Compare commits

...
Author SHA1 Message Date
taodengandClaude <claude-opus> <noreply@anthropic.com> 6394ca3265 fix(tui): pass CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN to spawned claude + reap defunct sessions
Root cause (PI231 incident): tmux does not forward the parent's env to the
pane, so the TUI claude never saw CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN and fell back to
~/.claude/.credentials.json, whose single-use refresh token got corrupted to an
empty string by the per-request spawn + kill-session teardown racing claude's
token rotation -> permanent "Please run /login" 401 (re-login re-corrupted on
the next spawn). Connected leak: the pane's claude is a child of the tmux server
(not node), so kill-session left <defunct> zombies the server never reaped (25
over 30 days; tmux kill-server dropped it 25->3).

Fix 1: buildTuiCmd now adds CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=<shq-escaped> to the pane
env prefix when the env is set, so claude authenticates via the long-lived token
and never touches the credentials.json refresh path (matching stable hosts).
Unset -> no token added (credentials.json-only hosts unaffected).

Fix 2: reapStaleTuiSessions kill-servers after clearing our own sessions ONLY
when no foreign tmux session remains (never disrupts a co-hosted olp-tui-*).
kill-server is the only node-reachable action that ACTUALLY reaps -- server exit
reparents survivors to init, which waitpids them; a per-session kill cannot,
since node is not the zombies' parent. Added a 15-min periodic reap (server.mjs)
gated on TUI_MODE and on the TUI path being idle. Residual: a request whose pane
is created in the idle-check/kill-server window fails cleanly via the existing
honesty gates (documented).

ALIGNMENT: Class B (OCP-owned TUI spawn). cli.js does NOT perform either
operation -- there is no cli.js analogue for "how the TUI pane authenticates" or
"reaping tmux-server-owned zombies"; authorized by ADR 0007 (PR-C amendment) per
ALIGNMENT.md's Class B citation requirement. No Class A wire surface, no endpoint
shape, no alignment.yml token, and no models.json entry touched.

Tests: +6 in test-features.mjs (buildTuiCmd token set/unset/shq-injection;
reaper kill-server ours-only / foreign-present / no-server). 241 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus> <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 12:19:51 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude <claude-fable-5> <noreply@anthropic.com>
c86e3d014f chore(release): v3.20.0 — TUI billing-safety hardening for 2026-06-15 (PR-A/B/C, #137-139) (#140)
Bump 3.19.0 → 3.20.0 + CHANGELOG. Aggregates three already-reviewed, already-merged PRs:
- #137 (PR-A) TUI honesty/cache correctness
- #139 (PR-B) TUI concurrency limit + /health observability
- #138 (PR-C) 6/15 canary + flip/rollback runbooks + setup auth-probe guard

README env-var / endpoint tables were updated in the respective feature PRs.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude-fable-5> <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 21:56:56 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude <claude-opus> <noreply@anthropic.com>
3322d7bdae feat(tui): per-path concurrency limit + /health observability (PR-B) (#139)
Two P1 audit fixes for the TUI subscription-pool bridge (ADR 0007). The
default path (CLAUDE_TUI_MODE unset) is unchanged except the additive
/health `tui` block (enabled:false when off).

C-4 — TUI path had NO concurrency bound. The global MAX_CONCURRENT gate
lives in spawnClaudeProcess (the -p/stream-json path); callClaudeTui never
calls it — it calls runTuiTurn, which cold-boots a full interactive claude
in tmux. So N concurrent TUI requests spawned N simultaneous cold boots (a
family burst of 5 on a Pi 4 = OOM risk + subscription rate-limit pressure).
Adds an independent in-process limiter (lib/tui/semaphore.mjs, TuiSemaphore)
gating callClaudeTui: OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT (default 2 — a TUI turn is heavy:
per-request cold-boot + up to 120s wallclock). Queues rather than rejects
(mirrors MAX_CONCURRENT intent), with a bounded wait queue (default 32x the
limit) → tui_queue_full (503) on overflow rather than unbounded growth. The
slot releases in a finally, so PR-A's honesty-gate throws / timeouts / paste
failures never leak a slot.

C-5 — no operator-visible TUI drift surface. The tui_entrypoint_mismatch
warning only reached journald; after the 6/15 flip a silent sdk-cli drift
(the documented top risk) would drain metered credits invisibly. Adds an
additive `tui` block to /health: { enabled, entrypointMode, lastEntrypoint,
entrypointMismatches, inflight, queued, maxConcurrent }. lastEntrypoint /
entrypointMismatches are recorded in callClaudeTui (same mismatch branch the
journald warning covers); inflight/queued come from the C-4 semaphore.

ALIGNMENT (Class B): cli.js does NOT perform this operation — both the TUI
path and /health are OCP-owned, so no cli.js citation applies. /health is a
grandfathered B.2 endpoint (ADR 0006, frozen at v3.16.4). The response-shape
change is authorized by the ADR 0007 PR-B amendment added in this commit and
is behaviour-preserving: the `tui` block is NEW fields only — no existing
/health field is changed, renamed, removed, or re-typed, and no existing
semantics change, so existing consumers (dashboard, ocp-connect, monitoring)
are unaffected. Per ALIGNMENT.md's grandfather provision, an additive
behaviour-preserving change to a grandfathered B.2 endpoint is authorized by
an ADR; ADR 0007 is the authority for the TUI observability surface. No
Class A forwarding path, no alignment.yml, no models.json touched — alignment
blacklist is unaffected (zero new network tokens).

Tests: 11 new (lib/tui/semaphore.mjs is importable, so the semaphore + the
two pure /health helpers are tested directly): limit=1 serializes two
overlapping calls; limit=2 runs two + queues the third; slot released on
throw; bounded queue → tui_queue_full; mismatch counter increments on
cli→other drift; auto mode never counts a mismatch; /health tui block shape
+ live inflight/queued. npm test: 235 passed, 0 failed (was 224).

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude-opus> <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 21:54:07 +10:00
79c1d61e1d docs(tui): 6/15 canary + flip/rollback runbooks + setup auth-probe guard (PR-C) (#138)
Docs scope (no server.mjs touched):
- docs/runbooks/615-canary.md — executable canary runbook: quiesce host,
  read Agent SDK credit balance manually (no programmatic API exists for
  that pool — this is stated explicitly to avoid endpoint hallucination),
  send one Haiku turn via TUI-mode, confirm cc_entrypoint=cli in transcript,
  re-read balance, green/red decision tree, periodic self-classification
  mini-canary with OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT=auto.
- docs/runbooks/tui-flip-rollback.md — flip and rollback procedure for
  systemd (EnvironmentFile + daemon-reload) and launchd (plist edit +
  bootout/bootstrap cycle). Calls out both known pitfalls explicitly:
  daemon-reload required on systemd; launchctl kickstart -k does NOT
  reload plist env on launchd (matches MEMORY.md operational pit entry).
- README.md § "2026-06-15 operator checklist" — brief fleet checklist +
  pointers to both runbooks. Placed inside the existing TUI-mode section
  just before "Architecture and design decisions".
- README.md § Environment Variables — adds OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST row.

Operator-tooling scope (setup.mjs, not a Class A wire path):
- setup.mjs auth quick-test: wraps the existing claude -p probe in an
  OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST=1 gate; adds inline comment warning that after
  2026-06-15 the probe draws from the Agent SDK credit pool. The setup
  flow is unchanged when OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST is unset.

Alignment note: this PR does not touch server.mjs. The setup.mjs change
is operator-tooling only — it guards a local test spawn, not any wire
path. No cli.js citation required (no Class A surface is modified).

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude claude-sonnet-4-6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 21:41:03 +10:00
dtzp555-maxGitHubtaodengClaude <claude-opus> <noreply@anthropic.com>
a37ff713d9 fix(tui): honest error/truncation handling + version-robust entrypoint + short-prompt paste (PR-A) (#137)
TUI-mode (CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true) is an OCP-owned subscription-pool bridge for the
2026-06-15 Anthropic billing split. This PR fixes four honesty/robustness defects
confirmed by a prior audit and live-reproduced on PI231 (2026-06-10).

C-1 (P1) — upstream AUTH-FAILURE banner returned/cached as a real answer.
  The interactive claude CLI renders in-session errors as ordinary assistant text.
  The R-1 case C-1 exists to catch is expired/invalid credentials, where EVERY turn
  comes back as the same one-line auth-failure banner, e.g. the two live PI231
  banners (2026-06-10):
    "Please run /login · API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials"  (69 chars)
    "Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials" (73 chars)
  callClaudeTui returned that banner verbatim → OCP cached it, shared it via
  singleflight, and recorded a model SUCCESS. New detectTuiUpstreamError()
  (lib/tui/transcript.mjs) flags such a turn; callClaudeTui throws tui_upstream_error
  + logEvent("error", …) BEFORE recordModelSuccess/cache write-back, so the error
  never enters the cache; the client gets a 5xx.

