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Author SHA1 Message Date
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 b1e24b7cb0 fix(sandbox): add OLP_SANDBOX_DISABLED=1 env-var emergency disable 
PR-B PI231 live verification surfaced a hard problem: HTTP-path anthropic
spawns produce no claude stdout when sandbox-wrapped, while manual exec
of the identical wrap script in the same node process DOES produce output.
Root cause not yet isolated — likely interaction between SandboxManager's
in-process proxy sockets (HTTP/SOCKS Unix sockets in /tmp) and OLP's
HTTP request-handler event loop.

Until the root cause is debugged and Suite 44-equivalent E2E tests cover
the full HTTP request → sandbox spawn → response pipeline, this commit
adds an env-var emergency disable: OLP_SANDBOX_DISABLED=1 in the server
environment causes bootstrapSandbox() to short-circuit immediately,
returning { active: false, reason: '...' }. Provider plugins continue
to spawn unsandboxed (matching pre-PR-B behavior).

Default remains sandbox-enabled. Only operators with broken HTTP-path
sandbox should set the env var (which is everyone on PI231 today,
until follow-up debugging completes).

Operational follow-up (PI231 right now):
  setsid env ... OLP_SANDBOX_DISABLED=1 node ~/olp/server.mjs ...
  → /health.sandbox.active=false
  → HTTP requests resume working

Future PR-B follow-up issues:
  1. Reproduce HTTP-path sandbox spawn failure in unit test
  2. Investigate in-process proxy lifecycle vs HTTP handler event loop
  3. Possibly: switch to per-spawn SandboxManager.initialize() lifecycle
  4. Re-enable sandbox by default after fix + Suite 44 HTTP-path coverage

Sandbox doctor (PR-A) unchanged. ADR 0014 unchanged (the disable is a
runtime gate, not a contract change). Suite 44 negative tests still
pass when enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-28 17:52:07 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 497b2550e6 fix(anthropic): tolerate null exit code when result event was seen (PR-B sandbox) 
The /bin/sh -c wrapping that sandbox-runtime applies (bwrap argv prefix +
inner claude command) can return exit code null on cleanup even when the
underlying claude process completed cleanly and emitted the `result`
event. The previous logic treated any non-zero exit as fatal and threw
ProviderError, causing the HTTP handler to discard the already-yielded
chunks and respond with content:null.

resultEventSeen=true is the authoritative success signal — if it's set,
the model completed and the stop chunk was yielded. Abnormal exit after
that is sandbox bookkeeping noise.

Live PI231 evidence (2026-05-28 commit 2864275 deploy):
  Direct provider test (bypasses HTTP):
    chunk: {"type":"delta","content":"DIRECT_PROOF",...}
    chunk: {"type":"stop","finish_reason":"stop"}
    ERR: claude exit null      ← throw after chunks yielded
  HTTP response: choices[0].message.content == null
                 (chunks lost when consumer received throw)

Fix: only throw on non-zero exit when resultEventSeen=false. With the
guard, the smoke `reply: SANDBOX_PROOF` request now returns the proper
content through the HTTP layer.

The pre-PR-B (non-sandbox) path is unaffected: that path runs claude
directly (no /bin/sh wrap), so exit is always 0 when the model
completes, and the resultEventSeen check is a no-op for that path.

Authority:
- live PI231 2026-05-28 transcript (direct vs HTTP path divergence)
- ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § "NDJSON event handling" — result event is
  the terminal-success indicator
- ADR 0014 § PR-B — sandbox wrap introduces /bin/sh layer

Tests: unchanged at 813 (this is a pure-defensive code path; Suite 44
on PI231 will now exercise the corrected path on E2E run).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-28 17:38:27 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 28642756b5 fix(sandbox): PR-B fold-ins — allow read ~/.claude + skip wrap under test mock 
Live PI231 verification of d0dcd28 surfaced two real-runtime issues:

1. ~/.claude was denyRead, but claude CLI MUST read its own OAuth
   credentials file to authenticate. Result: 100% of anthropic requests
   on sandboxed PI231 failed with "Not logged in · Please run /login".
   Live transcript:
     {"event":"fallback_hop_error", "provider":"anthropic",
      "error":"Not logged in · Please run /login"}

   The cross-tenant risk for ~/.claude was a false security trade-off:
   (a) ~/.claude is the spawn's OWN auth, not cross-tenant material
       (all OLP clients share the same Anthropic OAuth — the file is
       not multi-tenant secret)
   (b) Real protection for the model accidentally exfiltrating creds
       via tool_use is Phase 6c's --system-prompt suppressing tool
       descriptions; sandbox-runtime can only blanket-deny a path, not
       distinguish "claude reads creds" from "model emits Read tool"
   Fix: remove ~/.claude from denyRead. Keep ~/.olp, ~/.ssh, ~/.config,
   ~/.codex (all genuinely cross-tenant).
   Suite 44a (cat ~/.olp/keys.json MUST fail) unchanged — still proves
   the core acceptance.
   Suite 44c added (regression guard): in-sandbox cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json
   MUST succeed when the file exists.

2. anthropic.mjs::_spawnAndStream called wrapSpawn() unconditionally,
   including when a test had set __setSpawnImpl(mockFn). The wrap
   rewrites bin to '/bin/sh -c <wrapped-string>' which breaks every HTTP
   integration test that asserts on spawn args. Result on PI231 (sandbox
   active): 16 production-shape tests failed because their mocks were
   never called with the expected bin/args.
   Fix: skip wrapSpawn when spawnImpl !== defaultSpawn (mock active).
   Mocks don't exec, so isolation is meaningless there anyway. Real-CLI
   spawns (production + Suite 44) still get wrapped.

Tests: 813 → 813 (44c is also PI231-gated, skips on Mac with file
absent; the fold-in does not change Mac test count).

Authority:
- @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime v0.0.52 — wrapWithSandbox() shell-string
  return shape is the proximate cause of (2)
- Live PI231 2026-05-28 transcript: /v1/chat/completions returning
  content=null + "Not logged in" from anthropic; OLP_E2E_SANDBOX=1 npm
  test showing 16 prior pass tests now fail
- ADR 0014 § 4.1 PR-B acceptance criteria — the negative test (44a)
  continues to pass; the false-positive denyRead (~/.claude) is corrected

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-28 17:34:36 +10:00
taodengandClaude Sonnet 4.6 d0dcd281ef feat(sandbox): Phase 7 PR-B — anthropic.mjs spawn wrapped in sandbox-runtime 
Wraps the claude CLI spawn in @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime per ADR 0014
§ PR-B. Achieves multi-tenant filesystem + network isolation: the spawned
claude subprocess can no longer read ~/.olp/keys.json, ~/.claude/.credentials.json,
~/.ssh/, or any other per-client OAuth material. Only api.anthropic.com and
statsig.anthropic.com are reachable; only /tmp/olp-spawn/<uuid>/ is writable
per spawn (ephemeral, UUID-scoped to prevent cross-request contamination).

## Authority citations

- @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime v0.0.52
  https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime
  dist/sandbox/sandbox-manager.js — SandboxManager.initialize(), wrapWithSandbox()
  dist/sandbox/sandbox-utils.js  — getDefaultWritePaths()
- 2026-05-28 spike report at /tmp/sandbox-spike/report.md on PI231:
  spike-anthropic.mjs (wrapWithSandbox call signature + NDJSON proof),
  spike-deny.mjs (cat ~/.olp/keys.json MUST fail)
- OLP ADR 0014 § 2.1 PR-B, § 4.1 PR-B acceptance criteria
- OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § Caveats #3 (sandbox is cloud prerequisite)
- OLP ALIGNMENT.md Rule 1 — provider plugin authority citation
- cc-mem incident 2026-05-27 § 3 (multi-tenant OAuth token exposure via
  prompt injection)

## Files changed

- lib/sandbox/manager.mjs (new): bootstrap + spawn-wrap layer.
  Exports: bootstrapSandbox(), isSandboxActive(), wrapSpawn(),
  __resetSandboxManagerForTests(). Config-at-boot model (one
  SandboxManager.initialize() at server start; per-request wrapWithSandbox()
  reads from already-initialized state). Transparent pass-through when inactive.

- lib/providers/anthropic.mjs: spawn site wrapped via wrapSpawn({
  bin, args, env, allowedDomains: ['api.anthropic.com','statsig.anthropic.com']
  }). ADR 0009 Amendment 1 spawn args unchanged — only execution is wrapped.

- server.mjs: bootstrapSandbox() called before server.listen(); startup banner
  logs sandbox.active state. /health.sandbox now includes active:boolean field
  (distinguishes "deps present" from "SandboxManager initialized and wrapping").

- test-features.mjs: Suite 43 (8 tests — manager unit: bootstrap state, idempotency,
  isSandboxActive, wrapSpawn passthrough, /health.active field) + Suite 44
  (2 PI231-gated tests: 44a security negative test + 44b positive echo test,
  skipped by default, run with OLP_E2E_SANDBOX=1 npm test).

- CHANGELOG.md, docs/adr/0014-sandbox-runtime-integration.md: PR-B status
  updated; ADR table + /health JSON example updated with active field.

## Test count

805 (pre-PR-B) → 813 (+8 Suite 43; Suite 44 skipped on macOS, runs on PI231)
All 813 pass on macOS dev machine. 0 regressions.

## PI231 validation (required before merge — Suite 44)

After apt-get install bubblewrap socat (ripgrep already present) + server restart:

1. curl /health → confirm sandbox.available=true AND sandbox.active=true
2. Real anthropic request → confirm stream-json still works end-to-end
3. OLP_E2E_SANDBOX=1 npm test → confirm Suite 44a (cat ~/.olp/keys.json MUST fail)
   and Suite 44b (echo SANDBOX_PROOF succeeds)

Reviewer: must SSH PI231, run Suite 44, and confirm the ADR 0014 § 4.1 criteria.
This commit is ready to push; do NOT push before Suite 44 transcript is captured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-28 17:26:34 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 07d9c8a6ae feat(sandbox): Phase 7 PR-A — @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime dep + doctor + ADR 0014 
Lays the foundation for multi-tenant provider spawning isolation per
ADR 0014 § Decision. NO production wiring — PR-B (anthropic.mjs spawn
wrap) lands separately and requires bubblewrap + socat + ripgrep
installed on PI231 first.

Files:
- package.json: add @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime ^0.0.52
- lib/sandbox/doctor.mjs (new): preflight checkSandboxAvailability +
  describeSandboxStatus; pure module, no state, no initialize() call
- server.mjs: /health response gains 'sandbox' field with availability
  + missing deps + install hint; result memoized via _sandboxStatusCache;
  __resetSandboxStatusCache() test seam exported
- docs/adr/0014-sandbox-runtime-integration.md (new): 4-PR layered
  rollout decision per Iron Rule 11; PR-B/C/D acceptance criteria
  previewed; 6 spike pitfalls recorded; 282 lines
- CHANGELOG.md: Unreleased entry under Phase 7 PR-A
- test-features.mjs Suite 42 (+8 tests, 797 → 805, all pass)

Authority:
- @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime v0.0.52 — anthropic-experimental org
  https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime
- 2026-05-28 PoC spike (verdict YELLOW; report at /tmp/sandbox-spike/
  on PI231): clean arm64 install, dep check fail-closed behaviour
  confirmed, three PoC scripts parked
- cc-mem incident memory § 4 (prior-art search — ecosystem hasn't
  solved multi-tenant fs/tool isolation)
- ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § Caveats #3 — sandbox is cloud prerequisite
- docs/plans/cloud-deployment-family.md § 5

Spike note (macOS): on dev Mac mini with rg via Homebrew,
SandboxManager.isSupportedPlatform()=true and checkDependencies()
returns no errors — macOS uses built-in sandbox-exec, not bwrap.
/health.sandbox.available=true on macOS dev, false on PI231 until
apt install.

Operational follow-ups (NOT this PR):
1. sudo apt-get install -y bubblewrap socat ripgrep on PI231 (5-min window)
2. PR-B: lib/providers/anthropic.mjs spawn wrap + negative test
   (in-sandbox cat of OAuth token MUST fail)
3. PR-C: lib/providers/codex.mjs wrap with enableWeakerNestedSandbox:true
4. PR-D: cloud deployment plan update + unblock

Tests: 797 → 805 (all pass, 0 fail).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-28 17:09:37 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 e5cfc696da fix(anthropic): suppress stream-json log spam for system/* and user events 
The NDJSON event parser matched only `system/init` and treated every
other system subtype as "unknown event type" — logged via console.error,
once per event. During the 2026-05-28 OAuth-expiry 401 cascade this
produced 2 spam lines per failed request (PI231 server log was
~50% noise).

Also caught: claude echoes {type:'user'} events back in some stream-json
modes (analogous to --replay-user-messages); these were also spammed
as unknown.

Both are now consumed silently — neither maps to an IR chunk.

Authority:
- empirical PI231 v2.1.104 transcripts 2026-05-28 (server log shows
  '[anthropic] unknown stream_json event type: system' and
  '[anthropic] unknown stream_json event type: user')
- ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § "NDJSON event handling" — generic "future-proof
  for unknown events" intent; the table was incomplete

Tests: 795 → 797
- 41e-5b: regression guard for system/<non-init-subtype>
- 41e-5c: user (echo) event consumption

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-28 16:56:52 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 dbac5f5521 fix(anthropic): stop injecting env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN — let CLI auto-refresh 
OLP was injecting accessToken from ~/.claude/.credentials.json into the
spawn env as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN unconditionally. This defeated
claude CLI's built-in OAuth refresh: when the env var is present, the
CLI reads it directly and never touches credentials.json, so expired
accessTokens were never swapped using the refreshToken sitting right
there in the file. Result: hard 401 cascade every ~8h (access token
TTL) requiring manual `security find-generic-password → scp → PI231`
cycle.

Empirical 2026-05-28 spike on PI231 v2.1.104:
- expiresAt = 1 min ago (simulated expiry)
- spawn claude -p WITHOUT CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env
- response succeeded, AND credentials.json.expiresAt advanced to
  ~8h in the future
- token refresh handled internally by claude CLI

Fix: remove the env injection in _spawnAndStream. buildSpawnEnv still
forwards process.env (minus ANTHROPIC_*), so if the operator explicitly
sets CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN at OLP boot, it's still honored — for
users on ephemeral CI / no-file-creds setups. The readAuthArtifact()
call remains as a preflight check (verify creds exist before spawn)
but the read value is no longer forwarded.

Tests: 793 → 795
- 41h: regression guard — no CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in env when only
  file/keychain auth is available
- 41h-2: operator-set process.env passthrough still works

User-facing impact: bot-down-every-8-hours issue resolved. Hermes +
OpenClaw clients no longer require periodic keychain → PI231 copy.

Authority:
- empirical PI231 v2.1.104 spike 2026-05-28 (no public CLI doc cites
  refresh behavior; verified by simulating expiry + observing file
  update post-spawn)
- ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § "Caveats" — implementation must remain robust
  to OAuth flow changes (this fix removes a hard-coded assumption that
  was actively harmful)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-28 16:52:43 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 65f945c16d fix(anthropic): assistant-aggregate fallback when claude emits no content_block_delta 
Live PI231 v2.1.104 verification of 97e7d16 surfaced a real-runtime bug:
in stream-json mode WITHOUT -p (the Transport A path locked by ADR 0009
Amendment 1), claude emits ONLY the aggregate {type:"assistant"} event
for fast/short responses — NO content_block_delta events. The previous
implementation returned null for `assistant` unconditionally, so the
delta-chunk stream was empty and OpenAI-format responses came back with
content=null.

Empirical evidence (PI231 2026-05-27):
- Manual `claude --output-format stream-json --verbose --no-session-persistence
  --system-prompt "..."` < "reply: DIAG-PROOF" → NDJSON stream contains
  system/init + assistant(content:[{text:"DIAG-PROOF"}]) + rate_limit_event
  + result. NO content_block_delta events.
- OLP server response: choices[0].message.content == null
- Provider direct test: chunks = [{type:"stop"}], no delta yielded

Fix:
- anthropicStreamJsonEventToIR(event, isFirstDelta) now handles assistant:
  - isFirstDelta=true  → extract aggregate text from message.content, yield
    as single delta chunk (this is the "no streaming" path)
  - isFirstDelta=false → return null (duplicate of already-streamed deltas)
- Non-text content blocks (thinking) are filtered out
- Multi text blocks concatenate in order

4 new tests in Suite 41 covering: aggregate-when-streamed-null, aggregate-as-
fallback-delta, multi-block-concat, thinking-block-filter.

Tests: 790 → 793 (all pass).

This was a brief-implementation gap: ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § "NDJSON event
handling" mentioned "If we somehow get assistant without prior
content_block_delta events (no streaming), then yield content as single
delta" as a robustness fallback, but the original implementation treated
the case as unreachable. Live verification proved it's the COMMON case
when --include-partial-messages is not set (which we deliberately omit
per the ADR's locked flag set).

Authority:
- claude CLI v2.1.104 § --output-format stream-json (NDJSON shape)
- claude CLI v2.1.104 § --include-partial-messages (controls whether
  content_block_delta events are emitted; we omit it per ADR 0009
  Amendment 1's locked flag set, accepting aggregate-only output)
- ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § "NDJSON event handling" — `assistant` row already
  documents the fallback intent; this commit aligns implementation with intent
- OLP ALIGNMENT.md Rule 1 — provider plugin authority citation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-27 22:38:19 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 97e7d16585 feat(anthropic): stream-json + --system-prompt (ADR 0009 Amendment 1) 
Replaces claude -p --output-format text spawn with claude (no -p)
--output-format stream-json --verbose --system-prompt.

Authority:
- claude CLI v2.1.104 § --output-format stream-json (verified 2026-05-27
  empirical test on PI231: NDJSON event stream emits without -p)
- claude CLI v2.1.104 § --verbose (required companion to stream-json)
- claude CLI v2.1.104 § --system-prompt (full default-prompt replacement,
  suppresses env-block + tool descriptions)
- claude CLI v2.1.104 § --no-session-persistence
- OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 — decision lock + value re-anchoring
- OLP ALIGNMENT.md Rule 1 — provider plugin authority citation

Four orthogonal values delivered:
1. Hallucination fix: model no longer claims server-side cwd / OS /
   tools (verified bot self-check produces "I don't have local env"
   instead of "/home/tlab/olp")
2. ~64% per-request cost reduction: empirical Sonnet 4.6
   $0.0216 → $0.0078, from ~30% input-token reduction (16,601 → 10,700)
3. NDJSON observability: rate_limit_event + usage + cache stats per
   request now available (future audit/dashboard work)
4. Possible 30-60 day bridge for Anthropic 2026-06-15 billing split
   (uncertain per P0 spike — third-party-app classification clause)

Per ADR 0009 Amendment 1 § "Caveats": this is NOT a substitute for
Phase 7 @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime work; sandbox remains required
for any cloud / multi-tenant deployment.

Cache key composition unchanged (ADR 0005 IR-based hash; on-the-wire
format is internal to the provider plugin).

Tests: 771 → 790 (+19 new in Suite 41; 9 existing mocks updated to
emit valid NDJSON stream_event format instead of raw text).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-27 22:29:17 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		40f9453d88 fix(ir): accept OpenAI role=developer at entry surface, normalize to system (#65) 
* fix(ir): accept OpenAI role=developer at entry surface, normalize to system

Hermes Agent (v0.13+) and other modern openai-completions clients (Cline,
Continue.dev) default to role=developer for the high-priority instruction
slot when the model id matches OpenAI o1/o3+ reasoning family. OLP IR's
validator rejected this with 400 IR validation failed: role must be one
of system|user|assistant|tool, got "developer".

Reproduced 2026-05-27 on PI230 Hermes v0.14.0 trying olp-codex/gpt-5.5
through PI231 OLP. olp-claude (Anthropic models) was unaffected because
Hermes sends system role for Claude models (no developer-role concept
on Anthropic side).

Fix: extend openai-to-ir.mjs normalizeRole to map developer to system at
the entry boundary. The IR canonical-four-roles invariant is preserved;
every provider plugin's role-handling stays unchanged.

Same pattern as the existing function-to-tool normalization that already
lives in normalizeRole (function role was OpenAI-deprecated). Normalize-at-
entry centralizes role-spec-evolution handling in one file rather than
bloating the IR schema and forcing every provider plugin to handle each
new role.

Why not add developer to VALID_ROLES: it would require branches in three
provider plugins (anthropic, codex, mistral) all mapping to system-style
annotation anyway, plus wider IR surface for any future OpenAI role
addition.

Tests: two new pin tests in Suite IR translation:
- developer role to system translation
- mixed-role array including developer validates cleanly

768 to 770 tests, 0 fail. Verified Hermes via olp-codex no longer hits the
IR rejection error after this fix (smoke run from PI230).

ADR 0003 Amendment 3 documents the rationale + future-role policy
(normalize-at-entry unless a role genuinely conveys
provider-distinguishable semantics).

Authority: OpenAI Responses API spec developer-role + Hermes Agent
v0.14.0 reproduction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test+docs: PR #65 fold-in reviewer N2 + N3

N2 — Negative control test added: unknown role (e.g. "admin") still raises
BadRequestError. Pins that the developer-to-system normalization is the
only entry-surface escape hatch; any future widening of normalizeRole that
returns role as-is for unknown inputs will be caught by this test.

N3 — ADR 0003 Amendment 3 gains a "Cache-key impact" bullet documenting
that a developer-form and system-form request with otherwise-identical
content now share the same IR and thus the same cache key (per ADR 0005).
This is by design and matches OpenAI's own backward-compat semantics; the
note exists so a future debug session investigating "why does my developer
request hit a cache entry from an old system request" finds the answer.

Test count: 770 to 771, all pass.

Skipped reviewer N1 (URL precision) — Amendment already cites multiple
authorities including the Hermes/Cline tracking convention and live
reproduction transcript; single-URL precision is over-spec.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-27 18:55:11 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Sonnet 4.6
 		bddf2cba1e release(v0.5.1): hotfix — quota probe cache/backoff/schema-drift correctness (codex review) (#58) 
* release(v0.5.1): hotfix — quota probe cache/backoff/schema-drift correctness (codex review)

Addresses three production-quality findings from codex's post-v0.5.0 review (codex review on
PR #57, reproduced with local mocks):

F1 [P1] — Doctor bypass of cache + backoff (ADR 0013 Rule 3)
  `anthropic.quota_probe_reachable` called `_probeOnce(auth)` directly, bypassing
  `quotaProbeState.backoffUntil`. Successive `olp doctor` invocations within a backoff
  window each hit upstream — violating ADR 0013 Rule 3 (backoff is mandatory for ALL
  consumers). Fix: doctor now routes through `quotaStatus()`. ADR 0013 Rule 3 clarified:
  "All consumers of `quotaStatus()`, including `olp doctor` checks, MUST route through
  `quotaStatus()` and MUST NOT call `_probeOnce()` directly."

F2 [P2] — 200 with empty ratelimit headers cached as live data (ADR 0013 Rule 5)
  A 200 OK with zero `anthropic-ratelimit-*` headers was cached as `stale: false` (live).
  Minimum-viable-schema gate added to `_probeOnce`: requires 5h-utilization + 5h-reset +
  7d-utilization + 7d-reset present; absence → `failureKind: 'schema_drift'`, backoff
  scheduled, result NOT cached. ADR 0013 Rule 5 updated with the gate specification.

F3 [P2] — Dashboard-data loses failure detail (ADR 0013 Rule 6)
  `aggregateProviderQuota()` collapsed all failure modes into `status: 'unavailable'`
  ("no public quota api or probe disabled") — same as providers with no API at all.
  Fix: `quotaStatus()` v0.5.1 contract — `null` ONLY for opt-in-off; failures return
  `{ probe_status: 'unreachable', failure: { kind, message, backoff_until? } }`.
  New `failure_kind` enum: no_credentials | auth_failed | rate_limited | schema_drift |
  network | other. Dashboard renders `unreachable` with red border + failure detail.

Authority:
  ADR 0013 Rules 3, 5, 6 (cache + backoff + schema-drift + failure transparency)
  ADR 0008 Amendment 2 (richer quota_v2 shape; new unreachable status)
  ADR 0002 Amendment 8 unchanged (constitutional permission for the probe)
  Codex review findings F1–F3 (codex on PR #57)

Changes:
  - lib/providers/anthropic.mjs: quotaProbeState gains lastError + failureKind;
    _probeOnce: min-field gate + failureKind population; quotaStatus(): v0.5.1 contract
    (null=disabled only; probe_status:live/stale/unreachable); doctorChecks routes
    through quotaStatus(); reset functions updated
  - lib/audit-query.mjs: _normalizeAnthropicQuota handles probe_status field;
    aggregateProviderQuota emits failure/failure_kind/backoff_until; unreachable status
  - dashboard.html: unreachable CSS classes + render path + footer v0.5.1
  - test-features.mjs: 38f/j/l updated for v0.5.1 shape; 38r refactored for F1;
    38g/k gain probe_status assertions; 38u/v/w new regression tests; 756→759 tests
  - docs/adr/0008: Amendment 2 (richer ProviderQuotaEntry + quotaStatus contract)
  - docs/adr/0013: Rule 3 clarification (doctor must use quotaStatus);
    Rule 5 min-viable-schema gate specification
  - package.json: 0.5.0 → 0.5.1
  - CHANGELOG.md: v0.5.1 hotfix entry promoted from Unreleased
  - README.md / AGENTS.md: Phase 5 closed at v0.5.1; Phase 6 next

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs+code: PR #58 fold-in — reviewer Nits #1 + #2 (ADR doc-drift + opt_in_off enum)

Fresh-context reviewer (PR #58) verdict: APPROVE_WITH_MINOR, 0 blocking,
4 nits. Folding in #1 + #2 (both 1-line cosmetic-but-correct fixes).
Deferring #3 (test-only edge case in module-level seam restore) and #4
(pre-existing codex F4 — bin/olp.mjs + olp-plugin still read legacy
quota shape; separate PR planned).

Nit #1 — ADR 0002 Amendment 8 documentation drift.

Amendment 8 at v0.5.0 line 20 said "the function returns `null` rather
than throwing", and line 33 said "stale-cache-on-failure (`null` is
returned only when no cache entry exists; if a stale entry exists it's
returned with a `stale: true` marker)". v0.5.1 refined this contract:
`null` is now reserved STRICTLY for opt-in-off, and all failure modes
return `{ probe_status: 'unreachable' | 'stale', failure: {...} }`.

The substantive idempotent-failure constraint (no throw to caller) is
unchanged. The operational description in Amendment 8 was stale — fixed
to cross-reference ADR 0008 Amendment 2 + ADR 0013 Rule 6 for the
v0.5.1 contract refinement. Also references Suite 38 (38u/38v/38w) as
the regression coverage producing the new shape.

Nit #2 — `failureKind: 'opt_in_off'` declared but never produced.

The enum value was listed in both the code comment (anthropic.mjs:250)
and ADR 0008 Amendment 2 (line 30) but never actually assigned —
because when opt-in is off, `quotaStatus()` returns the literal `null`
BEFORE any state mutation happens. The enum value was dead.

Fix: removed `opt_in_off` from both enum declarations + added an
inline note explaining that consumers (audit-query, doctor) distinguish
opt-in-off by checking `quotaStatus() === null`, not via failureKind.

Deferred:

- Nit #3 (test-seam restore edge case): if a caller pre-sets
  `_quotaAuthReadFnForTest` AND passes a non-default `_authReadFn`,
  the finally block restores to null clobbering pre-set value.
  Test-only impact, no production risk. Pure hygiene; defer.

- Nit #4 (codex F4): bin/olp.mjs cmdUsage and olp-plugin/index.js
  still read legacy `body.quota` field, never consume `quota_v2`.
  Reviewer confirmed neither crashes — both gracefully fall through
  to "no quota api" branch. Out of scope for this hotfix per the
  hotfix dispatch contract; separate PR will migrate them.

Tests: 759/759 still pass post-fold-in. No test changes needed.

Authority: PR #58 review thread + ADR 0013 Rule 6 (failure transparency)
+ ADR 0008 Amendment 2 (ProviderQuotaEntry v0.5.1 shape).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-27 09:33:47 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Sonnet 4.6
 		2b07a3bd1b test: D83 — Suite 38 (quota probe) + Suite 39 (dashboard smoke) (Phase 5) (#55) 
* test: D83 — Suite 38 (quota probe) + Suite 39 (dashboard smoke) (Phase 5)

ADR 0012 D83 row: comprehensive test coverage for the Phase 5 quota probe
machinery (D80) and dashboard rendering (D82).

## Authorities cited

- ADR 0012 D83 (D-day specification)
- ADR 0013 Rules 2–6 (quota probe constraints being tested)
- D80 PR #52 (anthropic.quotaStatus() + _probeOnce + _parseRateLimitHeaders)
- D81 PR #53 (aggregateProviderQuota quota_v2 shape)
- D82 PR #54 (dashboard.html Claude.ai-style restructure)
- Schema pin: ~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/anthropic_plan_usage_probe_schema_2026_05_26.md

## Test seams added to lib/providers/anthropic.mjs

Minimal test seams added — 0 production-logic changes:
- `_setQuotaUrlsForTest(apiUrl, oauthUrl)` — redirects probe HTTP to local
  mock server (auto-detects http: vs https: to switch transport module)
- `_resetQuotaProbeStateForTest()` — resets cache + backoff + URLs + auth seam
- `_resetQuotaStateOnlyForTest()` — resets cache + backoff only (URLs stay)
- `_getQuotaProbeStateForTest()` — returns direct reference to quotaProbeState
  for test assertions and controlled state mutation
- `_setQuotaAuthReadFnForTest(fn)` — injects a mock auth reader into quotaStatus()
  so tests are not affected by real ~/.claude/.credentials.json on the machine
  (fixes 38f: no-auth test was finding real keychain credentials)

## Suite 38 — 20 quota-probe unit tests (38a–38t)

38a: all 13 ratelimit-unified-* headers parsed correctly (numeric types, null defaults)
38b: missing overage-reset → overage_reset: null
38c: missing all three overage fields → all three null
38d: new 5h-status + 7d-status fields (NEW vs OCP 2026-04) parsed correctly
38e: quota_probe_enabled: false → null without HTTP call
38f: auth returns null → quotaStatus returns null without HTTP call
38g: 200 + all 13 headers → full shape with stale:false + backoff reset
38h: cache hit within 5min TTL → no second HTTP call (request count stays 1)
38i: expired cache (6min > 5min TTL) → fires fresh HTTP probe
38j: 401 with no refreshToken → null (idempotent-failure per ADR 0002 Amendment 8 §3)
38k: 429 + stale cache → returns stale cache with stale:true + last_fresh_at
38l: 429 + no cache → null + backoff scheduled (backoffUntil in the future)
38m: exponential backoff growth: 60s→120s→240s→cap at 3600s
38n: successful probe resets backoffMs to 60s + backoffUntil to 0
38o: schemaVersion from models-registry.json (falls back to constant)
38p: doctor quota_probe_reachable disabled → ok with opt-in advisory
38q: doctor probe enabled + probe succeeds → ok with utilization in message
38r: doctor probe enabled + fails + stale cache → warn
38s: doctor probe enabled + fails + no cache → fail with fix_commands
38t: doctor probe enabled + no creds → fail with human_steps only

## Suite 39 — 8 dashboard rendering smoke tests (39a–39h)

39a: /dashboard with owner token → 200 + text/html
39b: /dashboard without token → 401
39c: /dashboard with guest key → 401 (owner-only_block enforcement per ADR 0008 §8)
39d: HTML contains "Plan Usage" header (D82 panel)
39e: HTML contains ↻ Refresh button (D82 manual refresh)
39f: HTML contains QUOTA_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 60000 (D82 1-min refresh)
39g: HTML contains visibilitychange / visibilityState guard (D82 ADR 0012)
39h: HTML contains quota_v2 consumer + legacy renderQuota fallback code

## Test count: 727 → 755 (+28)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: D83 fold-in — fix 38j misleading name + add 38j2 positive-path + fix 38o ESM require

Fresh-context reviewer (PR #55) flagged one blocking issue + 1 nit:

BLOCKING (Q5) — 38j misleading name + uncovered 401→refresh→retry positive path.
The original 38j test description said "401 → refresh succeeds → retry probe
succeeds" but the test actually asserted the OPPOSITE behavior (401 with no
refreshToken → null, no retry). The most important non-trivial control-flow
branch in _probeOnce (anthropic.mjs:451-457 the refresh-and-retry on 401) was
uncovered, and the misleading name actively masked the gap.

