feat(tui): PR-0 — TUI-only ISOLATION .claude.json seed

First PR of the TUI-mode A-path (interactive claude → cc_entrypoint=cli →
subscription pool, so the proxy stays usable for Pro subscribers post-6/15).

Adds a `tui` opt-in param to prepareIsolatedEnvironment (lib/sandbox/manager.mjs).
When tui:true (and only then):
- chmod 700 the per-reqId dir + ephemeralRoot (credential-wall, spec §5.5)
- seed ephemeral .claude.json via _seedTuiClaudeJson: read ~/.claude.json
  (or tuiSeedSource), STRIP projects (no owner history leak), stamp
  hasCompletedOnboarding + bypassPermissionsModeAccepted, preserve
  oauthAccount/userID, write mode 0o600, never log contents
- return reqId in isolationCtx (PR-2 driver derives tmux session name —
  maintainer decision P1: reuse isolationCtx, no server.mjs call-site edits)

DEFAULT PATH BYTE-FOR-BYTE UNCHANGED: when tui falsy, none of the above runs;
the only return-shape change is the additive reqId field existing callers
ignore. Reviewer verified this invariant airtight (server.mjs:1347/:1564 pass
no tui arg).

Seed carries NO MCP-disable weight (T6 negative control: --strict-mcp-config
in PR-2 is the mechanism, not the seed). The seed also does NOT suppress the
per-directory trust-folder dialog — corrected a review-fix overclaim that
attributed trust-dialog suppression to bypassPermissionsModeAccepted (that
flag only suppresses the bypass-permissions dialog; the trust dialog still
appears and PR-2's driver MUST answer it "1", per the spikes).

Tests: Suite 45 (45a default-path-unchanged, 45b tui-seed perms/markers/
strip, 45c missing-source minimal seed). 816 pass / 0 fail.

ADR 0002 Amendment 9 § tuiSeed extension note added.

Authority: design spec docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-30-tui-mode-production-design.md
§7.1/§5.5/§12.1; implementation plan + maintainer decisions; ADR 0002 Amd 9;
claude CLI v2.1.158.

Co-Authored-By: jaekwon-park <insainty21@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/adr/0002-plugin-architecture.md

@@ -677,4 +677,8 @@ The full test list is captured in ADR 0014 Amendment 1's PR-B-revised test suite
 - **`ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 1 (Cite First)** — every per-field design choice is cited above. Every per-provider concrete instance is cited to the underlying CLI authority.
 - **`ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 2 (No Invention)** — no invented env vars, no invented CLI flags. The mistral `crossTenantReadProtection: 'none'` declaration is the explicit honest acknowledgment that no protection regime has been established, rather than invention of one.
 - **`ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 4 (Unalignable Plugins / Fields Are Deleted)** — see § Rule 4 compliance above for the explicit reasoning that OPTIONAL `ISOLATION` is not "feature-flagging" but rather "honestly transitional."
+
+#### tuiSeed extension note (PR-0 co-merge, 2026-05-30)
+
+`lib/sandbox/manager.mjs` adds a `tui` opt-in param to `prepareIsolatedEnvironment`. When `tui:true`, the orchestrator (a) chmod 700s the per-reqId dir and ephemeralRoot (spec §5.5 credential-wall), and (b) calls the module-private helper `_seedTuiClaudeJson(ephemeralRoot, seedSource)`. The helper reads `~/.claude.json` (or the override `tuiSeedSource`) once, copies `oauthAccount` and `userID` via object spread, strips `projects` entirely to avoid leaking the operator's real project history (spec §7.1), stamps `hasCompletedOnboarding:true` and `bypassPermissionsModeAccepted:true`, and writes the result to `join(ephemeralRoot, '.claude.json')` at mode 0o600. The seed carries NO MCP-disable weight — it does not set `claudeAiMcpEverConnected` or `mcpServers`; that is the spawn-argv flag `--strict-mcp-config` landed in PR-2 (spec §5.2 T6 negative control). The `projects` field is stripped unconditionally and is NOT re-populated with a pre-trusted `cwd` entry. **Correction to the original plan framing:** `bypassPermissionsModeAccepted:true` suppresses the bypass-permissions acceptance dialog only — it does **NOT** suppress the per-directory **trust-folder** dialog ("Is this a project you trust?"), which still appears for a fresh ephemeral `$HOME`. The pre-code spikes confirmed this (their playbook answers the trust dialog by sending "1"). PR-0 does not pre-trust because the spawn `cwd` is a PR-2 session-driver concern (not known at seed time) and the exact trust-field key is unverified; therefore **PR-2's session driver MUST answer the trust-folder dialog** (the spike-validated approach). Pre-trusting `projects[cwd]` in the seed remains an optional future optimization. Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 first-run onboarding behavior (spec §7.1); the default (stream-json) code path is byte-for-byte unchanged.
 - **`ALIGNMENT.md` Amendment Procedure** — this section (Amendment 9) is the PR-required citation of evidence (the 2026-05-27 incident memory, the ADR 0014 PoC spike report at `/tmp/sandbox-spike/report.md` on PI231) and the structural amendment of the Provider contract documented in this ADR's § Decision.