  C-1 NARROWING (false-positive probe, 2026-06-10). An earlier generalised default
  rule — ^<short auth-failure prefix>?API Error: <3-digit> <detail>$ — was TOO BROAD:
  the unbounded ".*" detail tail let any short prefix + "API Error: NNN" + an
  arbitrarily long sentence match, so it KILLED legitimate long answers that merely
  DISCUSS an API error (e.g. "API Error: 500 happened because the server was
  overloaded. To fix this, retry with exponential backoff …"). A false-positive costs
  the user a missing answer AND a double-burn retry — strictly worse than the rare
  false-negative (caching one transient error for the 5-min TTL). C-1 is therefore
  reframed from "detect any API error" to "detect a claude-CLI AUTHENTICATION-FAILURE
  banner", and is CONSERVATIVE: when unsure it PASSES. The narrowed default detector
  flags a turn only when ALL of the following hold over the WHOLE trimmed text
  (a conjunction; any one failing => PASS):
    1. SHORT whole-message — length ≤ 100 (live banners are 69/73; cap gives headroom
       while rejecting multi-sentence prose; a 226-char auth answer is dropped on
       length alone).
    2. Contains "API Error: 4\d{2}" — auth failures are 4xx (401/403); transient 5xx
       and bare "HTTP 401 means unauthorized." (no API-Error core) are excluded.
    3. Contains an auth keyword — authenticat | /login | credential (case-insensitive);
       rejects "To debug a 401 … API Error: 401 Unauthorized …" (authoriz-, not
       authenticat-).
    4. Contains NO backtick/quote char (` ' ") — a real banner is plain text; quoted
       text signals an answer QUOTING the error, e.g. "You'll see `API Error: 401` …
       run /login to fix it." (short + 4xx + /login, excluded only by this signal).
  Full required matrix (2 KILL + 7 PASS) encoded as tests; npm test green.
  CLAUDE_TUI_ERROR_PATTERNS still overrides (a non-empty value REPLACES the default
  with operator regexes; empty/whitespace DISABLES detection). New fixture
  lib/tui/fixtures/error-401-failauth.jsonl + positive/negative tests retained.

C-2 (P1) — wallclock-truncated partial text returned as silent success.
  readTuiTranscript returned {text, entrypoint} identically on the terminal-marker
  path and the cap-with-partial path, so a cut-off turn was cached + returned as
  finish_reason:stop. It now returns truncated:false on terminal-marker and
  truncated:true on the cap-with-partial path (additive field; no-text cap path
  still throws). callClaudeTui throws tui_wallclock_truncated on truncated.

C-3 (P1) — verifyEntrypoint only read the turn_duration line.
  Some claude builds don't emit turn_duration (Mac mini: absent; PI231/2.1.104:
  present), while the entrypoint field is on ordinary lines on BOTH. Reading only
  turn_duration made the server.mjs tui_entrypoint_mismatch assertion get got:null
  every turn on non-emitting builds. verifyEntrypoint now PREFERS the turn_duration
  entrypoint and FALLS BACK to the entrypoint field on any line.

C-4 (P2) — short prompts 100% failed paste-landing.
  tuiPromptLanded required needle.length >= 3, so a 1–2 char first line ("hi","ok")
  never matched and 5s-failed with tui_paste_not_landed every time (live-repro:
  "hi"). Threshold lowered 3 → 2; the input box starts empty (placeholder excluded
  by the affirmative-signal design) so a 2-char needle present in the pane is the
  prompt. Kept >=2 (not >=1) to avoid collisions with claude's chrome glyphs.

Tests: extended test-features.mjs with unit coverage for each fix + three fixtures
(lib/tui/fixtures/error-401.jsonl, error-401-failauth.jsonl, no-turn-duration.jsonl).
The C-1 block now encodes the full narrowed auth-banner matrix (2 must-kill + 7
must-pass + supporting regression guards incl. a length-cap-load-bearing test).
npm test: 224 passed, 0 failed. Default path (CLAUDE_TUI_MODE unset →
upstreamCall=callClaude) is byte-identical: the only server.mjs change is one import
+ the callClaudeTui body, and callClaudeTui is unreachable when TUI_MODE is off.

ALIGNMENT: Class B (OCP-owned compatibility surface). cli.js does not perform this
operation (TUI is an OCP-owned subscription-pool bridge); scope authorized by ADR
0007 (Class B). No Class A path touched (callClaude / handleUsage / OAuth unchanged);
no change to .github/workflows/alignment.yml or any blacklisted token.

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude-opus> <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 21:39:01 +10:00
6d4751f983 feat(tui): OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS gate — -p-equivalent tools for single-user TUI (#135)
* feat(tui): OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS gate — -p-equivalent tool surface for single-user TUI

Lets a SINGLE-USER / trusted TUI deployment run a tool-using / MCP agent (e.g. an
OpenClaw assistant) on the subscription pool. When OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS=1, buildTuiCmd
grants the interactive session the SAME tool surface as the -p A-path — --allowedTools
(+ optional --mcp-config / --dangerously-skip-permissions, read from the same
CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS / CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG / CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS env as buildCliArgs)
— instead of the default MCP-walled, built-in-tools-only set.

Motivation: the default TUI tool wall (--strict-mcp-config --disallowedTools mcp__*)
exists for multi-tenant safety, but it also blocks a trusted single-operator agent from
its MCP tools — forcing tool-using agents onto the metered -p pool after 2026-06-15.
This gate resolves that for the single-user case.

Safe to gate ON only because TUI is hard-incompatible with AUTH_MODE=multi (server.mjs
refuses to boot, see existing guard), so this can NEVER widen a guest's tool surface.
Default (gate unset) is unchanged: MCP wall + built-in tools only.

Verified live on PI231 through the real OCP TUI path (spike 2026-06-02):
- built-in tools: claude created + read a file on the host (2 tool_use entries);
- MCP: claude invoked a custom MCP server's tool (mcp__spike__echo_marker) and returned
  its output;
- billing: entrypoint=cli (subscription pool) WITH full tools + MCP;
- completion: end_turn, no permission stall, no hang.

Tests: +1 (full-tools branch: --allowedTools present + MCP wall dropped; skip-permissions
supersedes; mcp-config threaded). 195 pass. README: new OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS env var entry.

ALIGNMENT.md: changes lib/tui/session.mjs, not server.mjs — server.mjs hard requirements
do not trigger. Mirrors buildCliArgs() permissions logic; the flags are documented Claude
Code CLI flags, not invented endpoints. cli.js citation N/A under Rule 2. ADR 0007 (A-path).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tui): shq operator tool tokens in full-tools shell string (reviewer Finding 2)

Independent reviewer (APPROVE WITH CHANGES) caught that buildTuiCmd returns a SHELL
STRING (run by tmux via sh -c), unlike buildCliArgs which returns an argv array to
spawn(). Operator-supplied CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS can be a scoped specifier such as
"Bash(npm run test:*)" or "Read(~/**)", whose ( ) * ~ would break / inject the shell
command if pasted bare. Now shq() each allowed-tool token (operator-self-injection only —
guests cannot reach TUI per the multi-mode boot guard, but it's a real correctness bug).

Also: tightened the README OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS wording per reviewer Finding 1 — the precise
safety property is "no guest key can reach the TUI path (multi-mode boot is a hard exit)",
and noted the AUTH_MODE=shared + OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN trust model is unchanged.