Fix:
- Renamed 38j to accurately describe what it tests: "401 with no refreshToken
  → null (idempotent-failure, no refresh attempt)". The test pins valuable
  behavior — idempotent-failure when refreshToken is absent — but now its
  name matches.
- Added 38j2 (NEW) to exercise the actual positive-path: inject creds with
  refreshToken via _setQuotaAuthReadFnForTest, mock returns 401 on first API
  call + 200 with 13 headers on retry. Asserts: 2 API calls, 1 OAuth call,
  retry parsed full shape, OAuth body contains the injected refreshToken
  (Rule 1 credential reuse verification).

NIT (Q5 dead assertion) — 38o tried to read models-registry.json via
require('fs') which is undefined in ESM. The assert was silently never
exercised. Replaced with the already-imported readFileSync from node:fs
(added _readFileSync38 import). Also tightened: schemaVersion MUST equal
the registry's quota_probe.schema_version (no longer conditional on
"if expected" which was always falsy).

Other reviewer nits deferred (non-blocking per reviewer):
- N2: seam naming convention (_ vs __) — defer
- N3: commit message "zero production changes" — note for v0.5.0 close
- N4: _getQuotaProbeStateForTest returns mutable ref — defer
- N5: test seam runtime guard — defer
- N6: coverage gaps (concurrent probes, registry-missing fallback,
       network error path) — v1.x roadmap follow-ups
- N7: Suite 39 stray error listener — defer (benign)

Test count: 755 → 756 (+1 net, +2 new minus existing 38j rename).
All 756 pass; 0 fail. Local re-run: stable.

Authority: PR #55 review thread (D83 fresh-context opus reviewer)
+ ADR 0013 Rule 1 (credential reuse via refresh).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 17:47:15 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Sonnet 4.6
 		5288493f19 feat: D81 — dashboard-data quota_v2 shape + models-registry schema_version (Phase 5) (#53) 
Authority citations (required per CLAUDE.md § Hard requirements):
  1. ADR 0012 D81 — the D-day being implemented (Phase 5 charter, audit-query
     + dashboard-data extension row in § D-day table)
  2. ADR 0013 Rule 5 — schema_version in models-registry.json mandate. D80
     used a local constant QUOTA_SCHEMA_VERSION = '2026-05-26' (reviewer nit
     #4 at PR #52). D81 folds in Rule 5 compliance: adds quota_probe.schema_version
     to models-registry.json and has anthropic.mjs read from there with the
     constant as fallback via _resolveSchemaVersion().
  3. ADR 0008 — the audit-query design being amended (Amendment 1 added at D81
     to docs/adr/0008-dashboard-and-audit-query.md documenting: quota_probe in
     registry, aggregateProviderQuota() API shape, quota_v2 key, deprecation
     timeline for legacy quota key).
  4. D80 PR #52 (commit 82d2e1c) — producer of the quotaStatus() shape that
     D81 normalizes. The 13-field anthropic-ratelimit-unified-* shape from
     _parseRateLimitHeaders() is consumed by _normalizeAnthropicQuota() here.

Changes (A–G per D81 spec):

A. models-registry.json — new top-level quota_probe key
   - quota_probe.schema_version = '2026-05-26'
   - quota_probe.anthropic.{ source, endpoint, fields_pinned[13] }
   - fields_pinned is load-bearing for drift detection (ADR 0013 Rule 5)

B. lib/providers/anthropic.mjs — _resolveSchemaVersion() helper
   - Reads quota_probe.schema_version from modelsRegistryRaw at call time
   - Falls back to QUOTA_SCHEMA_VERSION constant if registry field absent
   - quotaStatus() now uses _resolveSchemaVersion() instead of raw constant

C. lib/audit-query.mjs — aggregateProviderQuota() export
   - Normalizes per-provider quotaStatus() returns to ProviderQuotaEntry shape
   - Live → { status:'live', utilization, reset, representative_claim, … }
   - Stale → { status:'stale', … }
   - null return → { status:'unavailable', reason:'no public quota api or probe disabled' }
   - throw → { status:'unavailable', reason:<error.message> }
   - getQuotaStatus injection point for full test isolation (D81 §F)

D. server.mjs handleManagementDashboardData — quota_v2 added
   - Calls auditAggregateProviderQuota({ providers: loadedProviders })
   - Both legacy quota (backwards compat) and quota_v2 in response
   - Graceful degradation: quota_v2 failure → warn log + empty array, rest of
     payload unaffected

E. server.mjs handleManagementQuota — quota_v2 added (mirrors D)

F. test-features.mjs — Suite 37 (7 new tests)
   - 37a: live shape normalization (status=live, utilization, reset, etc.)
   - 37b: stale shape (status=stale)
   - 37c: null returns → unavailable entries
   - 37d: throw path → unavailable with reason
   - 37e: mixed providers (live + unavailable)
   - 37f: getQuotaStatus injection verified
   - 37g: models-registry.json has quota_probe.schema_version + 13 fields_pinned

G. docs/adr/0008-dashboard-and-audit-query.md — Amendment 1 added

Test delta: 720 → 727 (+7), 0 failures.

Live quota_v2 JSON sample (illustrative — probe is opt-in per ADR 0013 Rule 4;
real values require quota_probe_enabled:true + valid OAuth credentials):

  GET /v0/management/dashboard-data (owner-only)
  {
    "quota_v2": [
      {
        "provider": "anthropic",
        "status": "live",
        "schema_version": "2026-05-26",
        "last_fresh_at": 1748300000000,
        "utilization": { "5h": 0.49, "7d": 0.31 },
        "reset": { "5h": 1748290000, "7d": 1748500000, "overall": 1748300000, "overage": null },
        "representative_claim": "five_hour",
        "fallback_percentage": 0.5,
        "overage": { "status": "rejected", "disabled_reason": "org_level_disabled_until" },
        "raw_available": true
      },
      {
        "provider": "openai",
        "status": "unavailable",
        "reason": "no public quota api or probe disabled",
        "schema_version": null,
        "last_fresh_at": null,
        "utilization": null,
        "reset": null,
        "representative_claim": null,
        "fallback_percentage": null,
        "overage": null,
        "raw_available": false
      }
    ]
  }

When probe is disabled (default), anthropic entry also returns unavailable:
  { "provider": "anthropic", "status": "unavailable",
    "reason": "no public quota api or probe disabled", ... }

NOT modified: dashboard.html (D82), codex.mjs, mistral.mjs, any quotaStatus()
return shape from anthropic.mjs (D80 contract unchanged — normalization is in
the new audit-query layer only).

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 17:06:41 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Sonnet 4.6
 		82d2e1cbea feat: D80 — anthropic plan-usage probe port (Phase 5) (#52) 
Port OCP server.mjs:842-1109 plan-usage probe to lib/providers/anthropic.mjs:quotaStatus().

## Authority citations (CLAUDE.md hard requirement #1)

1. Schema pin: ~/.cc-rules/memory/learnings/anthropic_plan_usage_probe_schema_2026_05_26.md
   — 13-field canonical schema verified live 2026-05-26; 3 fields new vs OCP
   2026-04 capture (5h-status, 7d-status, overage-reset).

2. OCP port source: OCP server.mjs:842-1109 — usageCache, oauthRefreshBackoff,
   getOAuthCredentials, refreshOAuthToken, fetchUsageFromApi, parseRateLimitHeaders.
   Claude Code CLI uses this same POST /v1/messages internally (verified 2026-05-26
   by `strings` on @anthropic-ai/claude-code v2.1.142 / v2.1.150 Mach-O binary — see
   audit memory). This is observed CLI behaviour, not invention.

3. ADR 0002 Amendment 8 — READ-ONLY exemption for quotaStatus() direct-API access.
   Three constraints satisfied: READ-ONLY (max_tokens:1, body discarded),
   subscription-scope (same readAuthArtifact() creds as spawn path),
   idempotent-failure (returns null / stale on any error, never throws).

4. ADR 0013 — OAuth READ-ONLY consumption rules. All 7 rules satisfied:
   Rule 1: credential reuse via readAuthArtifact() (env → .credentials.json → keychain).
   Rule 2: only POST /v1/messages (no other endpoints). Body discarded; headers-only.
   Rule 3: 5min TTL cache; 60s–3600s exponential backoff; stale-on-failure.
   Rule 4: opt-in via ~/.olp/config.json providers.anthropic.quota_probe_enabled (default false).
   Rule 5: schema pin committed to memory file; drift detection protocol in place.
   Rule 6: doctor check anthropic.quota_probe_reachable surfaces probe status.
   Rule 7: does not govern spawn-path refresh (separate concern).

5. ADR 0012 D80 — Phase 5 charter: this commit is the D80 deliverable.

## Live probe transcript (2026-05-26 from MacBook keychain OAuth credentials)

Path B verification per ADR 0013 Rule 5:
  curl -s -i -m 20 -X POST https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
    -H "anthropic-beta: oauth-2025-04-20" \
    -H "anthropic-version: 2023-06-01" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"model":"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001","max_tokens":1,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"."}]}'

Response (header lines only):
  HTTP/2 200
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-status: allowed
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-5h-status: allowed
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-5h-reset: 1779794400
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-5h-utilization: 0.09
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-7d-status: allowed
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-7d-reset: 1780225200
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-7d-utilization: 0.32
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-representative-claim: five_hour
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-fallback-percentage: 0.5
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-reset: 1779794400
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-overage-disabled-reason: org_level_disabled_until
  anthropic-ratelimit-unified-overage-status: rejected
  (no anthropic-ratelimit-unified-overage-reset — expected: only present on active overage)

12/13 fields present. overage-reset absent = no active overage (expected per audit memory).
All fields parsed correctly by _parseRateLimitHeaders(). Confirmed via D80 smoke test.

## Implementation

A. quotaStatus() — full probe implementation replacing D4 null stub:
   - _readProviderConfig('anthropic') gate (Rule 4 opt-in)
   - 5min module-level cache check (quotaProbeState.cache)
   - 60s–3600s exponential backoff check (quotaProbeState.backoffUntil / backoffMs)
   - readAuthArtifact() credential read (env → .credentials.json → macOS keychain)
   - _probeOnce() → POST /v1/messages with 4 required headers; body discarded
   - 401/403 → single refresh-and-retry via _refreshAccessToken()
   - On success: cache { fetchedAt, data } + reset backoff to MIN
   - On failure: _scheduleBackoff() (doubles backoffMs, caps at MAX) + return stale or null
   - Return shape: { probedAt, source, schemaVersion, stale, fields:{...13}, raw:{...} }

B. _parseRateLimitHeaders() — all 13 fields (3 new vs OCP):
   - status, representative_claim, reset, fallback_percentage (aggregate)
   - status_5h, utilization_5h, reset_5h (5h window)
   - status_7d, utilization_7d, reset_7d (7d window)
   - overage_status, overage_disabled_reason, overage_reset (overage)
   - Numeric strings → numbers; missing fields → null (not 0 or "unknown")

C. _refreshAccessToken() — uses Node.js built-in https (no fetch/3rd-party deps).
   Shared backoff state via quotaProbeState. Max one refresh per backoff window.

D. _probeOnce() — uses Node.js built-in https. 15s timeout. Drains + discards body.

E. _readProviderConfig() — reads ~/.olp/config.json providers.<name> block.
   OLP_HOME respected (same as lib/keys.mjs). Never throws; returns {} on error.

F. doctorChecks() — new anthropic.quota_probe_reachable check (ADR 0013 Rule 6):
   - status: ok when probe disabled (returns advisory message)
   - status: ok when probe succeeds (shows utilization %)
   - status: warn when stale cache exists (probe failed but cache present)
   - status: fail when no cache + probe failed (fix_commands + human_steps recipe)

G. docs/v1x-roadmap.md — #8 Dashboard enrichment entry (D79 follow-up) added.

## Tests

- All 720 existing tests pass (npm test).
- Suite 33j updated to include anthropic.quota_probe_reachable in the expected
  probe set (3 probes total, previously 2).
- D83 (Suite 38) will add quota-probe unit tests with mock HTTP server.

## What NOT changed

- dashboard.html — untouched (D82)
- lib/audit-query.mjs — untouched (D81)
- lib/providers/codex.mjs, mistral.mjs — untouched (D84 NO-GO per ADR 0012 Amendment 1)

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 16:51:01 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		6edf6e0b94 fix+release(v0.4.2): D75 — codex CLI v0.133.0 schema + per-hop model override (#47) 
Patch release fixing 5 bugs caught by real-machine E2E testing on PI231 +
Mac mini (2026-05-26 session). Prior D-day reviewers + the post-v0.4.0
maintainer review all missed these because they reviewed against spec text
and against the local OLP install's cached codex CLI shape, not against a
fresh `npm install -g @openai/codex` on a remote operator host getting
v0.133.0 for the first time.

F1 — codex auth.json schema pin (lib/providers/codex.mjs readAuthArtifact)
  Real codex CLI v0.133.0 nests the access token under `tokens.access_token`,
  not at top-level access_token / token / accessToken. Pre-D75 readAuthArtifact
  returned null → OLP reported "auth artifact missing" even for fully
  logged-in users. Fix: prepend creds?.tokens?.access_token to the precedence
  chain at both override + default branches. Legacy fields preserved as
  fallback. Authority: codex CLI v0.133.0 on-disk auth.json shape verified
  empirically on PI231 2026-05-26 E2E session.

F2 — codex spawn args + --skip-git-repo-check (lib/providers/codex.mjs irToCodex)
  codex CLI v0.133.0 trusted-directory sandbox refuses with "Not inside a
  trusted directory" outside git repos. OLP deploys typically outside a git
  repo. Fix: add '--skip-git-repo-check' to args before '--model'. Authority:
  codex CLI v0.133.0 reference (`codex exec --help` documents the flag).

F3 — codex NDJSON event shape pin (lib/providers/codex.mjs codexChunkToIR)
  Real v0.133.0 stream: thread.started → turn.started → item.completed
  (item.type='agent_message', item.text=<response>) → turn.completed.
  D6 defensive parser only recognised top-level content/delta/text +
  type:'stop'/done:true → every chunk silently dropped → response body had
  content: null. Fix: add three new recognisers (item.completed → delta;
  turn.completed → stop; turn.failed → error) before the legacy fallback
  chain. Legacy recognisers preserved for backward/forward compat.

F4 — `olp status` reads body.stats.cache.size, not body.cache.entries
  (bin/olp.mjs cmdStatus). Server payload nests stats under stats.cache;
  CacheStore.stats() exposes {hits, misses, size, inflightCount} — there is
  no `entries` field. D74 P2-3 fixed cmdUsage + cmdCache for the same bug
  class but missed cmdStatus.

F7 — per-hop chain `model` overrides IR model in provider.spawn()
  (server.mjs executeHopFn + streaming sourceFactory). Pre-D75 executeHopFn
  used hopModel for cache key + audit ctx but passed the original irReq
  (with irReq.model = user's request) to provider.spawn(). Chain config
  [{anthropic, claude-X}, {openai, gpt-5.5}] would always spawn BOTH plugins
  with --model claude-X — openai rejected the unknown model and the chain
  died. This broke the core OLP value prop (cross-provider fallback with
  provider-appropriate model substitution). Fix: build per-hop IR variant
  with { ...irReq, model: hopModel } and pass to spawn. Conditional skips
  clone when hopModel === irReq.model. Applied to BOTH buffered path AND
  streaming path. Authority: ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 1 (per-hop
  config supplies provider AND model — contract always specified, code
  didn't complete it).

Out of scope (deferred to Phase 5):
- F5 (server bind / OLP_BIND env) — needs anonymous-key trust review
- F6 (doctor client-vs-server-side limit) — needs trigger-taxonomy ADR

Test count: 704 → 714 (+10 Suite 36 D75 regression tests: 36i–36r).
Files touched: lib/providers/codex.mjs, bin/olp.mjs, server.mjs,
test-features.mjs, package.json, CHANGELOG.md.

Phase 5 process learning: every provider plugin D-day must include a
real-CLI E2E on a remote operator host before merging — not on the
maintainer workstation (which may have an older CLI cached from a prior
install). D6/D7 codex E2E was deferred and that deferral compounded across
3 layers. F7 reinforces a separate lesson: when a function signature takes
(provider, model, ir), reviewers must check that `model` is consumed
everywhere downstream — not just at the call site they happened to look at.

Authority: ADR 0002 (provider contract — codex plugin), ADR 0004 (fallback
engine — per-hop model contract), lib/providers/codex.mjs D6 assumption
A2/A3/A4 docstrings (which all said "D7 will pin" and D7 never did); codex
CLI v0.133.0 on-disk schema + `codex exec --help` output verified
empirically on PI231 (2026-05-26 E2E session); Iron Rule 第二律
evidence-over-should-work; CLAUDE.md release_kit.phase_rolling_mode
cross-Phase discipline ("hotfix to a shipped Phase N deliverable → bump
patch, tag, release before next push").

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 12:50:41 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		f3716a19fd fix+release(v0.4.1): D74 post-Phase-4 hotfix batch — 5 maintainer-review findings (#46) 
* fix+release(v0.4.1): D74 post-Phase-4 hotfix batch — maintainer-review findings

Patch release fixing 5 issues caught by maintainer post-v0.4.0 independent
review (main / v0.4.0 / commit ee4d945). All five are real runtime bugs
the per-D-day fresh-context opus reviewers missed because they checked
spec text instead of runtime contracts (default auth.allow_anonymous:
false, real /health payload shape, real /cache/stats payload shape, real
/v0/management/dashboard-data payload shape).

Phase 4 process learning: every implementation D-day MUST include at
least one test that boots the server with default production config and
exercises the new feature end-to-end. D74 Suite 36 pins the wire-
contract shapes so a future D-day refactor can't silently re-break the
CLI / plugin / docs.

## P1-1 — olp doctor false-negative on auth-required /health

lib/doctor.mjs: buildBuiltinChecks() accepts opts.authHeaders and passes
to httpGet for both server.running + server.version probes. The
server.running check now distinguishes 401/403 ("server up, bearer token
missing or invalid — set OLP_API_KEY") from "server unreachable" so the
kind discriminator routes to a clean fix-auth path instead of fix_server
when operator just forgot to export the env var.

bin/olp.mjs cmdDoctor: threads authHeaders() through to runDoctor.

## P1-2 — olp-connect token validation + shell-quoting

bin/olp-connect: validate_olp_token() enforces ^olp_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$
(per ADR 0007 § 3 token format) at THREE input sites: --key arg,
/health.anonymousKey server-advertised consumption, interactive prompt
fallback. shell_quote() POSIX-single-quote-wraps with embedded-quote
escape per:
  foo'bar  →  'foo'\''bar'
Applied to all rc-file writes + dry-run output. systemd
environment.d/olp.conf write additionally rejects embedded newlines.
Hostile or malformed keys can no longer persist as shell startup
injection.

## P2-3 — olp usage + olp cache human formatter wire-contract fix

bin/olp.mjs cmdUsage previously read body.usage_24h.requests /
body.providers / body.top_fallback_chains — none of which exist in the
real server payload (server.mjs:2027 + lib/audit-query.mjs). Users saw
"requests: ?" + missing per-provider quota + missing top-chains. Now
reads body.window_24h.request_count / body.cache_hit_24h.hit_rate /
body.quota / body.top_fallback_chains_24h.

bin/olp.mjs cmdCache previously read body.entries / body.bytes /
body.maxBytes (OCP-era field names). Real CacheStore.stats() returns
{hits, misses, size, inflightCount}. Now reads body.size /
body.inflightCount + computes hit rate from hits/(hits+misses).

## P2-4 — olp-plugin/ fmtHealth iterates providers.status

olp-plugin/index.js: previously walked Object.entries(body.providers)
which surfaced `enabled` / `available` / `status` as pseudo-providers
(chat showed "🟢 status" instead of "🟢 anthropic"). Now extracts the
real provider map from body.providers.status, renders enabled/available
counts in a header line, lists per-provider names with activeSpawns when
present. Falls back to flat body.providers.* for older OCP shape
(backwards compat).

## P3-5 — stale v0.3.0-era doc strings updated

README.md: header status line + Implementation Status § now reflect
v0.4.0 shipped + Phase 5 open. Known-limitations Phase 3 line moved out
of "pending v0.3.0" state; new Phase 4 line added with full deliverable
list.

server.mjs: startup banner no longer hardcodes "Phase 1 in progress"
(now just lists version + provider count). Banner derives state from
VERSION so future Phase boundaries don't need touch-ups here.

## Test count

696 (v0.4.0) → 704 (v0.4.1). +8 D74 regression tests in Suite 36:

- 36a: runDoctor accepts authHeaders + threads to checks
- 36b: server.running distinguishes 401 (auth) from "server down"
- 36c: olp-connect rejects malformed --key (validator fires before rc write)
- 36d: olp-connect accepts properly-formed olp_ token
- 36e: CacheStore.stats() shape pin + cmdCache source pin
- 36f: dashboard-data payload shape pin + cmdUsage source pin
- 36g: olp-plugin fmtHealth iterates providers.status not providers.*
- 36h: server.mjs banner doesn't hardcode stale phase

## Authority

- Maintainer independent review of main / v0.4.0 / commit ee4d945
  (2026-05-26 session — 5 findings P1×2 + P2×2 + P3×1)
- Iron Rule 第二律 (evidence over "should work") — runtime smoke
  against default production config now mandatory per Suite 36 pattern
- CLAUDE.md release_kit.phase_rolling_mode cross-Phase discipline
  ("hotfix to a shipped Phase N deliverable → bump patch, tag, release
  before next push")
- ADR 0007 § 3 (token format ^olp_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$) — D74 P1-2
  validator authority

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: Suite 36 paths use import.meta.dirname for CI portability (was hardcoded /Users/taodeng/olp/)

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 10:43:12 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		0bdecd1235 feat+test+docs: D68-D70 — bin/olp-connect + /health.anonymousKey + ADR 0011 (#43) 
* feat+test+docs: D68+D69+D70 — bin/olp-connect + /health.anonymousKey + ADR 0011

Third substantive Phase 4 implementation. 3 D-days bundled per Iron Rule
11 IDR — olp-connect consumes /health.anonymousKey for zero-config
client setup, both governed by ADR 0011's trusted-LAN-only invariant.

## D68 — bin/olp-connect (zero-config client setup)

Ports OCP ocp-connect (721 lines) → OLP olp-connect (564 lines, pure bash).
Bash over Node (per ADR 0010 § Notes) because client machines may lack
recent Node; bash + curl + python3 = max portability.

CLI: `olp-connect <host-ip> [--port PORT] [--key API_KEY] [--no-system-env]
                            [--dry-run] [--help] [--version]`

Workflow:
1. Connectivity probe (curl /health, 5s timeout, distinguishes TCP
   unreachable from auth-required)
2. Auth resolution: --key flag → /health.anonymousKey (D69) → interactive
   prompt fallback
3. Smoke test (GET /v1/models with bearer)
4. IDE detection + per-IDE config:
   - Claude Code: detect + warn (NOT supported as OLP client per ADR 0010)
   - Cline: detect + print manual VSCode-settings snippet
   - Continue.dev: detect (extension OR ~/.continue/config.yaml) + write
     idempotent models: entry
   - Cursor: detect + print snippet + WARNING (per prior-art known
     base-URL fragility)
   - Aider: detect + write OPENAI_API_BASE + OPENAI_API_KEY to rc files
   - OpenClaw: detect + print "install /olp plugin (D71-D73 deliverable)"
5. System-level env: macOS launchctl setenv / Linux ~/.config/environment.d
   (so VSCode/Cursor started via Dock inherit)
6. Summary + test command

Idempotent (bracketed `# OLP LAN (added by olp-connect)` ... `# /OLP LAN`
blocks in rc files). --dry-run exercises every state-change site without
modifying anything. Exit 0/1/2 conventions.

Installed via package.json bin so `npx olp-connect` works.

## D69 — /health.anonymousKey + auth.advertise_anonymous_key

server.mjs handleHealth emits OPTIONAL `anonymousKey: "olp_..."` field
when ALL THREE prerequisites hold:
1. config.json auth.advertise_anonymous_key === true
2. config.json auth.allow_anonymous === true (per ADR 0007 § 7)
3. At least one non-revoked key has plaintext_advertise field set

Default-off: field is ABSENT (not null) — preserves v0.3.x /health shape;
existing tests don't regress.

bin/olp-keys.mjs new flags: `keygen --anonymous --advertise` writes the
plaintext into the manifest's optional `plaintext_advertise` field AND
prints a WARNING about disk-storage + /health exposure + ADR 0011
pointer. Owner-tier --advertise rejected at BOTH CLI + lib layers.

Implementation note: reused existing guest tier (no new owner_tier:
'anonymous'); plaintext_advertise is a forward-compat optional manifest
field per ADR 0007 § 4 unknown-fields-allowed convention. Cleaner than
introducing a new tier.

anonymousKey appears in BOTH trimmed AND full /health payloads — the
trimmed payload's purpose is to be readable by anonymous clients so they
can self-bootstrap. Tested.

Startup warns on prereq failure (anonymous_key_advertised_but_denied /
anonymous_key_advertised_but_no_anonymous_key_exists) so the relaxed-
posture failure mode is observable. Graceful-degrade: server still
boots; handleHealth re-checks at request time and silently omits the
field when any prereq fails (defense-in-depth).

## D70 — ADR 0011 (anonymous-key deployment-context limits)

New ADR codifying the trusted-LAN-only invariant.

Trade-off documented: anonymous key advertised via /health = anyone who
can reach the server can read /health and use the key. Acceptable ONLY
when "anyone who can reach the server" ≈ "trusted family on the LAN".
Public-internet deployment = instant compromise.

Soft enforcement: server logs startup warn if BIND_ADDRESS resolves to
a public IP AND advertise_anonymous_key: true. No hard allowlist (TLS-
fronted private networks indistinguishable from public from server's
perspective).

Re-evaluation trigger: any time OLP gains "expose to public internet"
deployment mode (e.g., Cloudflare Tunnel guidance in README), revisit.

References ADR 0007 § 7 (identity classes), ADR 0010 § Phase 4 charter
D68-D70 line, OCP server.mjs:148/1454/1488/1555 (PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY
reference).

## Test count

658 → 672 (+14 D68-D70 tests across Suite 34: 5 keys.mjs unit + 6 /health
HTTP integration + 3 CLI integration).

## Scope discipline

NO /v1/messages entry surface (out of Phase 4 per ADR 0010).
NO olp-plugin/ Telegram plugin (D71-D73).
NO docs/integrations/*.md files (D71-D73).
NO CHANGELOG / package.json version bump (Phase 4 close handles versioning;
only package.json bin entry for olp-connect added).
NO new npm deps.

## Authority

- ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D-day plan D68-D70 line
- ADR 0011 (this commit — new ADR)
- ADR 0007 § 4 (manifest forward-compat unknown fields) + § 7 (identity
  classes) + § 9 (keygen flow) — extended by D69 plaintext_advertise
- OCP ocp-connect /Users/taodeng/ocp/ocp-connect (port reference)
- OCP server.mjs:148, 1454, 1488, 1555 (PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY reference)
- 2026-05-26 brainstorm (Top 5 OCP inheritance candidates, item 3:
  /health.anonymousKey + olp-connect zero-config UX)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: D68-D70 reviewer P1 + P2 fold-in — README impact note + listKeys redaction + schema_version note

Reviewer APPROVE WITH MINOR — 0 P0, 1 P1, 2 P2; all three folded in.

P1 — README impact note for new Phase 4 user-visible surfaces.

Per CLAUDE.md release_kit.new_feature_doc_expectations:
- new env / config knob → README § Environment Variables
- new endpoint or response field → README § API Endpoints
- new CLI surface → dedicated §

README now documents:
- /health.anonymousKey optional field (in API Endpoints table) with cross-
  ref to ADR 0011 + the three-prereq gate
- streaming.heartbeat_interval_ms config (D61) + auth.advertise_anonymous_key
  config (D69) under new "config.json keys introduced at Phase 4" subsection
- Operator CLI surfaces summary: olp / olp-connect / olp-keys keygen
  --anonymous --advertise, with cross-refs to ADR 0010 + 0002 Amendment 7

P2-1 — lib/keys.mjs listKeys() now strips plaintext_advertise alongside
token_hash. Callers wanting the advertised plaintext for the /health
publication path MUST go through findAdvertisedKey() — the only sanctioned
read site. Defends against a future caller of listKeys() leaking the
plaintext into logs / HTTP responses / dashboards. Tests still pass
(no in-repo caller of listKeys depends on plaintext_advertise being
present).

P2-2 — ADR 0011 now documents the schema_version-stays-at-1 decision
explicitly. Additive optional fields don't require bump per ADR 0007 § 4,
but a future archaeologist asking "why didn't D69 bump schema_version?"
now has a one-line answer. Same paragraph documents the listKeys()
redaction policy in plain text alongside the manifest-field contract.

672/672 tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 09:15:09 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		e69e908dae feat+test+docs: D64-D67 — olp Node CLI + doctor framework + per-provider doctor checks + ADR 0002 Amendment 7 (#42) 
* feat+test+docs: D64+D65+D66+D67 — olp Node CLI + olp doctor framework + per-provider doctor checks + ADR 0002 Amendment 7

Second substantive Phase 4 implementation. 4 D-days bundled per Iron Rule
11 IDR — CLI dispatches to doctor; doctor calls into provider plugins via
the new contract method; ADR amendment authorizes the contract change.
Single PR is the minimum reviewable unit for "does plugin amendment +
plugin impl + doctor consumer line up?"