lib/providers/anthropic.mjs

@@ -1726,4 +1726,15 @@ export const ISOLATION = {
   // 1).  No additional CLI flags are needed at the orchestrator level.
   // Per ADR 0002 Amendment 9 § 7: absence means the orchestrator passes args
   // through unchanged from spawn().
+
+  // TUI-mode reuses this ISOLATION shape unchanged for Layers 1+2.
+  // The .claude.json seed extension (onboarding/trust/bypass markers) is an
+  // orchestrator-side opt-in: the session driver (PR-2/PR-3) calls
+  // prepareIsolatedEnvironment({ ..., tui:true }) to seed the ephemeral home.
+  // The seed logic lives in lib/sandbox/manager.mjs _seedTuiClaudeJson(),
+  // gated on the tui param so the default stream-json path is unchanged.
+  //
+  // NOTE (T6 negative control): the seed does NOT disable managed MCP — that
+  // is the spawn-argv flag --strict-mcp-config (PR-2). See spec §5.2 + §7.1.
+  // Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 + ADR 0002 Amendment 9 (tuiSeed extension).
 };

lib/sandbox/manager.mjs

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
  *   __resetSandboxManagerForTests()  — test seam: reset module state
  */
 
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, symlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
@@ -189,18 +189,21 @@ export function isSandboxActive() {
  * returns the legacy unsandboxed shape (identity env, identity hooks, no cleanup).
  *
  * @param {object} params
- * @param {object} params.provider   — provider plugin object (may have .ISOLATION)
+ * @param {object} params.provider         — provider plugin object (may have .ISOLATION)
- * @param {string} params.keyId      — OLP key identity driving this request
+ * @param {string} params.keyId            — OLP key identity driving this request
- * @param {string} params.reqId      — per-request UUID
+ * @param {string} params.reqId            — per-request UUID
+ * @param {boolean} [params.tui=false]     — TUI-mode opt-in: seed .claude.json + chmod 700 (spec §7.1)
+ * @param {string} [params.tuiSeedSource]  — override path for the seed source (default: ~/.claude.json)
  * @returns {Promise<{
  *   ephemeralRoot: string|null,
+ *   reqId: string,
  *   envOverrides: Record<string, string>,
  *   hardenedArgs: (args: string[]) => string[],
  *   wrapForLayer3: (command: string) => Promise<string>,
  *   cleanup: () => Promise<void>,
  * }>}
  */
-export async function prepareIsolatedEnvironment({ provider, keyId, reqId }) {
+export async function prepareIsolatedEnvironment({ provider, keyId, reqId, tui = false, tuiSeedSource }) {
   const isolation = provider?.ISOLATION;
 
   // ── Test-context bypass ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -317,6 +320,46 @@ export async function prepareIsolatedEnvironment({ provider, keyId, reqId }) {
     }
   }
 