Test: +scoped-specifier assertions (token shq'd; never appears unquoted). 195 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 11:03:20 +10:00
15 changed files with 1478 additions and 39 deletions
+27
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,32 @@
# Changelog
## v3.20.0 — 2026-06-10
TUI-mode billing-safety hardening for the 2026-06-15 Anthropic billing split. A 5-dimension multi-agent audit (adversarial verification + live tests on all three hosts — PI231 / Oracle / Mac mini, claude 2.1.104 / 2.1.114 / 2.1.170) found the TUI subscription-pool path could silently bill the metered Agent SDK pool or poison the cache under realistic failure modes. Three PRs, each with a fresh-context reviewer (Iron Rule 10) and CI; the default path (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` unset) is byte-for-byte unchanged.
### TUI — honesty & cache correctness (#137)
- **C-1** — `callClaudeTui` now throws on a claude-CLI auth-failure banner (e.g. `Please run /login · API Error: 401 …`, `Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 …`) instead of returning it as a real answer, so it is never cached, singleflight-shared, or counted as a model success. Conservative detector (whole trimmed text ≤100 chars + `API Error: 4xx` + auth keyword + no code/quote char); overridable via `CLAUDE_TUI_ERROR_PATTERNS`. Live-reproduced on PI231.
- **C-2** — `readTuiTranscript` distinguishes a complete turn from a wallclock-truncated partial (`truncated` flag); `callClaudeTui` throws `tui_wallclock_truncated` so a partial is never cached or counted as success.
- **C-3** — `verifyEntrypoint` reads the `entrypoint` field from any transcript line, not just `{system, turn_duration}` — some claude builds emit zero turn_duration lines (live-confirmed on Oracle's claude 2.1.114), which previously left the billing-drift assertion blind on those builds.
- **C-4 (paste)** — short prompts (e.g. `hi`) could never pass paste-landing detection; threshold lowered. Live-reproduced on PI231.
### TUI — concurrency & observability (#139)
- **Concurrency** — `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` (default 2) bounds concurrent interactive `claude` boots via a queuing semaphore (`lib/tui/semaphore.mjs`); the slot is released on throw so honesty-gate / spawn failures never leak it; bounded wait-queue → `tui_queue_full` (503). Independent of the global `MAX_CONCURRENT` (8) — a TUI turn is a heavy per-request cold-boot of tmux+claude + up to 120s wallclock.
- **Observability** — additive `/health` `tui` block (`enabled` / `entrypointMode` / `lastEntrypoint` / `entrypointMismatches` / `inflight` / `maxConcurrent`) so an operator can poll for a silent `sdk-cli` metered-pool drift (the audit's top risk) instead of grepping journald. Authorized by the ADR 0007 PR-B amendment under the ALIGNMENT grandfather provision (additive, behaviour-preserving — every pre-existing `/health` field unchanged).
### Operations (#138)
- `docs/runbooks/615-canary.md` — the 2026-06-15 credit-balance canary: quiesce, read the Agent SDK credit balance (manual — no programmatic API exists for that pool; OCP's `/usage` headers are subscription rate-limit data, not the credit pool), one TUI canary turn, confirm `entrypoint:cli` in the transcript, green/red decision tree, periodic auto-mode self-classification mini-canary.
- `docs/runbooks/tui-flip-rollback.md` — flip/rollback per deployment (systemd `daemon-reload`; launchd `bootout`/`bootstrap`, not `kickstart -k`).
- `setup.mjs` auth quick-test gated behind `OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST=1` (the `claude -p` probe draws from the metered Agent SDK pool after 6/15).
### New environment variables
- `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` — max concurrent interactive TUI turns (default 2) (#139).
- `OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST` — skip the `claude -p` auth probe in `setup.mjs` (default off) (#138).
## v3.19.0 — 2026-06-02
TUI-mode reliability + proxy-purity release. Two fixes diagnosed and verified live on both test hosts (PI231 / Oracle, claude 2.1.104 / 2.1.114), each its own PR with a fresh-context reviewer (Iron Rule 10), then an adversarial multi-host test battery (0 hangs / 0 crashes / 0 injection / 0 leaks). The default path (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` unset) is byte-for-byte unchanged.
+53 -1
View File
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ The canonical list lives in [`models.json`](./models.json) — the single source
|----------|--------|-------------|
| `/v1/models` | GET | List available models |
| `/v1/chat/completions` | POST | Chat completion (streaming + non-streaming) |
| `/health` | GET | Comprehensive health check |
| `/health` | GET | Comprehensive health check (includes a `tui` block for TUI-mode drift/concurrency monitoring) |
| `/usage` | GET | Plan usage limits + per-model stats |
| `/status` | GET | Combined overview (usage + health) |
| `/settings` | GET/PATCH | View or update settings at runtime |
@@ -871,6 +871,21 @@ openclaw gateway restart # so OpenClaw re-reads the config
Future `ocp update` invocations sync automatically.
### TUI-mode returns `Please run /login · API Error: 401` (re-login doesn't stick)
A long-running TUI-mode host can get stuck returning a permanent 401 that re-login cannot fix. Root cause: when `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is **unset**, the interactive `claude` authenticates via `~/.claude/.credentials.json`, whose single-use OAuth refresh token can be corrupted (ending up an empty string) by the per-request spawn + `kill-session` teardown racing claude's token rotation. Re-login writes a fresh token, but the next spawn re-corrupts it.
Fix: set `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` on the OCP host (then restart — on systemd `daemon-reload`, on launchd `bootout`+`bootstrap`; `kickstart -k` does **not** reload env). The TUI `claude` then authenticates via the stable long-lived token and never touches credentials.json. Verify the env reached the process:
```bash
# Linux (systemd): confirm the token is in the service env
tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$(pgrep -f server.mjs | head -1)/environ | grep CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
# Re-login once to repair the credentials file (belt-and-braces), then it stays unused:
claude /login
```
See [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) and ADR 0007 PR-C amendment.
## Environment Variables
| Variable | Default | Description |
@@ -894,10 +909,14 @@ Future `ocp update` invocations sync automatically.
| `PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY` | *(unset)* | Well-known anonymous key allowlist (multi mode). When set, this exact string bypasses `validateKey()` and grants public access. Exposed via `/health.anonymousKey` only to localhost, or to all callers when `PROXY_ADVERTISE_ANON_KEY=1`. See [Anonymous Access](#anonymous-access-optional). |
| `PROXY_ADVERTISE_ANON_KEY` | *(unset)* | When `=1`, advertise `PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY` in the public `/health` body for remote zero-config discovery. Default off — `/health` is unauthenticated, so this exposes the shared key to any LAN-reachable device (issue #109). Localhost always sees it regardless. |
| `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` | `false` | **Opt-in.** Set to `"true"` to serve requests via interactive `claude` (no `-p` / `--output-format` → `cc_entrypoint=cli`, subscription pool). **Single-user only** — see [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) for the security constraint. |
| `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | *(unset)* | OAuth bearer token (highest-precedence credential source). **Recommended for TUI-mode hosts:** when set, the interactive `claude` authenticates via this long-lived token and never touches `~/.claude/.credentials.json`, avoiding the refresh-token corruption that caused a permanent `Please run /login` 401 on a long-running TUI host (see [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) and ADR 0007). The token appears in the pane command (ps-visible) — acceptable for the single-user A-path; the multi-user B-path is refused at boot. |
| `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS` | `120000` | (TUI-mode) Maximum time in ms to wait for the native transcript to signal turn completion. Increase for long Opus thinking turns. |
| `OCP_TUI_CWD` | `$HOME/.ocp-tui/work` | (TUI-mode) Scratch working directory where interactive claude sessions run. Transcripts land under `<HOME>/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/`. Created automatically. |
| `OCP_TUI_HOME` | `$HOME` (real home) | (TUI-mode) `HOME` claude runs under. Default is the operator's real home (shared credentials, existing onboarding). Set to a separate path for scratch-home isolation — see ADR 0007 for the credential-fork caveat. |
| `OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT` | `cli` | (TUI-mode) Billing-classifier labeling: `cli` (default) pins `cc_entrypoint=cli` deterministically; `auto` lets claude self-classify via TTY detection; `off` leaves the inherited env untouched. Honest only when the spawn is a genuine interactive PTY — see ADR 0007. |
| `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` | `2` | (TUI-mode) Max concurrent interactive TUI turns. **Independent** of `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT` (which bounds the `-p`/stream-json path; TUI never uses it). A TUI turn is heavy (per-request cold-boot of tmux+claude + up to `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS` wallclock), so the default is low to keep small hosts (e.g. a Pi 4) alive under a burst. Excess turns **queue** (bounded); a full queue yields a 503. See ADR 0007 PR-B amendment. |
| `OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST` | *(unset)* | When `=1`, skip the `claude -p` auth probe during `setup.mjs`. After 2026-06-15 this probe draws from the Agent SDK credit pool; set this to avoid burning a metered credit on re-installs or `ocp update` runs. Auth is validated at the first real request. |
| `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS` | *(unset)* | (TUI-mode, **single-user only**) When `=1`, grant the interactive session the **same tool surface as the `-p` path** — `--allowedTools` (+ optional `--mcp-config` / `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, read from `CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS` / `CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG` / `CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS`) — instead of the default MCP-walled, built-in-tools-only set. Lets a trusted single-operator TUI deployment run a **tool-using / MCP agent** (e.g. an OpenClaw assistant) on the subscription pool. Safe because TUI **refuses to boot under `AUTH_MODE=multi`** (hard exit) — no guest key can ever reach the TUI path, so this gate cannot expose tools to an untrusted caller. (Under `AUTH_MODE=shared` + `OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1`, anyone holding the single shared key reaches it — that is the existing TUI trust model, unchanged.) See [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) and ADR 0007. |