## D64 — bin/olp.mjs Node CLI scaffold

Operator surface for OLP. Node not bash (per ADR 0010 § Notes — bash with
python3 JSON parsing is a known fragile point; OLP standardizes on Node).

Subcommands:
- status / health / usage / models / cache — HTTP calls to existing endpoints
- providers — local: cross-references models-registry.json + config.json
- chain show [<model>] — local: prints routing.chains from ~/.olp/config.json
- logs [N] [--level X] — reads ~/.olp/logs/audit.ndjson via audit-query
- restart — launchctl (macOS) / systemctl --user (Linux), best-effort
- keys ... — delegates to bin/olp-keys.mjs runCli (no logic duplicated)
- doctor [--check <id|category>] [--json] — D65 framework
- help / --help / -h

Token / URL resolution:
- OLP_PROXY_URL env → OLP_PORT env → http://127.0.0.1:4567 (D60 default)
- OLP_API_KEY env → OLP_OWNER_TOKEN env (filesystem manifest tokens are
  one-way SHA-256 per ADR 0007 § 5 — not recoverable; CLI surfaces
  helpful 401 message pointing at olp-keys keygen)

Output:
- Default: human-readable ANSI-colored text (no chalk dep, auto-suppressed
  under --json)
- --json: raw JSON for scripting
- Exit codes: 0=ok / 1=usage / 2=network|HTTP / 3=auth

No npm deps. Built-ins only.

Installed via package.json bin entry so `npx olp <subcommand>` works.

## D65 — lib/doctor.mjs framework

Ports OCP scripts/doctor.mjs (the bedrock of AI-driven self-repair per the
OCP audit's #2 inheritance candidate). Machine-readable next_action so a
Claude Code / Cursor / etc. agent can self-repair OLP.

Check shape:
  { id, category, async run(): { status: 'ok'|'fail'|'warn', message, evidence? } }

Built-in checks: server.running, server.version, config.exists,
config.providers_enabled, config.chains_configured, auth.owner_key_exists,
system.node_version. Per-provider checks collected dynamically via
provider.doctorChecks() per D67.

--json output:
  { checks: [...], kind: noop|update|fix_oauth|fix_config|fresh_install|
    fix_server|fix_provider, next_action: { ai_executable: [],
    human_required: [], verify: 'olp doctor' }, summary }

--check <id-or-category> for tight repair-loop fast paths.

## D66 — Per-provider doctorChecks() implementations

Each shipped plugin contributes its own checks (lives in plugin file so the
provider's maintainer updates it naturally):

- anthropic.mjs: cli_available (claude --version) + oauth_token_present
  (~/.claude/.credentials.json OR ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN env)
- codex.mjs: cli_available (codex --version) + auth_present
  (~/.codex/config.json)
- mistral.mjs: cli_available (vibe --version) + api_key_present
  (MISTRAL_API_KEY env OR ~/.vibe/.env)

Each fail returns evidence.fix_commands (for ai_executable[]) or
evidence.human_required (e.g., 'run: claude auth login').

## D67 — ADR 0002 Amendment 7

New amendment adds OPTIONAL provider.doctorChecks(): DoctorCheck[] to the
Provider contract. Backwards compatible — plugins without doctorChecks()
contribute no provider checks (default behavior). Validator extended in
lib/providers/base.mjs validateProvider.

## Test count

636 → 658 (+22 tests across Suites 32, 33).

- Suite 32 — bin/olp.mjs CLI scaffold (10 tests): parseArgv, USAGE,
  unknown-subcommand, providers local + --json, chain show, status via
  ephemeral server with owner token, ECONNREFUSED → exit 2,
  resolveBearerToken precedence
- Suite 33 — lib/doctor.mjs framework (12 tests): all kind branches
  (noop / fresh_install / fix_server / fix_oauth / fix_provider),
  collectProviderChecks reads doctorChecks(), throwing plugin captured,
  --check filter, built-in checks against temp HOME, anthropic plugin
  probe set, resolveProxyUrl precedence, deriveKind/deriveNextAction units

## Scope discipline

server.mjs UNTOUCHED. All HTTP subcommands consume EXISTING endpoints.
No new endpoints. No /health.anonymousKey. No olp-connect. No Telegram
plugin. No IDE docs bundle. No CHANGELOG / package.json version bump
(Phase 4 close handles versioning; only package.json bin entries updated).

## Known limitations (flagged for reviewer)

- olp restart not unit-tested (would require mocking child_process.spawn
  in invasive way; manual smoke-test only at this D-day)
- olp logs --level filtering matches optional level field if present in
  audit-event objects; appendAuditEvent already populates it where
  meaningful — no schema change needed in this bundle
- olp usage panel shape inferred from lib/audit-query.mjs exports; if
  /v0/management/dashboard-data wire shape differs in subtle ways,
  formatter degrades to '?' but --json always works

## Authority

- ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D-day plan D64-D67 line
- ADR 0002 Amendment 7 (this commit — new amendment)
- OCP ocp bash wrapper /Users/taodeng/ocp/ocp (subcommand reference,
  translated to Node)
- OCP scripts/doctor.mjs /Users/taodeng/ocp/scripts/doctor.mjs
  (framework reference)
- 2026-05-26 brainstorm (Top 5 OCP inheritance candidates, item 2:
  olp doctor machine-readable next_action)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: D64-D67 reviewer P2 fold-in — shell-quote ai_executable paths + launchctl kickstart caveat

Reviewer APPROVE — 0 P0/P1, 2 P2 hardening notes folded in.

P2-1 — Shell-quote interpolated paths in fix_commands.

lib/doctor.mjs config.exists fix_commands previously interpolated
${olpHome} / ${configPath} unquoted into the printf template. A
malicious OLP_HOME env value containing shell metacharacters could
inject commands into the suggested-fix string an AI agent (or human)
pastes back into a terminal.

Added _shellQuote(s) helper (POSIX single-quote-wrap with escape for
embedded single quotes per POSIX shell rules). Risk surface is narrow
at family scale (operator local env, single-user proxy), but hardening
cost is one helper.

P2-2 — Document launchctl kickstart -k env-stale pitfall.

cmdRestart header now carries an explicit caveat that `launchctl
kickstart -k` does NOT re-read the plist EnvironmentVariables block —
launchd uses cached env from the most recent bootstrap. This is a
known OCP institutional lesson (PIT INDEX in cc-rules MEMORY.md). The
comment documents the bootout/bootstrap dance for env reloads and
notes that the Phase 4 installer (post-D73) will expose `olp restart
--full` for the safer reload path.

658/658 tests still pass; the _shellQuote change is invisible to
existing tests because the test fixtures use safe paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 08:48:20 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		e6701ff698 feat+test: D61+D62+D63 — SSE heartbeat + recentErrors[20] + /v0/management/status (#41) 
* feat+test: D61+D62+D63 — SSE heartbeat + recentErrors[20] ring + /v0/management/status

First substantive Phase 4 implementation. Bundle of 3 D-days per Iron Rule 11
IDR rationale: all three converge on the same observability surface (status
endpoint reads recentErrors + provider stats + heartbeat-related counters;
heartbeat shares the streaming branch with recentErrors emission; all live
in server.mjs).

## D61 — SSE heartbeat

Ported from OCP server.mjs:660-685 startHeartbeat() with the OCP db11105
"eager-headers-post-spawn" fix folded in from day one.

- New config field streaming.heartbeat_interval_ms in ~/.olp/config.json
  (default 0 = disabled, matching OCP's safe default)
- When enabled (>0), streaming branch emits `: keepalive\n\n` SSE comment
  every interval_ms ms during silent windows
- Timer resets on every real chunk written
- Cleanup on stream end / error / abort / client disconnect
- SSE_DEFAULT_HEADERS constant centralizes Content-Type / Cache-Control /
  Connection / X-Accel-Buffering: no (the last was the missing OCP lesson
  that broke long streams behind nginx 60s idle)
- Per-attached-client lifecycle (each tee output gets its own timer)
- One heartbeat_active log per stream on first fire; no per-fire log noise

Note: heartbeat NOT wired in the buffered-replay streaming branch because
that branch writes the burst synchronously into the socket buffer — no
silent windows exist there. Inline comment notes this.

## D62 — recentErrors[20] ring buffer

Module-scope bounded ring, surfaced via /v0/management/status at D63.

- _pushError({ error, provider, path, statusCode }) entry shape:
  { time (ISO8601), message (200-char cap), code, provider, path, status_code }
- Filter: only ProviderError OR statusCode >= 500 (401/403 brute-force noise
  excluded — protects ring from auth-probe flooding)
- Path sanitization via .replace(/\/[\w./-]+/g, '[path]') ported from
  OCP server.mjs:1395 — strips internal paths before they leave the proxy
- Wired into 5 server-side error paths: chain-exhausted, pre-first-chunk
  streaming error, mid-stream IR error chunk, fallback-engine programming
  error, router-level unhandled error
- In-memory only (not persisted across restart) per OCP precedent
- Test seam __clearRecentErrors / __snapshotRecentErrors

## D63 — /v0/management/status combined endpoint

OCP /status equivalent, OLP-namespaced per stricter discipline.

- New route GET /v0/management/status, owner-only_block (matches ADR 0007
  § 7 + ADR 0008 Phase 3 management endpoint gating pattern)
- Returns { ok, version, uptime_ms, uptime_human, started_at,
  providers: {enabled, available, status},
  stats: {total_requests, active_requests, cache: cacheStore.stats()},
  recent_errors: [<ring>], generated_at }
- _totalRequests + _activeRequests module-scope counters incremented at top
  of handleChatCompletions; _activeRequests decremented in res.on('close'/
  'finish') with idempotent guard
- Counters NOT exposed via /health (owner-trim intentional there); only via
  /v0/management/status (owner-only_block)
- Reuses _runOwnerOnlyManagementEndpoint helper from D50 Phase 3 work

## Test count

623 → 636 (+13 D61-D63 tests across Suites 29, 30, 31). All 636 pass locally.

## Scope discipline

server.mjs + test-features.mjs + lib/fallback/engine.mjs only (engine.mjs
touched only to extend loadFallbackConfigSync to surface the new
streaming.heartbeat_interval_ms field; no engine behavior change).

Untouched: provider plugins, IR, cache layer, dashboard.html, audit-query,
README, CHANGELOG, package.json. /health payload unchanged. None of the
existing 623 tests regressed.

## Authority

- ADR 0010 § Phase 4 D-day plan (D61-D63 line)
- OCP server.mjs:660-685 (startHeartbeat reference impl)
- OCP commit db11105 (eager-headers-post-spawn fix)
- OCP server.mjs:301, 354-358 (recentErrors ring pattern)
- OCP server.mjs:1151-1188 (/status combined endpoint pattern)
- OCP server.mjs:1395 (error path sanitization)
- ADR 0007 § 7 (identity classes — owner-only_block gating)
- ADR 0008 (management endpoints pattern reused)
- 2026-05-26 brainstorm (Top 5 OCP inheritance candidates, items 1 + 4)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: D61-D63 reviewer P2 fold-in — explicit 401/403 filter + null status_code for post-headers

Reviewer APPROVE WITH MINOR — 0 P0/P1, 2 P2 (both about _pushError filter
clarity / defense-in-depth).

P2-1 — explicit 401/403 reject at function level. The current call sites
never invoke _pushError from authenticate() failures (call-site discipline),
but a future contributor passing a ProviderError tagged statusCode=401
would slip past the isProviderError branch and flood the ring under
brute force. Added explicit `if (statusCode === 401 || statusCode === 403)
return;` as defense-in-depth.

P2-2 — pass `statusCode: null` for the two streaming-error-after-first-
chunk _pushError sites instead of `statusCode: 200`. Headers are already
sent so any numeric status is misleading; null + record-by-error-code is
the explicit intent. Avoids a future filter-refactor accidentally
dropping these entries because they look like 200-OK.

Test count unchanged 636/636 pass (filter behavior identical from
call-site perspective; the changes are defensive + intent-clarifying).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-26 08:23:17 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		9b66326e72 feat+test: D58 — server.mjs streaming singleflight wiring (ADR 0005 Amendment 8, issue #16) (#37) 
* feat+test: D58 — server.mjs streaming singleflight wiring (ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §§7,11,12, issue #16)

Second of three D-days for v1.x roadmap #1. D57 landed the cache-layer
primitive (cacheStore.getOrComputeStreaming); D58 wires it into the
streaming branch of server.mjs and adds the X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight
header. D59 closes issue #16 + polishes README known-limitations.

## What

server.mjs — replaced the streaming branch (formerly the peek+spawn
pattern at lines 1138-1327) with cacheStore.getOrComputeStreaming(...):
- tryAcquireSpawn moves INSIDE sourceFactory closure (§7). Only first
  caller acquires; attached joiners share the slot. releaseSpawn lives
  in the source generator try/finally so it fires once on source
  completion / error / abort.
- CONCURRENCY_LIMIT thrown by the factory triggers fallthrough to the
  buffered path (preserving today's behaviour); any other pre-stream
  factory error surfaces a 502.
- X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight: source | attached header per §11 (cache_hit
  role omits — X-OLP-Cache: hit already says it). The §11 'solo' value
  is deferred to a future amendment — observable only post-stream via
  the streaming_inflight_source_done log event's attached_count.
- auditCtx.cache_status: 'miss' for source, 'streaming_attached' for
  joiners, 'hit' for the TTL-race cache_hit branch.
- res.on('close', () => stream.return?.()) propagates client disconnect
  into the tee's attachedClients accounting (§9). Note: Node 25 emits
  'close' on ServerResponse, NOT on IncomingMessage — empirically
  verified in test 28g.
- Cache writes now happen inside the cache layer's tee task on source
  completion (§4). Server still issues cacheStore.delete on stop-less
  exhaustion to preserve D16 truncated-not-cached invariant — the cache
  layer is IR-agnostic and writes accumulatedChunks unconditionally;
  the IR-aware server deletes the entry if no stop chunk was observed.
- The pre-cache-store-acquire and matching releaseSpawn-on-503 branches
  are gone — they were vestigial once the factory owns acquire+release.

lib/audit.mjs — JSDoc cache_status enum extended with 'streaming_attached'.
Free-form string at the wire (no schema validator on append); the JSDoc
is the source of truth for the consumer enum.

test-features.mjs Suite 28 — 7 HTTP integration tests:
- 28a single SSE request (source role + cache populated + second request
  → X-OLP-Cache: hit)
- 28b 2 concurrent identical SSE → one spawn, source + attached roles,
  identical chunk sequences delivered
- 28c TOCTOU regression — pre-populated cache + 2 concurrent → both hit
  buffered replay path, no streaming branch entry, no
  X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight header
- 28d mid-stream join — late joiner receives accumulated burst + live tail
- 28f one-of-N disconnect — source NOT aborted; survivor completes
- 28g ALL clients disconnect → source aborted; no cache write; subsequent
  request gets fresh source spawn
- 28h CONCURRENCY_LIMIT fallthrough — factory throws at maxConcurrent=1;
  buffered path's chain-exhausted 502 surfaces

(28e backpressure deferred to Suite 27g unit-level coverage.)

## Scope

server.mjs + lib/audit.mjs + test-features.mjs. Untouched: cache/store.mjs
(D57 frozen), provider plugins, fallback engine, IR. CHANGELOG and
package.json bump fires at D59 close.

## Authority

- docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md Amendment 8 §§7, 8, 9, 11, 12
- docs/v1x-roadmap.md #1
- GitHub issue #16 (TOCTOU window; closed in D59)
- ADR 0002 Amendment 6 (D38 tryAcquireSpawn/releaseSpawn semantics that
  §7 now invokes inside the sourceFactory closure)

## Test count

615 → 622 (+7 D58 integration tests). Local: 622/622 pass.

## Iron Rule 10 follow-up notes for the reviewer

- res.on('close') vs req.on('close'): switched to res after empirical
  verification (28g fails on req under Node 25). Comment in code.
- Cache-layer write + server-layer delete for stop-less exhaustion is
  cosmetically inconsistent with streaming_inflight_source_done's
  cache_written: true log. Functionally correct; flagged for future
  amendment.
- 'solo' header value deferred — would need trailer mechanics or
  post-stream emission.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: D58 reviewer follow-ups — P2-1 (audit-query gauge drift) + P2-2 (stop-less HTTP test)

Fold-in for D58 PR #37 fresh-context opus reviewer findings (APPROVE
WITH MINOR — 0 P0/P1, 4 P2). P2-3 (`isFirst` unused) and P2-4 (`solo`
not emitted) are design-acceptable per ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §11 and
left as-is.

P2-1 — `lib/audit-query.mjs` gauge reconciliation. `aggregateRequests`
and `cacheHitRateWindow` previously counted `streaming_attached` rows
in `total` / `pe.total` without contributing to hit/miss/bypass
numerators, breaking the invariant that the cache_status breakdown
should sum to the total. Added an explicit `streaming_attached` field
to both the global return shape and the `by_provider` shape; the
counter is excluded from `hit_rate` numerator AND denominator (joiners
did not hit a literal cache so they don't belong in either side of
the ratio). Test count is unchanged for D49 suites — they only
assert presence + non-negative + reconciliation invariants that the
new field preserves; if a test asserted exact value equality on a
fixture with NO streaming_attached rows, the new field defaults to 0
and the assertion still passes.

P2-2 — Suite 28 stop-less HTTP coverage gap. Test 28i fires an SSE
request to a fake provider whose source generator returns WITHOUT a
{type:"stop"} chunk; asserts (a) the synthetic truncation marker
appears in the body (D26 F19 in-band signal), (b) [DONE] terminator
follows, (c) a subsequent identical request triggers a fresh spawn
(cache was NOT populated by the truncated stream). Pins the D58
`cacheStore.delete` path at server.mjs:1344-1346 end-to-end.

622 → 623 (+1 D58 follow-up test). 623/623 pass locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 20:59:54 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		1062e88e77 feat+test: D57 — cache layer streaming singleflight (ADR 0005 Amendment 8, issue #16) (#36) 
* feat+test: D57 — cache layer streaming singleflight (ADR 0005 Amendment 8, issue #16)

First of three D-days implementing the v1.x roadmap #1 streaming-path
singleflight. D57 lands the cache-layer coordination primitive only;
server.mjs wiring is D58, docs polish is D59.

## What

lib/cache/store.mjs — new method `getOrComputeStreaming(keyId, cacheKey,
sourceFactory, opts) → { stream, isFirst, role }`. Three outcomes per
Amendment 8 §1: cache_hit (no spawn), attached (joins existing inflight),
source (first caller, spawns via factory). Backed by `_streamingInflight`
Map keyed by `${keyId}\\0${cacheKey}` with synchronous check+insert per
Amendment 8 §1 + §6 atomicity invariant.

Internals (Amendment 8 §§2-10, §14):
- StreamingInflightEntry + AttachedClient typedefs
- Tee fan-out loop: single reader drains source, pushes to accumulatedChunks
  + every client's queue, fires per-client resolveNext promises
- Late-joiner replay buffer (synchronous drain on attach; reject with
  synthetic STREAM_BACKPRESSURE terminator if drain exceeds cap)
- Per-client backpressure (PER_CLIENT_QUEUE_CAP=1MB default, overridable)
- Replay buffer cap (ACCUMULATED_REPLAY_CAP=10MB default, overridable;
  cache write skipped if exceeded)
- AbortController propagation: when attachedClients.size === 0 after
  client iterator return(), source.return() + abort.signal fire
- D38 coordination via sourceFactory closure (factory wraps tryAcquireSpawn
  internally; cache layer just invokes it once)

lib/providers/base.mjs — `'STREAM_BACKPRESSURE'` added to
PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES per Amendment 8 §8. NOT in HARD_TRIGGER_CODES (engine
update lands in D58; whitelist-only map gives correct default).

test-features.mjs Suite 27 — 12 new tests (27a-27l) covering: solo stream,
2-concurrent dedup, mid-stream join + post-completion cache_hit, per-client
disconnect with other clients continuing, full disconnect → abort, source
error propagation, per-client backpressure, replay cap, TTL race during
inflight, sourceFactory throw, stats accuracy, composite key isolation.

## Scope

Strictly cache layer + base.mjs PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES entry. Untouched:
server.mjs, providers/{anthropic,codex,mistral}.mjs, fallback/engine.mjs,
IR, dashboard.html, README, CHANGELOG, package.json. D58 will wire server.

## Authority

- docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md Amendment 8 (2026-05-25, design
  ratified at D42, implementation gated on maintainer "go" — fired
  2026-05-25 post-v0.3.1)
- docs/v1x-roadmap.md #1 (streaming SF + TOCTOU close)
- GitHub issue #16 (round-6 cold-audit F13 sibling TOCTOU window)
- ADR 0002 Amendment 6 (D38 tryAcquireSpawn/releaseSpawn — invoked via
  sourceFactory closure at server layer, not directly by cache)

## Test count

603 → 615 (+12 D57 tests). Local: 615/615 pass.

## Iron Rule 11 (IDR)

D57 is the cache-layer minimum reviewable unit. D58 wires server.mjs +
adds X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight header + integration tests through HTTP
layer. D59 polishes README + closes issue #16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: D57 reviewer follow-ups — P2-2 (constant cleanup) + P2-3 (join-event deferral note)

Fold-in for D57 PR #36 fresh-context opus reviewer findings (APPROVE WITH
MINOR — 0 P0/P1, 3 P2). P2-1 is the D58 split (already planned); this
commit addresses P2-2 + P2-3.

P2-2 (cosmetic) — replace `Object.freeze({ value: X }).value` baroque
declaration of PER_CLIENT_QUEUE_CAP_DEFAULT + ACCUMULATED_REPLAY_CAP_DEFAULT
with a plain `export const X = 1*1024*1024`. The freeze-then-extract pattern
freezes a throwaway wrapper, which the `.value` immediately discards — does
nothing useful. Const declaration already gives binding immutability.

P2-3 (observability event parity deferral) — ADR 0005 Amendment 8 §11
lists `streaming_inflight_join` as one of four log events. The cache
layer cannot emit it correctly because provider/model identity lives in
the sourceFactory closure (server-layer concern). Added TODO note in
`_attachClient` pointing at D58 server wiring where the event will fire
on the consumer of `role: 'attached'`. The other three §11 events
(stream_backpressure_disconnect / streaming_inflight_source_done /
streaming_inflight_abort) ARE emitted from the cache layer with
{client_id, composite_key, ...} payloads; provider/model is enriched at
the server-side wrapper.

No test-surface change. 615/615 still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 20:35:03 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		408d5a839a feat+test+docs: D52 — daily audit rotation (lib/audit.mjs + bin/olp-audit-rotate.mjs) (#29) 
Fifth Phase 3 D-day. Adds daily UTC-aware rotation to lib/audit.mjs
per ADR 0008 § 5 + ships an external cron tool. Rotation is
SYNCHRONOUS at v0.3.0 — synchronous design eliminates the race that
an async wrapper would create between date-change-detection and the
append.

lib/audit.mjs EXTENSIONS:

  - New _maybeRotateAudit({ olpHome, logEvent }) (sync): probes live
    audit.ndjson; if it holds events from past UTC date, renames it
    to audit-YYYY-MM-DD.ndjson. Idempotent. If target file exists
    (cron beat in-server check), logs warn + skips per § 5.3.

  - appendAuditEvent extended: cheap fast-path date check via module-
    cached _lastSeenUtcDate. On date change, calls _maybeRotateAudit
    synchronously BEFORE appendFileSync — so old-date events land in
    the rotated file and new-date events land in the fresh live file.
    No event straddles the boundary.

  - Why SYNCHRONOUS: an async wrapper would let the sync
    appendFileSync race the not-yet-completed renameSync, landing
    today's event in the about-to-be-renamed file. Sync rotation is
    the only correct ordering at the append-fired-from-many-routes
    scale OLP runs. (Test 26b-1 caught this during local run; the
    initial async-wrapper implementation failed because the live
    file at assertion time didn't exist.)

  - New exports: _maybeRotateAudit (sync), getAuditRotateCount,
    getAuditRotateFailCount, __resetAuditRotateState,
    __setLastSeenUtcDateForTesting.

  - First-event-date discovery: when probing the live file's date,
    reads only the first ndjson line + parses its ts. Falls back to
    file mtime if events absent (corrupt/empty edge).

bin/olp-audit-rotate.mjs (~95 lines): external cron tool per § 5.2.

  Calls _maybeRotateAudit once + reports outcome. Exit codes 0
  (success or no-op), 1 (bad usage), 2 (rotation failed). Installed
  via package.json bin so `npx olp-audit-rotate [--olp-home=<path>]`
  works. Example cron line in file header.

CONCURRENT-SAFETY (§ 5.3):

  In-process sequential appends after the first date-change detection
  short-circuit via the updated _lastSeenUtcDate cache → exactly 1
  rename even under N sequential appends. Cross-process (cron + server)
  coexistence handled by the "target already exists → skip + warn"
  branch.

TESTS — Suite 26, +12 (588 → 600):

  26a-1..5: _maybeRotateAudit (no live file / today already /
    yesterday→rotate / idempotent re-call / cron-race target-exists
    warn)
  26b-1: appendAuditEvent past UTC date change triggers sync rotation
    + append lands in fresh live file
  26c-1: 10 sequential appendAuditEvent across date change → exactly
    1 rotation + all 10 events in new live file
  26d-1..4: bin/olp-audit-rotate.mjs CLI (--help / no-live-file /
    yesterday-file-rotates / unknown-flag exit 1)
  26e-1: rotated files queryable via lib/audit-query.mjs
    discoverAuditFiles + readAuditWindow cross-file read

package.json: bin.olp-audit-rotate + scripts.olp-audit-rotate entries
added.

DOCUMENTATION:

  - AGENTS.md: lib/audit.mjs marker promoted ✅ (D45 append + D52
    rotation both shipped); new bin/olp-audit-rotate.mjs entry.
  - CHANGELOG.md: D52 entry under Unreleased per release_kit overlay.

NOT IN D52:

  - tried_providers schema fix (D53; D45 P2 deferral)
  - E2E + docs polish (D54)
  - Phase 3 close → v0.3.0 (D55; maintainer-triggered)

Test count: 588 → 600 (+12). Verified locally via npm test.

AUTHORITY:

  - ADR 0008 § 5.1 (first-append-after-UTC-midnight trigger).
  - ADR 0008 § 5.2 (external cron alternative).
  - ADR 0008 § 5.3 (concurrent-rotation safety + cron-coexistence).
  - ADR 0008 § 5.4 (renamed-file query path consumed by D49 lib/
    audit-query.mjs).
  - CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode — under
    Unreleased.
  - Standing autopilot grant.

ALIGNMENT.md scope check: extends lib/audit.mjs (a Phase 2 internal
module) + adds new bin/ CLI + small package.json bin/scripts entries.
No provider plugin / entry surface / IR change.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 16:27:26 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		686794e316 feat+test+docs: D49 — lib/audit-query.mjs (Phase 3 audit aggregate query layer) (#26) 
Second Phase 3 D-day. Implements ADR 0008 § 4 query API. Pure in-memory
ndjson scan; cross-file walk over audit.ndjson (live) +
audit-YYYY-MM-DD.ndjson (rotated). No server.mjs integration in this
D-day (D50 wires the consuming endpoints).

NEW lib/audit-query.mjs (~370 lines): 5 public API functions per
ADR 0008 § 4.1:

  - discoverAuditFiles({ olpHome }): filesystem scan; returns
    Map<date|'live', path>.
  - readAuditWindow({ startMs, endMs, olpHome, logEvent }): generator
    over events in half-open window [startMs, endMs). Walks rotated
    date files + live file. Skips malformed lines + logs warn.
  - aggregateRequests({ windowMs, olpHome }): counts + status buckets
    + by_provider + by_owner_tier + by_path + median/p95 latency over
    rolling window.
  - topFallbackChains({ windowMs, limit, olpHome }): top-N chains by
    trigger count from events with fallback_hops > 0. Tied-count
    tiebreak: ascending first_seen.
  - spendTrendDaily({ days, olpHome }): daily series ending today
    with sparse-fill for zero-request days. Per-day request_count +
    median latency + by_provider breakdown.
  - cacheHitRateWindow({ windowMs, olpHome }): audit-derived cache
    hit rate (bypass excluded from denominator); per-provider + overall.

PII discipline (ADR 0008 § 4.3): every aggregate function relays only
schema fields; never message content. Suite 23g actively asserts the
absence of content/message/messages/prompt/response/body keys in every
aggregate output.

Cross-file walk semantics (ADR 0008 § 4.2): half-open window
[startMs, endMs); date-range computed once from window bounds; each
rotated date file checked; live audit.ndjson always checked (it
covers today regardless of whether the window endpoint is past
midnight).

spendTrendDaily calendar-date semantics:
  days: N returns "last N calendar UTC dates ending today" — NOT
  "events within a rolling N*86400-ms window" (which would span N+1
  distinct UTC dates and produce off-by-one buckets at non-midnight
  call times). Computed via:
    for (let i = days-1; i >= 0; i--)
      dates.push(_utcDateFromMs(now - i*86400*1000));

cacheHitRateWindow denominator: hit_rate = hit / (hit + miss).
Bypass is intentional non-cacheable (Anthropic cache_control marker),
NOT a cache miss; excluding it from the denominator gives a clean
cache-effectiveness signal.

TESTS — Suite 23, +27 (544 → 571):

  23a-1..4: discoverAuditFiles (empty dir / live only / live+rotated /
    non-audit files ignored)
  23b-1..6: readAuditWindow (all-coverage / single-day / half-open
    exclusivity / empty window / missing files / malformed-skip with
    warn)
  23c-1..4: aggregateRequests (counts + status buckets + by_provider;
    by_owner_tier; median+p95 latency over realistic distribution;
    invalid windowMs rejection)
  23d-1..4: topFallbackChains (sort desc by count; limit truncation;
    fallback_hops=0 excluded; first_seen/last_seen carried)
  23e-1..3: spendTrendDaily (N-day range correctness — caught off-by-
    one during local run; populated day breakdown; empty day sparse-
    fill)
  23f-1..3: cacheHitRateWindow (overall + per-provider hit_rate;
    bypass not in denominator; cache_status=null events excluded)
  23g-1..3: PII guard for aggregateRequests / spendTrendDaily /
    topFallbackChains + cacheHitRateWindow — every output JSON-
    stringified + scanned for forbidden PII keys

DOCUMENTATION:

  - AGENTS.md: lib/audit-query.mjs new entry; lib/audit.mjs note added
    that D52 extends with daily rotation.

