refuses with "Not inside a
trusted directory" outside git repos. OLP deploys typically outside a git
repo. Fix: add '--skip-git-repo-check' to args before '--model'. Authority:
codex CLI v0.133.0 reference (`codex exec --help` documents the flag).
F3 — codex NDJSON event shape pin (lib/providers/codex.mjs codexChunkToIR)
Real v0.133.0 stream: thread.started → turn.started → item.completed
(item.type='agent_message', item.text=<response>) → turn.completed.
D6 defensive parser only recognised top-level content/delta/text +
type:'stop'/done:true → every chunk silently dropped → response body had
content: null. Fix: add three new recognisers (item.completed → delta;
turn.completed → stop; turn.failed → error) before the legacy fallback
chain. Legacy recognisers preserved for backward/forward compat.
F4 — `olp status` reads body.stats.cache.size, not body.cache.entries
(bin/olp.mjs cmdStatus). Server payload nests stats under stats.cache;
CacheStore.stats() exposes {hits, misses, size, inflightCount} — there is
no `entries` field. D74 P2-3 fixed cmdUsage + cmdCache for the same bug
class but missed cmdStatus.
F7 — per-hop chain `model` overrides IR model in provider.spawn()
(server.mjs executeHopFn + streaming sourceFactory). Pre-D75 executeHopFn
used hopModel for cache key + audit ctx but passed the original irReq
(with irReq.model = user's request) to provider.spawn(). Chain config
[{anthropic, claude-X}, {openai, gpt-5.5}] would always spawn BOTH plugins
with --model claude-X — openai rejected the unknown model and the chain
died. This broke the core OLP value prop (cross-provider fallback with
provider-appropriate model substitution). Fix: build per-hop IR variant
with { ...irReq, model: hopModel } and pass to spawn. Conditional skips
clone when hopModel === irReq.model. Applied to BOTH buffered path AND
streaming path. Authority: ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 1 (per-hop
config supplies provider AND model — contract always specified, code
didn't complete it).
Out of scope (deferred to Phase 5):
- F5 (server bind / OLP_BIND env) — needs anonymous-key trust review
- F6 (doctor client-vs-server-side limit) — needs trigger-taxonomy ADR
Test count: 704 → 714 (+10 Suite 36 D75 regression tests: 36i–36r).
Files touched: lib/providers/codex.mjs, bin/olp.mjs, server.mjs,
test-features.mjs, package.json, CHANGELOG.md.
Phase 5 process learning: every provider plugin D-day must include a
real-CLI E2E on a remote operator host before merging — not on the
maintainer workstation (which may have an older CLI cached from a prior
install). D6/D7 codex E2E was deferred and that deferral compounded across
3 layers. F7 reinforces a separate lesson: when a function signature takes
(provider, model, ir), reviewers must check that `model` is consumed
everywhere downstream — not just at the call site they happened to look at.
Authority: ADR 0002 (provider contract — codex plugin), ADR 0004 (fallback
engine — per-hop model contract), lib/providers/codex.mjs D6 assumption
A2/A3/A4 docstrings (which all said "D7 will pin" and D7 never did); codex
CLI v0.133.0 on-disk schema + `codex exec --help` output verified
empirically on PI231 (2026-05-26 E2E session); Iron Rule 第二律
evidence-over-should-work; CLAUDE.md release_kit.phase_rolling_mode
cross-Phase discipline ("hotfix to a shipped Phase N deliverable → bump
patch, tag, release before next push").
Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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e69e908dae |
feat+test+docs: D64-D67 — olp Node CLI + doctor framework + per-provider doctor checks + ADR 0002 Amendment 7 (#42)
* feat+test+docs: D64+D65+D66+D67 — olp Node CLI + olp doctor framework + per-provider doctor checks + ADR 0002 Amendment 7 Second substantive Phase 4 implementation. 4 D-days bundled per Iron Rule 11 IDR — CLI dispatches to doctor; doctor calls into provider plugins via the new contract method; ADR amendment authorizes the contract change. Single PR is the minimum reviewable unit for "does plugin amendment + plugin impl + doctor consumer line up?" ## D64 — bin/olp.mjs Node CLI scaffold Operator surface for OLP. Node not bash (per ADR 0010 § Notes — bash with python3 JSON parsing is a known fragile point; OLP standardizes on Node). Subcommands: - status / health / usage / models / cache — HTTP calls to existing endpoints - providers — local: cross-references models-registry.json + config.json - chain show [<model>] — local: prints routing.chains from ~/.olp/config.json - logs [N] [--level X] — reads ~/.olp/logs/audit.ndjson via audit-query - restart — launchctl (macOS) / systemctl --user (Linux), best-effort - keys ... — delegates to bin/olp-keys.mjs runCli (no logic duplicated) - doctor [--check <id|category>] [--json] — D65 framework - help / --help / -h Token / URL resolution: - OLP_PROXY_URL env → OLP_PORT env → http://127.0.0.1:4567 (D60 default) - OLP_API_KEY env → OLP_OWNER_TOKEN env (filesystem manifest tokens are one-way SHA-256 per ADR 0007 § 5 — not recoverable; CLI surfaces helpful 401 message pointing at olp-keys keygen) Output: - Default: human-readable ANSI-colored text (no chalk dep, auto-suppressed under --json) - --json: raw JSON for scripting - Exit codes: 0=ok / 1=usage / 2=network|HTTP / 3=auth No npm deps. Built-ins