### Streaming heartbeat
@@ -943,6 +962,11 @@ mkdir -p ~/.ocp-tui/work # one-time scratch cwd setup
# Enable
export CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true
# STRONGLY RECOMMENDED on a TUI host — authenticate via the long-lived OAuth token
# so the interactive claude never touches ~/.claude/.credentials.json (whose single-use
# refresh token can get corrupted by the per-request spawn/teardown cycle → permanent
# "Please run /login" 401). See the auth note below + ADR 0007.
export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=sk-ant-oat01-...
# Optionally tune:
export CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS=180000 # 3 min cap for long Opus turns
export OCP_TUI_CWD=$HOME/.ocp-tui/work # default; override if needed
@@ -962,7 +986,28 @@ Then restart OCP. At boot you will see:
- **No real token streaming.** TUI-mode buffers the full response then replays it as chunked SSE. You will see a delay then the complete response rather than real-time tokens.
- **Cache and singleflight work normally.** TUI-mode writes the buffered response to the cache on success; cache-hits skip the interactive turn entirely.
- **The host's `CLAUDE.md` / auto-memory is never injected.** OCP is a proxy — the proxied client (OpenClaw / your IDE) owns its own context and memory. TUI-mode always runs `claude` with `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS` + `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY`, so a `CLAUDE.md` on the OCP host can never leak into proxied turns (verified live; see #4). Built-in tool schemas + the interactive system prompt remain (the inherent ~2035K context floor of interactive mode); MCP is hard-disabled.
- **Authenticate via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (recommended).** tmux does not forward the parent process's env to the pane, so OCP sets the token explicitly on the spawned `claude` when `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is present. With the token set, the interactive `claude` authenticates via the stable long-lived token and **never touches `~/.claude/.credentials.json`**. Without it, claude falls back to credentials.json, whose single-use OAuth refresh token can be corrupted by the per-request spawn + `kill-session` teardown racing claude's token rotation — on a long-running host this produced a permanent `Please run /login · API Error: 401` that re-login could not fix (the next spawn re-corrupted it). Setting the token mirrors how the stable hosts already run. (The token is then visible in `ps` on the pane command — acceptable for the single-user A-path; the multi-user B-path is refused at boot.) See ADR 0007 PR-C amendment.
- **Stale tmux sessions are reaped.** The pane's `claude` is a child of the tmux server (not OCP), so OCP cannot reap it directly; `claude` zombies can otherwise accumulate as `<defunct>` over a long-running host. OCP reaps them at boot and on a 15-min idle sweep by issuing `tmux kill-server` — but **only when no foreign tmux session remains** (it never disrupts a co-hosted `olp-tui-*` instance). See ADR 0007 PR-C amendment.
- **Default path unchanged.** Unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` and restart → `callClaude` / `callClaudeStreaming` are used again, byte-for-byte identical to today.
- **Concurrency is bounded separately.** TUI turns are heavy (per-request cold-boot + long wallclock), so the TUI path has its own limiter — `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` (default `2`), independent of `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT`. Excess turns queue; a full queue returns a 503. Tune it up only on a host that can run more interactive `claude` sessions at once.
### Monitoring drift via `/health`
`GET /health` includes a `tui` block so you can poll for a silent billing-pool drift (the top risk after the 6/15 flip — a lost TTY flipping `cc_entrypoint` from `cli` to the metered `sdk-cli` pool would still return answers but burn metered credits). The block is **always present** (with `enabled:false` when TUI-mode is off):
```jsonc
"tui": {
"enabled": true, // CLAUDE_TUI_MODE === "true"
"entrypointMode": "cli", // OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT (cli | auto | off)
"lastEntrypoint": "cli", // last cc_entrypoint observed in a transcript, or null
"entrypointMismatches": 0, // count of cli-expected-but-got-other turns — ALERT if this climbs
"inflight": 1, // TUI turns running right now
"queued": 0, // TUI turns waiting for a concurrency slot
"maxConcurrent": 2 // OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT
}
```
Alert on `entrypointMismatches > 0` (or `lastEntrypoint !== "cli"`): it means a turn drew from the metered Agent SDK pool instead of the subscription. `inflight` / `queued` show how close the TUI path is to its concurrency cap.
### Kill-switch
@@ -973,6 +1018,13 @@ unset CLAUDE_TUI_MODE
The stream-json path is restored immediately. No other change is needed.
### 2026-06-15 operator checklist
Every host serving traffic must be flipped to TUI-mode **and** canary-verified before 2026-06-15, or it will bill the metered Agent SDK credit pool instead of the subscription.
- **[Flip/rollback runbook](docs/runbooks/tui-flip-rollback.md)** — how to set `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` on systemd (Linux) and launchd (macOS) hosts. Covers the `daemon-reload` requirement (systemd) and the `bootout`+`bootstrap` cycle requirement (launchd — `launchctl kickstart -k` does not reload plist env).
- **[615-canary runbook](docs/runbooks/615-canary.md)** — after each flip, run one quiesced request and compare the Agent SDK credit balance before and after. `entrypoint:cli` in the transcript (the `cc_entrypoint` billing classifier) is necessary but not sufficient — only a stable credit balance confirms the subscription pool is being used. Balance check is a manual step (no known programmatic API for the Agent SDK credit pool balance).
### Architecture and design decisions
See [`docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md`](docs/adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md) for the full rationale, home-strategy options, MCP-disable mechanism, coexistence rules, and the B-path (multi-tenant isolation) roadmap.
+130
View File
@@ -139,6 +139,136 @@ B-path is **deferred** and is not implemented in this ADR. Until B-path lands, T
---
## Observability and concurrency (PR-B amendment)
**Date:** 2026-06-10
**Status:** Accepted — amends ADR 0007.
**Motivation:** the post-PR-A code audit, findings C-4 (P1) and C-5 (P1).
### C-4 — independent concurrency bound for the TUI path
The global `MAX_CONCURRENT` gate lives in `spawnClaudeProcess()` (the `-p` / stream-json
path). `callClaudeTui()` never calls `spawnClaudeProcess` — it calls `runTuiTurn()`, which
cold-boots a full interactive `claude` inside a fresh tmux session. So the TUI path had **no**
concurrency bound: N concurrent TUI requests spawned N simultaneous cold-boot tmux+claude
processes. On a small host (e.g. a Pi 4 serving a family) a burst of ~5 is an OOM risk and
also multiplies subscription rate-limit pressure.
PR-B adds an **independent** limiter for the TUI path (`lib/tui/semaphore.mjs`,
`TuiSemaphore`):
- **`OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT`, default `2`.** Rationale: a TUI turn is heavy — a per-request
cold-boot of tmux+claude plus up to `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS` (120 s) of wallclock — so a
small host cannot run many at once. `2` is the conservative default that keeps a Pi-class
host alive under a family burst while still allowing some overlap. It is deliberately **not**
the same knob as `MAX_CONCURRENT` (default 8): the two pools have different shapes (a
stream-json spawn is cheap and fast; a TUI turn is a heavy cold-boot + long wallclock), so
coupling them would mis-size one of the two paths.
- **Queue, don't reject.** The limiter **queues** (awaits a slot), mirroring the spirit of
`MAX_CONCURRENT` — requests are not dropped on contention. To bound memory against a runaway
client, the wait queue itself is capped (`maxQueue`, default 32× the limit); when the queue
is full `run()` rejects with `tui_queue_full`, surfaced as a 503 — deterministic backpressure
rather than silent OOM.
- **Slot released in a `finally`.** `TuiSemaphore.run(fn)` releases the slot in a `finally`, so
any throw — PR-A's honesty gates (`tui_wallclock_truncated`, `tui_upstream_error`), a
`tui_paste_not_landed`, or a `tui_spawn_failed` — can never leak a slot.
This limiter has **zero effect when `TUI_MODE` is off**: `callClaudeTui` is never reached, so
the semaphore is never entered. The default stream-json path is untouched.
### C-5 — operator-visible drift surface on `/health` (additive)
The `tui_entrypoint_mismatch` warning only reached journald. After the 2026-06-15 flip, a
silent `sdk-cli` drift (the documented top risk in this ADR — a lost TTY flipping the
self-classification to the metered Agent SDK pool) would drain metered credits **invisibly**.
PR-B adds a `tui` block to the `/health` JSON response so an operator can poll it:
```
tui: {
enabled: <TUI_MODE>,
entrypointMode: <OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT>, // cli | auto | off
lastEntrypoint: <last observed cc_entrypoint, e.g. "cli", or null>,
entrypointMismatches: <count of cli-expected-but-got-other turns>,
inflight: <current concurrent TUI turns>,
queued: <turns waiting for a slot>,
maxConcurrent: <OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT>
}
```
`lastEntrypoint` is recorded and `entrypointMismatches` incremented inside `callClaudeTui` in
the same mismatch branch that already emits the journald warning (via `recordTuiEntrypoint`).
`inflight` / `queued` / `maxConcurrent` come from the C-4 semaphore. When `TUI_MODE` is off the
block still appears with `enabled:false` (cheap, harmless) so the response shape is stable for
consumers regardless of mode.
### ALIGNMENT authorization for the `/health` change
`/health` is a **grandfathered B.2 endpoint** under ADR 0006, frozen at its v3.16.4 behaviour.
`ALIGNMENT.md`'s grandfather provision states: *"Any change to the contract (request shape,
response shape, semantics) of a grandfathered B.2 endpoint is treated as a new authorization
request and requires either a behaviour-preserving refactor PR or its own ADR."*
This amendment **is** that authorization. The argument:
- The change is **additive**: it adds one new top-level field (`tui`) containing only new
sub-fields. **No existing `/health` field is changed, renamed, removed, or re-typed**, and no
existing semantics change. Existing `/health` consumers (the dashboard, `ocp-connect`,
monitoring) read the fields they already read and are unaffected — the change is