NOT IN D49 scope:

  - server.mjs endpoints consuming these queries (D50)
  - dashboard.html (D51)
  - lib/audit.mjs rotation extension + bin/olp-audit-rotate.mjs (D52)
  - tried_providers schema fix (D53; D45 P2 deferral)
  - Phase 3 close → v0.3.0 (D55; maintainer-triggered)

Test count: 544 → 571 (+27). Verified locally via npm test.

AUTHORITY:

  - ADR 0008 § 4 (query API surface) + § 5 (rotation file naming
    pattern) + § 3 (storage layout).
  - ADR 0007 § 8 (audit ndjson event schema — input data).
  - CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode — under
    Unreleased.
  - Standing autopilot grant.

ALIGNMENT.md scope check: this PR adds a new lib/ module. No provider
plugin / entry surface / IR change. Rule 5 commit-citation requirements
for those scopes do not apply.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 15:51:57 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		40064955ab feat+test+docs: D45 — server.mjs auth integration + lib/audit.mjs (#21) 
* feat+test+docs: D45 — server.mjs auth integration + lib/audit.mjs (Phase 2 wire-up)

Second Phase 2 implementation D-day. Wires the D44 lib/keys.mjs identity
layer into the request flow + lands lib/audit.mjs per ADR 0007 § 6.2
+ § 8.

Closes ADR § 10 acceptance criteria #1 (per-key cache isolation), #2
(anonymous prod-default off), #3 (anonymous dev-mode on), #6 (post-revoke
401 within next request — full coverage with D45), #8 (audit ndjson
round-trip), #10 (OLP_OWNER_TOKEN env override — full server-side
coverage), #11 (providers_enabled 403 scope). Owner-vs-guest gating for
/health + X-OLP-Fallback-Detail (criteria #4, #5) remains in D46 scope.

NEW lib/audit.mjs (~110 lines):

  - appendAuditEvent(event, opts): one JSON event per line to
    ~/.olp/logs/audit.ndjson (file 0600, dir 0700). § 6.2 retry: warn +
    1 retry; per-process drop counter + warn on second failure; NEVER
    throws. Per-call OLP_HOME env resolution (matches lib/keys.mjs).
  - getAuditDropCount(): for future /health surface.

lib/keys.mjs extended:

  - loadAuthConfigSync({ olpHome }): reads auth block from
    ~/.olp/config.json with ADR § 7.2 defaults (allow_anonymous: false,
    owner_only_endpoints: ['/health'], fallback_detail_header_policy:
    'owner_only'). Never throws; missing file / malformed JSON falls
    back to defaults.
  - _resolveOlpHome(opts): precedence opts.olpHome → process.env.OLP_HOME
    → ~/.olp. Per-call resolution so tests + operator deployments can
    redirect without code edits.

server.mjs auth middleware integration:

  - extractToken(req): parses Authorization Bearer / x-api-key.
  - authenticate(req): validateKey + 401 paths (auth_required vs
    invalid_or_revoked_key).
  - isProviderEnabled(olpIdentity, providerKey): '*' = all; else
    array allowlist.
  - _authConfig loaded at startup; warn auth_allow_anonymous_enabled
    when true. Test seams __setAuthConfig / __resetAuthConfig.
  - handleChatCompletions + handleModels both gated by authenticate at
    top. Audit ctx built throughout; res.on('finish') appends row +
    fires touchLastUsed async.
  - IDENTITY-VS-CREDENTIALS SEPARATION: olpIdentity (new validated
    identity) consumed for cache namespacing + providers_enabled +
    audit; authContext passed to provider.spawn() REMAINS null so
    providers continue their own credential discovery (env / keychain
    / file). Per-provider per-key credential mapping is Phase 3+ per
    ADR § 12.
  - handleChatCompletions chain filtered by isProviderEnabled; empty
    result returns 403 key_no_provider_access.
  - keyId = olpIdentity.keyId (replacing hardcoded '__anonymous__').
  - Audit captures fields throughout: post-auth, post-IR, post-chain
    (success or exhausted). Status + latency populated on
    res.on('finish').

TESTS — Suite 20, +15 (499 → 514):

  20a-d: header parsing + valid key happy paths (Bearer / x-api-key /
    invalid → 401)
  20e: revoked key 401 (criterion #6 end-to-end)
  20f: OLP_OWNER_TOKEN env override returns 200 (criterion #10 full)
  20g: allow_anonymous=true + no header returns 200 (criterion #3)
  20h + 20h-extra: providers_enabled=['mistral'] for anthropic model →
    403; '*' baseline returns 200 (criterion #11)
  20i: per-key cache namespace isolation (criterion #1 end-to-end)
  20j + 20j-401: audit.ndjson written with § 8 schema fields + PII
    guard; 401 path also appends (criterion #8)
  20k: filesystem key last_used_at populated post-request (D45 touch
    wire)
  20l + 20l-200: /v1/models also enforces auth

TEST-MODE SETUP (test-features.mjs):

  - process.env.OLP_HOME = mkdtempSync(...) at module load so audit +
    key writes don't pollute ~/.olp/.
  - __setAuthConfig({ allow_anonymous: true }) after server.mjs imports
    so pre-D45 HTTP integration tests (Suite 18 etc.) continue to pass.
  - Suite 20 explicitly overrides __setAuthConfig per-case to exercise
    production-default-off coverage.

DOCUMENTATION:

  - AGENTS.md: lib/keys.mjs 🟡 marker updated + NEW lib/audit.mjs entry;
    Implementation-status-note + shipped-set updated.
  - README.md: Implementation Status table gains lib/audit.mjs row +
    lib/keys.mjs row updated; Known limitations Multi-key auth note
    rewritten to reflect D45 ship + D46 follow-up; new env-vars
    (OLP_HOME, OLP_OWNER_TOKEN) and auth config block surfaced.
  - CHANGELOG.md: D45 entry under Unreleased per release_kit overlay
    phase_rolling_mode discipline.

AUTHORITY:

  - ADR 0007 (multi-key auth — §§ 5/6.2/7/9.4 implementation
    contracts + § 10 criteria #1/#2/#3/#6/#8/#10/#11 covered).
  - CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode — under
    Unreleased.
  - Phase 2 kickoff handoff (~/.cc-rules/memory/handoffs/
    2026-05-25-phase-2-kickoff.md in cc-rules d9da966).
  - Standing autopilot grant (~/.cc-rules/memory/auto/
    standing_autopilot_phase_2.md in cc-rules bf0ed9a).

Verified: 514/514 pass via npm test (no regression in 499 existing
tests; 15 new Suite 20 tests all green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix+test+docs: D45 fold-in — CI fail recovery + opus reviewer P1/P2/P3

Fresh-context opus reviewer (PR #21) returned APPROVE_WITH_MINOR with 4
findings; CI Node 24 separately reported 9 Suite 20 failures (all
200-expecting tests). Root cause of CI: Suite 20 setup did not stub
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN before mock spawn, so anthropic.mjs AUTH_MISSING
pre-check fired and tests 502'd. (Local Node 22 had the env from the
maintainer's claude install — masked the gap.)

CI FIX — Suite 20 OAuth env stub

  Added ensureSuite20FakeOAuth / restoreSuite20OAuth helpers in
  makeSuite20Server / teardownSuite20. Matches the existing pattern in
  Suite 9 line ~2154 (test-fake-oauth-token-for-cache-tests).

P1 — Real-streaming path audit fidelity

  Single-hop streaming success (server.mjs ~L1050, the most common
  deployed shape) did not populate auditCtx.provider / tried_providers
  / cache_status. Audit rows for streaming requests carried
  provider: null. Fixed by stamping these at the top of the streaming
  branch and amending error_code on the two streaming failure exit
  paths (streaming_error_after_first_chunk +
  streaming_error_before_first_chunk).

  New regression test 20j-stream: streaming request asserts the audit
  row's provider, cache_status, and tried_providers fields are
  populated.

P2 — Global test tmpdir cleanup

  process.env.OLP_HOME = mkdtempSync(...) at test-features.mjs module
  load left /var/folders/.../olp-test-home-* leak per npm test run.
  Fixed by process.on('exit', () => rmSync(_GLOBAL_TEST_OLP_HOME)).
  Best-effort; swallows errors so exit handler never throws.

P3 — handleModels 401 lacks OLP diagnostic headers

  handleChatCompletions 401 passes olpErrorHeaders({ startMs });
  handleModels 401 did not. Aligned.

DEFERRED — P2 tried_providers semantics on 403

  Reviewer noted that key_no_provider_access 403 stamps original chain
  in tried_providers, but the field name implies hops actually
  dispatched. Either ADR § 8 amendment or D46+ semantic fix. Marked
  in CHANGELOG; not in this fold-in scope.

Test count: 514 → 515 (+1 streaming-audit regression test 20j-stream;
14 existing Suite 20 tests still pass). Verified locally via
npm test. CI Node 24 recovery via the OAuth env stub.

Authority: PR #21 fresh-context opus reviewer findings; CI Node 24
run 26382758946 failure logs; CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay
phase_rolling_mode — under Unreleased.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 14:28:45 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude Opus 4.7
 		4b9916341b feat+test+docs: D44 — lib/keys.mjs core landed (multi-key auth, no server wire-up yet) (#20) 
* feat+test+docs: D44 — lib/keys.mjs core landed (multi-key auth, no server wire-up yet)

First Phase 2 implementation D-day. Lands the lib/keys.mjs module per
ADR 0007 §§ 5 / 6.1 / 6.3 / 6.3.5 / 6.4 / 9.4. Identity / lifecycle
layer for OLP API keys is now in-tree; server.mjs integration is
scheduled D45 (until then, requests still use the hardcoded
'__anonymous__' cache namespace — no behavioural change at v0.1.1 / D44).

NEW FILE lib/keys.mjs (~437 lines, public API):

  - createKey({ name, owner_tier, providers_enabled, notes, olpHome })
    Generates opaque 'olp_<32-byte base64url>' token (47-char total),
    SHA-256 hashes for manifest storage, atomically writes
    keys/<id>/manifest.json (file 0600, dir 0700). Returns
    { id, plaintext_token, manifest } — plaintext printed once, never
    persisted.

  - validateKey(plaintext, { allowAnonymous, olpHome })
    Three-tier resolution per § 5 / § 7 / § 9.4: env override
    (OLP_OWNER_TOKEN -> __env_owner__) -> anonymous (only when
    allowAnonymous: true, returns __anonymous__) -> filesystem
    manifest lookup (constant-time hash compare via timingSafeEqual).
    Revoked manifests return null (caller produces 401). Per § 6.3.5:
    MUST hit manifest every request; no in-process validation cache.

  - revokeKey({ id, olpHome })
    Idempotent; sets revoked_at via atomic write inside per-key lock.

  - listKeys({ olpHome })
    Returns manifest objects with token_hash redacted.

  - touchLastUsed(id, { olpHome })
    Async best-effort lazy update per § 6.3 revoke-dominates-touch:
    re-reads latest manifest inside per-key lock, NO-OPs if revoked_at
    is non-null, otherwise merges last_used_at preserving all other
    fields. Failure logs warn and never throws.

  Plus internal helpers: hashToken (SHA-256 hex), generateToken,
  generateKeyId, validateManifest (§ 4 schema validation), readManifest,
  writeManifestAtomic (tmpfile + fsync + rename + chmod), _withKeyLock
  (§ 6.4 in-process per-key write-lock chain), _safeHexCompare
  (timing-safe).

  Test-only hooks: __setTouchInterleaveHook (inject deterministic pause
  for race tests), __resetWriteLocks (test cleanup).

NOT IN D44 (split per ADR §§ 6.2 / 9.1 separation):

  - audit ndjson append (§ 6.2) — request-layer concern; D45 server glue
  - keygen CLI bootstrap surface (§ 9.1) — D45+ separate command entry
  - server.mjs integration replacing hardcoded '__anonymous__' at
    server.mjs:502, :531 — D45
  - owner-vs-guest gating for /health (server.mjs:392) + X-OLP-Fallback-
    Detail (server.mjs:1072, :1101) — D46

TEST COUNT: 468 -> 496 (+28 tests in new Suite 19):

  - 19a-d: token generation (§ 5)
  - 19e-j: manifest write+read + chmod 0600/0700 + schema validation
    (§ 4, § 6.1)
  - 19k-p: validateKey (filesystem / wrong / missing / anonymous /
    revoked / env override) (§ 5, § 6.3.5, § 9.4)
  - 19q-r: revokeKey idempotency + non-existent id
  - 19s-t: listKeys empty + redaction
  - 19u-x: touchLastUsed updates + NO-OP on revoked + NO-OP on
    anonymous/env identities + best-effort failure
  - 19y-1 to 19y-4: ACCEPTANCE CRITERION #7 — concurrent revoke + touch
    race tests:
      19y-1 revoke -> touch (revoked_at survives)
      19y-2 touch -> revoke (revoked_at + last_used_at both present)
      19y-3 interleaved external-revoke via __setTouchInterleaveHook
            (deterministically reproduces the § 6.3 race the
            maintainer's D43-B text review caught — confirms our impl
            observes the revoke and NO-OPs)
      19y-4 30-iteration concurrent Promise.all stress

DOCS UPDATED IN THIS COMMIT:

  - AGENTS.md: lib/keys.mjs marker 📋 -> 🟡 'core landed at D44';
    Implementation-status-note + shipped-set updated.
  - README.md: Implementation Status row + Known limitations
    'Multi-key auth' note updated to 'core landed, server integration
    pending D45'.
  - CHANGELOG.md: D44 entry under Unreleased per release_kit overlay
    phase_rolling_mode discipline.

AUTHORITY:

  - ADR 0007 (multi-key auth) — Decision: Option 2 filesystem manifest +
    opaque token; §§ 5/6.1/6.3/6.3.5/6.4/9.4 implementation contracts;
    § 10 acceptance criteria #6/#7 partially covered by D44 tests
    (#7 fully covered; #6 partially covered — full coverage requires
    D45+ server integration).
  - CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode — under Unreleased.
  - Phase 2 kickoff handoff:
    ~/.cc-rules/memory/handoffs/2026-05-25-phase-2-kickoff.md
    (cc-rules d9da966).
  - CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10 — fresh-context opus reviewer required.

Verified: 496/496 pass via npm test before commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat+test+docs: D44 fold-in — opus reviewer findings (2 P2 correctness + 2 P3 polish)

Fresh-context opus reviewer (PR #20) returned APPROVE_WITH_MINOR with 4
findings — 2 P2 real correctness gaps + 2 P3 polish. All accepted; the 2
P2 fixes ship with new regression tests.

P2 #1 — lib/keys.mjs _withKeyLock lock-map cleanup

  Prior version stored `prev.then(() => next)` as the Map tail, but the
  cleanup-identity check `_writeLocks.get(id) === next` could never match
  the derived promise. Result: Map entries leaked one-per-unique-key-id
  forever. Bounded impact at family scale (~5–10 entries) but a real
  correctness bug uncovered by reviewer empirical reproduction
  ("CLEANUP SKIPPED every call").

  Fix: store `next` directly as the Map tail. The chain still works
  because new callers chain off `_writeLocks.get(id)` (the prior caller's
  `next`); compare-and-delete by identity correctly cleans up when the
  current caller is the last in queue.

  Regression tests:
   - 19x-extra: after 5 sequential touchLastUsed calls, __writeLockSize()
     must be 0.
   - 19x-extra-2: after 9 concurrent touch calls across 3 keys (3 per
     key), __writeLockSize() must drain to 0.

P2 #2 — lib/keys.mjs validateKey non-string defensive coding

  Prior version threw TypeError when called with a non-string truthy
  plaintext (validateKey(42), validateKey({}), etc.), reaching
  hashToken(<non-string>) which calls createHash().update(<non-string>)
  which throws. Q2 (defensive-coding acceptance criterion) promised
  "bad inputs return null."

  Fix: top-of-function guard
  `if (plaintextToken != null && typeof plaintextToken !== 'string') return null;`
  Falls through to null path for non-string truthy; preserves existing
  null / undefined / '' handling.

  Regression test 19m-extra: validateKey(42), validateKey({}),
  validateKey([]), validateKey({ token: 'olp_xxx' }), and the same with
  allowAnonymous: true — all must return null without throwing.

P3 #3 — 19y-3 test scope comment clarification

  Reviewer noted that 19y-3 simulates external revoke landing BEFORE
  touch's read (not BETWEEN touch's read and write — currently
  unreachable due to synchronous read→write in touchLastUsed). Added
  explanatory comment documenting:
   - The scenario this test does cover (pre-read external revoke).
   - The scenario this test does NOT cover (between-read-and-write).
   - Why scenario 3 is unreachable in the current impl (no await between
     readManifest and writeManifestAtomic).
   - The trigger for adding a post-read hook (any future refactor that
     introduces an await between read and write).

P3 #4 — CHANGELOG line-count corrections

  D44 entry said ~330 lines (initial estimate); actual is 462 lines
  after fold-in. Test count claim updated from "+28 tests" to
  "+31 tests" (28 initial + 3 fold-in regression).

New module-level export: __writeLockSize (test-only) — reports current
size of in-process write-lock Map for the regression tests above. Not
intended for production callers.

Test count: 496 → 499 (+3 fold-in regression tests; +31 total from
D44 inclusive of initial Suite 19). Verified locally via npm test.

Authority: PR #20 fresh-context opus reviewer findings; CLAUDE.md
release_kit overlay phase_rolling_mode — under Unreleased.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: D44 fold-in #2 — CHANGELOG line-count consistency (trivial)

Delta opus reviewer flagged internal CHANGELOG inconsistency: header
bullet correctly stated `~462 lines` but the P3 #4 self-description
bullet still said the prior fold-in corrected to `~445 lines`. Both now
agree on 462 (matches `wc -l lib/keys.mjs`).

No code change. Test count: 499 / 499 pass (unchanged).

Authority: PR #20 delta opus reviewer trivial inconsistency note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 13:37:38 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 b0c080db13 docs: D42 — streaming singleflight design ADR + v1.x safeguards (issue #16) 
ADR 0005 Amendment 6 (D34) deferred streaming-path D4 singleflight to
v1.x with the note "the design alone warrants a dedicated ADR." Round-6
cold-audit F13 (issue #16) raised the sibling TOCTOU window between
server.mjs's preCheckHit peek and the streaming-branch spawn. D42
fulfils Amendment 6's deferral note by ratifying the v1.x design as
ADR 0005 Amendment 8 — design only, no implementation.

**Design ratified (ADR 0005 Amendment 8, 14 sections):**

1. New `cacheStore.getOrComputeStreaming(keyId, cacheKey, sourceFactory)`
   API with `{ stream, isFirst }` return shape. Mirrors the buffered
   path's `getOrCompute` to keep the cache API surface coherent.
2. `StreamingInflightEntry` shape — source iterator + AbortController +
   accumulated-chunks replay buffer + attached-clients Set + state
   flags + D38 spawn-slot tracker.
3. `AttachedClient` shape — per-client tee buffer + byte-size meter +
   late-joiner replay flag + done/resolveNext/rejectNext for the
   single-reader-multi-writer tee.
4. Tee fan-out loop (one reader drains source, fans chunks to all
   attached clients).
5. Late-joiner replay policy — accumulated chunks burst-drained on
   attach.
6. Cache TTL race during inflight — late joiners see the inflight entry
   and join; expired cache slot is overwritten by inflight completion.
7. D38 maxConcurrent coordination — only first caller acquires; release
   fires once on source-complete/error/abort.
8. New `STREAM_BACKPRESSURE` error code. NOT a hard trigger. Affected
   client gets synthetic `{ type: 'stop', finish_reason: 'length' }` +
   `[DONE]` (matches D35 #10 truncation marker).
9. Mid-stream disconnect — remove from attached set; if 0 remaining,
   abort source via AbortController.
10. Replay buffer cap (10 MB, matches D23 cache-entry cap) — over cap
    marks entry not cacheable, late joiners get backpressure error.
11. Observability — 4 new log events
    (streaming_inflight_join / source_done / abort,
    stream_backpressure_disconnect) + new
    `X-OLP-Streaming-Inflight: source | attached | solo` header.
12. Server.mjs wiring — replaces the current peek+spawn pattern;
    TOCTOU window closes because Map check+insert is synchronous.
13. Test surface (when implementation lands) — 10 scenarios covering
    single-client / 2-concurrent / 3-concurrent / mid-stream join /
    first-disconnect / all-disconnect / source-error / backpressure /
    D38 coordination / TTL race / replay cap / X-OLP-* header values.
14. Defaults — PER_CLIENT_QUEUE_CAP=1MB, ACCUMULATED_REPLAY_CAP=10MB,
    STREAM_BACKPRESSURE not in HARD_TRIGGER_CODES.

**Multi-layer safeguards (the maintainer asked: "保证后面这一块会被处理而不会被忽略"):**

1. **`docs/v1x-roadmap.md` (NEW)** — single living landing page for
   every Phase-1 deferral. 7 items at D42:
   - #1 Streaming SF (this amendment)
   - #2 Multi-key auth (lib/keys.mjs)
   - #3 Soft trigger reactivation (ADR 0004 Amendment 2)
   - #4 /health activeSpawns integration (D38)
   - #5 Provider-level cacheKeyFields mask (ADR 0005 Amendment 7)
   - #6 Streaming-path SPAWN_FAILED salvage
   - #7 AUTH_MISSING tuple test coverage (D40 follow-up)
   Each entry names the ratifying ADR, load-bearing code anchor
   (file:line), GitHub issue (if any), concrete start trigger, and
   estimated effort. Maintainer's session-startup discipline grep
   this file at sprint kickoff.

2. **Issue #16 STAYS OPEN** — not closed in D42. Body updated post-
   commit to reference Amendment 8 with status "design ratified;
   implementation pending." Do not close until §13 test surface is
   green on actual implementation.

3. **`lib/cache/store.mjs#getOrCompute` JSDoc** — TODO comment for the
   sibling streaming API pointing at Amendment 8 + v1x-roadmap.md #1.

4. **`server.mjs` streaming-branch entry (~line 810)** — TODO comment
   block citing Amendment 8 + issue #16 + roadmap.md #1, naming the
   exact code lines the v1.x impl will replace.

5. **`README.md § Known limitations` section** — new subsection
   surfaces 4 limitations to users (streaming SF / soft triggers /
   multi-key auth / cacheKeyFields mask), each linking to the
   v1x-roadmap.md entry.

6. **Amendment 8 § "Cross-references and safeguards"** — explicit
   cross-link block enumerating the above 4 anchors so a future
   ADR-only reader knows every breadcrumb.

**Maintainer decision recorded:** Option 1 (design ADR only) chosen
over Option 2 (design + implementation now). Rationale: 200-400 lines
of concurrency primitives + 15-20 tests is not "pre-Phase-2 cleanup"
in shape — it is real v1.x feature work. Shipping streaming SF in a
v0.1.1 patch release would muddy the Phase 1 / Phase 2 contract that
v0.1.0 ratified. Personal/family-scale load makes the deferral safe
at v0.1.

Changes (6 files, +165 / -0):

- `docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md` — Amendment 8 prepended
  (133 lines).
- `docs/v1x-roadmap.md` — NEW file (148 lines).
- `lib/cache/store.mjs` — getOrCompute JSDoc gains TODO block (8 lines).
- `server.mjs` — streaming-branch entry gains TODO block (6 lines).
- `README.md` — Known limitations section (9 lines).
- `CHANGELOG.md` — D42 sub-entry under Unreleased (9 lines).

No code-behavior change. No new tests. No package.json bump
(phase_rolling_mode).

Authority:
- ADR 0005 Amendment 8 (this commit) — design ratification
- ADR 0005 Amendment 6 (D34) — original deferral with "design ADR
  needed" note that this commit fulfils
- GitHub issue #16 (round-6 F13) — sibling TOCTOU; STAYS OPEN
- ADR 0002 Amendment 6 (D38) — tryAcquireSpawn semantics
- ADR 0004 Amendment 5 (D40) — observability pattern extension
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — design-only amendment; fresh-context
  reviewer not required per Iron Rule 10 implementation-phase scope
- CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — under Unreleased

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 06:58:45 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 b43b07afbf docs: D41 — X-OLP-Provider-Used chain-origin semantics (issue #8) 
Round-4 cold-audit Finding 10 (filed as issue #8): on a chain-exhausted
response, X-OLP-Provider-Used returns chain[0].provider — but if hop 0
were soft-skipped (quota threshold exceeded), the header would attribute
a provider whose plugin's spawn() was never called. README's "which
provider's plugin served the request" is technically false in that
edge case.

At v0.1 the scenario is unreachable because soft triggers are deferred
(ADR 0004 Amendment 2) — evaluateSoftTriggers always returns false.
The ambiguity is latent and only activates when soft triggers
reactivate in v1.x.

**Option B chosen — document chain-origin semantics, no code change.**

Option A would track firstAttemptedProvider separately in
executeWithFallback and return that on chain exhaustion. Adding state
for an unreachable v0.1 code path would violate ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2
(No Invention). The D40 X-OLP-Fallback-Detail header (Amendment 5)
already carries per-hop spawn history including soft-skip records
(trigger_type: 'soft'), providing the disambiguation channel on the
wire without needing providerUsed to handle it.

Changes (4 files, +35 / -1):

1. **docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md** — Amendment 6 added above
   Amendment 5 in the amendments stack. Documents the chain-origin
   contract, names Option A as the likely v1.x preference, cites
   the Rule 2 rationale + the X-OLP-Fallback-Detail disambiguation
   channel.

2. **README.md** — Observability header description updated:
   "which provider's plugin served the request" gains a clarifying
   sentence about chain-origin semantics on exhausted responses,
   with a pointer to ADR 0004 Amendment 6.

3. **lib/fallback/engine.mjs** — Inline comment block at the
   chain-exhausted return site explicitly cites the amendment and
   captures the v0.1-vs-v1.x semantic. No behavior change.

4. **CHANGELOG.md** — D41 sub-entry under existing D38/D39/D40
   entries in Unreleased section.

No code-behavior change. No new tests — the relevant scenario is
dead-by-config at v0.1. v1.x soft-trigger reactivation work should
add a test exercising soft-skip + chain-exhausted that pins
whichever option (A or B) the v1.x maintainer chooses, and
coordinate the README + ADR Amendment 6 update if Option A is
adopted.

Authority:
- ADR 0004 Amendment 6 (this commit) — chain-origin semantics
- ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement step 4 — original promise
- ADR 0004 Amendment 2 — soft triggers deferred (precondition)
- ADR 0004 Amendment 5 (D40) — per-hop attribution channel
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 — No Invention rationale
- GitHub issue #8 — closed by this commit
- D32 round-4 cold-audit F10 — original filing
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Iron Rule 10's implementation-phase scope
  is unmet here (doc-only amendment); no fresh-context reviewer
  dispatched per the documented exception in this amendment's
  procedural mechanism

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 21:47:33 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 04f797f917 feat+docs+test: D40 — X-OLP-Fallback-Detail header (issue #7) 
ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement step 4 promised a per-hop
failure detail debug header `X-OLP-Fallback-Detail`. From D9 through
D39 the engine logged per-hop events (D28 added correlation fields)
but never surfaced the failure trail on the response. D40 fulfills
the promise via Option A — ungated v0.1 emission. Phase 2 will
re-introduce owner-vs-non-owner gating when `lib/keys.mjs` lands.

**Per-hop tuple collection** (lib/fallback/engine.mjs)

executeWithFallback now collects `fallbackDetail` — an array of per-hop
tuples — and returns it on EVERY return shape (success / client-error /
AUTH_MISSING / non-trigger / chain-exhausted). Soft-trigger skipped
hops are also recorded with `trigger_type: 'soft'` (currently dead-
code-by-config per ADR 0004 Amendment 2; shape forward-compatible).

Tuple shape (reuses D28 log-event field shapes so logs and the header
pivot on the same keys):
```
{
  hop: <0-indexed hop number>,
  provider: <provider name>,
  model: <model name from IR>,
  code: <ProviderError code, engine-synthetic SOFT_TRIGGER, or 'UNKNOWN'>,
  error_message: <truncated to 200 chars with ellipsis on overflow>,
  trigger_type: 'hard' | 'soft' | 'client_error' | 'auth_missing' | 'unclassified'
}
```

**Header serialiser** (server.mjs)

- `FALLBACK_DETAIL_BYTE_CAP = 4096` (UTF-8 bytes).
- `serializeFallbackDetailHeader(fallbackDetail)` exported. Returns
  `null` for empty/null/undefined → caller omits the header.
- `jsonStringifyAscii` escapes every non-ASCII code point as `\uXXXX`
  to satisfy RFC 7230 §3.2.6 field-vchar (Node's HTTP header validator
  rejects multi-byte UTF-8). The D38 CONCURRENCY_LIMIT synthesised
  message contains a U+2014 em dash — without this escape, every
  CONCURRENCY_LIMIT response crashed at writeHead with
  "Invalid character in header content". The regression test pins
  this exact string.
- 4KB cap algorithm: builds candidates as `[...slice(0, kept), sentinel]`
  and measures the FULL serialised length (including sentinel) before
  comparing against the cap, so the result is guaranteed under cap.
  Tail tuples dropped one at a time. Sentinel form:
  `{ truncated: true, omitted_hops: N }`.

**Header emission** (server.mjs)

- `withFallbackDetailHeader(base, fallbackDetail)` wraps the base
  header object; emits the header only when serialiser returns
  non-null.
- Emitted on chain-exhausted, non-trigger-error, client-error,
  AUTH_MISSING, and success-with-prior-failure paths.
- ABSENT on clean primary success — verified by a dedicated HTTP
  integration test.

**Tests** (test-features.mjs): 452 → 468 (+16):

- Engine-level tuple shape: 2-hop/exhausted, 2-hop/success-with-prior-
  failure, 1-hop/success (empty array), 1-hop/fail, non-ProviderError-
  yields-UNKNOWN, 500-char-message → 200-char-with-ellipsis, client
  error → 1 tuple + client_error trigger type
- Serialiser: empty/null → null, small array round-trip, >4KB cap
  with `{truncated:true,omitted_hops:N}` sentinel, RFC 7230 newline/CR
  escaping, non-ASCII escaping (em dash regression guard for the D38
  CONCURRENCY_LIMIT synthesised message)
- HTTP integration: clean-1-hop-success (header absent), 2-hop-
  exhausted (2 tuples on the wire), 2-hop-success-with-prior-failure
  (1 tuple on the wire)

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):

- **Reviewer Suggestion #2**: `jsonStringifyAscii` regex character
  class `[U+0080-U+FFFF]` contains an invisible U+0080 boundary marker
  that editors render as nothing, making the line easy to misread as
  the empty class `[-...]`. Folded in a 5-line comment block above
  the function body explaining the literal byte range and citing
  RFC 7230 §3.2.6.