only. Installed via package.json bin entry so `npx olp <subcommand>` works. ## D65 — lib/doctor.mjs framework Ports OCP scripts/doctor.mjs (the bedrock of AI-driven self-repair per the OCP audit's #2 inheritance candidate). Machine-readable next_action so a Claude Code / Cursor / etc. agent can self-repair OLP. Check shape: { id, category, async run(): { status: 'ok'|'fail'|'warn', message, evidence? } } Built-in checks: server.running, server.version, config.exists, config.providers_enabled, config.chains_configured, auth.owner_key_exists, system.node_version. Per-provider checks collected dynamically via provider.doctorChecks() per D67. --json output: { checks: [...], kind: noop|update|fix_oauth|fix_config|fresh_install| fix_server|fix_provider, next_action: { ai_executable: [], human_required: [], verify: 'olp doctor' }, summary } --check <id-or-category> for tight repair-loop fast paths. ## D66 — Per-provider doctorChecks() implementations Each shipped plugin contributes its own checks (lives in plugin file so the provider's maintainer updates it naturally): - anthropic.mjs: cli_available (claude --version) + oauth_token_present (~/.claude/.credentials.json OR ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN env) - codex.mjs: cli_available (codex --version) + auth_present (~/.codex/config.json) - mistral.mjs: cli_available (vibe --version) + api_key_present (MISTRAL_API_KEY env OR ~/.vibe/.env) Each fail returns evidence.fix_commands (for ai_executable[]) or evidence.human_required (e.g., 'run: claude auth login'). ## D67 — ADR 0002 Amendment 7 New amendment adds OPTIONAL provider.doctorChecks(): DoctorCheck[] to the Provider contract. Backwards compatible — plugins without doctorChecks() contribute no provider checks (default behavior). Validator extended in lib/providers/base.mjs validateProvider. ## Test count 636 → 658 (+22 tests across Suites 32, 33). - Suite 32 — bin/olp.mjs CLI scaffold (10 tests): parseArgv, USAGE, unknown-subcommand, providers local + --json, chain show, status via ephemeral server with owner token, ECONNREFUSED → exit 2, resolveBearerToken precedence - Suite 33 — lib/doctor.mjs framework (12 tests): all kind branches (noop / fresh_install / fix_server / fix_oauth / fix_provider), collectProviderChecks reads doctorChecks(), throwing plugin captured, --check filter, built-in checks against temp HOME, anthropic plugin probe set, resolveProxyUrl precedence, deriveKind/deriveNextAction units ## Scope discipline server.mjs UNTOUCHED. All HTTP subcommands consume EXISTING endpoints. No new endpoints. No /health.anonymousKey. No olp-connect. No Telegram plugin. No IDE docs bundle. No CHANGELOG / package.json version bump (Phase 4 close handles versioning; only package.json bin entries updated). ## Known limitations (flagged for reviewer) - olp restart not unit-tested (would require mocking child_process.spawn in invasive way; manual smoke-test only at this D-day) - olp logs --level filtering matches optional level field if present in audit-event objects; appendAuditEvent already populates it where meaningful — no schema change needed in this bundle - olp usage panel shape inferred from lib/audit-query.mjs exports; if /v0/management/dashboard-data wire shape differs in subtle ways, formatter degrades to '?' but --json always works ## Authority - ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D-day plan D64-D67 line - ADR 0002 Amendment 7 (this commit — new amendment) - OCP ocp bash wrapper /Users/taodeng/ocp/ocp (subcommand reference, translated to Node) - OCP scripts/doctor.mjs /Users/taodeng/ocp/scripts/doctor.mjs (framework reference) - 2026-05-26 brainstorm (Top 5 OCP inheritance candidates, item 2: olp doctor machine-readable next_action) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: D64-D67 reviewer P2 fold-in — shell-quote ai_executable paths + launchctl kickstart caveat Reviewer APPROVE — 0 P0/P1, 2 P2 hardening notes folded in. P2-1 — Shell-quote interpolated paths in fix_commands. lib/doctor.mjs config.exists fix_commands previously interpolated ${olpHome} / ${configPath} unquoted into the printf template. A malicious OLP_HOME env value containing shell metacharacters could inject commands into the suggested-fix string an AI agent (or human) pastes back into a terminal. Added _shellQuote(s) helper (POSIX single-quote-wrap with escape for embedded single quotes per POSIX shell rules). Risk surface is narrow at family scale (operator local env, single-user proxy), but hardening cost is one helper. P2-2 — Document launchctl kickstart -k env-stale pitfall. cmdRestart header now carries an explicit caveat that `launchctl kickstart -k` does NOT re-read the plist EnvironmentVariables block — launchd uses cached env from the most recent bootstrap. This is a known OCP institutional lesson (PIT INDEX in cc-rules MEMORY.md). The comment documents the bootout/bootstrap dance for env reloads and notes that the Phase 4 installer (post-D73) will expose `olp restart --full` for the safer reload path. 658/658 tests still pass; the _shellQuote change is invisible to existing tests because the test fixtures use safe paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
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30de965e8e |