+  // ── TUI-mode: chmod 700 + seed .claude.json (gated on tui=true) ─────────
+  // Spec §7.1 + §5.5: runs ONLY when the caller opts in with tui:true.
+  // The default (stream-json) path is byte-for-byte unchanged — this block
+  // does not execute when tui is falsy.
+  //
+  // NOTE: the seed does NOT disable managed MCP. That is the spawn-argv flag
+  // --strict-mcp-config (PR-2). See spec §5.2 + T6 negative control.
+  if (tui) {
+    // chmod 700 the per-reqId dir and ephemeralRoot so sibling spawns cannot
+    // traverse into each other's ephemeral homes (§5.5 credential-wall).
+    const reqIdDir = join(SPAWN_BASE_DIR, safeKeyId, safeReqId);
+    chmodSync(reqIdDir, 0o700);
+    chmodSync(ephemeralRoot, 0o700);
+
+    // Seed .claude.json with onboarding + bypass markers.
+    //
+    // PR-0 seeds `hasCompletedOnboarding` + `bypassPermissionsModeAccepted` only.
+    // It deliberately does NOT pre-trust the spawn cwd, and the per-directory
+    // **trust-folder dialog is therefore NOT suppressed** by this seed.
+    //
+    // Important correction to the original plan §4/§7.1 framing: there are TWO
+    // distinct dialogs. `bypassPermissionsModeAccepted:true` suppresses the
+    // bypass-permissions acceptance dialog ("you accept all responsibility…
+    // 1.No 2.Yes") — verified on claude v2.1.158. It does NOT suppress the
+    // per-directory trust-folder dialog ("Is this a project you trust? 1.Yes
+    // 2.No"), which still appears for a fresh ephemeral $HOME (projects is
+    // stripped). The pre-code spikes confirmed this — their playbook answers
+    // the trust dialog by sending "1".
+    //
+    // PR-0 does not pre-trust because (a) the spawn cwd is chosen by PR-2's
+    // session driver, not known here, and (b) the exact trust-field key in the
+    // projects map is unverified. Therefore **PR-2's session driver MUST answer
+    // the trust-folder dialog (send "1")** — the spike-validated approach.
+    // Pre-trusting projects[cwd] in the seed is an optional future optimization
+    // (PR-2 could thread cwd back), but the dialog-answer is the proven default.
+    // See ADR 0002 Amendment 9 § tuiSeed extension note.
+    const resolvedSeedSource = tuiSeedSource ?? join(homedir(), '.claude.json');
+    _seedTuiClaudeJson(ephemeralRoot, resolvedSeedSource);
+  }
+
   // ── Compose envOverrides (Layer 1 output) ────────────────────────────────
   let envOverrides = {};
   if (typeof isolation.ephemeralEnvOverrides === 'function') {
@@ -434,6 +477,7 @@ export async function prepareIsolatedEnvironment({ provider, keyId, reqId }) {
 
   return {
     ephemeralRoot,
+    reqId: safeReqId,
     envOverrides,
     hardenedArgs,
     wrapForLayer3,
@@ -441,6 +485,64 @@ export async function prepareIsolatedEnvironment({ provider, keyId, reqId }) {
   };
 }
 