**behaviour-preserving** for them, which is exactly the bar the grandfather provision sets for
a non-ADR contract change.
- The TUI observability surface is an **intrinsic part of the TUI feature** whose authorizing
authority is **this ADR (0007)**, not a brand-new B.2 endpoint. We are not adding a new B.2
endpoint or a new method (which would each require their own fresh ADR under the New Class B
endpoint procedure) — we are extending the response of an existing grandfathered endpoint with
fields that report state owned by an ADR-0007 feature. ADR 0007 is the natural home for that
authority, and this amendment records it explicitly.
- `cli.js` does not perform this operation — `/health` is OCP-owned (Class B), so no `cli.js`
citation applies; the citation is this ADR + ADR 0006 (grandfathered B.2) per
`ALIGNMENT.md`'s Class B citation requirement.
### `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` summary
| Env var | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` | `2` | Max concurrent interactive TUI turns. Independent of `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT` (the stream-json path). Excess turns queue (bounded); a full queue yields a 503. |
---
## Authentication + defunct-reaping (PR-C amendment)
**Date:** 2026-06-13
**Status:** Accepted — amends ADR 0007.
**Motivation:** the PI231 production incident — TUI-mode returned `Please run /login · API Error: 401` for days; re-login never stuck.
### How the TUI `claude` authenticates
The spawned interactive `claude` obtains its OAuth bearer in one of two ways, in this order of preference:
1. **`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` in env (PREFERRED).** If the env var is set on the OCP process, `buildTuiCmd` adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=<shq-escaped token>` to the pane command's `env` prefix. claude then authenticates via this long-lived token and **never touches the credentials-refresh path**. This is the stable mode — it is exactly how the oracle and Mac-mini hosts already run (and how `server.mjs`'s own `getOAuthCredentials()` takes the same env at highest precedence). cli.js is **not** the authority here: this is a Class B, OCP-owned TUI spawn — see the Class B citation below.
2. **`<HOME>/.claude/.credentials.json` (FALLBACK).** When the env var is unset, claude falls back to the credentials file and its short-lived access token, renewing via the single-use refresh token.
The token MUST be set explicitly in `buildTuiCmd` because **tmux does not forward the parent process's environment to the pane** (verified live 2026-06-01 — the same reason the whole env is delivered as an `env` prefix). A token sitting in the OCP process env is invisible to the pane unless `buildTuiCmd` re-emits it.
### Why the fallback path corrupts (the PI231 incident)
When the env token is absent, every per-request spawn drives claude through the credentials.json refresh path. OAuth refresh tokens are **single-use / rotating**: a refresh consumes the old refresh token and writes a new one. The per-request `kill-session` teardown can race / interrupt claude mid-rotation, and over many spawn+kill cycles the refresh token ended up an **empty string** — at which point renewal is impossible and the host returns a permanent 401. Re-login writes a fresh token, but the next spawn re-corrupts it. **Proof the env-token fix works:** on the broken PI231 host, `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=<oat01 token> claude -p ...` returned a real answer *despite* the corrupt credentials.json (control without the env token = 401).
**Operator guidance:** set `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` on any TUI-mode host. The credentials.json fallback is retained only for hosts that intentionally rely on it; it is not recommended for a long-running TUI deployment.
**Security note:** with the token in the pane command, it is visible in `ps`. This is acceptable for the **single-user A-path** (it mirrors the existing plaintext-token practice for `server.mjs`), and the **multi-user B-path is already refused at boot** (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` + `AUTH_MODE=multi` is a hard FATAL), so a guest can never reach this spawn.
### Defunct `<claude>` reaping
The connected leak: the pane's `claude` process is a child of the long-lived **tmux server** daemon, not of the OCP node process (`tmux new-session -d` returns the instant the server forks the pane). Node can therefore never `waitpid()`/reap it — a SIGKILL still needs the *parent* (the tmux server) to reap. `kill-session` destroys the session but leaves the pane's `claude` (and its grandchildren) as `<defunct>` zombies that only the server reaps; over 30 days on PI231 this accumulated to **25 defunct `<claude>`** (a live `tmux kill-server` dropped it 25→3).
The node-reachable action that *actually reaps* — rather than merely re-signalling — is to stop the tmux server: on server exit the kernel reparents survivors to init (PID 1), which reaps them. `reapStaleTuiSessions` therefore, after killing our own `ocp-tui-*` sessions, issues `kill-server` **only when no foreign session of any prefix remains** (coexistence: never disrupt a co-hosted `olp-tui-*` instance). This runs at boot (existing) and now on a 15-min periodic interval gated on TUI-mode and on the TUI path being idle (`inflight === 0 && queued === 0`) so a live turn's pane is never torn down. Residual: a request whose pane is created in the narrow window between the idle-check and `kill-server` would fail cleanly via the existing honesty gates (rare; documented in the server comment).
### ALIGNMENT authorization (Class B)
Both changes are **Class B** (OCP-owned TUI spawn). `cli.js` does not perform either operation — there is no `cli.js` analogue for "how the TUI pane authenticates" or "reaping tmux-server-owned zombies"; this surface is authorized by **this ADR (0007)** per `ALIGNMENT.md`'s Class B citation requirement. No Class A wire surface, no endpoint shape, no `alignment.yml` blacklist token, and no `models.json` entry is touched.
---
## Consequences
### Positive
+151
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
# 2026-06-15 Canary Runbook
**Purpose:** Confirm that a TUI-mode turn is billed to the **Pro/Max subscription pool** (not the Agent SDK credit pool) after Anthropic's 2026-06-15 billing split activates.
The billing classifier reading `cli` is **necessary but NOT sufficient** proof. (Note the naming: the value is stored in the JSONL transcript under the field name `entrypoint`, and sent to Anthropic on the wire as the `cc_entrypoint` header — they carry the same value after claude's startup classification. The commands below grep the transcript, so they match `entrypoint`.) A `cli` label tells you OCP sent the right classification; it does not tell you Anthropic billed the right pool. The only authoritative test is to observe whether the **Agent SDK credit balance** moves or not before and after the canary turn.
---
## Prerequisites
- `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` already set and OCP restarted (see [TUI-mode setup in README](../../README.md#enabling-tui-mode-opt-in))
- `tmux` installed on the host
- No other OCP traffic during the canary (quiesce — see below)
- Access to your Anthropic account billing page (manual step — see below)
---
## Step 1 — Quiesce the host
Stop any IDE or client that is actively sending requests through this OCP instance.
Confirm the proxy is idle:
```bash
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3456/health | python3 -m json.tool | grep activeRequests
# Expected: "activeRequests": 0
```
Wait until `activeRequests` is `0` before proceeding. If you cannot quiesce (e.g. family members are actively using it), run the canary on a separate OCP instance or during a quiet window.
---
## Step 2 — Read the Agent SDK credit balance BEFORE the canary
> **Manual step — no programmatic API available.**
>
> OCP's `/usage` endpoint reads `anthropic-ratelimit-unified-*` response headers from the Pro/Max plan quota (5-hour and 7-day subscription windows). These headers report **subscription usage**, not the Agent SDK credit pool balance. There is no known programmatic API to query the Agent SDK credit pool balance from outside the Anthropic web app.
To read the balance:
1. Open [https://claude.ai/settings/billing](https://claude.ai/settings/billing) (or your Anthropic Console billing page) in a browser.
2. Find the **Agent SDK Credits** section (sometimes labeled "API Credits" or "Agent SDK usage").
3. Note the current balance (e.g. `$18.43 remaining of $20.00`).
Write the value down — you will compare it after the canary turn.
---
## Step 3 — Send the canary turn
With TUI-mode on and the host quiesced, send exactly one small request:
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Reply with the single word: pong"}],
"max_tokens": 10
}' | python3 -m json.tool
```
Use Haiku (the cheapest model) to minimize any hypothetical impact if the canary turns red.
Wait for the response to arrive completely (TUI-mode buffers the full response before returning — you will see a delay of several seconds, then the full reply).
---
## Step 4 — Confirm the transcript shows `entrypoint:"cli"`
After the canary turn completes, inspect the most recent JSONL transcript for the billing-classifier label:
```bash
# The canary was run quiesced (Step 1), so the most recent JSONL across ALL project
# dirs IS the canary turn. We glob every projects subdir instead of recomputing
# claude's cwd-encoding rule (it maps every "/" AND "." to "-", e.g. ~/.ocp-tui/work
# => projects/-home-<user>--ocp-tui-work/; see lib/tui/transcript.mjs encodeCwd) —
# a glob is robust even if that encoding changes in a future claude build.
LATEST=$(ls -t "$HOME"/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonl 2>/dev/null | head -1)
echo "Transcript: $LATEST"
grep -o '"entrypoint":"[^"]*"' "$LATEST" | tail -1
# Expected: "entrypoint":"cli"
```
If the output shows `"entrypoint":"cli"`, the billing-classifier label is correct. If it shows `"entrypoint":"sdk-cli"`, the spawn did not get a real PTY — stop immediately and do not re-enable TUI-mode without investigation. Check `tmux new-session` manually and review ADR 0007 § spawn/PTY gate. (If the grep returns nothing, the transcript may not yet be flushed — re-run after a second, or confirm the turn completed.)
**Reminder: an `entrypoint:cli` label (the `cc_entrypoint=cli` wire header) is necessary but not sufficient.** It tells you OCP sent the right label to Anthropic. You must still check the credit balance in Step 5.
---
## Step 5 — Re-read the Agent SDK credit balance AFTER the canary
Return to [https://claude.ai/settings/billing](https://claude.ai/settings/billing) and reload the page. Note the current balance again.
---
## Step 6 — Green/Red decision
### Green (balance unchanged)
The Agent SDK credit balance did not decrease. The turn billed against the Pro/Max subscription pool as expected. TUI-mode is working correctly.