fix+docs: D32 — round-4 cleanup batch (F2/F3/F4/F5/F7/F8/F9)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 4) Round-4 cold-audit cleanup batch. 7 items grouped per IDR cleanup-batch convention (D19/D20/D25/D26/D30/D31 precedent). 2 P2 + 3 ADR amendments + 2 small docs/code cleanups. F10 (P3 semantic edge case) filed separately as GitHub issue #8. Changes (8 files, +200 / -38): **P2 fixes** 1. **F3 — README missing 6 provider auth env vars** (README.md): D30 fixed the `OLP_*` table but missed the auth-bearing env vars actually read by plugin code: - `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (anthropic.mjs:84) — highest-precedence override; bypasses keychain + .credentials.json file lookup - `OPENAI_CODEX_AUTH_PATH` (codex.mjs:163) — overrides full auth file path; when set, no other path tried - `CODEX_HOME` (codex.mjs:176) — overrides base dir; default auth path becomes `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json` - `MISTRAL_API_KEY` (mistral.mjs:260) — directly supplies API key; highest precedence per Mistral DOCS-2 - `MISTRAL_VIBE_AUTH_PATH` (mistral.mjs:265) — overrides full .env path; evaluated only when MISTRAL_API_KEY absent - `VIBE_HOME` (mistral.mjs:277) — overrides Vibe base dir; default auth path becomes `$VIBE_HOME/.env` Real onboarding-blocker fix: new users couldn't run OLP without knowing about these env vars; README now documents them in a "Per-provider auth env vars" subsection. 2. **F8 — Early-return error paths missing X-OLP-* headers** (server.mjs): ADR 0004 § Observability + README claim "every response carries the 5 X-OLP-* headers" but 503 (no-enabled-providers), 415 (wrong Content-Type), and early 400s (bad JSON, IR validation) emitted only Content-Type + Content-Length + X-OLP-Latency-Ms (D18 only wired the chain-exhausted path). Operators debugging these paths got less info than the ADR promised. New helper `olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model })` emits the canonical "no provider attempted" defaults: X-OLP-Provider-Used: 'none' X-OLP-Model-Used: model ?? 'unknown' X-OLP-Fallback-Hops: '0' X-OLP-Cache: 'bypass' X-OLP-Latency-Ms: <delta> 6 sendError call sites updated: 415 / 400-bad-JSON / 400-IR-parse (model: undefined → 'unknown') + 503-no-providers / 503-provider- disappeared / 500-engine-programming (model: ir.model). The 502 streaming-error-before-first-chunk path correctly stays on `olpHeaders(...)` since a provider WAS attempted. **ADR amendments** 3. **F2 — ADR 0003 model-mapping example correction** (docs/adr/0003, Amendment 2): the § Required fields example claimed `claude-sonnet-4-6` → `claude-sonnet-4-6-20260301` mapping happens in the provider plugin. This was wrong: per D17 SPOT decision (commit |
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taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
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a281d3e424 |
fix: D26 — round-3 small batch (F16+F17+F18+F19)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 3)
4 small fixes batched per Iron Rule 11 IDR cleanup-batch convention.
None exceeds ~15 lines; mixed surfaces (server.mjs / 2 plugins /
plugin header / tests) but all P3-class and related by being honesty
fixes to claims the ADR/spec made but code didn't honor.
Changes (5 files, +546 / -13):
1. server.mjs — TWO changes:
- **F16 (startup warning)**: `logEvent` function moved earlier in
the file (was at line ~124, now at line ~56) so it's defined
before `_startupConfig` is loaded. After loading, check
`_startupConfig.soft_triggers` — if non-empty, emit
`logEvent('warn', 'soft_triggers_deferred_v1x', ...)` with the
configured provider names + a descriptive message citing ADR
0004 Amendment 2. Wires the mitigation that ADR 0004 § Mitigations
(original pre-Amendment-2 text) requires: "Soft triggers configured
against such providers issue a startup warning so the user knows
the trigger will never fire." D22 deferred soft triggers but
didn't re-implement this mitigation.
- **F19 (streaming truncation marker)**: in the stop-less exhaustion
branch of the real-streaming code path (post-D25 F9 — the no-cache
fix), write a synthetic `{type:'stop', finish_reason:'length'}`
SSE chunk via `irChunkToOpenAISSE(...)` BEFORE `res.write(SSE_DONE)`.
Guarded on `streamedChunks.length > 0` (emitting truncation on
a zero-content response would mislead the client). Mirrors the
buffered D16 path which already synthesizes the same marker.
The synthetic marker is `res.write`-only — NEVER pushed to
`streamedChunks` — so the D25 F9 no-cache invariant
(cache decision sees the original chunks array unchanged) is
structurally preserved.
2. lib/providers/codex.mjs + mistral.mjs — F17 stderr propagation:
the SPAWN_FAILED throw from the error-chunk-in-NDJSON path now
includes `accumulatedStderr.slice(0, 200)` suffix when non-empty.
Comment cites ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 4 ("preserve the
client's ability to debug — the first failure is the load-bearing
signal").
**anthropic.mjs intentionally NOT modified**. Re-analysis confirmed
Anthropic's SPAWN_FAILED throws are from (a) process.on('error')
for binary-not-found (already includes OS-level err.message),
(b) SPAWN_TIMEOUT (separate code, D24 race fix), and (c) post-loop
exit-code (already includes `accumulatedStderr.slice(0, 300)`).