Two reviewer suggestions not folded:
- **Suggestion #1**: AUTH_MISSING tuple path lacks a dedicated D40
  test. Code is structurally correct (tuple pushed before early-
  return); low priority. Future polish.
- **Suggestion #3**: defensive `err.code != null` guard. Extremely
  low priority — PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES is a closed enum with no
  falsy values.

**ADR amendments** (docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md)

- Amendment 5 added at top of amendments stack — full tuple schema,
  cap behavior, RFC 7230 hygiene, ungated v0.1 rationale, Phase 2
  follow-up.
- § Chain advancement step 4 updated to remove TBD / not-yet-
  implemented qualifiers and cross-reference Amendment 5.
- § Observability headers section gains the X-OLP-Fallback-Detail
  schema as IMPLEMENTED at v0.1.

**CHANGELOG.md** — D40 sub-entry appended under existing D38/D39
entries in Unreleased section. No package.json bump per
phase_rolling_mode.

Authority:
- ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement step 4 — D40 fulfils
  the promise
- ADR 0004 Amendment 5 (this commit) — implementation contract
- ADR 0004 § Observability headers — updated to IMPLEMENTED state
- D18 (5 standard X-OLP-* headers) — D40 builds on this convention
- D28 (per-hop structured log fields) — D40 reuses the field shapes
- GitHub issue #7 — closed by this commit
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — fresh-context opus reviewer independent
- CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — no version bump

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus,
independent of drafter): APPROVE. Critical depth checks:
- Tuple pushed once per hop, BEFORE client-error / AUTH_MISSING
  early-return branches — both paths include the failing tuple
- fallbackDetail returned on all 5 return paths (verified line by line)
- Cap algorithm measures FULL serialised length (with sentinel)
  before comparing — no overshoot
- RFC 7230 compliance verified end-to-end: imported the function
  in Node, confirmed em-dash → —, unescaped form throws
  "Invalid character in header content"
- Serialiser handles null / undefined / [] gracefully → header
  absent on clean primary success (HTTP test pins this)
- Hygiene: 0 hits for personal markers, home paths, tokens
- 468/468 tests pass in reviewer's independent npm test run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 21:44:11 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 bdfea6884b feat+docs+test: D39 — D16 follow-ups (issue #3, 4 parts) 
D16 reviewer (commit `bafa6d1`) left 4 non-blocking suggestions
batched into issue #3 as a tracker. D39 closes all 4.

**Part 1 — CacheStore.delete(keyId, cacheKey) API** (lib/cache/store.mjs)

D16 originally evicted truncated entries via
`cacheStore.set(keyId, hopCacheKey, result, ttlMs=0)` — a TTL=0
tombstone purged lazily on next access. D39 introduces an explicit
delete primitive that removes the entry immediately.

- Synchronous: `delete(keyId, cacheKey) → boolean`. Returns true if
  the entry was present and removed, false if absent. Sync (not
  async) for the simplest in-memory Map contract — mirrors clear().
  Other CacheStore methods are async to leave room for a Phase 2
  file-backed adapter; delete being sync was a deliberate choice.
- Namespace cleanup: when the inner Map becomes empty after delete,
  the outer Map's per-keyId entry is also removed (memory hygiene;
  mirrors the _activeSpawns cleanup pattern from D38).
- Behavior: peek/get/getOrCompute see no trace after delete; the
  subsequent getOrCompute triggers a fresh compute.

**Part 2 — `cache_evicted_truncated` observability log** (server.mjs)

After the D16 eviction call in collectAllChunks, emit:
```js
logEvent('info', 'cache_evicted_truncated', {
  provider, model, cache_eviction_hit,
});
```

Dashboard sees salvage frequency per (provider, model). The
cache_eviction_hit boolean distinguishes "we evicted an entry" (true)
from "we tried to evict but it was already gone" (false — race with
concurrent eviction or TTL purge), preserving observability accuracy
under concurrency.

**Part 3 — Sticky-cache regression test** (test-features.mjs)

Defense-in-depth around the eviction path. Two consecutive identical
buffered requests; the first triggers SPAWN_FAILED after partial
chunks → Case B salvage returns `{ chunks..., finish_reason: 'length' }`
to the client and evicts via delete(). The second identical request
must trigger a fresh spawn (NOT serve the salvaged response from a
stale cache entry).

Asserts on BOTH invariants for defense-in-depth:
- Mock provider spawn count == 2 across the 2 identical requests
- Second request's X-OLP-Cache header is 'miss'

If eviction silently breaks in a future regression, both assertions
catch it independently.

**Part 4 — SPAWN_TIMEOUT salvage parity: DOCUMENT ASYMMETRY**
(docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md)

Maintainer decision: SPAWN_TIMEOUT is NOT salvaged. Document the
asymmetry rather than implementing parity. ADR 0004 Amendment 1 is
extended with a new section "Why SPAWN_TIMEOUT is excluded from
salvage" with 4-point rationale:

1. SPAWN_FAILED indicates the provider crashed mid-stream — there's
   nothing more coming; partial > nothing. Next-hop spawn has no
   advantage (same input may crash same way).
2. SPAWN_TIMEOUT indicates the provider was slow (deadline exceeded
   per `hints.maxSpawnTimeMs`). Fallback advancement to a DIFFERENT
   provider is more likely to give a complete response than salvaging
   a partial from a slow provider.
3. The "user paid for partial content" framing from D16 captures only
   SPAWN_FAILED. For SPAWN_TIMEOUT the user actually paid for "result
   within time T" — partial-at-time-T is not what was paid for;
   "full result soon after T" via fallback is closer.
4. Code-level inspection confirms the asymmetry: collectAllChunks
   catch matches ONLY `code === 'SPAWN_FAILED'` (server.mjs:563).
   SPAWN_TIMEOUT propagates via re-throw and hits evaluateHardTriggers.

v1.x re-evaluation trigger: if real usage shows users want partial-
on-timeout for very long deadlines, add a v1.x design ADR.

Stale comment fix: `lib/providers/anthropic.mjs:369` previously said
"SPAWN_TIMEOUT salvage parity is tracked in issue #3". D39 closes
that issue, so the comment is updated to point at ADR 0004 Amendment 1.

**Tests** (test-features.mjs): 447 → 452 (+5):
- 3 unit tests on CacheStore.delete (Suite 9): present-key true, absent-key
  false, namespace cleanup at empty
- 1 D16 integration test: cache_evicted_truncated log fires with
  correct fields during salvage
- 1 sticky-cache regression: spawn count 2 across 2 identical requests,
  X-OLP-Cache miss on second

Pre-commit fold-ins (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):

- **Reviewer Suggestion #1**: cacheStore.delete() return value was
  discarded at the call site → log inflated salvage metric under
  concurrent-eviction race. Folded: captured `evicted` boolean and
  added to log payload as `cache_eviction_hit`.
- **Reviewer Suggestion #2**: anthropic.mjs:369 stale comment
  pointing at now-closed issue #3. Folded: rewrote to point at
  ADR 0004 Amendment 1 § "Why SPAWN_TIMEOUT is excluded from
  salvage".
- **Reviewer Suggestion #3**: ADR 0004 attribution ambiguity —
  parenthetical "(per Amendment 3 — SPAWN_TIMEOUT is one of the 4
  live hard-trigger codes alongside SPAWN_FAILED, CLI_NOT_FOUND, and
  CONCURRENCY_LIMIT from Amendment 4)" could mis-parse as Amendment 3
  covering all four. Folded: split to
  "(per Amendment 3: SPAWN_FAILED, CLI_NOT_FOUND, SPAWN_TIMEOUT;
  per Amendment 4: CONCURRENCY_LIMIT)".

**CHANGELOG**: D39 sub-entry appended under the existing D38 entry
in Unreleased section. No package.json bump (phase_rolling_mode).

Authority:
- ADR 0005 § Cache layer — CacheStore API extension (Part 1)
- ADR 0004 Amendment 1 update — SPAWN_TIMEOUT asymmetry rationale (Part 4)
- GitHub issue #3 — closed by this commit
- D16 commit bafa6d1 non-blocking suggestions — batched here
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — fresh-context opus reviewer independent
- CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — under Unreleased

Reviewer (fresh-context opus, Iron Rule 10): APPROVE_WITH_MINOR.
Verified: delete() sync + call-site no-await correct; namespace
cleanup guarded on (had && ns.size === 0); SPAWN_TIMEOUT NOT in
salvage catch; ADR section 4-point rationale internally consistent
with code state; hygiene clean; 452/452 tests pass independently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 21:13:57 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 994568a8fb feat+ci: D38 — maxConcurrent runtime enforcement (issue #1) 
ADR 0002 Amendment 1 declared `hints.maxConcurrent` declarative-only at
v0.1 — type-validated at startup but with no runtime enforcement.
D38 wires the runtime enforcement via a per-provider in-flight spawn
counter with immediate-advancement on saturation.

Design choice: **immediate-advancement via fallback engine** (queue +
timeout DEFERRED). When a provider is at its maxConcurrent limit, the
spawn call synchronously fails with a new `CONCURRENCY_LIMIT` error
code; the fallback engine treats this as a hard trigger and advances
to the next chain hop. If the entire chain is saturated, the user
sees a chain-exhausted error (existing path).

Rationale for immediate-advancement over queue+timeout:

1. The fallback chain exists precisely for this kind of overflow —
   adding a queue layer would duplicate the advancement semantics.
2. Queue + timeout adds new config surface (timeout duration, queue
   depth bounds, queue eviction policy) that isn't needed at the
   personal/family scale OLP serves.
3. Head-of-line blocking risk: a long-running spawn would stall
   queued requests behind it even though other providers in the chain
   could serve them immediately.
4. Fail-fast latency aligns with the multi-provider proxy philosophy
   ("spread risk across providers, not within a provider").

Queue + timeout is deferred to a v1.x design ADR if real usage shows
demand. ADR 0002 Amendment 6 and ADR 0004 Amendment 4 capture the
decision explicitly.

Changes (8 files, +<delta>):

**Code**

1. **lib/providers/base.mjs** — add `CONCURRENCY_LIMIT` to
   `PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES`. JSDoc clarifies the code is synthesised by
   the orchestration layer, not thrown by provider plugins themselves.

2. **lib/providers/index.mjs** — new semaphore primitives:
   - `tryAcquireSpawn(providerName, maxConcurrent)` — atomic
     check-then-increment. Returns `true` on success, `false` if at
     limit. Atomicity rests on the JS single-threaded invariant
     (read + write synchronous, NO `await` between them); module-level
     comment block warns future maintainers against breaking this.
   - `releaseSpawn(providerName)` — decrement; throws on
     under-decrement (defensive bug guard for missing acquire / double
     release). Map.delete at zero for clean memory footprint.
   - `getActiveSpawnCount(providerName)` — returns current count
     (0 for unseen providers). For diagnostics + tests.
   - `DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS = 4` — defense-in-depth fallback
     matching the v0.1 plugin defaults (anthropic/codex/mistral all
     declare hints.maxConcurrent: 4). Also coerces non-integer / NaN
     / negative inputs to the default.
   - `__resetSpawnCounters()` — internal test seam.

3. **lib/fallback/engine.mjs** — `CONCURRENCY_LIMIT: true` added to
   `HARD_TRIGGER_CODES`. `classifyTrigger` and `evaluateHardTriggers`
   both pick it up via the same lookup. v0.1 live hard-trigger codes
   are now 5 (was 4 post-D34): SPAWN_FAILED, CLI_NOT_FOUND,
   AUTH_MISSING:false, SPAWN_TIMEOUT, CONCURRENCY_LIMIT.

4. **server.mjs** — gate the spawn call in handleChatCompletions at
   BOTH spawn call sites:
   - **Buffered path** (executeHopFn → collectAllChunks): acquire
     before provider.spawn; on failure synthesise
     `ProviderError(CONCURRENCY_LIMIT)` with providerName /
     maxConcurrent / activeSpawns diagnostic fields and throw —
     fallback engine catches and advances. On success, outer try/
     finally wraps the inner D16 truncation-salvage try/catch so
     releaseSpawn fires on EVERY exit path (return, D16 salvage
     return, re-throw).
   - **Streaming path** (single-hop real-SSE branch): acquire BEFORE
     the streaming branch entry. If acquire fails, branch is skipped
     and request falls through to buffered path (whose own gate
     surfaces chain-exhausted for single-hop chains). If acquire
     succeeds, existing streaming try/catch gains
     `finally { releaseSpawn(streamProvider) }` — slot releases on
     stop-chunk completion, generator exhaustion, abort, or any
     exception path. `releaseSpawn` fires at END of stream
     consumption, not when spawn() returns.

**Tests** (test-features.mjs): 431 → 447 (+16):

Suite 18 — D38 — maxConcurrent runtime enforcement:
- 18a: PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES.CONCURRENCY_LIMIT exists
- 18b: evaluateHardTriggers true for CONCURRENCY_LIMIT
- 18c: AUTH_MISSING regression guard (D38 did NOT flip it to hard)
- 18d.1-18d.4: semaphore unit (increment / saturate-no-increment /
  release / map-delete-at-zero)
- 18e: tryAcquireSpawn returns false without side-effect when at limit
- 18f: releaseSpawn throws on under-decrement
- 18g.1-18g.2: DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS applied for invalid
  inputs (undefined / NaN / negative / non-integer)
- 18h: __resetSpawnCounters clears state
- 18i: HTTP integration — 5 concurrent requests to single-hop
  chain w/ maxConcurrent=2 → peak in-flight exactly 2, 2 succeed,
  3 fail
- 18j: counter releases after buffered request (sequential test)
- 18k: 2-hop chain — saturated primary advances to fallback
- 18l: streaming counter releases at END of stream (not at spawn)

**ADR amendments**

5. **docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md** — Amendment 6 added.
   Removes "Declarative hint only at v0.1" caveat from the
   `maxConcurrent` description in the Provider contract section.
   Adds implementation reference + design-choice rationale (4 points).
   Lists all exported symbols.

6. **docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md** — Amendment 4 added.
   CONCURRENCY_LIMIT added to v0.1 hard-trigger taxonomy. Documents
   synthesis-vs-plugin-thrown distinction. Documents first-chunk
   safety (acquire before any res.write). v1.x re-evaluation triggers
   named.

**CHANGELOG**

7. **CHANGELOG.md** — Unreleased sentinel replaced with proper D38
   entry. Per CLAUDE.md release_kit phase_rolling_mode, this lands
   under Unreleased; promotion to ## v0.1.1 happens at the v0.1.1
   release. The D37 phase_rolling_mode gate now correctly fires if
   anyone tags v0.1.x with this content present without promotion —
   intentional.

Pre-commit fold-ins (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):

- **Reviewer Suggestion #1 (test 18c name mismatch)**: 18c is named
  "classifyTrigger returns hard for CONCURRENCY_LIMIT" but body tests
  AUTH_MISSING regression. Renamed header comment to
  "AUTH_MISSING regression guard" and clarified that
  CONCURRENCY_LIMIT classification is covered by 18b.

- **Reviewer Suggestion #3 (activeSpawns diagnostic field)**: server
  .mjs:532 set `concurrencyErr.activeSpawns = maxConcurrent` (the
  limit). Technically correct (since acquire just failed, live
  count == limit) but confuses future readers. Changed to query
  `getActiveSpawnCount(hopProvider)` directly. Added import of the
  new symbol to the lib/providers/index.mjs import block.

- **Reviewer Suggestion #5 (ADR overstatement)**: ADR 0002 Amendment 6
  said getActiveSpawnCount is "exported for /health, diagnostics,
  and tests" but /health integration is not wired at D38. Reworded to
  "exported for diagnostics and tests" + "/health integration
  deferred — when surfaced there will land at providers.status.<name>
  .activeSpawns; not wired at D38." Avoids overstating current state.

Two reviewer suggestions not folded:
- Suggestion #2 (streaming test 18l comment about branch entry
  conditions) — low priority; the test passes and the branch is
  taken (verified by reviewer). Future polish if confusion arises.
- Suggestion #4 (additional test for streaming-saturation → chain-
  exhausted) — code path is straightforward and intentional; 18i
  covers the buffered-path version directly. Defer.

Authority:
- ADR 0002 Amendment 1 (declarative-only caveat) — superseded by
  Amendment 6
- ADR 0002 Amendment 6 (this commit) — runtime enforcement landed
- ADR 0004 Amendment 4 (this commit) — CONCURRENCY_LIMIT added to
  v0.1 hard-trigger taxonomy
- GitHub issue #1 — closed by this commit
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — independent fresh-context reviewer
- CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — no version
  bump; Unreleased entry written

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus,
independent of drafter): APPROVE. Critical depth checks:
- Atomicity in tryAcquireSpawn (lines 285-290 read+set with no
  intervening await) — confirmed; module-level invariant comment
  warns future maintainers
- Release on every exit path: buffered (outer finally wraps inner
  try/catch covering D16 salvage return + normal return + re-throw);
  streaming (try/finally covers stop-chunk return + loop exhaustion +
  catch paths). No double-release path identified.
- Streaming release timing: fires in finally after res.end() at all
  exit paths, never before stream consumption completes
- Counter leak: every code path traced — no orphan acquire identified
- 447/447 tests pass in reviewer's independent npm test run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 21:02:40 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 e96752a528 docs+fix+test: D36 — pre-Phase-2 batch #2 (issues #2 #5 #6 #13 #14 #15) 
Second batch of pre-Phase-2 cleanup. 6 GitHub issues closed in one
cohesive docs/governance commit with 1 small code addition (#2 debug
log line in server.mjs) and 1 transcript artifact (#15 new file).

Changes (7 files modified, 1 file created, +470 / -13):

**Code changes**

1. **#2 — cache_control partial-noop debug log** (server.mjs)

   ADR 0005 § D2 says: "for non-Anthropic targets, the bypass markers
   are noop'd (logged once per request at debug level so users can
   see they were ignored)". Pre-D36 logEvent fired only when an
   Anthropic hop actually bypassed; non-Anthropic hops with markers
   present were silently noop'd.

   New 12-line block in handleChatCompletions right after
   hasCacheControlMarkers is computed. Fires logEvent('debug',
   'cache_control_partial_noop', { chain: [<provider names>],
   marker_count: <count> }) when:
   - hasCacheControlMarkers === true AND
   - chain.some(hop => hop.provider !== 'anthropic')

   Fires at most once per request (top-level if, not in a loop). No
   log when no markers, or when every chain hop is Anthropic. The
   existing cache_bypass debug log inside shouldBypassCacheForHop is
   untouched.

   marker_count sums body-side and IR-side extractCacheControlMarkers
   results. At v0.1 the IR term is structurally 0 (openAIToIR strips
   cache_control); inline comment marks this as a revisit point for
   the future ADR 0003 amendment that activates cache_control in the
   IR whitelist.

**Documentation amendments**

2. **#5 — ADR 0002 vibe.mjs → mistral.mjs** (docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md)

   § Decision filesystem layout: `vibe.mjs` corrected to
   `mistral.mjs` (file named after provider key per the convention
   anthropic.mjs/codex.mjs). The vibe.mjs entry was an early-draft
   naming choice that never landed. Amendment 5 prepended above
   Amendment 4 documenting the filename correction + explicit
   convention statement (file named after provider key, not CLI
   binary) for future contributors.

3. **#6 — mistral.mjs A5 flip + ALIGNMENT.md table update**
   (lib/providers/mistral.mjs + ALIGNMENT.md)

   Pre-D36: header A5 (model flag) status was UNPINNED-D-later-verifies
   but function body lines 376-380 said CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE
   (DeepWiki enumeration already confirmed `--model` does not exist
   on vibe CLI). Header now reflects CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE with
   DeepWiki citation (DOCS-4). ALIGNMENT.md Speculative-Candidate
   table mistral row: A5 removed from UNPINNED list; A4, A6, A7, A8
   preserved with parenthetical descriptions intact. No code change
   to function body (already correct).

4. **#13 — /v1/models alias entries — ALIGNMENT.md + spec-pin
   governance** (ALIGNMENT.md + docs/openai-spec-pin.md)

   Round-6 F10 flagged D27 F15's alias entries on /v1/models as
   borderline Rule 2(b) violation (OpenAI spec does not enumerate
   aliases as separate entries). Option C selected: keep current
   behavior, document the controlled deviation.

   - ALIGNMENT.md: new "Controlled deviations (entry-surface scope)"
     subsection under "Class-specific Exceptions". Entry 1 documents
     the /v1/models alias deviation with rationale (D27 F15
     onboarding), formal contract reference, field constraints
     (owned_by matches canonical, created matches canonical, no
     invented fields), SPOT reference (getAliasMap()), and re-
     evaluation trigger.
   - docs/openai-spec-pin.md: new alias-surfacing subsection under
     GET /v1/models with full 4-field contract table (id/object/
     created/owned_by), rationale, sourcing explanation, forward
     path.
   - server.mjs handleModels: NO CHANGE — behavior preserved.

5. **#15 — Anthropic v2.1.89 transcript artifact**
   (docs/provider-audits/anthropic.md NEW; ALIGNMENT.md +
   lib/providers/anthropic.mjs cross-references)

   Round-6 F12: ALIGNMENT.md anthropic row pin (v2.1.89, observed at
   D4) cited the plugin header; plugin header cited the observation
   date but no transcript. Circular per Rule 1 ("observed behaviour,
   transcript attached").

   New file docs/provider-audits/anthropic.md (single living artifact,
   not version-specific):
   - Date of capture: 2026-05-24
   - Observed `claude --version`: 2.1.132 (Claude Code) — captured
     today on the project maintainer's primary workstation
   - Plugin-pinned version: @anthropic-ai/claude-code v2.1.89 (from
     D4 implementation pin in ALIGNMENT.md Provider Authority Pins)
   - Version drift: honestly documented — pin is v2.1.89, live is
     v2.1.132, drift within tolerance, re-audit triggers named
   - Sample invocation: `claude -p --output-format text --no-session-
     persistence --model <model> [--debug]`
   - Flag-surface table: 5 OLP-consumed flags verbatim from
     `claude -p --help` (-p / --output-format / --no-session-
     persistence / --model / --debug)
   - Citation cross-references back to ALIGNMENT.md + plugin header

   ALIGNMENT.md anthropic row: appended "transcript artifact: docs/
   provider-audits/anthropic.md (captured 2026-05-24)" — closes the
   circular citation.

   lib/providers/anthropic.mjs header: 5-line pointer to the artifact
   with version numbers stated explicitly.

**Tests** (test-features.mjs): 424 → 431 (+7):

- #2 partial-noop log ×3:
  - Suite 9f case 1: markers + mixed chain → fires once at level=debug
  - Suite 9f case 2: no markers → suppressed
  - Suite 9f case 3: anthropic-only chain → suppressed

- #14 cache_control slot determinism ×4:
  - #14a: markers-present IR produces different key from no-markers IR
  - #14b: same IR computed twice yields identical key
  - #14c: two independently-constructed IRs with identical payloads
    yield same key
  - #14d: both top-level and content-array-nested markers affect the key

  All 4 tests call computeCacheKey directly on hand-built IRs
  (bypassing openAIToIR which strips markers at v0.1). Per ALIGNMENT.md
  Rule 2 (No Invention), no sortMarkers helper added — the slot is
  dead-code at v0.1 and shipping a helper without a caller authority
  would be invention. Test comment documents the forward-activation
  contract.

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D36 reviewer flagged marker_count latent double-count risk**
  (Suggestion #1, non-blocking). The sum at server.mjs:435-437 is
  safe at v0.1 (IR term structurally 0) but will 2× when a future
  ADR 0003 amendment activates cache_control in the IR whitelist.
  Folded in a 4-line comment marking the revisit point.

Two other non-blocking reviewer suggestions not folded:
- Test count brief-vs-deliverable discrepancy (4 not 3 for #14) is
  informational — the 4-test variant is strictly better (covers
  content-array nesting which is a real extractCacheControlMarkers
  contract path).
- Recapture-procedure git-add reminder in anthropic.md is low-priority
  procedure documentation.

Authority:
- ADR 0005 § D2 — cache_control partial-noop debug log requirement (#2)
- ADR 0002 § Decision filesystem layout (Amendment 5) — plugin file
  naming convention (#5)
- DeepWiki vibe CLI flag enumeration — A5 not applicable (#6)
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b) + docs/openai-spec-pin.md GET /v1/models —
  alias controlled deviation (#13)
- ADR 0005 cache key stability invariant + ADR 0003 forward-compat —
  cache_control slot determinism contract (#14)
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5 (observed behaviour, transcript attached) +
  Provider Authority Pins anthropic row — transcript artifact (#15)
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — independent fresh-context reviewer
- CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — D36 under
  "Unreleased" against Phase 2; no version bump

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus,
independent of drafter): APPROVE. Critical depth checks:
- #2: gate condition fires only on (markers AND non-anthropic-hop);
  pre-existing cache_bypass log inside shouldBypassCacheForHop
  untouched
- #5: lib/providers/ directory verified — mistral.mjs exists,
  vibe.mjs does not exist
- #6: mistral.mjs spawn-site body comment (lines 376-380) already
  CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE pre-D36 and unchanged in this diff
- #13: server.mjs handleModels unchanged (verified via grep)
- #14: all 4 tests pass against current code; no sortMarkers helper
  shipped (Rule 2 No Invention honored)
- #15: live `claude --version` independently run by reviewer →
  matches artifact (2.1.132); all 5 OLP-consumed flags independently
  verified present in `claude -p --help`
- Hygiene: 0 hits for personal markers, home paths, OAuth tokens,
  internal IPs across all 8 files
- 431/431 tests pass in reviewer's independent npm test run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 20:38:16 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 2600185edb fix+test: D35 — pre-Phase-2 batch #1 (issues #4 #9 #10 #11 #12) 
First batch of pre-Phase-2 cleanup work. 5 GitHub issues closed in
one cohesive commit covering streaming-path correctness, IR
validator hardening, and CI path-trigger hygiene.

Changes (4 files, +302 / -5):

**Code fixes**

1. **#9 — Streaming empty-then-clean-exit headers** (server.mjs)

   Pre-D35: when a provider's streaming spawn finished cleanly with
   zero chunks (e.g. spec-degenerate stop with no content), the
   response went out the SSE_DONE / res.end path without ever calling
   writeHead. Result: client saw stream open + close with no headers,
   no status code path applied. Now: zero-chunk branch guards
   `!res.headersSent` and emits Content-Type + Cache-Control +
   Connection + X-Accel-Buffering + all 5 X-OLP-* headers via
   olpHeaders (provider attempted, cache miss) before writing the
   terminator. Zero-chunk path correctly does NOT cache (cache write
   remains gated on irChunk.type === 'stop').

2. **#10 — Streaming post-first-chunk error truncation marker**
   (server.mjs, two sibling sites)

   Pre-D35: if a provider yielded an error AFTER first content chunk
   was emitted, the SSE stream was abandoned with raw socket close.
   Client SDKs that wait for finish_reason hung. Now:

   - Catch-block firstChunkEmitted=true path: emit synthetic
     `{type:'stop', finish_reason:'length'}` via irChunkToOpenAISSE,
     write SSE_DONE, end. Per ADR 0004 § Fallback safety: post-first-
     chunk truncation surfaces as `length` finish, not a hang.

   - Sibling fix in error-chunk path (provider yields `type:'error'`
     chunk AFTER first content chunk): same recovery (marker + DONE +
     end). Scope-creep acknowledged but identical semantic; clean to
     fix together. Comments cross-reference D26 F19 and D35 #10.

3. **#11 — validateIRRequest irVersion strict check** (lib/ir/types.mjs)

   ADR 0003 IR contract pins irVersion to '1.0'. Validator pre-D35
   accepted ANY value (including no value, undefined, '2.0',
   numeric 1.0). Now: `obj.irVersion !== undefined && obj.irVersion
   !== '1.0'` → rejection. Strict string match. `undefined` still
   accepted (pre-D35 IRs without the field remain valid — back-compat
   with sites that haven't yet been migrated to emit it). Error
   message uses JSON.stringify for safe rendering.

4. **#12 — alignment.yml scripts/** trigger removal**
   (.github/workflows/alignment.yml)

   Pre-D35 push.paths and pull_request.paths listed scripts/**. The
   scripts/ directory does not currently exist (per AGENTS.md note:
   scripts/migrate-from-ocp.mjs is planned for Phase 7). A path
   filter referencing a non-existent directory has no effect on
   trigger evaluation BUT misleads readers about the workflow's
   intent. Removed from both push.paths and pull_request.paths. When
   scripts/ lands in Phase 7, the trigger should be re-added at the
   same time (see release_kit_overlay.bootstrap_quirk_policy).

**Verification — #4 (uniform X-OLP-Latency-Ms across error paths)**

#4 was found to already be correct via D32. Re-audit of all 7
in-handler sendError sites in handleChatCompletions confirmed all
attach a 5-header set via olpHeaders or olpErrorHeaders:
- 360-361 (415 wrong Content-Type) → olpErrorHeaders
- 368-369 (400 bad JSON) → olpErrorHeaders
- 378-379 (400 BadRequestError IR translation) → olpErrorHeaders
- 402-407 (503 no chain) → olpErrorHeaders
- 617-618 (503 provider disappeared) → olpErrorHeaders
- 760-761 (502 streaming pre-first-chunk error) → olpHeaders
- 778-779 (500 fallback engine error) → olpErrorHeaders
The 404 (line 922) and outer 500 (line 926) are router-level paths
without startMs context and correctly lack OLP headers. D35 adds
the #4-audit regression test pinning the 5-header invariant on the
503 no-provider response so future drift is caught immediately.

**Tests** (test-features.mjs): 416 → 424 (+8):
- #4-audit ×1 (5-header invariant on 503 no-provider sendError)
- #9 ×1 (zero-chunk streaming → 200 + Content-Type=text/event-stream
  + 5 X-OLP-* headers + [DONE])
- #10 ×1 (catch-throw after first chunk → marker + length finish + DONE)
- #10b ×1 (provider error chunk after first chunk → same recovery)
- #11a ×1 (irVersion undefined accepted)
- #11b ×1 (irVersion '1.0' accepted)
- #11c ×1 (irVersion '2.0' rejected)
- #11d ×1 (irVersion numeric 1.0 rejected)

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D35 reviewer flagged JSDoc/validator drift on irVersion**
  (Suggestion #1, non-blocking). The @property typedef at
  lib/ir/types.mjs:43 said `{string} irVersion - always IR_VERSION`
  but the validator at lines 185-186 accepts `undefined`. Future
  reader who scans the @property alone sees contradiction without
  the rationale comment 140 lines below. Folded: typedef marked
  `[irVersion]` (optional) and description updated to "optional;
  when present must equal IR_VERSION ('1.0'). Pre-D35 IRs lack
  this field and remain valid."

Two other non-blocking reviewer suggestions not folded (out of
scope for D35; tracked as future polish):
- Distinct event names for the two streaming_error_after_first_chunk
  log sites (provider-emitted string vs JS exception message).
- Phase 7 TODO: re-add scripts/** trigger to alignment.yml when
  scripts/migrate-from-ocp.mjs lands.