**Actions:**
- Keep `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` on this host.
- Monitor the balance periodically for the first week to catch any delayed attribution.
- Resume normal traffic.
### Red (Agent SDK credit balance decreased)
The Agent SDK credit balance decreased. The subscription pool is not being used for TUI-mode turns on this host, despite `cc_entrypoint=cli` being set. This may indicate a backend routing change on Anthropic's side, a TTY detection failure, or a policy change.
**Actions — immediate:**
1. Unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` (or set to any value other than `"true"`) in the service unit:
- systemd: edit `/etc/ocp/ocp.env` (or the unit's `Environment=` line), then `sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl restart ocp.service`
- launchd: edit the plist `EnvironmentVariables` section, then `launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy && launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) <plist-path>`
2. Restart OCP and confirm the `/health` response no longer shows TUI-mode active.
3. If you share this OCP with family or other Max users: freeze their access temporarily until you understand the billing impact.
4. Consider pivoting to OLP multi-provider (see [OLP](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp)) which can spread load across other providers to avoid the Agent SDK credit drain.
Per ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 / ADR 0007 § Kill-switch: "Per the constitution, the response is to drop the Anthropic provider rather than escalate spoofing."
---
## Ongoing monitoring — self-classification mini-canary
To detect future drift (e.g. a claude CLI upgrade that changes TTY-detection behavior), you can run a periodic one-liner that sends a tiny TUI turn with `OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT=auto` (so claude self-classifies rather than having OCP pin the value) and alerts if the transcript self-classification is not `cli`:
```bash
# Run with OCP temporarily configured OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT=auto
# Then check the most recent transcript:
# Glob the most recent transcript across all project dirs (robust to claude's
# cwd-encoding rule; run this right after the auto-mode mini-canary turn).
LATEST=$(ls -t "$HOME"/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonl 2>/dev/null | head -1)
RESULT=$(grep -o '"entrypoint":"[^"]*"' "$LATEST" | tail -1)
echo "Self-classified entrypoint: $RESULT"
if echo "$RESULT" | grep -q '"entrypoint":"cli"'; then
echo "OK — subscription pool"
else
echo "ALERT — not cli; check TTY and billing"
fi
```
Run this after any major `claude` CLI upgrade. The `auto` mode lets the CLI's own `t$A` startup function determine the value from the actual TTY state (see ADR 0007 § Billing-classifier labeling).
---
## Related
- [Flip/rollback runbook](./tui-flip-rollback.md) — how to set and unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` on systemd and launchd hosts
- [ADR 0007](../adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md) — TUI-mode architecture and governing rules
- README § [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](../../README.md#subscription-pool-tui-mode)
+180
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
# TUI-Mode Flip and Rollback Runbook
**Purpose:** Step-by-step instructions for enabling (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true`) or disabling TUI-mode on real OCP deployments managed by **systemd** (Linux) or **launchd** (macOS).
Run the [615-canary](./615-canary.md) runbook after any flip to confirm billing pool routing is correct.
---
## Critical pitfalls — read first
### systemd: `daemon-reload` is required after editing the unit
Editing the unit file (or EnvironmentFile) and then doing `systemctl restart ocp.service` **without** `daemon-reload` will restart the process with the **old** environment from the cached unit. Always run `daemon-reload` after editing any unit file.
### launchd: `launchctl kickstart -k` does NOT reload plist env
`launchctl kickstart -k gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy` kills the running process and re-launches it, but it **re-uses the launchd-cached environment** — not the current plist file. If you edited the plist's `EnvironmentVariables` section, you must do a full `bootout` + `bootstrap` cycle for the change to take effect. `kickstart` is not sufficient.
---
## Flip — enable TUI-mode
### systemd (Linux, e.g. Raspberry Pi, VPS)
**Option A — EnvironmentFile (recommended for clean separation)**
If your unit uses `EnvironmentFile=/etc/ocp/ocp.env` (or similar):
```bash
# 1. Edit the environment file
sudo nano /etc/ocp/ocp.env
# Add or update:
# CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true
#
# If OCP binds to 0.0.0.0 AND you trust the network:
# OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1
# (WARNING: TUI-mode is single-user only — only enable OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1
# if you fully trust every caller that can reach the OCP port on your network)
# 2. Reload the unit definition and restart
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl restart ocp.service
# 3. Verify
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3456/health | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E "tui|version"
# Expected: "tuiMode": true (or similar TUI indicator in the health response)
```
**Option B — inline Environment= in the unit file**
```bash
# 1. Edit the unit file
sudo systemctl edit --full ocp.service
# Add or update in the [Service] section:
# Environment=CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true
# 2. Reload and restart
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl restart ocp.service
# 3. Verify
systemctl show ocp.service --property=Environment
# Expected: Environment=CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true ...
```
### launchd (macOS)
Locate the OCP plist. The standard label is `dev.ocp.proxy`:
```bash
# Find the plist path
ls ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ocp.proxy.plist
```
**Edit the plist:**
```bash
# 1. Stop the service first (bootout)
launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy
# 2. Edit the plist — add CLAUDE_TUI_MODE to EnvironmentVariables
# Use your editor of choice:
nano ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ocp.proxy.plist
```
Inside the plist, in the `<key>EnvironmentVariables</key>` `<dict>` block, add:
```xml
<key>CLAUDE_TUI_MODE</key>
<string>true</string>
```
If `OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1` is also needed (only if OCP binds to `0.0.0.0` and you trust the network):
```xml
<key>OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN</key>
<string>1</string>
```
```bash
# 3. Bootstrap (reload from disk + start)
launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ocp.proxy.plist
# 4. Verify
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3456/health | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E "tui|version"
```
**Confirm env was actually loaded** (not just set in your shell):
```bash
ps aux | grep server.mjs | grep -v grep
# Get the PID, then:
# macOS: ps -E -p <PID> | tr ' ' '\n' | grep CLAUDE_TUI_MODE
# Expected: CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true
```
---
## Rollback — disable TUI-mode
Rollback is the same procedure as flip, but you **remove** `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` or set it to any value other than `"true"` (e.g. `false`, or simply omit it).
After rollback, OCP returns to the default `callClaude` / `callClaudeStreaming` stream-json path — byte-for-byte identical to the pre-TUI code path. No other change is required.
### systemd rollback
```bash
# Option A — EnvironmentFile
sudo nano /etc/ocp/ocp.env
# Remove or comment out:
# CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true
# OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1 (if set)
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl restart ocp.service
# Verify
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3456/health | python3 -m json.tool | grep tui
# Expected: "tuiMode": false (or the field absent)
```
### launchd rollback
```bash
# 1. Stop
launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/dev.ocp.proxy
# 2. Edit plist — remove the CLAUDE_TUI_MODE and OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN entries from EnvironmentVariables
# 3. Bootstrap
launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/dev.ocp.proxy.plist
# 4. Verify
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3456/health | python3 -m json.tool | grep tui
```
---
## Billing impact of staying on the default (non-TUI) path after 2026-06-15
If you do NOT flip to TUI-mode and keep `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` unset (the default), OCP continues using `claude -p --output-format stream-json`, which sets `cc_entrypoint=sdk-cli`. After 2026-06-15, every OCP request on the default path will draw from the Agent SDK credit pool (approximately $20/month on a Pro plan, or $100/month on a Max plan) rather than the Pro/Max subscription. The subscription pool usage (5-hour and 7-day windows) will be unaffected, but the Agent SDK credit balance will drain with each request.
If you want to continue using OCP without TUI-mode after 2026-06-15, budget for the Agent SDK credit cost accordingly — or switch to [OLP](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp) for multi-provider fallback.
---
## Verify after any flip
1. Check `/health` shows the expected `tuiMode` state.
2. Run the [615-canary](./615-canary.md) to confirm billing pool routing.
3. If TUI-mode is ON: check `ocp logs 10` for any TUI spawn errors (`tui_spawn_failed`, tmux errors).
---
## Related
- [615-canary runbook](./615-canary.md) — how to verify billing pool routing after a flip
- [ADR 0007](../adr/0007-tui-interactive-mode.md) — TUI-mode architecture; Kill-switch section
- README § [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](../../README.md#subscription-pool-tui-mode)
- README § [Environment Variables](../../README.md#environment-variables) — `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE`, `OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1`
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
{"type":"user","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/tmp/tui-test","sessionId":"bbbb2222-3333-4444-5555-666677778888","version":"2.1.104","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"What is 2 + 2?"}]}}
{"type":"assistant","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/tmp/tui-test","sessionId":"bbbb2222-3333-4444-5555-666677778888","version":"2.1.104","message":{"role":"assistant","model":"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001","stop_reason":"end_turn","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials"}]}}
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