Anthropic uses `--output-format text`, so it has no NDJSON
error-chunk parsing path. The cold-audit was correct that the
error-chunk class only affects codex + mistral.
3. lib/providers/anthropic.mjs — F18 plugin header self-contained
D4 observation note. Pre-D26: ALIGNMENT.md anthropic Authority pin
row cited the plugin header for the OLP-side observation, and the
plugin header cited ALIGNMENT.md back — circular citation, no
party documented a fresh observation. Fix: plugin header now
carries the actual observation ("@anthropic-ai/claude-code v2.1.89
confirmed present at D4 implementation per ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5").
ALIGNMENT.md side unchanged (still points to plugin header — but
now points to a real artifact, not back to itself).
4. test-features.mjs — 9 new tests in 3 describe blocks:
- F16 ×3: soft_triggers non-empty → warn fires; empty → no warn;
undefined → no warn. Test uses inline simulation of the startup
code path (ESM module-eval can't be re-triggered per test process
without isolation gymnastics; inline simulation exercises the
same `Object.keys + length > 0 + logEvent('warn', ...)` shape).
- F17 ×3: codex with stderr → stderr appears in throw message;
codex without stderr → no suffix; mistral with stderr → suffix
- F19 ×3: partial-content + stop-less exhaustion → finish_reason='length'
marker before [DONE]; zero-content + stop-less exhaustion →
no marker (just [DONE]); D25 F9 invariant preserved (second
identical request triggers fresh spawn, X-OLP-Cache: miss)
Tests: 349 → 358 (+9). All pass on Node 20.
Authority:
- F16 → ADR 0004 § Mitigations (original) + ADR 0004 Amendment 2 (D22)
- F17 → ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 4
- F18 → ALIGNMENT.md Rule 1 (Cite First) + Rule 5 (Cite in Commits)
- F19 → OpenAI Chat Completions streaming spec finish_reason enum
https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/streaming
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-3 Cold Audit caught all 4
Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified critical concerns: (a) logEvent move is
net-zero (1 removed + 1 added; no duplicate); (b) F17 anthropic
non-application is justified by code-reading 3 SPAWN_FAILED sites in
anthropic.mjs (none is the NDJSON-error-chunk class); (c) F18 citation
chain no longer circular (verified BOTH endpoints); (d) F19 critical
no-cache invariant preserved (truncMarker is res.write-only, never
enters streamedChunks; verified both by code-path analysis and by F19
test 3 behavioral assertion).
3 non-blocking suggestions noted (F18 copy redundancy; F16 test linking
comment; F17 stderr slice-depth alignment) — all cosmetic, not folded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
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7ef5510837 |
feat(cache): D23 — implement hints.cacheable + 10MB size cap (round-2 F3)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24
Round-2 cold-audit Finding 3 (P2 cache correctness). ADR 0005 § "Cache
write conditions" items 3 and 4 were documented but never wired in
code:
- Item 3: "The provider's hints.cacheable flag is not false"
- Item 4: "The response is below a size cap (default 10 MB; configurable)"
Grep verified zero matches for `cacheable` / `10485760` / size-cap
patterns in lib/ or server.mjs pre-D23.
Changes (9 files, +391 / -12):
1. docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md — Amendment 3 adds `cacheable`
to the Provider contract hints list (after D11's Amendment 1 added
maxSpawnTimeMs). Authority chain cites ADR 0005 § Cache write
conditions item 3 as the field's origin.
2. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md — Amendment 3 documents the
D23 implementation of items 3 + 4 + the D16-interaction edge case
(truncated > 10MB → no-op eviction, structurally bounded since
responses > 10MB are anomalous by ADR's own rationale).
3. lib/providers/base.mjs — ProviderHints typedef gains
`[cacheable]` (optional boolean); validateProvider rejects non-
boolean non-undefined values. Omission accepted (default = true).
4. 3 plugins (anthropic / codex / mistral) each declare
`cacheable: true` explicitly with citation comment.
5. lib/cache/store.mjs — CacheStore constructor accepts
`maxEntryBytes` (default 10 * 1024 * 1024 = 10_485_760) +
injectable `_warnFn`. `set()` computes
`Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(value))`; if exceeded, warns via
`_warnFn` and returns undefined (no persistence). `getOrCompute`
still returns the computed value to caller — cache write skipped
but caller gets data; subsequent identical requests re-spawn.
6. server.mjs — 4 sites coordinated for cacheable opt-out:
- `executeHopFn`: cacheable check before D13 shouldBypassCacheForHop
(permanent provider policy precedes per-request bypass condition)
- `cacheStore.peek` gate at line ~504: `cacheableForFirstHop`
short-circuit
- Real-streaming branch entry condition at line ~522:
`cacheableForFirstHop` added (so cacheable: false + stream falls
through to buffered path which honors the opt-out via executeHopFn)
- Both `cacheStore.set` sites in streaming branch wrapped in
`if (cacheableForFirstHop)` defensive guards (post-D23
restructure these are unreachable for cacheable: false, but the
guards make intent explicit and survive future refactors)
7. test-features.mjs — 13 new tests:
- 5 validator tests (Suite 4): explicit true/false, omitted, string
rejected, number rejected
- 5 size-cap unit tests (Suite 9): default 10MB, custom override,
oversize skip + warn capture, within-limit normal persistence,
getOrCompute oversize returns-but-doesn't-cache + re-spawn
- 3 cacheable integration tests (Suite 9e): non-streaming opt-out,
streaming opt-out (the regression case that pre-fold-in failed),
X-OLP-Cache header consistency on both paths
Tests: 335 → 348 (+13). All pass on Node 20.
Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D23 reviewer flagged 2 blocking issues**: (1) the cacheable opt-out
in initial implementation was only in `executeHopFn` (buffered path);
the D10 real-streaming branch in server.mjs bypassed the check
entirely — calling streamPlugin.spawn() directly and writing to
cacheStore.set() at 2 sites without consulting cacheable. (2) Suite
9e integration tests didn't cover stream: true so the leak wasn't
caught.
Both diff-review and the implementer focused on `executeHopFn`
because that's where the cold-audit reviewer pointed for Finding 3.
Same class of "narrow attention" miss as several earlier D-days.
Fold-in: compute `cacheableForFirstHop` once at request entry; add
`!cacheableForFirstHop` short-circuit to peek gate; add
`cacheableForFirstHop` to streaming-branch entry condition (forces
fall-through to buffered path which has the opt-out); add defensive
guards on both `cacheStore.set` call sites. Added a 3rd Suite 9e
test covering stream: true + cacheable: false (which pre-fold-in
would have failed by serving the second request from cache).
This is now the FOURTH D-day where a doc-vs-code or path-coverage
gap was caught by the reviewer rather than the implementer. The
v1.6 § 10.x diff-review discipline continues to pay off.
Default behavior unchanged for 3 shipped plugins (all explicitly
`cacheable: true` → cache path identical to pre-D23).
Authority:
- ADR 0002 Amendment 3 (in-place) — establishes cacheable in contract
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 (in-place) — documents implementation of items
3 + 4
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions items 3 + 4 — the original
authority for both rules
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught the missing
implementation; diff-review Mode A caught the streaming-path gap
Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): REQUEST_CHANGES on initial, APPROVE after fold-in (implicit
— fold-in followed the exact recommendation). Verified:
- ADR amendment placement + structure
- Validator typedef + checks
- Size cap implementation in CacheStore + inflight slot release on
oversize-skip
- All 4 interaction cases (cacheable × cache_control × D16
× ordering) coherent post-fold-in
- 13 new tests including the regression test that would have failed
on pre-fold-in code
Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking notes, NOT in this PR):
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 could add one sentence on the prior-write-also-
oversize case (file as docs polish)
- Consider extracting `shouldUseCacheForHop(hopProvider, ir)` helper
combining D13 + D23 logic — reduces miss-risk for next reviewer
- Test 30 could add `assert.equal(store._inflight.size, 0)` as
inflight-slot leak regression guard
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
|
f8348adb3b |
fix(providers): D24 — close spawn-timeout race when timer fires during yield-suspension (round-2 F4)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24
Round-2 cold-audit Finding 4 (P2 concurrency bug). All 3 provider plugins
(anthropic / codex / mistral) had a race in spawn-timeout enforcement:
The timer's rejection branch is `if (rejectNext) { rejectNext(SPAWN_TIMEOUT) }`.
`rejectNext` is only set while the drain loop is AWAITING an empty-queue
promise. If the timer fires while the generator is suspended at a `yield`
(rejectNext === null because we're not currently awaiting), the rejection
is silently skipped. The loop then drains queued items, sees `close`
(from the SIGTERM), breaks normally. Post-loop guards on `!spawnTimedOut`
both skip: SPAWN_FAILED throw + yield-stop emit. Generator returns
normally with N partial chunks. Consumer (collectAllChunks) sees a
"successful" return. Fallback never advances. Truncated response gets
cached.
This violates BOTH:
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4 (hard trigger never fires)
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions item 1 (truncated response cached)
The bug escaped FOUR reviewers: D10 diff-review, round-1 cold-audit, D11
reviewer, D14 reviewer. Round-2 cold-audit caught it because it was
unprimed and walked the timer/drain-loop race manually.
Fix (3 plugins, parallel race):
Each plugin gains an unconditional post-loop check, placed AFTER the
existing `try { drain loop } finally { clearTimeout(timer) }` block,
but BEFORE the existing `!spawnTimedOut`-gated guards:
```js
if (spawnTimedOut) {
throw new ProviderError(
`<cli-name> spawn timed out after ${maxSpawnTimeMs}ms`,
'SPAWN_TIMEOUT',
);
}
```
This closes the race surface: the inner-loop guard (unchanged, lines
~319/461/583) handles the rejectNext-set path; the new post-loop guard
handles the rejectNext-null path. Together they cover both halves —
SPAWN_TIMEOUT now reliably surfaces as a hard trigger regardless of
which path the timer fire took.
Changes (4 files, +154 / -0):
- lib/providers/anthropic.mjs: post-loop guard at lines 360-365 (after
clearTimeout at line 348-350, before existing SPAWN_FAILED guard at 368)
- lib/providers/codex.mjs: post-loop guard at lines 521-526 (parallel)
- lib/providers/mistral.mjs: post-loop guard at lines 643-648 (parallel)
- test-features.mjs: new Suite 16 test 16e — race reproduction (109 lines)
Test 16e race reproduction (deterministic):
Exploits Node event-loop ordering. Mock spawn schedules data1 + data2 +
close via a single setImmediate. setImmediate runs before timers in the
same tick, so all 3 events queue before the timer can fire. Generator
yields data1 then suspends at yield with rejectNext null. Consumer
pauses 25ms (> 10ms timer). Timer fires during yield-suspension:
spawnTimedOut=true, rejectNext null → branch skipped, SIGTERM sent.