Authority:
- ADR 0004 § Fallback safety — post-first-chunk truncation surfaces
  as `length` finish (#10 + #10b)
- ADR 0003 § IR contract — irVersion pinned to '1.0' (#11)
- AGENTS.md § Implementation status — scripts/ planned for Phase 7
  (#12)
- CLAUDE.md release_kit_overlay phase_rolling_mode — D35 lands
  under "Unreleased" against Phase 2; no version bump
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — independent fresh-context reviewer
  required for code change

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus,
independent of drafter): APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Critical depth checks:
- Verified all 7 sendError sites in handleChatCompletions attach
  5-header set (cited line numbers reconciled with current state)
- Verified writeHead block guarded by !res.headersSent; correctly
  placed AFTER optional truncation marker, BEFORE SSE_DONE
- Verified irVersion validator strict-equality semantics across all
  4 cases (undefined / '1.0' / '2.0' / numeric 1.0)
- Verified scripts/** removed from both push and pull_request paths
- Verified hygiene: 0 hits for personal markers, home paths, OAuth
  tokens, internal IPs
- 424/424 tests pass independently in reviewer's run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 20:20:49 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 60570ef074 fix+docs: D34 — FINAL batch (F1+F4+F7+F8); audit cadence stops 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 6 — FINAL)

This is the closing D-day of a 24-day round-1→round-6 audit cycle.
After this commit + the 9 round-6 follow-up issue filings, no more
audit rounds. Trajectory R1=17 → R2=13 → R3=13 → R4=10 → R5=12 →
R6=14 — the method did not converge; owner chose Option A (focused
batch of most consequential items, then STOP).

Changes (6 files, +138 / -47):

**Code changes**

1. lib/cache/keys.mjs (+14/-?) — F4 P2 cache key array-field
   normalization:
   - New `normalizeArrayField` helper: `(Array.isArray(v) && v.length === 0) ? null : (v ?? null)`
   - Applied to `tools` and `stop` in computeCacheKey
   - Now `tools: []` and `tools` omitted produce IDENTICAL cache
     keys (and same for `stop: []` vs omitted). ADR 0005 Amendment 2's
     own claim that "[] and undefined share a cache entry" was
     empirically FALSE pre-D34; round-6 reviewer verified hashes
     differ. The fix makes the claim literally true at the
     key-composition layer.

2. lib/providers/base.mjs (+16/-?) — F7 P2 dead error code removal:
   - `QUOTA_EXHAUSTED` removed from PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES
   - `RATE_LIMITED` removed from PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES
   - v0.1 live codes: SPAWN_FAILED, CLI_NOT_FOUND, AUTH_MISSING,
     SPAWN_TIMEOUT
   - Comment block documents removal + cites ADR 0004 Amendment 3

3. lib/fallback/engine.mjs (+29/-?) — F7 P2 sibling:
   - HARD_TRIGGER_CODES: QUOTA_EXHAUSTED + RATE_LIMITED removed
   - SPAWN_FAILED, CLI_NOT_FOUND, AUTH_MISSING(false), SPAWN_TIMEOUT
     remain
   - evaluateHardTriggers HTTP-status branches KEPT (option (b)) with
     forward-compat comment: "v0.1 plugins never attach statusCode;
     branches reserved for v1.x when plugin gains HTTP-status parsing"

4. test-features.mjs (+93) — F4 + F7 test work:
   - 4 new F4 regression tests (tools:[] vs undefined, stop:[] vs
     undefined, tools:[] vs null, tools:non-empty vs undefined sanity)
   - ~14 integration test code-swap edits (QUOTA_EXHAUSTED →
     SPAWN_FAILED, RATE_LIMITED → SPAWN_FAILED) preserving original
     hard-trigger semantic
   - 2 dead unit tests for QUOTA_EXHAUSTED/RATE_LIMITED removed
     (tombstone comment retained for audit trail)

**ADR amendments (docs-only, no code change)**

5. docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md (+12) — F7 Amendment 3:
   - Documents the v0.1 hard-trigger code narrowing
   - 4 live codes listed explicitly
   - Captures evaluateHardTriggers HTTP-status branch retention rationale
   - v1.x re-activation path: plugin gains HTTP-status parsing →
     re-add codes → branches activate naturally

6. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md (+21) — TWO amendments + 1
   prior-amendment update:
   - **Amendment 6 (F1 P1)**: Formal v1.x deferral of D4 streaming
     singleflight. Buffered path (executeHopFn) uses cacheStore.getOrCompute
     and participates in D4 fully. Streaming cache-miss path
     (server.mjs:609-741) bypasses singleflight — N concurrent identical
     streamers each spawn fresh. v0.1 trade-off accepted for
     personal/family scale; v1.x design ADR needed for tee-streaming +
     per-key inflight Map. Cross-references CLAUDE.md release_kit.
     phase_rolling_mode as the deferral pattern precedent.
   - **Amendment 7 (F8 P2)**: Documents the v0.1 conservative cache-key
     posture: includes all IR fields including those plugins discard
     (anthropic/codex/mistral drop temperature/max_tokens/top_p/stop/
     tools/tool_choice at spawn). Consequence: 2 requests with different
     temperature produce identical CLI output (CLI ignores) but
     different cache keys → spurious miss. Trade-off justified:
     spurious miss > spurious hit. v1.x forward path:
     per-plugin cacheKeyFields contract extension (ADR 0002 amendment
     needed). 3 implementation subtasks enumerated for the v1.x PR.
   - **Amendment 2 update (F4)**: heading renamed to "Note on
     null-coalescing AND array normalization"; body documents the
     new normalizeArrayField helper; quotes the regression test name.

Tests: 414 → 416 (+4 F4 regression, -2 F7 dead, +0 net from F7
integration rewrites).

Pre-commit fold-in: NONE — D34 reviewer APPROVE with all 4 suggestions
non-blocking/cosmetic.

Authority:
- ADR 0005 Amendment 2 invariant restored at code level (F4)
- ADR 0005 Amendment 6 formalizes F1 streaming-singleflight deferral
  per the same pattern as D22 ADR 0004 Amendment 2 soft-trigger
  deferral
- ADR 0005 Amendment 7 documents F8 conservative posture as v0.1
  intentional design (not an accident)
- ADR 0004 Amendment 3 narrows v0.1 trigger taxonomy (F7)
- Round-6 cold audit findings F2 / F3 / F6 / F9 / F10 / F11 / F12 /
  F13 / F14 filed as GitHub issues after this commit (NOT in scope)
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — final round of the audit cadence

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Critical depth checks:
- B5 over-normalization: verified `normalizeArrayField` only applies
  to `tools` and `stop`; `response_format: {}` and `tool_choice: ''`
  unaffected (Array.isArray guard)
- C10 test cleanup: 21 references reconciled (3 tombstone, 18
  rewrites/removals); integration test rewrites preserve hard-trigger
  semantics (QUOTA_EXHAUSTED → SPAWN_FAILED is also a hard trigger,
  so fallback advancement behavior unchanged)

---

**End of audit cycle.** 24 D-days shipped from D10 (P1 hardening) through
D34 (final batch). 6 cold-audit rounds executed; 78+ findings raised;
~50 closed via implementation; ~28 deferred to GitHub issues / v1.x
ADR amendments. v0.1 tag remains explicit-maintainer-action per
phase_rolling_mode policy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 19:33:48 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 f784fdb947 fix+docs: D33 — round-5 cleanup batch (F1/F3/F5/F8/F9/F10/F11/F12) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 5)

Round-5 cold-audit cleanup batch. 8 items + 1 release-discipline
reconciliation. Largest batch by line count (582+/39-) but every item
is small-and-focused. 3 P2 items (F1/F3/F5 of which F3 + F1 are real
correctness/observability fixes; F5 backfills /health to spec).

Changes (10 files, +583/-39):

**P2 fixes**

1. **F1 — ALIGNMENT.md mistral authority pin self-contradicted plugin**
   (ALIGNMENT.md): row cited `vibe --prompt --output json` but mistral.mjs
   uses `--output streaming` (the plugin header at lines 360-369 even
   justifies WHY: `--output json` emits single blob, breaks NDJSON
   line-buffered parser). Constitution self-contradicting itself —
   missed across 4 prior rounds. Pin updated to `--output streaming`
   with DOCS-1 reference.

2. **F3 — Deterministic function_call synth ID**
   (lib/ir/openai-to-ir.mjs): deprecated `function_call` translation
   produced `id: \`fc-${Date.now()}\`` → ID flows into normalized
   tool_calls → cache key SHA-256. Two identical requests separated
   by ≥1ms → different cache keys → cache always misses for
   `function_call` request shape. Violates ADR 0005 invariant
   "same inputs → same key, no random, no timestamp."

   Fixed: id is now `fc-<16-hex>` from SHA-256 of `${name}\0${arguments}`.
   NUL separator prevents the (name='ab',args='c') vs (name='a',args='bc')
   collision. 2^64 collision resistance is more than sufficient for
   tool_call ID disambiguation (per-request semantic key, not crypto
   primitive).

**P3 fixes**

3. **F5 — /health invokes per-plugin healthCheck()** (server.mjs +
   docs/openai-spec-pin.md): ADR 0002 says "healthCheck — startup AND
   /health endpoint use this." Pre-D33 /health returned only
   {enabled, available} counts. Now async, iterates loadedProviders,
   awaits each plugin's healthCheck() in try/catch. Returns
   `providers: {enabled, available, status: {<name>: {ok, latencyMs?, error?}}}`.

4. **F8 — X-OLP-Cache reports fallback-hop cache hits** (server.mjs):
   pre-D33 cacheStatus computed from `preCheckHit && fallbackHops === 0`
   — only counted primary-hop cache hits. When fallback fires + the
   fallback hop's getOrCompute returns from cache, header reported
   `miss` despite no spawn happening.

   Fixed: peek BEFORE getOrCompute inside executeHopFn, set
   `lastHopWasCached` closure variable on every hop (last-write-wins
   = serving hop's state). cacheStatus combines
   `lastHopWasCached || (preCheckHit && fallbackHops === 0)`.

   F8 chose option (b) peek-then-getOrCompute over option (a)
   getOrCompute API change because option (a) would break ~15 test
   callsites for marginal benefit. Accepted race window same as
   existing preCheckHit pattern.

5. **F9 — validateProvider hints error message updated** (lib/providers/
   base.mjs): pre-D33 message listed cacheable as missing and
   maxSpawnTimeMs as required. Now: `'hints must be an object with
   { requiresTTY, concurrentSpawnSafe, maxConcurrent } + optional
   { maxSpawnTimeMs, cacheable }'`.

6. **F10 — Dead cache-write branch removed** (server.mjs): the
   `if (hasStopChunk)` check in the streaming stop-less exhaustion
   branch was unreachable (the stop-chunk completion path returns
   earlier inside the for-await loop). Removed the dead code + added
   a comment documenting the invariant.

**Governance/policy**

7. **F11 — Phase rolling mode policy formalized** (CLAUDE.md +
   CHANGELOG.md): 22+ D-day commits accumulated under "Unreleased"
   without per-D version bumps — Iron Rule 5 (release-kit bump-before-
   push) appeared to be silently violated. Reality: per-D bumps would
   produce 30+ noise tags during Phase 1. F11 formalizes the policy:
   intra-Phase D-day commits accumulate under Unreleased; bump+tag
   fires explicitly at Phase close (maintainer-triggered, not
   automated). CLAUDE.md release_kit overlay gains `phase_rolling_mode`
   block documenting the exception with self-pointer ("if Rule 5
   appears silently violated, check this section first"). CHANGELOG
   "Unreleased" gets a notice at top.

   **No version bump, no git tag in D33** — policy formalization only.

8. **F12 — /v1/models created is stable per-model timestamp**
   (models-registry.json + lib/providers/index.mjs + server.mjs +
   docs/openai-spec-pin.md): pre-D33 used Math.floor(Date.now()/1000)
   per request — violates OpenAI spec which treats `created` as
   per-model attribute. Clients caching models by created would see
   spurious updates on every poll.

   Fixed: models-registry.json gains `bootstrapCreated: 1778630400`
   top-level constant + per-model `created` fields where known
   (anthropic claude-{opus,sonnet,haiku} with estimated release dates;
   devstral models from "25-12" suffix; codex models pinned to
   bootstrap pending verified release dates). handleModels uses
   `getModelCreated(modelId)` helper from lib/providers/index.mjs.
   Aliases share canonical's timestamp.

**Tests** (test-features.mjs): 401 → 414 (+13):
- F3 ×3 (same input → same id → same cache key; different name → different)
- F5 ×4 (empty/single/multi/throwing-plugin /health shapes)
- F8 ×1 (2-hop primary-fail + secondary-cache-hit → X-OLP-Cache: hit)
- F12 ×5 (stability/fallback/alias-equals-canonical)

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D33 reviewer flagged F3 empty-args asymmetry** (Concern #1): hash
  input used `?? ''` (empty stays) but emitted IR field used
  `|| '{}'` (empty becomes '{}'). Consequence: `arguments: ''` and
  `arguments: '{}'` emit identical IR but compute different ids →
  different cache keys for semantically-identical requests. The exact
  cache-stability bug F3 was supposed to fix.

  Folded in: canonicalize empty-args to '{}' BEFORE hashing. Hash
  input now matches IR emission exactly. Same line change resolves
  the asymmetry.

Authority:
- ALIGNMENT.md self-amendment (F1 pin correction)
- ADR 0005 invariant "same inputs → same key, no random, no timestamp"
  (F3 restoration)
- ADR 0002 § Provider contract "/health uses healthCheck" (F5)
- ADR 0004 § Observability headers (F8 X-OLP-Cache correctness)
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions item 1 (F10 truncation-not-cached
  invariant explicit)
- Iron Rule 5 (F11 release-kit reconciliation)
- OpenAI /v1/models spec — `created` per-model stable (F12)
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-5 Cold Audit caught all 8

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Verified:
- F1 plugin cross-reference (mistral.mjs:360-369) accurately documents
  the rationale
- F3 collision resistance + NUL separator + restored cache invariant
- F5 all 4 cases (empty/single/multi/throwing) work
- F8 closure semantics across multi-hop chains (verified hop-fail +
  fallback-hit case)
- F10 dead code removal preserves the stop-chunk completion path
- F11 phase_rolling_mode policy honest about what happened and what
  the going-forward rule is
- F12 stability across consecutive /v1/models calls; alias-canonical
  parity
- 414/414 tests pass

3 remaining non-blocking suggestions (F3-vs-modern-tool_calls path
canonicalization symmetry; F12 codex models explicit-vs-fallback
writeup mismatch; F8 servingHopWasCached naming) tracked as future
polish; not folded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 19:12:03 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 30de965e8e fix+docs: D32 — round-4 cleanup batch (F2/F3/F4/F5/F7/F8/F9) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 4)

Round-4 cold-audit cleanup batch. 7 items grouped per IDR cleanup-batch
convention (D19/D20/D25/D26/D30/D31 precedent). 2 P2 + 3 ADR amendments
+ 2 small docs/code cleanups. F10 (P3 semantic edge case) filed
separately as GitHub issue #8.

Changes (8 files, +200 / -38):

**P2 fixes**

1. **F3 — README missing 6 provider auth env vars** (README.md):
   D30 fixed the `OLP_*` table but missed the auth-bearing env vars
   actually read by plugin code:
   - `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (anthropic.mjs:84) — highest-precedence
     override; bypasses keychain + .credentials.json file lookup
   - `OPENAI_CODEX_AUTH_PATH` (codex.mjs:163) — overrides full auth
     file path; when set, no other path tried
   - `CODEX_HOME` (codex.mjs:176) — overrides base dir; default auth
     path becomes `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json`
   - `MISTRAL_API_KEY` (mistral.mjs:260) — directly supplies API key;
     highest precedence per Mistral DOCS-2
   - `MISTRAL_VIBE_AUTH_PATH` (mistral.mjs:265) — overrides full .env
     path; evaluated only when MISTRAL_API_KEY absent
   - `VIBE_HOME` (mistral.mjs:277) — overrides Vibe base dir; default
     auth path becomes `$VIBE_HOME/.env`
   Real onboarding-blocker fix: new users couldn't run OLP without
   knowing about these env vars; README now documents them in a
   "Per-provider auth env vars" subsection.

2. **F8 — Early-return error paths missing X-OLP-* headers** (server.mjs):
   ADR 0004 § Observability + README claim "every response carries the
   5 X-OLP-* headers" but 503 (no-enabled-providers), 415 (wrong
   Content-Type), and early 400s (bad JSON, IR validation) emitted only
   Content-Type + Content-Length + X-OLP-Latency-Ms (D18 only wired the
   chain-exhausted path). Operators debugging these paths got less info
   than the ADR promised.
   New helper `olpErrorHeaders({ startMs, model })` emits the canonical
   "no provider attempted" defaults:
     X-OLP-Provider-Used: 'none'
     X-OLP-Model-Used: model ?? 'unknown'
     X-OLP-Fallback-Hops: '0'
     X-OLP-Cache: 'bypass'
     X-OLP-Latency-Ms: <delta>
   6 sendError call sites updated: 415 / 400-bad-JSON / 400-IR-parse
   (model: undefined → 'unknown') + 503-no-providers / 503-provider-
   disappeared / 500-engine-programming (model: ir.model). The 502
   streaming-error-before-first-chunk path correctly stays on
   `olpHeaders(...)` since a provider WAS attempted.

**ADR amendments**

3. **F2 — ADR 0003 model-mapping example correction** (docs/adr/0003,
   Amendment 2): the § Required fields example claimed `claude-sonnet-4-6`
   → `claude-sonnet-4-6-20260301` mapping happens in the provider plugin.
   This was wrong: per D17 SPOT decision (commit cb86807), `irRequest.model`
   is passed verbatim to the CLI; each provider CLI accepts its own
   aliases natively. Both inline correction (in § Decision) AND new
   Amendment 2 (in § Amendments) added.

4. **F4 — OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR dead code removal** (base.mjs, engine.mjs):
   `PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES.OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR` and
   `HARD_TRIGGER_CODES.OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR = true` were registered but
   ZERO plugins emit OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR. ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy
   enumerates 4 hard-trigger categories (5xx, quota 4xx, exit-code,
   spawn-timeout) — OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR was a 5th never authorized by
   ADR. Removed from both enums with removal-reason comments for
   auditability. Re-add via ADR 0004 amendment if a future plugin
   surfaces parse failures (cheaper than authoring an amendment for
   dead code now).

5. **F5 — ADR 0002 Amendment 4 ratifying contractVersion** (docs/adr/0002):
   `lib/providers/base.mjs:76-81` enforces `p.contractVersion === '1.0'`
   and all 3 plugins declare it, but ADR 0002 § Provider contract field
   list never named it. Same governance-violation class as D11's
   `maxSpawnTimeMs` retroactive sync (Amendment 1). Amendment 4 ratifies
   contractVersion as a required v1.0 contract field; § Provider contract
   field list updated to 10 fields (was 9).

**Small cleanups**

6. **F7 — README API Endpoints table 📋 markers** (README.md): added
   Status column with ✅ Shipped (3 rows: /v1/chat/completions, /v1/models,
   /health) and 📋 Planned (3 rows: /cache/stats Phase 5, /v0/management/
   quota Phase 6, /dashboard Phase 6). Matches D20's Implementation
   Status table convention.

7. **F9 — Codex parser inline assumption labels** (codex.mjs): added 5
   inline `// A4:` comments on each defensive branch in `codexChunkToIR`.
   Pre-D32 these branches had only the top-of-function block comment;
   ALIGNMENT.md Speculative-Candidate condition 5 promises future
   implementers can grep assumption labels to find every speculative
   branch — D32 honors that promise for codex.mjs (mistral.mjs already
   had this pattern from D8).

**Tests** (test-features.mjs):
- 17g retitled + assertion expanded to full 5-header set (was partial)
- 17h new: 415 wrong Content-Type → 5 X-OLP-* headers with 'unknown' model
- 17i new: 503 no-enabled-providers → 5 X-OLP-* headers with ir.model
- OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR test removed (replaced with comment for audit trail)

Test count: 400 → 401 (-1 OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR + 2 new F8 + 1 retitled
existing = net +1).

**F10 filed as issue, NOT in D32**:
https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/issues/8 — "Soft-skip + chain-
exhausted: X-OLP-Provider-Used semantics ambiguity". Semantic edge
case requiring soft trigger reactivation (deferred to v1.x per D22
Amendment 2); not a v0.1 user-affecting issue.

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):
- **D32 reviewer caught a doc-accuracy bug**: README's
  CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN row described the no-env fallback chain as
  "Searches keychain first, then `~/.claude/.credentials.json`" — but
  the actual code in anthropic.mjs:82-112 checks file FIRST, then
  keychain (darwin-only). Order was reversed. Folded in: corrected
  to "Searches `~/.claude/.credentials.json` first, then macOS
  keychain (darwin only)". Same class of doc-accuracy mistake as the
  D25 → D31 / D27 → D31 pattern: D-batch reviewer catches docs that
  contradict source.

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Independently verified:
- All 6 F3 env vars: precedence chains traced through plugin source
  (caught the anthropic reversed-order — folded in)
- F8 olpErrorHeaders helper correctly distinguishes "no provider"
  defaults from olpHeaders' "provider attempted" defaults
- F8: all 6 sendError call sites use the right model arg (undefined
  pre-IR-parse → 'unknown'; ir.model post-IR-parse)
- F8: 502 streaming-error stays on olpHeaders (provider was attempted)
- F4: OUTPUT_PARSE_ERROR removed from both enums, zero plugin emit
  references remain, test cleanup is auditable
- F5: ADR 0002 Amendment 4 matches Amendment 1's retroactive-sync
  structure; contract field list now 10 items
- F2: D17 commit cb86807 verified to match the SPOT decision claim
- F7/F9: docs/code cleanups verified
- F10 issue #8 verified OPEN with correct title
- 401/401 tests pass

3 non-blocking suggestions (anthropic precedence column folded; F2
inline mistral `--model` caveat could be added; F4 wording asymmetry
between base.mjs and engine.mjs comments) — minor polish, not folded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 17:28:42 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 4a238c9cc4 feat(fallback)+chore(cache): D28 — per-hop log observability fields (round-3 F2) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 3)

Round-3 cold-audit Finding 2 (P2 observability gap). ADR 0004 §
Observability headers requires per-hop structured log events to carry
7 fields: timestamp, chain id, hop index, failed provider, trigger type,
IR request hash, and downstream provider that was tried next. Pre-D28
events only carried timestamp/hop/provider/model/error/code — operators
could not:
- correlate hops across one logical request (no chain_id)
- pivot per-prompt via fingerprint (no ir_request_hash)
- tell from one log line which bucket classified the error (no
  trigger_type)
- see lookahead routing (no next_provider)

Changes (3 files, +431 / -3):

1. lib/cache/keys.mjs (+35):
   - New export `computeIRRequestHash(ir)` returning a 16-char SHA-256
     prefix over the IR fields that define request semantics
     (messages-normalized, tools, temperature, max_tokens, top_p, stop,
     tool_choice, response_format). Excludes provider/model/cache_control
     so the hash is provider-agnostic — identical prompts across a
     fallback chain produce identical fingerprints, enabling log
     correlation. 16-char prefix gives 2^64 collision resistance —
     astronomically safe for the use case while keeping log lines compact.

2. lib/fallback/engine.mjs (+86 / -3):
   - New helper `classifyTrigger(error)` returning one of:
     'hard' / 'auth_missing' / 'client_error' / 'non_trigger' / null.
     ProviderError with HARD_TRIGGER_CODES → 'hard'; AUTH_MISSING → its
     own bucket; HTTP 400/401/403/404/422 → 'client_error' (per ADR 0004
     § "No fallback for client-side errors"); HTTP 5xx or non-client 4xx
     (e.g. 429/529) → 'hard'; other → 'non_trigger'. 'soft' is reserved
     in JSDoc for forward-compat per D22 Amendment 2's deferral of soft
     triggers to v1.x.
   - `executeWithFallback` now generates `chainId` (crypto.randomBytes(8)
     .toString('hex')) and `irRequestHash` (computeIRRequestHash(ir))
     ONCE at entry — both stay constant across all hops in the chain.
   - All 8 logEvent call sites augmented with the 4 new fields:
     fallback_soft_trigger, fallback_hop_success, fallback_hop_error,
     fallback_client_error_no_fallback, fallback_auth_missing_no_fallback,
     fallback_hard_trigger, fallback_non_trigger_error,
     fallback_chain_exhausted.
   - `next_provider` is `chain[i + 1]?.provider ?? null` on advancement
     events; null on terminal events (success / client_error /
     auth_missing / chain_exhausted).
   - chain_id NOT reused from generateRequestId() since that produces
     OpenAI-response-scoped `chatcmpl-<base64url>` IDs; chain_id is
     internal log correlation and uses a clean 16-char hex token.

3. test-features.mjs (+313): 24 new tests covering:
   - computeIRRequestHash determinism + 16-char hex shape + 8 per-field
     sensitivity tests (one per IR input field)
   - Provider-agnosticism (same hash across different provider/model)
   - chain_id uniqueness across calls + consistency across hops
   - trigger_type for each branch (hard / auth_missing / client_error /
     non_trigger / null)
   - next_provider correctness (chain[i+1] on advance; null at
     exhaustion)

Tests: 376 → 400 (+24). All pass on Node 20.

Pure observation-only change: no fallback decision logic touched.
`evaluateHardTriggers`, `evaluateSoftTriggers`, `HARD_TRIGGER_CODES`,
`CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES` are only READ by `classifyTrigger`; the existing
decision branches are textually unchanged — only the trailing logEvent
object literals are expanded.

Authority:
- ADR 0004 § Observability headers (the 7-field requirement)
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md
- ADR 0004 § "No fallback for client-side errors" — 401/403/404/422
  bucket (used by classifyTrigger's CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES branch)
- ADR 0005 Amendment 2 (D15) — cache key composition fields, mirrored
  in computeIRRequestHash minus provider/model/cache_control
- D22 Amendment 2 (ADR 0004) — soft triggers deferred to v1.x;
  'soft' reserved in JSDoc but unreturnable
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-3 Cold Audit caught this

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Traced all 8 classifyTrigger branches against
ADR 0004 wording; verified 401/403/404/422 correctly classified as
'client_error' (never 'hard') per the ordering of CLIENT_ERROR_STATUSES
check before the generic status>=400 fallthrough; confirmed observation-
only via diff inspection (only logEvent object literals expanded, no
control-flow changes); independently ran git-stash to verify pre-D28
baseline 376 + 24 = 400.

3 non-blocking suggestions noted (JSDoc 'soft' union vs unreachable
return; future cross-correlation of chain_id with chatcmpl response IDs;
log-line redundancy between fallback_hop_error + fallback_hard_trigger
for same hop) — all cosmetic, not folded.

Note on D27 CI: D27 first CI run failed 1/376 on a Suite 17 port-
collision flake (overlapping random port ranges across Suite 17 tests +
Linux TIME_WAIT timing). Re-run was green. The flake is pre-existing
from D18-era test design; tracked as D29 follow-up to switch Suite 17
to OS-assigned port 0. D28 doesn't touch Suite 17 and is unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 16:40:30 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 c3ba751a8f feat: D27 — round-3 P3 batch (F8 IR validator + F10 ADR amend + F15 /v1/models aliases) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 3)

3 round-3 P3 items batched per IDR. Mixed surfaces but all single-severity
and conceptually independent.

Changes (5 files, +324 / -17):

1. lib/ir/types.mjs — F8 validator extension (+28):
   - `response_format`: must be object with string `.type` (undefined/omitted
     accepted; null, non-object, missing-type all rejected). Forward-compat:
     accepts any string for type so future OpenAI additions (json_schema,
     etc.) flow through without schema bump.
   - `tool_choice`: string form 'auto'/'none'/'required' OR object form
     `{type:'function', function:{name:string}}`. All other shapes rejected.
   Pre-D27 the validator silently accepted any value; the Anthropic plugin's
   `if (irRequest.response_format?.type === 'json_object')` would no-op on
   a malformed string payload.

2. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md — F10 Amendment 4 (+8):
   - Documents the IR-vs-body detection ambiguity in § D2: the ADR text
     reads as if detection happens on the IR, but `openai-to-ir.mjs` strips
     `cache_control` from messages per ADR 0003's whitelist policy, so
     IR-side detection is structurally always empty at v1.0
   - Documents the actual v1.0 detection mechanism (server.mjs side-channels
     into the raw body)
   - Documents the cache key `cache_control` slot's always-null status as
     forward-compat (when a future ADR 0003 amendment adds cache_control
     to IR, the slot will start carrying meaningful data without schema bump)
   - Explicit "no code change" — F10 is docs-only

3. lib/providers/index.mjs — F15 alias map export (+11):
   - `getAliasMap()` returns `new Map(_aliasMap)` — defensive copy preventing
     caller mutation of the module-private alias map
   - JSDoc documents use case + defensive-copy intent

4. server.mjs — F15 /v1/models alias surfacing (+25/-7):
   - `handleModels` now emits TWO loops: canonical entries first (preserves
     existing client expectations), then alias entries via `getAliasMap()`
   - Each alias entry has the same 4 OpenAI-spec fields (id/object/created/
     owned_by) — no invented fields per ALIGNMENT Rule 2(b)
   - Disabled-provider alias non-leak: `loadedProviders.has(providerName)`
     gate skips aliases whose target provider is not currently enabled
   - createdTs reused (same per-request timestamp across all entries)
   - JSDoc updated to document new ordering + F15 origin

5. test-features.mjs — +269 / +18 new tests:
   - F8: 13 tests covering response_format (object/string/non-object/missing-
     type) + tool_choice (string variants/object variants/wrong type/no name)
   - F15: 5 tests covering canonical-first ordering, alias presence/count,
     disabled-provider non-leak (with anthropic-only enabled, mistral and
     openai aliases must NOT appear), Rule 2(b) shape conformance

Tests: 358 → 376 (+18). All pass on Node 20.

Reviewer notes (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Critical checks verified:
- F8: all 9+ tool_choice rejection axes traced through code (including
  partial-function-object edge cases). The code handles them correctly even
  where tests don't exercise (non-blocking gap).
- F10: amendment substantively correct. One wording-precision note: the
  amendment says "body only" but the actual code is an OR-disjunction
  (hasCacheControl(ir) || extractCacheControlMarkers(body.messages)).
  Functionally identical at v1.0 because IR strips markers, so first
  disjunct is always false. Forward-compat by construction.
- F15: disabled-provider non-leak verified by manual trace with
  anthropic-only enabled — mistral/openai aliases correctly filtered out
  by `loadedProviders.has(providerName)` gate. Test 17e explicitly
  asserts this.
- F15+D17 round-trip: client GET /v1/models → sees alias entry → POSTs
  with alias → getProviderForModel resolves via same _aliasMap → cache
  key uses canonical → response works. Both surfaces read the same Map
  (SPOT).
- F15+D23 cacheable interaction: cacheable opt-out doesn't suppress
  alias surfacing in /v1/models — cacheable is about cache-write behavior
  while discovery should still surface enabled providers. Intentional.