{"type":"user","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/tmp/tui-test","sessionId":"aaaa1111-2222-3333-4444-555566667777","version":"2.1.104","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"What is 2 + 2?"}]}}
{"type":"assistant","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/tmp/tui-test","sessionId":"aaaa1111-2222-3333-4444-555566667777","version":"2.1.104","message":{"role":"assistant","model":"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001","stop_reason":"end_turn","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Please run /login · API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials"}]}}
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
{"type":"user","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/tmp/tui-test","sessionId":"bbbb1111-2222-3333-4444-555566667777","version":"2.1.104","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Say PONG and nothing else."}]}}
{"type":"assistant","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/tmp/tui-test","sessionId":"bbbb1111-2222-3333-4444-555566667777","version":"2.1.104","message":{"role":"assistant","model":"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001","stop_reason":"end_turn","content":[{"type":"text","text":"PONG"}]}}
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// TUI-path concurrency limiter (audit finding C-4).
//
// WHY THIS EXISTS, SEPARATE FROM server.mjs's MAX_CONCURRENT:
// The global MAX_CONCURRENT gate lives in spawnClaudeProcess() (the -p / stream-json
// path). callClaudeTui() NEVER calls spawnClaudeProcess — it calls runTuiTurn(), which
// boots a full interactive `claude` inside a fresh tmux session. So nothing bounded the
// TUI path: N concurrent TUI requests spawned N simultaneous cold-boot tmux+claude
// processes. On a small host (a Pi 4 serving a family) a burst of ~5 is an OOM risk, and
// it also multiplies subscription rate-limit pressure. This is an INDEPENDENT limiter for
// the TUI path that mirrors MAX_CONCURRENT's intent without coupling to it (the two pools
// are different shapes: a stream-json spawn is cheap and fast; a TUI turn is a heavy
// cold-boot + up to 120s wallclock).
//
// QUEUE vs REJECT: we QUEUE (await a slot), mirroring the spirit of MAX_CONCURRENT's
// intent not to drop requests, rather than rejecting immediately. To avoid unbounded
// memory growth from a runaway client, the wait queue itself is bounded by maxQueue
// (default: a generous multiple of the concurrency limit). When the queue is full, run()
// rejects with a tui_queue_full error (the caller surfaces it as a 503) — a deterministic
// backpressure signal rather than silent OOM.
//
// Pure + importable so test-features.mjs can assert the bound directly (no server boot).
export class TuiSemaphore {
// limit: max concurrent slots. maxQueue: max waiters before run() rejects with backpressure.
constructor(limit, { maxQueue } = {}) {
this.limit = Math.max(1, parseInt(limit, 10) || 1);
// Default queue cap: 32× the limit. Large enough that real family-burst traffic never
// hits it, small enough that a pathological flood can't grow the queue without bound.
this.maxQueue = Number.isFinite(maxQueue) ? maxQueue : this.limit * 32;
this._inflight = 0;
this._waiters = []; // FIFO queue of resolve callbacks waiting for a slot
}
get inflight() { return this._inflight; }
get queued() { return this._waiters.length; }
// Acquire a slot. Resolves once a slot is free (immediately if under the limit, otherwise
// when an in-flight task releases). Rejects synchronously-ish if the wait queue is full.
acquire() {
if (this._inflight < this.limit) {
this._inflight++;
return Promise.resolve();
}
if (this._waiters.length >= this.maxQueue) {
return Promise.reject(new Error(
`tui_queue_full: TUI concurrency limit (${this.limit}) reached and wait queue ` +
`(${this.maxQueue}) is full`));
}
return new Promise((resolve) => { this._waiters.push(resolve); });
}
// Release a slot. If a waiter is queued, hand the slot directly to it (inflight stays
// constant across the handoff); otherwise decrement.
release() {
const next = this._waiters.shift();
if (next) {
next(); // the woken waiter already "owns" the slot — inflight unchanged
} else if (this._inflight > 0) {
this._inflight--;
}
}
// Run fn() under one slot. Releases in a finally so a throw (PR-A's honesty gates,
// wallclock truncation, paste-not-landed, tmux spawn failure) NEVER leaks a slot.
async run(fn) {
await this.acquire();
try {
return await fn();
} finally {
this.release();
}
}
}
// ── TUI drift observability (audit C-5) — pure helpers, importable for testing ──
// Record an observed cc_entrypoint into the (mutable) tuiStats counter. Sets lastEntrypoint
// unconditionally and increments entrypointMismatches when the spawn was supposed to be
// subscription-pool ("cli") but the transcript reported something else (a silent drift to
// the metered Agent SDK pool — the audit's top risk after the 6/15 billing flip).
// Returns true iff this observation was a mismatch (so the caller can also emit a log).
export function recordTuiEntrypoint(tuiStats, observed, expectedMode = "cli") {
tuiStats.lastEntrypoint = observed ?? null;
const mismatch = expectedMode === "cli" && observed !== "cli";
if (mismatch) tuiStats.entrypointMismatches++;
return mismatch;
}
// Build the additive /health `tui` block (ADR 0007 PR-B amendment). Pure: given the
// config + live counters, returns the exact object embedded in /health. New fields only —
// behaviour-preserving for existing /health consumers (grandfathered B.2 under ADR 0006).
export function buildTuiHealthBlock({ enabled, entrypointMode, maxConcurrent }, tuiStats, semaphore) {
return {
enabled,
entrypointMode, // cli | auto | off
lastEntrypoint: tuiStats.lastEntrypoint, // last observed cc_entrypoint, or null
entrypointMismatches: tuiStats.entrypointMismatches,
inflight: semaphore.inflight, // current concurrent TUI turns
queued: semaphore.queued, // turns waiting for a slot
maxConcurrent,
};
}
+91 -4
View File
@@ -23,16 +23,44 @@ const defaultTmux = (args, opts = {}) =>
// Kill ONLY our own stale sessions. Scoped to SESSION_PREFIX so a co-hosted
// OLP test instance's `olp-tui-*` sessions are never touched.
//
// Defunct-reaping (PI231 incident): the pane's `claude` process is a child of the
// long-lived tmux SERVER daemon, NOT of the OCP node process — `tmux new-session -d`
// returns the instant the server forks the pane, so node never becomes its parent and
// therefore can NEVER waitpid()/reap it (a SIGKILL still needs the *parent* to reap, and
// here that parent is the tmux server). `kill-session` destroys the session but the server
// can leave the pane's `claude` (and any grandchildren claude spawned) as `<defunct>`
// zombies that only the server can reap. Over many per-request spawn+teardown cycles these
// accumulate (live evidence on PI231: 25 defunct `<claude>` over 30 days; `tmux kill-server`
// dropped it 25→3). The only node-reachable action that ACTUALLY reaps them — rather than
// merely re-signalling — is to stop the tmux server: when the server exits, the kernel
// reparents its surviving children to init (PID 1), which reaps them immediately.
//
// So after killing our own sessions, if the server has NO sessions left of ANY prefix
// (i.e. nothing we could disrupt — no co-hosted `olp-tui-*` or other instance), we
// `kill-server` to flush the defunct backlog. If ANY non-ocp session remains we leave the
// server running (coexistence rule, ADR 0007) and let the next boot/periodic sweep retry
// once the server is otherwise idle.
export function reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux = defaultTmux } = {}) {
const r = tmux(["list-sessions", "-F", "#{session_name}"]);
if (!r || r.status !== 0) return 0; // no tmux server / no sessions
const names = String(r.stdout || "").split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
let killed = 0;
for (const name of String(r.stdout || "").split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)) {
let othersRemain = false;
for (const name of names) {
if (name.startsWith(SESSION_PREFIX)) {
tmux(["kill-session", "-t", name]);
killed++;
} else {
othersRemain = true; // a session we do NOT own (e.g. olp-tui-*) — never kill-server
}
}
// Reap defunct `claude` zombies: safe ONLY when the server is now ours-only/empty.
// kill-server is what actually reaps (server exit reparents survivors to init); a
// per-session kill cannot, since node is not the zombies' parent.
if (!othersRemain) {
tmux(["kill-server"]);
}
return killed;
}
@@ -68,7 +96,16 @@ function tuiPromptLanded(pane, prompt) {
if (flatPane.includes("[Pasted text")) return true;
const firstLine = String(prompt).split("\n").map(s => s.trim()).find(Boolean) || "";
const needle = firstLine.replace(/\s+/g, " ").slice(0, 24);
return needle.length >= 3 && flatPane.includes(needle);
// C-4/#133: threshold lowered 3 → 2. A prompt whose first non-blank line is 12
// chars ("hi", "ok") previously NEVER matched (needle.length >= 3) and never
// surfaced "[Pasted text", so EVERY short prompt 5s-failed with tui_paste_not_landed
// (live-reproduced: "hi"). The input box starts EMPTY (the curly-quote placeholder
// is excluded by the affirmative-signal design above), so a >=2-char needle present
// in the pane is the pasted prompt, not placeholder noise — false-positive risk is
// low. We keep >=2 rather than >=1 because a single visible char is more likely to
// collide with incidental glyphs in claude's chrome (borders, the "" prompt mark);
// 2 chars is the floor that lands real prompts while staying conservative.
return needle.length >= 2 && flatPane.includes(needle);
}
async function pollUntil(fn, { timeoutMs, intervalMs }) {
@@ -208,17 +245,67 @@ export function buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId, ehome, entrypointMode)
"CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS=1",
"CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY=1",
];
// CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: tmux does NOT forward the parent process's env to the pane (the
// same reason the whole env is delivered as an `env` prefix above — verified live 2026-06-01),
// so the token MUST be set explicitly here or the spawned `claude` never sees it. Without it,
// the TUI claude falls back to authenticating via <HOME>/.claude/.credentials.json, whose
// single-use refresh token gets corrupted by the per-request spawn + `kill-session` teardown
// racing claude's token-rotation write (the PI231 incident: refresh token ended up an empty
// string → permanent 401 "Please run /login", re-login re-corrupted on the next spawn). With
// the long-lived OAuth token in env, claude authenticates via the token and never touches the
// credentials.json refresh path — matching how the stable oracle / Mac-mini hosts already run.
//
// SECURITY: the token appears in the pane command (ps-visible). This is acceptable for the
// single-user A-path — it mirrors the existing plaintext-token practice (server.mjs reads the