Consumer resumes, drain processes data2 + close, breaks normally.
Post-loop: D24 guard catches spawnTimedOut → throws SPAWN_TIMEOUT.
Pre-D24 behavior: generator returns normally (truncated, silently
cacheable). Test would FAIL.
Post-D24: SPAWN_TIMEOUT throws → test PASSES.
Reviewer empirically validated the test's diagnostic power by stripping
D24 from anthropic.mjs and observing exactly 16e fail (only 16e — 16a
through 16d still pass on the orthogonal rejectNext-set path), then
restored.
Timing flake risk: very low. Race depends only on relative ordering of
two setTimeout callbacks (10ms vs 25ms) which Node guarantees regardless
of absolute drift. Reviewer ran 7 npm test passes; 16e timing spread
26.43-27.70ms (1.3ms variance).
Tests: 334 → 335 (+1). 335/335 pass on Node 20.
Out of scope (filed in issue #3):
- SPAWN_TIMEOUT salvage parity: this fix discards partial chunks (matches
current SPAWN_TIMEOUT semantics, doesn't introduce asymmetry vs
SPAWN_FAILED-no-chunks). Whether to add SPAWN_TIMEOUT-with-usable-chunks
salvage (analogous to D16's SPAWN_FAILED salvage) is a separate design
decision tracked in issue #3.
Authority:
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy — Hard triggers bullet 4: "Provider CLI
spawn timeout (configurable per-provider via hints.maxSpawnTimeMs)"
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions item 1 (no truncation)
- engine.mjs HARD_TRIGGER_CODES['SPAWN_TIMEOUT'] = true (D10 P1.3,
unchanged)
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught this
Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified guard position in all 3 plugins; read
push() to confirm rejectNext-null mechanism; empirically validated test
16e's diagnostic specificity (strip-revert-restore); 7 test runs
confirmed timing stability. No blocking issues.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
|
ed82e65859 |
chore: D19 — cleanup batch (Findings 8 + 14 + 15 + D17 dead import)
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-23
Batched 4 small P3 mechanical cleanups per Iron Rule 11 IDR cleanup-batch
convention (all P3, all small, no semantic feature changes beyond defensive
validation).
Changes (7 files):
1. lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs (+30 / -3) — Finding 8 defensive validator:
- Added OPENAI_FINISH_REASON_ENUM Set with the 6 spec-allowed values
(stop / length / tool_calls / content_filter / function_call / null)
- Added normalizeFinishReason(value) helper that returns value unchanged
if in enum, else 'stop'
- Routed both irChunkToOpenAISSE (streaming path) and
irResponseToOpenAINonStream (non-stream path) through the helper
- Bonus tightening (in-scope, same finish_reason concept):
irResponseToOpenAINonStream's gate changed from `if (chunk.finish_reason)`
(truthy check) to `if (chunk.finish_reason !== undefined)` so an
explicit null (valid spec value meaning "still in progress") is no
longer silently dropped by the truthy guard
- Note: undefined → null collapse via `?? null` is unreachable in the
current codebase (all provider plugins explicitly set finish_reason
on stop chunks); defensive only against a future plugin that omits
the field — documented inline
2. .github/workflows/alignment.yml (-16) — Finding 14 dead CI cleanup:
- Removed `setup.mjs` from path triggers (push + pull_request) — the
file does not exist in the repo
- Removed the dead `KNOWN_PROVIDERS=(...)` bash array from job 1 and
its comment block — no later step iterated over it, so the array
was abandoned
- LEFT untouched: the Node.js inline KNOWN_PROVIDERS array in the
models-registry validation job — that one is actively consumed by
the schema validation script
3. lib/providers/anthropic.mjs / codex.mjs / mistral.mjs (3 × 1 line) —
Finding 15: removed unused `PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES` from import lines.
Each line went from `import { ProviderError, PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES } from
'./base.mjs';` to `import { ProviderError } from './base.mjs';`. The
constant remains exported from base.mjs (its declaration site, where
it IS used for validation).
4. server.mjs (1 line) — D17 reviewer's observation: removed unused
`getProviderForModel` from the import line. The function is only
called by lib/fallback/engine.mjs which imports it directly from
lib/providers/index.mjs. server.mjs's import was dead (the routing
SPOT lives in engine.mjs after D17 — server.mjs uses buildDefaultChain
exclusively).
5. test-features.mjs (+44) — Suite 3 (irChunkToOpenAISSE format) extended
with 4 new finish_reason normalization tests:
- Test 1: non-spec streaming finish_reason ('timeout', 'overloaded',
'cancelled') → mapped to 'stop'
- Test 2: spec-enum streaming finish_reason (all 6 incl. null) preserved
- Test 3: non-spec non-stream finish_reason → mapped to 'stop'
- Test 4: spec-enum non-stream finish_reason preserved (null
intentionally omitted — documented inline)
Tests: 324 → 328 (+4). All pass on Node 20.