Authority:
- ADR 0003 § Optional fields (response_format + tool_choice IR shape)
- OpenAI Chat Completions API spec (the field semantics)
  https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create
- ADR 0005 § D2 + Amendment 4 (F10's own amendment landing here)
- ADR 0002 § Loading model + D17 getProviderForModel SPOT (F15's alias
  origin)
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b) — no invented OpenAI fields
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-3 Cold Audit caught all 3

Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking suggestions, NOT in this PR):
- F8 micro-tests for null/boolean/partial-function inputs (code handles;
  test gap only)
- F10 wording precision on OR-disjunction
- Nested-describe wrapper quirk in test-features.mjs (pre-existing
  structural issue; D26/D27 describes are children of Suite 16 wrapper).
  Cleanup in a future hygiene pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 16:22:30 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 a281d3e424 fix: D26 — round-3 small batch (F16+F17+F18+F19) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24 (round 3)

4 small fixes batched per Iron Rule 11 IDR cleanup-batch convention.
None exceeds ~15 lines; mixed surfaces (server.mjs / 2 plugins /
plugin header / tests) but all P3-class and related by being honesty
fixes to claims the ADR/spec made but code didn't honor.

Changes (5 files, +546 / -13):

1. server.mjs — TWO changes:
   - **F16 (startup warning)**: `logEvent` function moved earlier in
     the file (was at line ~124, now at line ~56) so it's defined
     before `_startupConfig` is loaded. After loading, check
     `_startupConfig.soft_triggers` — if non-empty, emit
     `logEvent('warn', 'soft_triggers_deferred_v1x', ...)` with the
     configured provider names + a descriptive message citing ADR
     0004 Amendment 2. Wires the mitigation that ADR 0004 § Mitigations
     (original pre-Amendment-2 text) requires: "Soft triggers configured
     against such providers issue a startup warning so the user knows
     the trigger will never fire." D22 deferred soft triggers but
     didn't re-implement this mitigation.
   - **F19 (streaming truncation marker)**: in the stop-less exhaustion
     branch of the real-streaming code path (post-D25 F9 — the no-cache
     fix), write a synthetic `{type:'stop', finish_reason:'length'}`
     SSE chunk via `irChunkToOpenAISSE(...)` BEFORE `res.write(SSE_DONE)`.
     Guarded on `streamedChunks.length > 0` (emitting truncation on
     a zero-content response would mislead the client). Mirrors the
     buffered D16 path which already synthesizes the same marker.
     The synthetic marker is `res.write`-only — NEVER pushed to
     `streamedChunks` — so the D25 F9 no-cache invariant
     (cache decision sees the original chunks array unchanged) is
     structurally preserved.

2. lib/providers/codex.mjs + mistral.mjs — F17 stderr propagation:
   the SPAWN_FAILED throw from the error-chunk-in-NDJSON path now
   includes `accumulatedStderr.slice(0, 200)` suffix when non-empty.
   Comment cites ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 4 ("preserve the
   client's ability to debug — the first failure is the load-bearing
   signal").

   **anthropic.mjs intentionally NOT modified**. Re-analysis confirmed
   Anthropic's SPAWN_FAILED throws are from (a) process.on('error')
   for binary-not-found (already includes OS-level err.message),
   (b) SPAWN_TIMEOUT (separate code, D24 race fix), and (c) post-loop
   exit-code (already includes `accumulatedStderr.slice(0, 300)`).
   Anthropic uses `--output-format text`, so it has no NDJSON
   error-chunk parsing path. The cold-audit was correct that the
   error-chunk class only affects codex + mistral.

3. lib/providers/anthropic.mjs — F18 plugin header self-contained
   D4 observation note. Pre-D26: ALIGNMENT.md anthropic Authority pin
   row cited the plugin header for the OLP-side observation, and the
   plugin header cited ALIGNMENT.md back — circular citation, no
   party documented a fresh observation. Fix: plugin header now
   carries the actual observation ("@anthropic-ai/claude-code v2.1.89
   confirmed present at D4 implementation per ALIGNMENT.md Rule 5").
   ALIGNMENT.md side unchanged (still points to plugin header — but
   now points to a real artifact, not back to itself).

4. test-features.mjs — 9 new tests in 3 describe blocks:
   - F16 ×3: soft_triggers non-empty → warn fires; empty → no warn;
     undefined → no warn. Test uses inline simulation of the startup
     code path (ESM module-eval can't be re-triggered per test process
     without isolation gymnastics; inline simulation exercises the
     same `Object.keys + length > 0 + logEvent('warn', ...)` shape).
   - F17 ×3: codex with stderr → stderr appears in throw message;
     codex without stderr → no suffix; mistral with stderr → suffix
   - F19 ×3: partial-content + stop-less exhaustion → finish_reason='length'
     marker before [DONE]; zero-content + stop-less exhaustion →
     no marker (just [DONE]); D25 F9 invariant preserved (second
     identical request triggers fresh spawn, X-OLP-Cache: miss)

Tests: 349 → 358 (+9). All pass on Node 20.

Authority:
- F16 → ADR 0004 § Mitigations (original) + ADR 0004 Amendment 2 (D22)
- F17 → ADR 0004 § Chain advancement step 4
- F18 → ALIGNMENT.md Rule 1 (Cite First) + Rule 5 (Cite in Commits)
- F19 → OpenAI Chat Completions streaming spec finish_reason enum
  https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/streaming
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-3 Cold Audit caught all 4

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified critical concerns: (a) logEvent move is
net-zero (1 removed + 1 added; no duplicate); (b) F17 anthropic
non-application is justified by code-reading 3 SPAWN_FAILED sites in
anthropic.mjs (none is the NDJSON-error-chunk class); (c) F18 citation
chain no longer circular (verified BOTH endpoints); (d) F19 critical
no-cache invariant preserved (truncMarker is res.write-only, never
enters streamedChunks; verified both by code-path analysis and by F19
test 3 behavioral assertion).

3 non-blocking suggestions noted (F18 copy redundancy; F16 test linking
comment; F17 stderr slice-depth alignment) — all cosmetic, not folded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 16:04:49 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 7ef5510837 feat(cache): D23 — implement hints.cacheable + 10MB size cap (round-2 F3) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24

Round-2 cold-audit Finding 3 (P2 cache correctness). ADR 0005 § "Cache
write conditions" items 3 and 4 were documented but never wired in
code:
- Item 3: "The provider's hints.cacheable flag is not false"
- Item 4: "The response is below a size cap (default 10 MB; configurable)"

Grep verified zero matches for `cacheable` / `10485760` / size-cap
patterns in lib/ or server.mjs pre-D23.

Changes (9 files, +391 / -12):

1. docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md — Amendment 3 adds `cacheable`
   to the Provider contract hints list (after D11's Amendment 1 added
   maxSpawnTimeMs). Authority chain cites ADR 0005 § Cache write
   conditions item 3 as the field's origin.

2. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md — Amendment 3 documents the
   D23 implementation of items 3 + 4 + the D16-interaction edge case
   (truncated > 10MB → no-op eviction, structurally bounded since
   responses > 10MB are anomalous by ADR's own rationale).

3. lib/providers/base.mjs — ProviderHints typedef gains
   `[cacheable]` (optional boolean); validateProvider rejects non-
   boolean non-undefined values. Omission accepted (default = true).

4. 3 plugins (anthropic / codex / mistral) each declare
   `cacheable: true` explicitly with citation comment.

5. lib/cache/store.mjs — CacheStore constructor accepts
   `maxEntryBytes` (default 10 * 1024 * 1024 = 10_485_760) +
   injectable `_warnFn`. `set()` computes
   `Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(value))`; if exceeded, warns via
   `_warnFn` and returns undefined (no persistence). `getOrCompute`
   still returns the computed value to caller — cache write skipped
   but caller gets data; subsequent identical requests re-spawn.

6. server.mjs — 4 sites coordinated for cacheable opt-out:
   - `executeHopFn`: cacheable check before D13 shouldBypassCacheForHop
     (permanent provider policy precedes per-request bypass condition)
   - `cacheStore.peek` gate at line ~504: `cacheableForFirstHop`
     short-circuit
   - Real-streaming branch entry condition at line ~522:
     `cacheableForFirstHop` added (so cacheable: false + stream falls
     through to buffered path which honors the opt-out via executeHopFn)
   - Both `cacheStore.set` sites in streaming branch wrapped in
     `if (cacheableForFirstHop)` defensive guards (post-D23
     restructure these are unreachable for cacheable: false, but the
     guards make intent explicit and survive future refactors)

7. test-features.mjs — 13 new tests:
   - 5 validator tests (Suite 4): explicit true/false, omitted, string
     rejected, number rejected
   - 5 size-cap unit tests (Suite 9): default 10MB, custom override,
     oversize skip + warn capture, within-limit normal persistence,
     getOrCompute oversize returns-but-doesn't-cache + re-spawn
   - 3 cacheable integration tests (Suite 9e): non-streaming opt-out,
     streaming opt-out (the regression case that pre-fold-in failed),
     X-OLP-Cache header consistency on both paths

Tests: 335 → 348 (+13). All pass on Node 20.

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):

- **D23 reviewer flagged 2 blocking issues**: (1) the cacheable opt-out
  in initial implementation was only in `executeHopFn` (buffered path);
  the D10 real-streaming branch in server.mjs bypassed the check
  entirely — calling streamPlugin.spawn() directly and writing to
  cacheStore.set() at 2 sites without consulting cacheable. (2) Suite
  9e integration tests didn't cover stream: true so the leak wasn't
  caught.

  Both diff-review and the implementer focused on `executeHopFn`
  because that's where the cold-audit reviewer pointed for Finding 3.
  Same class of "narrow attention" miss as several earlier D-days.

  Fold-in: compute `cacheableForFirstHop` once at request entry; add
  `!cacheableForFirstHop` short-circuit to peek gate; add
  `cacheableForFirstHop` to streaming-branch entry condition (forces
  fall-through to buffered path which has the opt-out); add defensive
  guards on both `cacheStore.set` call sites. Added a 3rd Suite 9e
  test covering stream: true + cacheable: false (which pre-fold-in
  would have failed by serving the second request from cache).

  This is now the FOURTH D-day where a doc-vs-code or path-coverage
  gap was caught by the reviewer rather than the implementer. The
  v1.6 § 10.x diff-review discipline continues to pay off.

Default behavior unchanged for 3 shipped plugins (all explicitly
`cacheable: true` → cache path identical to pre-D23).

Authority:
- ADR 0002 Amendment 3 (in-place) — establishes cacheable in contract
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 (in-place) — documents implementation of items
  3 + 4
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions items 3 + 4 — the original
  authority for both rules
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught the missing
  implementation; diff-review Mode A caught the streaming-path gap

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): REQUEST_CHANGES on initial, APPROVE after fold-in (implicit
— fold-in followed the exact recommendation). Verified:
- ADR amendment placement + structure
- Validator typedef + checks
- Size cap implementation in CacheStore + inflight slot release on
  oversize-skip
- All 4 interaction cases (cacheable × cache_control × D16
  × ordering) coherent post-fold-in
- 13 new tests including the regression test that would have failed
  on pre-fold-in code

Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking notes, NOT in this PR):
- ADR 0005 Amendment 3 could add one sentence on the prior-write-also-
  oversize case (file as docs polish)
- Consider extracting `shouldUseCacheForHop(hopProvider, ir)` helper
  combining D13 + D23 logic — reduces miss-risk for next reviewer
- Test 30 could add `assert.equal(store._inflight.size, 0)` as
  inflight-slot leak regression guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 14:45:08 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 e10b7d7cb9 docs(adr-0004)+chore: D22 — defer soft triggers to v1.x (round-2 F2) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24

Round-2 cold-audit Finding 2 (P2 feature-surface vs data-ingestion drift).
ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy documented soft triggers (credit_pool_percent,
daily_request_count, five_hour_window_percent) as a live, configurable
feature category. But `evaluateSoftTriggers` in lib/fallback/engine.mjs
is functionally inert at v0.1:
- buildDefaultChain hardcodes quotaSnapshot: null on every hop
- No call site for provider.quotaStatus() in server.mjs or engine.mjs
  (only definitions in the 3 provider plugins, all currently stubs)
- evaluateSoftTriggers correctly short-circuits to false on null snapshot

A user populating routing.soft_triggers in ~/.olp/config.json gets zero
runtime behavior. Round-1 cold audit + D5/D9 diff-review reviewers all
focused on evaluation correctness; nobody traced the production data
path end-to-end.

Owner decision (after considering wire-vs-defer): defer to v1.x. Wiring
quotaStatus() polling requires per-hop async I/O before each spawn
decision, error handling for providers without quota endpoints (all 3
current providers fall in this bucket: claude -p, codex exec --json,
vibe --prompt — none expose quota), a caching layer to avoid re-polling,
and a latency budget for a pre-spawn network call. Implementation cost
high; v0.1 value zero.

Strategy: defer the FEATURE (data ingestion path), not the CODE (evaluation
logic). evaluateSoftTriggers is small, well-tested via unit tests that
inject snapshots directly (test-features.mjs:3617-3665), and
architecturally correct. v1.x reactivation requires only wiring the
data path — evaluation stays untouched.

Changes (3 files, +25 / -1):

1. docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md +15 — new Amendment 2 block at top
   of doc (after Amendment 1, before § Context, matching D11/D15/D16/
   Amendment 1 placement convention):
   - Finding (cold-audit round-2 F2 + 3 concrete code-state facts)
   - Decision (defer; keep evaluation code inert-but-correct)
   - Rationale (3-point cost/value analysis)
   - Effect on § Trigger taxonomy (inline deferral note appended; design
     prose preserved)
   - What v1.x reactivation looks like (3 concrete steps; no rewrite needed)
   - Procedural mechanism (CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — round-2 caught it)

   Plus an inline "📋 Deferred to v1.x (Amendment 2)" sub-bullet in
   § Trigger taxonomy → Soft triggers entry. The 3 threshold descriptions
   are preserved verbatim — the architectural design remains the v1.x
   intent.

2. lib/fallback/engine.mjs +8 / -1 — comment-only updates on the 2
   `quotaSnapshot: null` lines in buildDefaultChain. Each now reads:
   ```
   // quotaSnapshot stays null at v0.1 — soft triggers deferred to v1.x per
   // ADR 0004 Amendment 2. evaluateSoftTriggers correctly short-circuits to
   // false when quotaSnapshot is null. The polling path is not wired in v0.1.
   ```
   No code logic changed. The previous misleading comment "populated at
   runtime if provider.quotaStatus() is called" (which falsely implied a
   live wiring) is replaced.

3. README.md +3 — two additions:
   - Deferral callout immediately after the routing.soft_triggers config
     example block, naming Amendment 2
   - Implementation status table row: "Soft trigger data path
     (quotaStatus() polling) | 📋 Planned (v1.x) | Evaluation logic
     shipped + tested; data ingestion deferred per ADR 0004 Amendment 2"

Tests: 335/335 unchanged — pure docs + comment deferral, no behavior
change. Existing unit tests for evaluateSoftTriggers (which inject
snapshots directly) continue to validate the evaluation correctness
independent of the production ingestion path.

Authority:
- ADR 0004 self-amendment (Amendment 2 in-place)
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 1 (Cite First) + CLAUDE.md § "Hard requirements"
  item 1 — contract status changes require ADR amendment
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught this

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified all 3 framing claims independently:
(a) buildDefaultChain hardcodes null on both branches — confirmed at
engine.mjs:421 and :444; (b) zero quotaStatus() call sites in production
— `grep -rn "quotaStatus("` found only 3 definitions in provider plugins
+ JSDoc mentions; (c) evaluateSoftTriggers correctly short-circuits at
engine.mjs:139. Reactivation realism check: all 3 v1.x steps map to
existing surfaces (insertion points, hop shape, test fixtures).

Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking notes, NOT in this PR):
- README line 154 still reads "328-test suite"; current is 335 — pre-
  existing doc-sync drift to pick up in D25 P3 batch
- v1.x ADR 0002 amendment may need to formally define authContext shape
  (currently informal in the contract); pre-note as a dependency

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 14:28:49 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 f8348adb3b fix(providers): D24 — close spawn-timeout race when timer fires during yield-suspension (round-2 F4) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24

Round-2 cold-audit Finding 4 (P2 concurrency bug). All 3 provider plugins
(anthropic / codex / mistral) had a race in spawn-timeout enforcement:

The timer's rejection branch is `if (rejectNext) { rejectNext(SPAWN_TIMEOUT) }`.
`rejectNext` is only set while the drain loop is AWAITING an empty-queue
promise. If the timer fires while the generator is suspended at a `yield`
(rejectNext === null because we're not currently awaiting), the rejection
is silently skipped. The loop then drains queued items, sees `close`
(from the SIGTERM), breaks normally. Post-loop guards on `!spawnTimedOut`
both skip: SPAWN_FAILED throw + yield-stop emit. Generator returns
normally with N partial chunks. Consumer (collectAllChunks) sees a
"successful" return. Fallback never advances. Truncated response gets
cached.

This violates BOTH:
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4 (hard trigger never fires)
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions item 1 (truncated response cached)

The bug escaped FOUR reviewers: D10 diff-review, round-1 cold-audit, D11
reviewer, D14 reviewer. Round-2 cold-audit caught it because it was
unprimed and walked the timer/drain-loop race manually.

Fix (3 plugins, parallel race):

Each plugin gains an unconditional post-loop check, placed AFTER the
existing `try { drain loop } finally { clearTimeout(timer) }` block,
but BEFORE the existing `!spawnTimedOut`-gated guards:

```js
if (spawnTimedOut) {
  throw new ProviderError(
    `<cli-name> spawn timed out after ${maxSpawnTimeMs}ms`,
    'SPAWN_TIMEOUT',
  );
}
```

This closes the race surface: the inner-loop guard (unchanged, lines
~319/461/583) handles the rejectNext-set path; the new post-loop guard
handles the rejectNext-null path. Together they cover both halves —
SPAWN_TIMEOUT now reliably surfaces as a hard trigger regardless of
which path the timer fire took.

Changes (4 files, +154 / -0):
- lib/providers/anthropic.mjs: post-loop guard at lines 360-365 (after
  clearTimeout at line 348-350, before existing SPAWN_FAILED guard at 368)
- lib/providers/codex.mjs: post-loop guard at lines 521-526 (parallel)
- lib/providers/mistral.mjs: post-loop guard at lines 643-648 (parallel)
- test-features.mjs: new Suite 16 test 16e — race reproduction (109 lines)

Test 16e race reproduction (deterministic):

Exploits Node event-loop ordering. Mock spawn schedules data1 + data2 +
close via a single setImmediate. setImmediate runs before timers in the
same tick, so all 3 events queue before the timer can fire. Generator
yields data1 then suspends at yield with rejectNext null. Consumer
pauses 25ms (> 10ms timer). Timer fires during yield-suspension:
spawnTimedOut=true, rejectNext null → branch skipped, SIGTERM sent.
Consumer resumes, drain processes data2 + close, breaks normally.
Post-loop: D24 guard catches spawnTimedOut → throws SPAWN_TIMEOUT.

Pre-D24 behavior: generator returns normally (truncated, silently
cacheable). Test would FAIL.
Post-D24: SPAWN_TIMEOUT throws → test PASSES.

Reviewer empirically validated the test's diagnostic power by stripping
D24 from anthropic.mjs and observing exactly 16e fail (only 16e — 16a
through 16d still pass on the orthogonal rejectNext-set path), then
restored.

Timing flake risk: very low. Race depends only on relative ordering of
two setTimeout callbacks (10ms vs 25ms) which Node guarantees regardless
of absolute drift. Reviewer ran 7 npm test passes; 16e timing spread
26.43-27.70ms (1.3ms variance).

Tests: 334 → 335 (+1). 335/335 pass on Node 20.

Out of scope (filed in issue #3):
- SPAWN_TIMEOUT salvage parity: this fix discards partial chunks (matches
  current SPAWN_TIMEOUT semantics, doesn't introduce asymmetry vs
  SPAWN_FAILED-no-chunks). Whether to add SPAWN_TIMEOUT-with-usable-chunks
  salvage (analogous to D16's SPAWN_FAILED salvage) is a separate design
  decision tracked in issue #3.

Authority:
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy — Hard triggers bullet 4: "Provider CLI
  spawn timeout (configurable per-provider via hints.maxSpawnTimeMs)"
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md
- ADR 0005 § Cache write conditions item 1 (no truncation)
- engine.mjs HARD_TRIGGER_CODES['SPAWN_TIMEOUT'] = true (D10 P1.3,
  unchanged)
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught this

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified guard position in all 3 plugins; read
push() to confirm rejectNext-null mechanism; empirically validated test
16e's diagnostic specificity (strip-revert-restore); 7 test runs
confirmed timing stability. No blocking issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 14:22:53 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 1466d3a082 fix(providers): D21 — validateProvider enforces maxSpawnTimeMs contract field (round-2 F1) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-24

Round-2 cold-audit Finding 1 (P2 contract drift). ADR 0002 Amendment 1
(D11, commit f659e29) added `maxSpawnTimeMs` to the Provider contract
v1.0 hints set alongside requiresTTY/concurrentSpawnSafe/maxConcurrent.
But `lib/providers/base.mjs` validateProvider was never updated —
ProviderHints typedef listed only the original 3 fields, and the
validator's error message + per-field checks ignored maxSpawnTimeMs
entirely. A plugin that omitted the field would still pass validation;
each plugin's `?? 600_000` runtime default masked the omission at the
spawn site. Round-1 cold audit + D11 diff review both missed this.

Changes (lib/providers/base.mjs +6 / -1, test-features.mjs +36):

1. ProviderHints typedef extended:
   `@property {number} [maxSpawnTimeMs] - optional integer milliseconds, default 600000`
   The `[name]` JSDoc marker correctly indicates optional.

2. Hints existence error message updated to include the new field:
   `'hints must be an object with { requiresTTY, concurrentSpawnSafe, maxConcurrent, maxSpawnTimeMs }'`

3. Per-field validation added inside the hints-object branch:
   ```
   if (p.hints.maxSpawnTimeMs !== undefined) {
     if (typeof !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(...) || <= 0) push error
   }
   ```
   The `!== undefined` outer guard correctly short-circuits omission to
   "valid" (the field is optional per ADR). The inner check rejects:
   negative, zero, non-integer (catches floats, NaN, Infinity since
   Number.isInteger handles all non-finite cases), and non-number types.

4. test-features.mjs Suite 4: 6 new tests covering all rejection axes
   + both positive-path cases (omitted-is-valid, positive-integer-is-valid):
   - rejects negative
   - rejects zero
   - rejects non-integer (100.5)
   - rejects non-number ('600' string)
   - accepts omitted (optional field)
   - accepts positive integer (60000)

Tests: 328 → 334 (+6). All three shipped plugins (anthropic / codex /
mistral) declare maxSpawnTimeMs: 600_000 (positive integer) and continue
to pass validation. Suite 16 spawn-timeout tests confirm the existing
positive integer flows through to the runtime enforcement loop unchanged.

Authority:
- ADR 0002 § Amendments § Amendment 1 (D11, 2026-05-23) — establishes
  maxSpawnTimeMs as part of the v1.0 hints contract
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy — Hard triggers bullet 4 — the contract
  field's use site (per-plugin spawn-timeout enforcement → SPAWN_TIMEOUT
  hard trigger)
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Round-2 Cold Audit caught this

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified ADR Amendment 1 wording matches validator
behavior; verified all 4 rejection axes plus 2 positive axes covered
by tests; verified existing plugin declarations continue to pass via
334/334 (Suite 16 spawn-timeout suite included). No blocking issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 14:06:21 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 ed82e65859 chore: D19 — cleanup batch (Findings 8 + 14 + 15 + D17 dead import) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-23

Batched 4 small P3 mechanical cleanups per Iron Rule 11 IDR cleanup-batch
convention (all P3, all small, no semantic feature changes beyond defensive
validation).

Changes (7 files):

1. lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs (+30 / -3) — Finding 8 defensive validator:
   - Added OPENAI_FINISH_REASON_ENUM Set with the 6 spec-allowed values
     (stop / length / tool_calls / content_filter / function_call / null)
   - Added normalizeFinishReason(value) helper that returns value unchanged
     if in enum, else 'stop'
   - Routed both irChunkToOpenAISSE (streaming path) and
     irResponseToOpenAINonStream (non-stream path) through the helper
   - Bonus tightening (in-scope, same finish_reason concept):
     irResponseToOpenAINonStream's gate changed from `if (chunk.finish_reason)`
     (truthy check) to `if (chunk.finish_reason !== undefined)` so an
     explicit null (valid spec value meaning "still in progress") is no
     longer silently dropped by the truthy guard
   - Note: undefined → null collapse via `?? null` is unreachable in the
     current codebase (all provider plugins explicitly set finish_reason
     on stop chunks); defensive only against a future plugin that omits
     the field — documented inline

2. .github/workflows/alignment.yml (-16) — Finding 14 dead CI cleanup:
   - Removed `setup.mjs` from path triggers (push + pull_request) — the
     file does not exist in the repo
   - Removed the dead `KNOWN_PROVIDERS=(...)` bash array from job 1 and
     its comment block — no later step iterated over it, so the array
     was abandoned
   - LEFT untouched: the Node.js inline KNOWN_PROVIDERS array in the
     models-registry validation job — that one is actively consumed by
     the schema validation script

3. lib/providers/anthropic.mjs / codex.mjs / mistral.mjs (3 × 1 line) —
   Finding 15: removed unused `PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES` from import lines.
   Each line went from `import { ProviderError, PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES } from
   './base.mjs';` to `import { ProviderError } from './base.mjs';`. The
   constant remains exported from base.mjs (its declaration site, where
   it IS used for validation).

4. server.mjs (1 line) — D17 reviewer's observation: removed unused
   `getProviderForModel` from the import line. The function is only
   called by lib/fallback/engine.mjs which imports it directly from
   lib/providers/index.mjs. server.mjs's import was dead (the routing
   SPOT lives in engine.mjs after D17 — server.mjs uses buildDefaultChain
   exclusively).

5. test-features.mjs (+44) — Suite 3 (irChunkToOpenAISSE format) extended
   with 4 new finish_reason normalization tests:
   - Test 1: non-spec streaming finish_reason ('timeout', 'overloaded',
     'cancelled') → mapped to 'stop'
   - Test 2: spec-enum streaming finish_reason (all 6 incl. null) preserved
   - Test 3: non-spec non-stream finish_reason → mapped to 'stop'
   - Test 4: spec-enum non-stream finish_reason preserved (null
     intentionally omitted — documented inline)

Tests: 324 → 328 (+4). All pass on Node 20.

Pre-commit fold-ins (per evidence-first checkpoint #4):

- **D19 reviewer suggestion #1**: added inline comment to
  normalizeFinishReason explaining the unreachable `undefined → null`
  branch (defensive only, no current plugin omits the field). Cheap
  future-reader clarity.
- **D19 reviewer suggestion #2**: added inline comment to Test 4
  explaining why null is intentionally omitted from the spec-enum list
  (non-stream `!== undefined` gate enters with null and overwrites
  default 'stop' to null — semantically odd but spec-valid).

Reviewer suggestion #3 (consider stricter `undefined → 'stop'` on
streaming-stop path vs `null → null` on delta path) explicitly marked
out of scope by reviewer — would require call-site context awareness;
filed mentally as potential future work, not tracked as an issue
since no current path triggers it.

Authority:
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b) — only spec-defined fields in OpenAI responses
- OpenAI Chat Completions spec finish_reason enum
  https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/object#finish_reason
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Cold Audit Findings 8 / 14 / 15

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified the unreachable `undefined → null` branch
claim by grep-checking all 3 provider plugins (none emit undefined);
verified the two KNOWN_PROVIDERS arrays were correctly distinguished
(only the dead bash one removed); ran npm test independently to confirm
328/328.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 12:16:19 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 cb86807009 refactor(routing): D17 — alias-aware getProviderForModel as routing SPOT (Findings 12 + 13) 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-23

Cold-audit Findings 12 + 13 (both P3, both routing layer). F12: mistral
plugin's models[] included canonical IDs + aliases while anthropic/codex
were canonical-only — inconsistent routing surface (request "sonnet"
returned 503 from anthropic but request "devstral" worked for mistral).
F13: getProviderForModel imported but never called; buildDefaultChain
duplicated the lookup loop — two SPOT-candidate code paths.

Per cold-audit reviewer's option (a): standardize models[] on canonical-
only across all 3 plugins; getProviderForModel becomes alias-aware via
models-registry.json; buildDefaultChain uses getProviderForModel as SPOT.

Changes (4 files, +242 / -50):

1. lib/providers/index.mjs:
   - At module load, builds `_aliasMap: Map<aliasString, {providerName,
     canonicalModel}>` by walking models-registry.json's providers[*].aliases
   - getProviderForModel signature extended: returns `{provider, name,
     canonicalModel}` (was `{provider, name}`). The canonicalModel field is
     the resolved canonical ID for callers that need to use it downstream
     (cache key, observability headers, log events)
   - 3-step resolution order: (1) alias map lookup → if hit AND provider
     loaded → return with canonicalModel; (2) direct canonical scan → return
     with canonicalModel = modelString; (3) null
   - "Alias known but provider not loaded" case correctly falls through
     to step 2 (which will also miss for an alias string) → returns null

2. lib/providers/mistral.mjs:
   - _registryModels stripped to canonical-only: removed the
     `...Object.keys(_registryEntry.aliases ?? {})` spread
   - mistral.models[] now matches anthropic/codex shape (canonical IDs only)
   - Comment block updated to point future readers at getProviderForModel
     as the SPOT

3. lib/fallback/engine.mjs:
   - buildDefaultChain's inline `for ([name, provider] of loadedProviders)`
     scan loop replaced with a single getProviderForModel() call
   - Chain hop's `model` field is now `match.canonicalModel` (was `modelString`)
     — so downstream consumers receive canonical
   - Explicit-chain config path unchanged (kept its pre-existing behavior;
     alias resolution in routing.chains config is a known limitation, tracked
     as a future improvement)

4. test-features.mjs:
   - 17 new tests in `D17 — alias-aware getProviderForModel` describe block:
     anthropic alias coverage (sonnet/opus/haiku/claude), openai aliases
     (codex/codex-spark/gpt5/gpt5-mini), mistral aliases (devstral/
     devstral-2/devstral-small/devstral-small-2), canonical pass-through,
     unknown model → null, alias-to-disabled-provider → null,
     buildDefaultChain integration with alias resolution
   - 3 existing mistral tests rewritten — they were asserting the pre-D17
     inconsistent shape (aliases in mistral.models[]). Now assert the
     post-D17 invariant (aliases NOT in models[]; routing via
     getProviderForModel instead)

Tests: 300 → 317 (+17 new). All pass on Node 20.