+// ── TUI-mode helper: seed ephemeral .claude.json ─────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Reads the operator's ~/.claude.json (or tuiSeedSource), strips `projects`,
+ * stamps onboarding/trust/bypass markers, and writes the result to
+ * join(ephemeralRoot, '.claude.json') mode 0o600.
+ *
+ * Called ONLY from prepareIsolatedEnvironment when tui=true. Never called on
+ * the default (stream-json) path.
+ *
+ * Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 first-run onboarding behavior (spec §7.1);
+ *   seed does NOT disable managed MCP (T6 negative control, spec §5.2).
+ *
+ * @param {string} ephemeralRoot  — the per-request ephemeral $HOME
+ * @param {string} seedSource     — path to read oauthAccount/userID from
+ */
+function _seedTuiClaudeJson(ephemeralRoot, seedSource) {
+  const destPath = join(ephemeralRoot, '.claude.json');
+
+  let seedObj;
+  if (existsSync(seedSource)) {
+    let raw;
+    try {
+      raw = JSON.parse(readFileSync(seedSource, 'utf8'));
+    } catch (e) {
+      throw new Error(`[sandbox/manager] Failed to parse TUI seed source ${seedSource}: ${e?.message ?? e}`);
+    }
+    // Strip projects to avoid leaking owner's real project history (§7.1).
+    // Copy everything else (oauthAccount, userID, etc.) and stamp markers.
+    const { projects: _dropped, ...rest } = raw;
+    seedObj = {
+      ...rest,
+      hasCompletedOnboarding: true,
+      bypassPermissionsModeAccepted: true,
+    };
+  } else {
+    // Source absent: write minimal seed so the session can still start.
+    // OAuth may fail without a real oauthAccount; operator must supply one.
+    console.warn(
+      `[sandbox/manager] [WARN][tui] TUI seed source not found: ${seedSource}. ` +
+      `Writing minimal seed — interactive claude may fail OAuth without a real ~/.claude.json.`,
+    );
+    seedObj = {
+      hasCompletedOnboarding: true,
+      bypassPermissionsModeAccepted: true,
+    };
+  }
+
+  try {
+    writeFileSync(destPath, JSON.stringify(seedObj), { mode: 0o600 });
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new Error(`[sandbox/manager] Failed to write TUI seed to ${destPath}: ${e?.message ?? e}`);
+  }
+
+  // NEVER log the seed contents — carries oauthAccount/userID (§5.5, §7.1).
+  console.info('[tui] seeded ephemeral .claude.json');
+}
+
 // ── Legacy unsandboxed shape ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /**