Pre-commit fold-ins (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D19 reviewer suggestion #1**: added inline comment to
normalizeFinishReason explaining the unreachable `undefined → null`
branch (defensive only, no current plugin omits the field). Cheap
future-reader clarity.
- **D19 reviewer suggestion #2**: added inline comment to Test 4
explaining why null is intentionally omitted from the spec-enum list
(non-stream `!== undefined` gate enters with null and overwrites
default 'stop' to null — semantically odd but spec-valid).
Reviewer suggestion #3 (consider stricter `undefined → 'stop'` on
streaming-stop path vs `null → null` on delta path) explicitly marked
out of scope by reviewer — would require call-site context awareness;
filed mentally as potential future work, not tracked as an issue
since no current path triggers it.
Authority:
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b) — only spec-defined fields in OpenAI responses
- OpenAI Chat Completions spec finish_reason enum
https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/object#finish_reason
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Cold Audit Findings 8 / 14 / 15
Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified the unreachable `undefined → null` branch
claim by grep-checking all 3 provider plugins (none emit undefined);
verified the two KNOWN_PROVIDERS arrays were correctly distinguished
(only the dead bash one removed); ran npm test independently to confirm
328/328.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7
|
2cfd0b194e |
feat(phase-1): D10 P1 hardening — providers.enabled wiring + real streaming + spawn timeout
Folds in three production-blocking defects from external Codex review
round-3 of Phase 1 (D5+D6+D8+D9 already merged). Without these, OLP
returns 503 on every request even when `npm start` succeeds, streams
arrive as a single buffered burst after the spawn completes, and hung
CLIs block the engine forever despite ADR 0004 declaring spawn-timeout
a hard trigger.
P1.1 providers.enabled config wiring (ADR 0002 § Disable model):
- loadFallbackConfigSync() returns tri-field {chains, soft_triggers,
providersEnabled}; server.mjs reads _startupConfig.providersEnabled
and passes to loadProviders() at startup
- Empty / missing config → 0 enabled providers → 503 no_enabled_provider
(matches v0.1 0-Enabled posture per ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory)
- __setProvidersEnabled / __resetProvidersEnabled test seams; in-place
Map mutation preserves existing direct-mutation patterns in Suite 13
P1.2 Real SSE streaming on single-hop cache-miss (ADR 0003 entry adapter
pattern, OpenAI /v1/chat/completions stream=true contract):
- New handleChatCompletions branch when ir.stream === true && chain.length
=== 1 && !bypassCache && !preCheckHit
- for await (const irChunk of provider.spawn(...)) writes SSE per chunk
via res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(...)); accumulates streamedChunks for
cacheStore.set on stop
- First-chunk rule preserved: error-before-first-chunk → sendError(502);
error-after-first-chunk → truncated res.end(), no fallback
- Multi-hop chains (chain.length > 1) continue to use buffered
executeWithFallback to keep fallback safety semantics
P1.3 Spawn timeout hard trigger (ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4):
- SPAWN_TIMEOUT added to PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES (lib/providers/base.mjs)
and HARD_TRIGGER_CODES (lib/fallback/engine.mjs)
- All three plugins (anthropic.mjs / codex.mjs / mistral.mjs) wrap drain
loop with setTimeout (default 600_000ms, configurable via
hints.maxSpawnTimeMs); on fire: proc.kill('SIGTERM') + reject pending
drain promise with ProviderError(..., 'SPAWN_TIMEOUT')
- Timer cleared in finally; resolveNext/rejectNext atomically nulled in
push() + timer-fire path to prevent late-fire double-settle
Tests 277 → 288 (+11). Suite 14 (4 providers.enabled), Suite 15
(3 streaming cache-miss real-time, including arrival-count >= 2
assertion that architecturally proves real streaming), Suite 16
(4 spawn timeout, including 2-hop chain advancement from timed-out
primary). 288/288 pass on Node 20.20.2 + Node 25.8.0.
Authorities:
- ADR 0002 § Disable model — config toggle, not plugin-removal
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md
- ADR 0003 § Translation direction model — entry adapter for await pattern
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0003-intermediate-representation.md
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy + § Fallback safety (first-chunk rule)
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md
- OpenAI /v1/chat/completions stream=true (server-sent events,
data: {chunk} per delta, terminator data: [DONE])
https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/streaming
Reviewer (Iron Rule 10): fresh-context opus, independent of drafter.
Verdict: APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Folded the one cheap minor before commit
(Suite 15a arrival-count assertion strengthened from chunks.length > 0
to arrivalTimestamps.length >= 2 — the prior assertion would have
admitted a buffered impl). Two remaining non-blocking notes deferred:
optional writeHead deferral (low value; single-hop guard makes pre-
content 200 + empty body safe), and version bump (Phase 1 ships as
v0.1.0 aggregate when D11–D16 land).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
|
ea9184d2e8 |
feat(phase-1): land OpenAI Codex provider plugin (D6)
Phase 1 Day 4. OpenAI Codex provider plugin code lands as Candidate.
Anthropic and Codex now both in STATIC_REGISTRY length 2. Codex CLI is
NOT installed on the orchestrator machine, so D6 ships with a docs-only
authority pin; D7 will install the binary, probe real behaviour, and
fix any docs-vs-reality divergences (A3 access-token field, A4 NDJSON
event schema, possibly keyring storage support).