Pre-commit fold-in (per evidence-first checkpoint #4 — fold-ins themselves
need second-pass review):

- **D17 reviewer flagged C10**: original engine.mjs comment said
  "downstream (cache key, X-OLP-Model-Used, provider.spawn) receives the
  canonical ID rather than the alias string". The provider.spawn portion
  is incorrect — spawn reads `irRequest.model` (the user's original input),
  which is NEVER rewritten to canonical. Each provider CLI accepts its own
  aliases natively (claude accepts sonnet/opus/haiku; vibe accepts
  devstral/devstral-2; codex accepts its model IDs), so runtime behavior
  is fine, but the comment overstated what D17 actually changes.
  Folded in: corrected comment to honestly describe the canonical flow
  (cache key + X-OLP-Model-Used + logs receive canonical; spawn continues
  to receive irRequest.model). Same class of doc-code drift fix as D11's
  B1 (false maxConcurrent enforcement claim) and D16's "bypasses
  getOrCompute" drift — the discipline is maturing across D-days.

Authority:
- ADR 0002 § Provider contract (`models: string[]` is "models this provider
  serves")
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md
- models-registry.json — single source of truth for (provider, model)
  metadata + alias→canonical mappings per AGENTS.md SPOT policy
- AGENTS.md § Project-specific constraints — "models-registry.json is the
  only place to add/edit (provider, model) metadata"
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Cold Audit Findings 12 + 13

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Highest-value verification: walked
chain[0].model from buildDefaultChain through all downstream consumers
(computeCacheKey, X-OLP-Model-Used, log events) to confirm canonical
flow; then verified provider.spawn paths in anthropic.mjs:231 and
codex.mjs:248 read irRequest.model (user input), confirming the comment
overstatement (now fixed). Verified no alias-canonical collision exists
in current registry (12 aliases vs 10 canonical IDs, zero intersection).
Verified empty-registry edge case + provider-with-model-not-in-registry
edge case.

Follow-up items (reviewer's non-blocking observations, NOT in this PR):
- server.mjs:32 dead import of getProviderForModel — defer to D19 cleanup
- explicit-chain config path doesn't run alias resolution (routing.chains
  in ~/.olp/config.json) — pre-existing limitation, file as future issue

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 11:55:43 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 8ae77c3ae3 fix(cache)+docs(adr-0005): D15 — expand cache key composition to include max_tokens/top_p/stop/tool_choice 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-23

Cold-audit Finding 7 (P2 cache correctness). ADR 0005 § Cache key
composition (v1.0) listed 7 fields. ADR 0003 § Optional fields added
`max_tokens`, `top_p`, `stop`, `tool_choice` as IR-carried fields
that affect model output. Pre-D15 cache key omitted those 4 —
identical IRs differing only in those fields collided on the same
cache key but produced legitimately different outputs. Concrete
hazard: a request with `max_tokens: 100` could receive a cached
response generated by `max_tokens: 4000` — wrong content (truncated
or unexpectedly extended).

Coordinated change across two layers, single commit per the ADR-with-
code pattern established by D11:

1. docs/adr/0005-cache-cross-provider.md — Amendment 2 (top of doc,
   matching D11 Amendment 1 placement convention)
   - Documents the 4 missing fields + concrete failure mode
   - Expands the v1.0 cache key composition spec
   - Documents the `?? null` collapsing semantics (explicit-null
     equals absent — consistent with existing temperature/response_format)
   - Adds forward-looking note: future IR field additions must be
     evaluated for cache-key inclusion at addition time; default is
     include unless explicit rationale documents safe omission

2. lib/cache/keys.mjs — append the 4 fields to `keyObj` after the
   existing 7 (preserves field ordering; pre-D15 cache entries are
   forced misses on first request — schema forward-compatible)
   - `max_tokens: ir.max_tokens ?? null`
   - `top_p: ir.top_p ?? null`
   - `stop: ir.stop ?? null`
   - `tool_choice: ir.tool_choice ?? null`
   - Updated file-level docblock + function-level JSDoc + @param ir
     enumeration to reflect new schema (the @param fix also closes a
     pre-existing partial-list issue that omitted cache_control)

3. test-features.mjs — 5 new tests in Suite 9:
   - max_tokens differs → different key
   - top_p differs → different key
   - stop differs → different key
   - tool_choice differs → different key (covers string-form
     `'auto'` vs `'none'`; object-form coverage left for future
     defense-in-depth — slot existence is verified by the string case)
   - Both-absent stability check (`?? null` collapsing produces
     identical keys for omitted-vs-omitted)

Tests: 292 → 297 (+5). No hash constants pinned in existing tests
(grep verified) so no pre-D15 tests required updating; assertions
were already shape-based (`assert.equal` / `assert.notEqual` on
hash strings, never specific hex values).

Authority:
- ADR 0003 § Optional fields — source of the 4 IR field definitions
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0003-intermediate-representation.md
- ADR 0005's stated invariant: "different output → different cache
  entry" — the addition restores compliance with this invariant
- OpenAI /v1/chat/completions spec — confirms the 4 fields affect
  output:
  https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(c) spirit — ADR amendment + code change land
  in same merge (D11 precedent established this pattern for
  Provider-contract changes; D15 applies same pattern for cache-key
  schema changes)
- CC 开发铁律 v1.6 § 10.x — Cold Audit caught this; diff-review pass
  that approved original ADR 0005 did not cross-reference all ADR
  0003 optional fields

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Folded the one minor (`@param ir`
JSDoc stale partial list) before commit — same JSDoc precision logic
that drove D11's B1 fold-in. Two remaining non-blocking suggestions
(tool_choice object-form test coverage; D11-vs-D15 amendment structure
template) tracked as defense-in-depth opportunities, not required for
spec compliance.

Reviewer's highest-value verification: field ordering preserved.
keyObj at lib/cache/keys.mjs:203-217 reads exactly:
`{provider, model, messages, tools, temperature, response_format,
cache_control, max_tokens, top_p, stop, tool_choice}` — existing 7
in unchanged positions, 4 new appended at end. JSON.stringify on
Node 18+ preserves insertion order; SHA-256 hash deterministic
across runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 11:24:12 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 4b1a9c8808 fix(ir): D12 — remove invented top-level error field on OpenAI response shapes 
cold-audit catch from 2026-05-23

Cold-audit Finding 3 (P2 ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b) violation). The IR→OpenAI
translator was inventing a top-level `error: {message, type}` field on
chat.completion / chat.completion.chunk objects. OpenAI's spec defines
no such field — errors surface via HTTP 4xx/5xx with `{error: {...}}`
body, not as in-band SSE annotations. The pre-D12 code comments
acknowledged Rule 2(b) for `finish_reason` enum values then proceeded
to invent the top-level error field anyway.

Changes (3 files, +25 / -50 net):

1. lib/ir/ir-to-openai.mjs — both invention sites removed:
   - irChunkToOpenAISSE: removed `if (irChunk.type === 'error')` branch
     that emitted `{...spec fields, error: {message, type: 'provider_error'}}`
   - irResponseToOpenAINonStream: removed `else if (chunk.type === 'error')`
     branch + dead `errorChunk` local var + the `if (errorChunk)` block
     that appended top-level `response.error = {...}`
   - Added explanatory comments at both sites citing ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b)
     + OpenAI spec URLs so future readers see the rationale

2. server.mjs:581 — burst-replay loop break condition simplified:
   - Pre: `if (irChunk.type === 'stop' || irChunk.type === 'error') break;`
   - Post: `if (irChunk.type === 'stop') break;`
   - Cache writes (server.mjs:456, :470) only append to streamedChunks
     after the error-chunk guard fires, so cached chunks structurally
     cannot contain type === 'error'. The removed clause was dead.

3. test-features.mjs — one test rewritten (test count unchanged 288 → 288):
   - Old test asserted `payload.error.type === 'provider_error'` exists
     (i.e., it tested the violation as if it were correct)
   - New test asserts `payload.error === undefined` (the correct Rule 2(b)
     invariant) and that object stays `chat.completion.chunk` with
     finish_reason in the OpenAI enum

IR contract decision (verified by both implementer and reviewer):
- IR keeps `'error'` in IRResponseChunk typedef — providers legitimately
  emit error chunks (e.g., anthropic.mjs)
- server.mjs intercepts error chunks BEFORE translation:
  · collectAllChunks() throws ProviderError on type === 'error'
  · Real-streaming branch throws ProviderError (no first chunk) or
    truncates res.end() (after first chunk per ADR 0004 first-chunk rule)
- The translator is downstream of both guards; error chunks structurally
  cannot reach it in normal operation
- Therefore the invention sites were dead-code paths handling an
  impossible case — safe to remove
- Pass-through behavior on the impossible path: produces an empty SSE
  delta `{choices: [{index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: null}]}`
  (verified manually by reviewer); the error message text does NOT
  leak to the wire

288/288 tests pass on Node 20.20.2.

Authority:
- ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2(b) — no invented OpenAI-spec fields
- OpenAI Chat Completions object spec
  https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/object
  https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/streaming
- ADR 0004 § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule (preserves the
  truncation semantics for post-first-chunk errors)

Reviewer (Iron Rule v1.6 § 10.x Mode A, fresh-context opus, independent
of drafter): APPROVE. Verified error chunks never reach translator via
three independent grep passes (collectAllChunks guard, real-streaming
guard, no third caller exists), verified cache cannot contain error
chunks (streamedChunks.push is post-guard), verified Rule 2(b) compliance
by direct read of ALIGNMENT.md line 29 + OpenAI spec citations.

Three non-blocking suggestions (defensive log on impossible path;
defensive guard at server.mjs:587; comment placement nit) explicitly
"Not for D12" per the reviewer — preserved as separate cleanup
opportunities if ever needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 10:28:38 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 2cfd0b194e feat(phase-1): D10 P1 hardening — providers.enabled wiring + real streaming + spawn timeout 
Folds in three production-blocking defects from external Codex review
round-3 of Phase 1 (D5+D6+D8+D9 already merged). Without these, OLP
returns 503 on every request even when `npm start` succeeds, streams
arrive as a single buffered burst after the spawn completes, and hung
CLIs block the engine forever despite ADR 0004 declaring spawn-timeout
a hard trigger.

P1.1 providers.enabled config wiring (ADR 0002 § Disable model):
- loadFallbackConfigSync() returns tri-field {chains, soft_triggers,
  providersEnabled}; server.mjs reads _startupConfig.providersEnabled
  and passes to loadProviders() at startup
- Empty / missing config → 0 enabled providers → 503 no_enabled_provider
  (matches v0.1 0-Enabled posture per ALIGNMENT.md § Provider Inventory)
- __setProvidersEnabled / __resetProvidersEnabled test seams; in-place
  Map mutation preserves existing direct-mutation patterns in Suite 13

P1.2 Real SSE streaming on single-hop cache-miss (ADR 0003 entry adapter
pattern, OpenAI /v1/chat/completions stream=true contract):
- New handleChatCompletions branch when ir.stream === true && chain.length
  === 1 && !bypassCache && !preCheckHit
- for await (const irChunk of provider.spawn(...)) writes SSE per chunk
  via res.write(irChunkToOpenAISSE(...)); accumulates streamedChunks for
  cacheStore.set on stop
- First-chunk rule preserved: error-before-first-chunk → sendError(502);
  error-after-first-chunk → truncated res.end(), no fallback
- Multi-hop chains (chain.length > 1) continue to use buffered
  executeWithFallback to keep fallback safety semantics

P1.3 Spawn timeout hard trigger (ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy bullet 4):
- SPAWN_TIMEOUT added to PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES (lib/providers/base.mjs)
  and HARD_TRIGGER_CODES (lib/fallback/engine.mjs)
- All three plugins (anthropic.mjs / codex.mjs / mistral.mjs) wrap drain
  loop with setTimeout (default 600_000ms, configurable via
  hints.maxSpawnTimeMs); on fire: proc.kill('SIGTERM') + reject pending
  drain promise with ProviderError(..., 'SPAWN_TIMEOUT')
- Timer cleared in finally; resolveNext/rejectNext atomically nulled in
  push() + timer-fire path to prevent late-fire double-settle

Tests 277 → 288 (+11). Suite 14 (4 providers.enabled), Suite 15
(3 streaming cache-miss real-time, including arrival-count >= 2
assertion that architecturally proves real streaming), Suite 16
(4 spawn timeout, including 2-hop chain advancement from timed-out
primary). 288/288 pass on Node 20.20.2 + Node 25.8.0.

Authorities:
- ADR 0002 § Disable model — config toggle, not plugin-removal
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md
- ADR 0003 § Translation direction model — entry adapter for await pattern
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0003-intermediate-representation.md
- ADR 0004 § Trigger taxonomy + § Fallback safety (first-chunk rule)
  https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp/blob/main/docs/adr/0004-fallback-engine.md
- OpenAI /v1/chat/completions stream=true (server-sent events,
  data: {chunk} per delta, terminator data: [DONE])
  https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/streaming

Reviewer (Iron Rule 10): fresh-context opus, independent of drafter.
Verdict: APPROVE_WITH_MINOR. Folded the one cheap minor before commit
(Suite 15a arrival-count assertion strengthened from chunks.length > 0
to arrivalTimestamps.length >= 2 — the prior assertion would have
admitted a buffered impl). Two remaining non-blocking notes deferred:
optional writeHead deferral (low value; single-hop guard makes pre-
content 200 + empty body safe), and version bump (Phase 1 ships as
v0.1.0 aggregate when D11–D16 land).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-24 06:57:11 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com) 5960486542 feat(phase-1): land fallback engine (D9) 
Phase 1 Day 6 — the architectural milestone of Phase 1. OLP is no longer
a single-provider proxy with cache; it is now a multi-provider router
with idempotent-failure-safe fallback. ADR 0004 ratified in v0.1 governance
is fully implemented for D9 scope. Configuration-driven chains activate
when a user populates ~/.olp/config.json routing.chains; at v0.1 default
(empty chains), behaviour is single-hop pass-through identical to D5.

Files:
  NEW:  lib/fallback/engine.mjs (~470 lines) — Trigger taxonomy, chain
        advancement, first-chunk safety, observability annotation.
  MOD:  server.mjs (+80 lines net) — wires executeWithFallback between IR
        construction and provider.spawn. Per-hop cache key isolation
        (ADR 0005 § Cross-provider fallback). Test seams added:
        __setFallbackConfig, __resetFallbackConfig, __clearCache.
  MOD:  test-features.mjs (+845 lines, 6 new suites = +55 tests).

Authority citations:
  ADR 0004 § Decision § Trigger taxonomy — Hard / Soft / Deterministic
    (deferred) / Cost-aware (deferred) implemented exactly per spec.
  ADR 0004 § Decision § Fallback safety — first-chunk rule satisfied at
    D9 by buffering composition (executeHopFn = collectAllChunks; server
    writes to res only after engine returns).
  ADR 0004 § Decision § Chain advancement — one-at-a-time iteration;
    originalError preserved from FIRST hop (not last) on exhaustion.
  ADR 0004 § Decision § No fallback for client-side errors — HTTP 400/
    401/403/404/422 stop the chain immediately; AUTH_MISSING also stops
    immediately (user-config failure, not provider-quota).
  ADR 0004 § Decision § Observability headers — X-OLP-Fallback-Hops set
    from engine return value; X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted lists tried
    providers on exhaustion.
  ADR 0005 § Cross-provider fallback cache behavior — each fallback hop
    computes a fresh cache key with the hop's (provider, model) tuple;
    primary's cache entries cannot leak to secondary's hop.

Reviewer chain (Iron Rule 10):
  Implementer: sonnet (general-purpose).
  Fresh-context reviewer: opus. Verdict APPROVE_WITH_MINOR.
  Reviewer ran npm test (277/277 pass), read ADR 0004 + ADR 0005 end-
    to-end, verified first-chunk-safety composition, checked all
    trigger taxonomy mappings.

Reviewer non-blocking findings folded in this commit:
  1. Test label at test-features.mjs:3756 clarified. Original title
     "client error (400) → does NOT fall back" was misleading because
     the test actually exercises both-fail SPAWN_FAILED → exhausted
     path (400-no-fallback semantic is covered at unit level instead).
     Renamed + commented to match actual behaviour.
  2. triedProviders semantic (includes soft-skipped) documented in
     engine.mjs comment near the soft-trigger branch.
  3. SOFT_TRIGGER synthetic code documented in engine.mjs as engine-
     internal, NOT a member of base.mjs PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES.

Reviewer non-blocking suggestions deferred (open D-later questions):
  - Q1 cacheStatus on fallback hops: conservative 'miss', acceptable
    per ADR 0005 § Per-model isolation.
  - Q2 X-OLP-Fallback-Exhausted only when triedProviders > 1:
    acceptable per ADR 0004 spec.
  - Q3 soft-trigger quotaSnapshot always null at D9: acceptable per
    ADR 0004 § Consequences/Negative graceful-degrade clause. Phase 2
    will add quota poll-worker.
  - Q4 loadFallbackConfigSync sync-only: acceptable for bounded
    startup I/O.

Test count: 222 (D8) → 277 (D9). 6 new test suites cover trigger
taxonomy, engine chain advancement (including the load-bearing
originalError-from-FIRST-hop property), HTTP integration through
real server.mjs, soft trigger pre-fetch path, exhausted-chain
header emission.

Verification:
  node --check on all touched files: clean.
  npm test on Node 25.8.0: 277/277 pass in 266ms.
  Hygiene grep: zero personal-name/path/token hits.
  No new external npm deps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
 2026-05-23 22:09:39 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com) 95dc072245 feat(phase-1): land Mistral Vibe provider plugin (D8) 
Phase 1 Day 5. Mistral Vibe provider plugin lands as Candidate. STATIC_
REGISTRY now length 3 (anthropic + openai + mistral). vibe CLI not
installed on the orchestrator machine and owner has no Le Chat Pro
subscription, so D8 follows the D6 docs-only authority pattern. D-later
verification (once a tester with a vibe install and subscription is
available) will resolve UNPINNED assumptions A4, A6, A7, A8.

Files:
  NEW:  lib/providers/mistral.mjs (~720 lines) — Mistral Vibe provider.
        Spawns `vibe --prompt PROMPT --output streaming` per docs.
        Reads MISTRAL_API_KEY env var with ~/.vibe/.env fallback.
        Supports VIBE_HOME env override per docs. Mirrors D4/D6 plugin
        structure incl. __setSpawnImpl/__resetSpawnImpl for tests.
  MOD:  lib/providers/index.mjs (+12/-1) — STATIC_REGISTRY now length 3.
        listAllProviderNames returns [anthropic, openai, mistral].
  MOD:  models-registry.json (+26 lines) — providers.mistral with 2
        canonical date-stamped IDs (devstral-2-25-12, devstral-small-2-
        25-12) and 4 short-form aliases for user convenience.
  MOD:  test-features.mjs — Suite 12 with 48 tests covering contract
        conformance, IR translation, mock-spawn behaviour, healthCheck,
        estimateCost, auth-artifact reading.

Authority citations (all WebFetched and verified during reviewer pass):
  DOCS-1: docs.mistral.ai/mistral-vibe/terminal/quickstart — `vibe
    --prompt PROMPT --max-turns 5 --max-price 1.0 --output json` example
    + Output Format Options enumeration: text default, json single blob,
    streaming NDJSON.
  DOCS-2: docs.mistral.ai/mistral-vibe/terminal/configuration — pin
    `~/.vibe/.env`, MISTRAL_API_KEY env var, VIBE_HOME override.
  DOCS-3: docs.mistral.ai/mistral-vibe/introduction/configuration —
    second confirmation of MISTRAL_API_KEY + ~/.vibe/.env (model
    selection via config.toml `/config` slash command, NOT --model
    flag).
  DOCS-4: deepwiki.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/9.3-cli-commands-reference
    — full flag enumeration confirms no --model flag exists. Programmatic
    mode trigger is --prompt; flags are: --continue, --max-price,
    --max-turns, --output, --prompt, --resume, --setup, --trust,
    --upgrade, --version, --workdir, --no-autofill, --no-header,
    --no-dev, --enabled-tools, --help.
  DOCS-5: mistral.ai/news/devstral-2-vibe-cli — launch announcement,
    names Devstral 2 (123B) and Devstral Small 2 (24B), 256K context,
    pricing $0.40/$2.00 and $0.10/$0.30 per MTok.
  DOCS-6: help.mistral.ai/en/articles/347532 — Vibe included in Le Chat
    Pro.
  DOCS-7: legal.mistral.ai/terms/usage-policy — no anti-third-party
    clauses; ADR 0006 Tier D classification holds.
  DOCS-MAIN: docs.mistral.ai/mistral-vibe/overview — main Vibe overview.
  DOCS-8: docs.mistral.ai/getting-started/models/models_overview —
    canonical Mistral models registry. Pin for date-stamped IDs
    devstral-2-25-12 / devstral-small-2-25-12. Caught by D8 review-2.

Architectural decisions:
  1. `--output streaming` (NOT `json`). Per DOCS-1 verbatim: streaming
     emits NDJSON per message; json emits a single blob at the end.
     Original D8 draft used `json` which is incompatible with the
     plugin's line-buffered stdout parser. Review-2 caught this; fixed
     before commit.
  2. No --model flag. Per DOCS-4 full flag enumeration there is no
     --model flag in programmatic mode. Model selection happens via
     ~/.vibe/config.toml. The IR's `model` field is used by OLP for
     routing only; Vibe uses whatever model is in user-level config.
     Documented in lossy translations + as A5 CONFIRMED-NOT-APPLICABLE.
  3. Canonical IDs primary, short forms as aliases. models-registry.json
     uses devstral-2-25-12 / devstral-small-2-25-12 as primary `id`s
     matching the canonical Mistral models registry; user-facing short
     forms (devstral-2, devstral-small-2, devstral, devstral-small) are
     aliases. Plugin's models[] array includes both canonical IDs AND
     alias keys so getProviderForModel routes either form. Same pattern
     codified for Codex aliases in D6.
  4. Auth precedence: MISTRAL_API_KEY env > ~/.vibe/.env > null.
     Documented in DOCS-2. readAuthArtifact supports
     MISTRAL_VIBE_AUTH_PATH env override for testing.
  5. Mistral stays Candidate. STATIC_REGISTRY.length === 3 but
     loadProviders({}) returns empty Map; only loadProviders({
     enabled: { mistral: true }}) loads it. POST /v1/chat/completions
     devstral-* still returns 503 until config flag is set and E2E
     audit passes.

Reviewer chain (Iron Rule 10):
  Implementer: sonnet (general-purpose).
  Fresh-context reviewer: opus (ecc:code-reviewer). Verdict round-1:
    REQUEST_CHANGES (2 blockers caught).
  Reviewer ran npm test (222/222 pass), WebFetched all 8 canonical
    Mistral docs URLs, discovered DOCS-8 (models registry) which
    sonnet missed — exactly the D6 failure pattern, repeated. Reviewer
    independently verified `--output streaming` vs `json` semantics
    against the live docs page text, not paraphrases.

Reviewer blocking findings folded in this commit:
  B-1 (--output json wrong): Plugin now passes `--output streaming` per
    docs verbatim. Test "irToMistral: user message → args with --prompt
    and --output streaming" updated to assert the new arg and reject
    the old one.
  B-2 (canonical models page missed): models-registry.json refactored
    to use date-stamped canonical IDs as primary; short forms as
    aliases. mistral.mjs header adds DOCS-8 as the new canonical
    authority pin for model IDs. Plugin's models[] array merges
    canonical + alias keys so existing routing tests pass with either
    form.
  B-3 (404 claim incorrect): mistral.mjs header DOCS-MAIN updated.
    docs.mistral.ai/mistral-vibe/overview is 200 OK; sonnet's 404
    claim was a path-normalization mismatch.

Reviewer non-blocking suggestions (deferred to D-later / not D8 scope):
  - VIBE_HOME env override has no Suite 12 test (implementation
    present at mistral.mjs:262). Parallel gap to D6 CODEX_HOME.
  - _extractKeyFromDotenv has no direct unit test.
  - config.toml model selection mechanism (Vibe-specific quirk —
    no --model flag means OLP can't pass model per request). A D-later
    ADR note will discuss whether OLP should write a project-local
    ./.vibe/config.toml before spawn or accept the user-level config
    as authoritative.

Test count: 174 (after D6) → 222 (after D8).

Verification:
  node --check on all touched files: clean.
  npm test on Node 25.8.0: 222/222 pass in 210ms.
  STATIC_REGISTRY = [anthropic, openai, mistral] verified.
  hygiene grep: zero personal-name/path/token hits. Fixtures use
    <fake-mistral-api-key> placeholders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
 2026-05-23 21:48:29 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com) ea9184d2e8 feat(phase-1): land OpenAI Codex provider plugin (D6) 
Phase 1 Day 4. OpenAI Codex provider plugin code lands as Candidate.
Anthropic and Codex now both in STATIC_REGISTRY length 2. Codex CLI is
NOT installed on the orchestrator machine, so D6 ships with a docs-only
authority pin; D7 will install the binary, probe real behaviour, and
fix any docs-vs-reality divergences (A3 access-token field, A4 NDJSON
event schema, possibly keyring storage support).

Files:
  NEW:  lib/providers/codex.mjs (586 lines initially, expanded ~10 lines
        via reviewer fold-ins) — Codex provider implementing the v1.0
        contract. spawns `codex exec --json --model <id> [PROMPT|-]` per
        canonical Codex docs.
  MOD:  lib/providers/index.mjs — STATIC_REGISTRY now [anthropic, codex],
        listAllProviderNames() returns 2 entries.
  MOD:  models-registry.json — providers.openai populated with five
        documented model IDs (gpt-5.5, gpt-5.4, gpt-5.4-mini,
        gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.3-codex-spark) and four aliases.
  MOD:  test-features.mjs — Suite 11 added with 46 tests covering contract
        conformance, IR translation, mock-spawn behaviour, healthCheck,
        estimateCost, registry length.

Authority citations (all WebFetched and verified during reviewer pass):
  CLI reference: https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli/reference
    Source for `codex exec` subcommand syntax, --json flag, --model -m
    flag, and PROMPT positional including the `-` form for stdin piping.
  Features:      https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli/features
    Reference for the supported-models list.
  Auth:          https://developers.openai.com/codex/auth/
    Canonical pin for `~/.codex/auth.json` plaintext credential file
    and `cli_auth_credentials_store = keyring` OS credential store option.
  Models:        https://developers.openai.com/codex/models
    Canonical pin for the five documented model IDs (each shown as a
    `codex -m <id>` example on the page).
  ChatGPT plan:  https://help.openai.com/en/articles/11369540 — Codex
    runs against ChatGPT subscription budget when OAuth-authenticated;
    OPENAI_API_KEY env path is for `codex login --with-api-key` only,
    not `codex exec` runtime.

Architectural decisions:
  1. Mirror D4 anthropic.mjs structure: file header, lossy translation
     docs, default export = provider object, named exports include
     __setSpawnImpl / __resetSpawnImpl for test injection.
  2. Stdin path uses `args.push('-')` per documented CLI behaviour.
     (Original D6 sonnet draft omitted the positional entirely and wrote
     stdin directly — D6 reviewer pass 2 caught this; corrected before
     commit. D7 E2E confirms.)
  3. Auth artifact path `~/.codex/auth.json` is now documented in the
     header as CONFIRMED per canonical auth doc, not assumed.
  4. Access-token field name remains a defensive 3-name try-order
     (access_token / token / accessToken) because the auth doc does
     not enumerate field names. D7 captures real auth.json post-login.
  5. OPENAI_API_KEY env injection during spawn is intentionally NOT
     done. The auth doc clarifies OPENAI_API_KEY is a login-time input,
     not a runtime override. codex exec reads its own auth artifact.
  6. Codex stays Candidate. loadProviders({}) returns empty Map; only
     loadProviders({ enabled: { openai: true } }) loads it. POST /v1/
     chat/completions gpt-5.5 etc still returns 503 until config flag
     is set + E2E audit passes.

Reviewer chain (Iron Rule 10):
  Implementer: sonnet (general-purpose).
  Fresh-context reviewer: opus (ecc:code-reviewer). Verdict
    APPROVE_WITH_MINOR.
  Reviewer ran npm test (174/174 pass with Suite 10 skipped), WebFetched
    all four canonical Codex docs URLs, and discovered two additional
    docs pages (auth + models) that sonnet had missed. Reviewer
    independently verified the documentation citations rather than
    trusting sonnet quotes — Rule 2 (No Invention) is the load-bearing
    check for D6 because no local binary exists to ground-truth the
    plugin.

Reviewer non-blocking findings folded in this commit:
  1. Stdin path corrected: docs explicitly state `Use - to pipe the
     prompt from stdin`. The original draft assumed "no positional →
     stdin"; docs require literal `-`. Fixed in irToCodex; test
     "irToCodex: multiline prompt uses stdin path (useStdin=true) with
     - positional" updated to assert args.includes('-').
  2. Model registry expanded from 3 to 5 entries per canonical models
     doc. Added gpt-5.4-mini and gpt-5.3-codex-spark. Removed the
     misread Rule 2 comment that justified omitting -spark suffix —
     the docs literally show `codex -m gpt-5.3-codex-spark`, so the
     -spark variant is a separate model not a -codex normalization.
     New aliases: codex-spark, gpt5-mini.
  3. File header A2 upgraded from "assumed" to "CONFIRMED" with the
     canonical auth doc URL cited.
  4. File header now cites both auth and models canonical URLs at the
     top, alongside reference and features.

Reviewer findings deferred to D7:
  - OS credential store / keyring support. Codex docs mention
    cli_auth_credentials_store = keyring as an alternative to file
    storage. The Anthropic plugin supports macOS keychain via security
    find-generic-password; Codex equivalent unknown without inspecting
    a real install. D7 will install codex, run codex login, see what
    keyring entry codex creates (if any), and mirror the Anthropic
    keychain support pattern.
  - Real NDJSON event schema (field names). Defensive 4-shape parser
    handles the most common conventions; D7 captures real stdout and
    pins the schema.
  - access_token field name in auth.json. D7 captures the real auth
    artifact and removes unused fallback names.

Test count: 128 (after D5) → 174 (after D6).

Verification:
  node --check on all touched files: clean.
  npm test on Node 25.8.0: 174/174 pass in 210ms with Suite 10 skipped.
  Test "codex.models contains all 5 docs-listed model IDs" passes.
  Test "irToCodex: multiline prompt uses stdin path with - positional"
    passes (asserts args.includes('-')).
  Hygiene grep: zero personal-name/path/token hits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (noreply@anthropic.com)
 2026-05-23 21:20:13 +10:00