test-features.mjs

@@ -18318,3 +18318,209 @@ describe('Suite 44 — sandbox Layer 3 E2E test (PI231 only) [SKIP: awaiting Tas
     assert.ok(true, 'placeholder — real test lands in Task #9');
   });
 });
+
+// ── Suite 45 — PR-0 TUI ISOLATION seed ────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Tests for the tui opt-in param of prepareIsolatedEnvironment:
+//   T-a  default-path-unchanged (tui omitted / false)
+//   T-b  tui-seed (tui:true, valid fixture source)
+//   T-c  missing-source (tui:true, non-existent source → minimal seed)
+//
+// Authority:
+//   spec §7.1 + §5.2 (T6 negative control) — seed does NOT disable managed MCP
+//   spec §5.5 — chmod 700 + mode-600 seed
+//   ADR 0002 Amendment 9 (ISOLATION contract, tuiSeed extension)
+//   claude CLI v2.1.158 first-run onboarding behavior
+
+import { ISOLATION as _ISOLATION_PR0 } from './lib/providers/anthropic.mjs';
+import { mkdtempSync as _mkdtemp45, rmSync as _rmSync45, statSync as _statSync45, writeFileSync as _wfs45, existsSync as _exists45, readFileSync as _rfs45 } from 'node:fs';
+import { join as _join45 } from 'node:path';
+import { tmpdir as _tmpdir45 } from 'node:os';
+
+describe('Suite 45 — PR-0 TUI ISOLATION seed', () => {
+
+  // ── Shared: build a mock provider that has the real anthropic ISOLATION shape
+  // (credentialMounts is overridden to [] so we don't symlink ~/.claude/.credentials.json).
+  function _mockAnthropicProvider() {
+    return {
+      name: 'mock-anthropic-pr0',
+      ISOLATION: {
+        ..._ISOLATION_PR0,
+        // Override credentialMounts to avoid accessing the real home during tests.
+        credentialMounts: [],
+      },
+    };
+  }
+
+  // ── T-a: default-path-unchanged ──────────────────────────────────────────
+  // With tui omitted (or false), prepareIsolatedEnvironment must NOT write
+  // .claude.json in the ephemeralRoot.  The return shape must equal the
+  // existing shape PLUS the additive reqId field.
+
+  it('45a: default-path-unchanged — no .claude.json written when tui is falsy', async () => {
+    await _resetSandboxMgr();
+    globalThis.__OLP_FORCE_ISOLATION_IN_TEST = true;
+    const provider = _mockAnthropicProvider();
+    let ctx;
+    try {
+      ctx = await prepareIsolatedEnvironment({
+        provider,
+        keyId: 'test-key-45a',
+        reqId: 'test-req-45a',
+        // tui intentionally omitted (defaults to false)
+      });
+
+      // ephemeralRoot must exist and be under /tmp/olp-spawn/
+      assert.ok(typeof ctx.ephemeralRoot === 'string' && ctx.ephemeralRoot.length > 0,
+        'ephemeralRoot must be a non-empty string');
+      assert.ok(ctx.ephemeralRoot.startsWith('/tmp/olp-spawn/'),
+        `ephemeralRoot must be under /tmp/olp-spawn/; got ${ctx.ephemeralRoot}`);
+
+      // NO .claude.json must be present
+      const claudeJsonPath = _join45(ctx.ephemeralRoot, '.claude.json');
+      assert.equal(_exists45(claudeJsonPath), false,
+        '.claude.json MUST NOT be present on the default (non-tui) path');
+
+      // reqId is present (additive — does not break existing callers who ignore it)
+      assert.ok('reqId' in ctx, 'reqId must be present in the returned ctx');
+      assert.equal(typeof ctx.reqId, 'string', 'reqId must be a string');
+
+      // Return shape has all original fields
+      assert.equal(typeof ctx.envOverrides, 'object', 'envOverrides must be present');
+      assert.equal(typeof ctx.hardenedArgs, 'function', 'hardenedArgs must be a function');
+      assert.equal(typeof ctx.wrapForLayer3, 'function', 'wrapForLayer3 must be a function');
+      assert.equal(typeof ctx.cleanup, 'function', 'cleanup must be a function');
+
+      await ctx.cleanup();
+    } finally {
+      delete globalThis.__OLP_FORCE_ISOLATION_IN_TEST;
+      if (ctx?.cleanup) { try { await ctx.cleanup(); } catch { /* already cleaned */ } }
+      await _resetSandboxMgr();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // ── T-b: tui-seed ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  // With tui:true + a fixture tuiSeedSource: .claude.json must be written
+  // mode 600, projects stripped, markers present, oauthAccount/userID present.
+  // The <reqId> dir and ephemeralRoot must be mode 700.
+
+  it('45b: tui-seed — .claude.json written mode 600, markers present, projects stripped, dirs mode 700', async () => {
+    await _resetSandboxMgr();
+    globalThis.__OLP_FORCE_ISOLATION_IN_TEST = true;
+
+    // Write a fixture .claude.json to a temp dir (never touches real ~/.claude.json).
+    const fixtureDir = _mkdtemp45(_join45(_tmpdir45(), 'olp-pr0-fixture-'));
+    const fixtureSeedPath = _join45(fixtureDir, 'fixture-claude.json');
+    const fixtureSource = {
+      oauthAccount: { emailAddress: 'test@example.com', organizationUuid: 'org-uuid-fake' },
+      userID: 'user-id-fake',