Files:
NEW: lib/providers/codex.mjs (586 lines initially, expanded ~10 lines
via reviewer fold-ins) — Codex provider implementing the v1.0
contract. spawns `codex exec --json --model <id> [PROMPT|-]` per
canonical Codex docs.
MOD: lib/providers/index.mjs — STATIC_REGISTRY now [anthropic, codex],
listAllProviderNames() returns 2 entries.
MOD: models-registry.json — providers.openai populated with five
documented model IDs (gpt-5.5, gpt-5.4, gpt-5.4-mini,
gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.3-codex-spark) and four aliases.
MOD: test-features.mjs — Suite 11 added with 46 tests covering contract
conformance, IR translation, mock-spawn behaviour, healthCheck,
estimateCost, registry length.
Authority citations (all WebFetched and verified during reviewer pass):
CLI reference: https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli/reference
Source for `codex exec` subcommand syntax, --json flag, --model -m
flag, and PROMPT positional including the `-` form for stdin piping.
Features: https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli/features
Reference for the supported-models list.
Auth: https://developers.openai.com/codex/auth/
Canonical pin for `~/.codex/auth.json` plaintext credential file
and `cli_auth_credentials_store = keyring` OS credential store option.
Models: https://developers.openai.com/codex/models
Canonical pin for the five documented model IDs (each shown as a
`codex -m <id>` example on the page).
ChatGPT plan: https://help.openai.com/en/articles/11369540 — Codex
runs against ChatGPT subscription budget when OAuth-authenticated;
OPENAI_API_KEY env path is for `codex login --with-api-key` only,
not `codex exec` runtime.
Architectural decisions:
1. Mirror D4 anthropic.mjs structure: file header, lossy translation
docs, default export = provider object, named exports include
__setSpawnImpl / __resetSpawnImpl for test injection.
2. Stdin path uses `args.push('-')` per documented CLI behaviour.
(Original D6 sonnet draft omitted the positional entirely and wrote
stdin directly — D6 reviewer pass 2 caught this; corrected before
commit. D7 E2E confirms.)
3. Auth artifact path `~/.codex/auth.json` is now documented in the
header as CONFIRMED per canonical auth doc, not assumed.
4. Access-token field name remains a defensive 3-name try-order
(access_token / token / accessToken) because the auth doc does
not enumerate field names. D7 captures real auth.json post-login.
5. OPENAI_API_KEY env injection during spawn is intentionally NOT
done. The auth doc clarifies OPENAI_API_KEY is a login-time input,
not a runtime override. codex exec reads its own auth artifact.
6. Codex stays Candidate. loadProviders({}) returns empty Map; only
loadProviders({ enabled: { openai: true } }) loads it. POST /v1/
chat/completions gpt-5.5 etc still returns 503 until config flag
is set + E2E audit passes.
Reviewer chain (Iron Rule 10):
Implementer: sonnet (general-purpose).
Fresh-context reviewer: opus (ecc:code-reviewer). Verdict
APPROVE_WITH_MINOR.
Reviewer ran npm test (174/174 pass with Suite 10 skipped), WebFetched
all four canonical Codex docs URLs, and discovered two additional
docs pages (auth + models) that sonnet had missed. Reviewer
independently verified the documentation citations rather than
trusting sonnet quotes — Rule 2 (No Invention) is the load-bearing
check for D6 because no local binary exists to ground-truth the
plugin.
Reviewer non-blocking findings folded in this commit:
1. Stdin path corrected: docs explicitly state `Use - to pipe the
prompt from stdin`. The original draft assumed "no positional →
stdin"; docs require literal `-`. Fixed in irToCodex; test
"irToCodex: multiline prompt uses stdin path (useStdin=true) with
- positional" updated to assert args.includes('-').
2. Model registry expanded from 3 to 5 entries per canonical models
doc. Added gpt-5.4-mini and gpt-5.3-codex-spark. Removed the
misread Rule 2 comment that justified omitting -spark suffix —
the docs literally show `codex -m gpt-5.3-codex-spark`, so the
-spark variant is a separate model not a -codex normalization.
New aliases: codex-spark, gpt5-mini.
3. File header A2 upgraded from "assumed" to "CONFIRMED" with the
canonical auth doc URL cited.
4. File header now cites both auth and models canonical URLs at the
top, alongside reference and features.
Reviewer findings deferred to D7:
- OS credential store / keyring support. Codex docs mention
cli_auth_credentials_store = keyring as an alternative to file
storage. The Anthropic plugin supports macOS keychain via security
find-generic-password; Codex equivalent unknown without inspecting
a real install. D7 will install codex, run codex login, see what
keyring entry codex creates (if any), and mirror the Anthropic
keychain support pattern.
- Real NDJSON event schema (field names). Defensive 4-shape parser
handles the most common conventions; D7 captures real stdout and
pins the schema.
- access_token field name in auth.json. D7 captures the real auth
artifact and removes unused fallback names.
Test count: 128 (after D5) → 174 (after D6).
Verification:
node --check on all touched files: clean.
npm test on Node 25.8.0: 174/174 pass in 210ms with Suite 10 skipped.
Test "codex.models contains all 5 docs-listed model IDs" passes.
Test "irToCodex: multiline prompt uses stdin path with - positional"
passes (asserts args.includes('-')).
Hygiene grep: zero personal-name/path/token hits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
|