+      projects: { '/some/real/project': { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true } },
+      someOtherField: 'keep-me',
+    };
+    _wfs45(fixtureSeedPath, JSON.stringify(fixtureSource), 'utf8');
+
+    const provider = _mockAnthropicProvider();
+    let ctx;
+    try {
+      ctx = await prepareIsolatedEnvironment({
+        provider,
+        keyId: 'test-key-45b',
+        reqId: 'test-req-45b',
+        tui: true,
+        tuiSeedSource: fixtureSeedPath,
+      });
+
+      // .claude.json must exist
+      const claudeJsonPath = _join45(ctx.ephemeralRoot, '.claude.json');
+      assert.equal(_exists45(claudeJsonPath), true,
+        '.claude.json must be present when tui:true');
+
+      // mode 600
+      const seedMode = _statSync45(claudeJsonPath).mode & 0o777;
+      assert.equal(seedMode, 0o600,
+        `.claude.json must have mode 0o600; got ${seedMode.toString(8)}`);
+
+      // Parse and check content
+      const seedContent = JSON.parse(_rfs45(claudeJsonPath, 'utf8'));
+      assert.equal(seedContent.hasCompletedOnboarding, true,
+        'hasCompletedOnboarding must be true');
+      assert.equal(seedContent.bypassPermissionsModeAccepted, true,
+        'bypassPermissionsModeAccepted must be true');
+      assert.equal('projects' in seedContent, false,
+        'projects must NOT be present in the seed (stripped to avoid leaking owner history)');
+      assert.deepEqual(seedContent.oauthAccount, fixtureSource.oauthAccount,
+        'oauthAccount must be copied from source');
+      assert.equal(seedContent.userID, fixtureSource.userID,
+        'userID must be copied from source');
+      assert.equal(seedContent.someOtherField, 'keep-me',
+        'other fields must be preserved');
+
+      // Negative assertion: no MCP-disable fields (T6 negative control)
+      assert.equal('claudeAiMcpEverConnected' in seedContent, false,
+        'seed must NOT contain claudeAiMcpEverConnected (MCP disable is spawn-argv, not seed)');
+      assert.equal('mcpServers' in seedContent, false,
+        'seed must NOT contain mcpServers');
+
+      // reqId present
+      assert.ok('reqId' in ctx, 'reqId must be present');
+      assert.equal(ctx.reqId, 'test-req-45b', 'reqId must match the sanitized input');
+
+      // <reqId> dir and ephemeralRoot must be mode 700 (§5.5)
+      const reqIdDir = _join45('/tmp/olp-spawn', 'test-key-45b', 'test-req-45b');
+      const reqIdMode = _statSync45(reqIdDir).mode & 0o777;
+      assert.equal(reqIdMode, 0o700,
+        `<reqId> dir must have mode 0o700; got ${reqIdMode.toString(8)}`);
+      const rootMode = _statSync45(ctx.ephemeralRoot).mode & 0o777;
+      assert.equal(rootMode, 0o700,
+        `ephemeralRoot must have mode 0o700; got ${rootMode.toString(8)}`);
+
+      await ctx.cleanup();
+    } finally {
+      delete globalThis.__OLP_FORCE_ISOLATION_IN_TEST;
+      if (ctx?.cleanup) { try { await ctx.cleanup(); } catch { /* already cleaned */ } }
+      try { _rmSync45(fixtureDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+      await _resetSandboxMgr();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // ── T-c: missing-source ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  // With tui:true and a non-existent tuiSeedSource, _seedTuiClaudeJson should
+  // write a minimal seed (markers only, no oauthAccount) and NOT throw.
+
+  it('45c: missing-source — minimal seed written when tuiSeedSource does not exist', async () => {
+    await _resetSandboxMgr();
+    globalThis.__OLP_FORCE_ISOLATION_IN_TEST = true;
+
+    const provider = _mockAnthropicProvider();
+    const nonExistentSource = _join45(_tmpdir45(), 'olp-pr0-nonexistent-' + Date.now() + '.json');
+    let ctx;
+    try {
+      // Must not throw even though source is absent
+      ctx = await prepareIsolatedEnvironment({
+        provider,
+        keyId: 'test-key-45c',
+        reqId: 'test-req-45c',
+        tui: true,
+        tuiSeedSource: nonExistentSource,
+      });
+
+      const claudeJsonPath = _join45(ctx.ephemeralRoot, '.claude.json');
+      assert.equal(_exists45(claudeJsonPath), true,
+        'minimal seed must be written even when source is absent');
+
+      const seedContent = JSON.parse(_rfs45(claudeJsonPath, 'utf8'));
+      assert.equal(seedContent.hasCompletedOnboarding, true,
+        'minimal seed must have hasCompletedOnboarding:true');
+      assert.equal(seedContent.bypassPermissionsModeAccepted, true,
+        'minimal seed must have bypassPermissionsModeAccepted:true');
+      assert.equal('oauthAccount' in seedContent, false,
+        'minimal seed must NOT have oauthAccount (source was absent)');
+
+      await ctx.cleanup();
+    } finally {
+      delete globalThis.__OLP_FORCE_ISOLATION_IN_TEST;
+      if (ctx?.cleanup) { try { await ctx.cleanup(); } catch { /* already cleaned */ } }
+      await _resetSandboxMgr();
+    }
+  });
+});