// same CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env at getOAuthCredentials()), and the multi-user B-path is
// already refused at boot (TUI + AUTH_MODE=multi is a hard FATAL). Read from process.env here,
// consistent with how buildTuiCmd already reads OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS / CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS below.
//
// When the env is unset (e.g. a host that intentionally relies on credentials.json), no token
// is added — behaviour is byte-for-byte unchanged from before this fix.
if (process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) {
sets.push(`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=${shq(process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN)}`);
}
const unset = ["CLAUDECODE", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN"];
if (entrypointMode === "cli") sets.push("CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT=cli");
else if (entrypointMode === "auto") unset.push("CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT"); // let claude self-classify via TTY
const envPrefix = ["env", ...unset.map((u) => `-u ${u}`), ...sets].join(" ");
// Tool surface.
// DEFAULT (safe): hard-disable MCP (--strict-mcp-config + --disallowedTools mcp__*);
// built-in tools stay on, acceptable for single-user A-path.
// OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS=1: grant the SAME tool surface as the -p A-path
// (--allowedTools [+ --mcp-config] [+ --dangerously-skip-permissions]), so a
// SINGLE-USER / trusted TUI deployment can run a tool-using agent (e.g. an OpenClaw
// assistant that needs Bash/Read/Write/MCP) on the subscription pool. This mirrors
// buildCliArgs() in server.mjs. Safe to gate ON only because TUI is hard-incompatible
// with AUTH_MODE=multi (server.mjs refuses to boot), so it can never widen a guest's
// surface. Env mirrors server.mjs's CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS / _SKIP_PERMISSIONS / _MCP_CONFIG.
let toolArgs;
if (process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS === "1") {
toolArgs = [];
if (process.env.CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS === "true") {
toolArgs.push("--dangerously-skip-permissions");
} else {
const allowed = (process.env.CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS ||
"Bash,Read,Write,Edit,Glob,Grep,WebSearch,WebFetch,Agent")
.split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
// shq EACH token: buildTuiCmd returns a SHELL STRING (run by tmux via sh -c), unlike
// buildCliArgs which returns an argv array to spawn(). claude accepts scoped specifiers
// like "Bash(npm run test:*)" / "Read(~/**)" whose ( ) * ~ would break/inject the shell
// command if pasted bare. (operator-self-injection only — guests can't reach TUI.)
if (allowed.length) toolArgs.push("--allowedTools", ...allowed.map(shq));
}
if (process.env.CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG) toolArgs.push("--mcp-config", shq(process.env.CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG));
} else {
toolArgs = ["--strict-mcp-config", "--disallowedTools", shq("mcp__*")];
}
return [
envPrefix,
shq(claudeBin),
"--model", shq(model),
"--session-id", sessionId,
"--strict-mcp-config",
"--disallowedTools", shq("mcp__*"),
...toolArgs,
].join(" ");
}
+161 -12
View File
@@ -100,24 +100,169 @@ export function extractLatestAssistantText(events) {
return text;
}
// Returns the entrypoint string from the turn_duration line (e.g. "cli"),
// Returns the entrypoint string (e.g. "cli") used for the billing-pool assertion,
// or null if absent. Lets callers assert the subscription-classified path.
// Fixture-confirmed: entrypoint field lives directly on the turn_duration line.
//
// Resolution order (C-3, issue #133):
// 1. PREFER the turn_duration system line's `entrypoint` — the authoritative
// end-of-turn classifier emitted by builds that produce turn_duration
// (e.g. claude-2.1.104/2.1.157 on PI231).
// 2. FALL BACK to the `entrypoint` field on ANY ordinary transcript line
// (assistant / user / attachment / system) — present on BOTH emitting and
// non-emitting builds. Some claude builds (e.g. certain Mac mini transcripts)
// do NOT emit a turn_duration line at all; reading ONLY turn_duration made the
// caller's tui_entrypoint_mismatch assertion (server.mjs) get got:null every
// turn and go blind. The entrypoint value is identical across line types within
// a single interactive session (fixture-confirmed: every line in
// complete-haiku.jsonl carrying `entrypoint` reads "cli"), so the fallback
// yields the same classifier. Last-writer-wins on the fallback.
export function verifyEntrypoint(events) {
let fallback = null;
for (const ev of events) {
if (ev && ev.type === "system" && ev.subtype === "turn_duration") {
return ev.entrypoint != null ? ev.entrypoint : null;
if (!ev || typeof ev !== "object") continue;
if (ev.type === "system" && ev.subtype === "turn_duration" && ev.entrypoint != null) {
return ev.entrypoint; // authoritative — short-circuit
}
if (ev.entrypoint != null) fallback = ev.entrypoint;
}
return fallback;
}
// ── C-1: honest AUTH-FAILURE banner detection (issue #133) ───────────────
// When the interactive `claude` CLI hits an in-session error it does NOT crash —
// it renders the error as ordinary assistant text in the transcript. The specific
// failure C-1 exists to catch is R-1: EXPIRED / INVALID credentials, where every
// turn comes back as the same one-line auth-failure banner and OCP, none the wiser,
// caches that banner (server.mjs setCachedResponse), shares it via singleflight, and
// records a model SUCCESS — so a hard auth error is silently served (and cached for
// the 5-min TTL) as a real answer. The two live-reproduced banners on PI231
// (2026-06-10) are:
// "Please run /login · API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials" (69 chars)
// "Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials" (73 chars)
//
// WHY THE SCOPE IS NARROW (conservatism — the load-bearing design choice).
// An earlier generalised rule (^<short-prefix>?API Error:\s*\d{3}\b.*$) was TOO
// BROAD: its unbounded `.*` tail let any short prefix + "API Error: NNN" + an
// arbitrarily long sentence match, so it KILLED legitimate long answers that merely
// DISCUSS an API error (e.g. "API Error: 500 happened because the server was
// overloaded. To fix this, retry with exponential backoff …"). That is the worst
// outcome: a false-positive costs the user a missing answer AND a double-burn retry,
// whereas the rare false-negative (caching one transient error for the 5-min TTL) is
// cheap and self-healing. So C-1 is reframed from "detect ANY API error" to "detect
// a claude-CLI AUTHENTICATION-FAILURE banner", and when unsure it PASSES (does not
// kill). Transient 5xx server errors are deliberately NOT detected — they are not the
// R-1 case and the conservative choice is to let them through.
//
// THE SIGNAL — a turn is an auth-failure banner only if ALL of these hold over the
// WHOLE trimmed assistant text (a conjunction; any one failing => PASS):
// 1. SHORT whole-message. Real banners are one short line (the two live samples are
// 69 and 73 chars). Cap = TUI_ERR_MAX_LEN (100) — headroom over 73 for a
// slightly longer future banner, while still rejecting multi-sentence prose. A
// long answer that happens to discuss auth (no code chars, e.g. 226 chars) is
// rejected on length alone.
// 2. Contains "API Error: 4\d{2}" — auth failures are 4xx (401/403). This rejects
// transient 5xx ("API Error: 500/503 …") and bare "HTTP 401 means unauthorized."
// (no "API Error:" core).
// 3. Contains an auth KEYWORD — authenticat | /login | credential (case-insensitive).
// This rejects answers that quote a 4xx but are not auth banners, e.g.
// "To debug a 401: the server returns API Error: 401 Unauthorized …"
// ("Unauthorized" is authoriz-, not authenticat-; no /login, no credential).
// 4. Contains NO backtick or quote char (` ' "). A real CLI banner is plain text;
// backticked/quoted text signals an answer that is QUOTING the error rather than
// being the banner, e.g. "You'll see `API Error: 401` … run /login to fix it."
// (75 chars — passes 1-3 but is excluded here). This is the conservative tie-
// breaker for short instructional answers.
//
// Worked matrix (all required cases pass — see test-features.mjs C-1 block):
// KILL: "Please run /login · API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials"
// KILL: "Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials"
// PASS: "API Error: 500 happened because the server was overloaded. …" (not 4xx)
// PASS: "Failed to parse the config. Here are the API Error: 401 details …" (too long + no auth-kw)
// PASS: "To debug a 401: … API Error: 401 Unauthorized, then you refresh …" (no auth-kw)
// PASS: "Here is the handler … It logs the string API Error: 503 …" (not 4xx)
// PASS: "You'll see `API Error: 401` … run /login to fix it." (has backtick)
// PASS: "HTTP 401 means unauthorized." (no API Error core)
// PASS: "The capital of France is Paris." (nothing matches)
//
// OPERATOR OVERRIDE (unchanged): CLAUDE_TUI_ERROR_PATTERNS lets an operator REPLACE
// the default auth-banner detector with their own newline- or `||`-separated JS regex
// source strings (each auto-anchored ^…$ over the trimmed text, case-insensitive). A
// non-empty override uses ONLY those regexes (the narrowed default is bypassed); an
// empty / whitespace-only override DISABLES detection entirely (escape hatch).
// Whole-message length cap for the default auth-banner detector. Real banners are
// 69/73 chars; 100 gives headroom while still rejecting multi-sentence prose.
const TUI_ERR_MAX_LEN = 100;
// 4xx "API Error:" core — auth failures are 4xx (401/403), never 5xx.
const TUI_ERR_4XX = /API Error:\s*4\d{2}\b/i;
// Auth keyword — the message must be about authentication, not just quote a 4xx.
const TUI_ERR_AUTH_KW = /authenticat|\/login|credential/i;
// Code/quote chars — their presence signals prose QUOTING an error, not the banner.
const TUI_ERR_CODE_CHAR = /[`'"]/;
// Default detector: returns true iff `trimmed` IS a claude-CLI auth-failure banner
// (all four signals above). Conservative — any signal failing => false (PASS).
function isDefaultAuthFailureBanner(trimmed) {
if (trimmed.length > TUI_ERR_MAX_LEN) return false; // 1. short whole-message
if (!TUI_ERR_4XX.test(trimmed)) return false; // 2. 4xx API Error core
if (!TUI_ERR_AUTH_KW.test(trimmed)) return false; // 3. auth keyword
if (TUI_ERR_CODE_CHAR.test(trimmed)) return false; // 4. no code/quote chars
return true;
}
// Compile an OPERATOR-SUPPLIED pattern set (override path only). Each source is
// anchored ^…$ over the trimmed text and matched case-insensitively (`s` so `.` spans
// a multi-line banner). A pattern that fails to compile is skipped (never throws into
// the request path).
function compileTuiErrorPatterns(raw) {
const sources = String(raw).split(/\r?\n|\|\|/).map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
const out = [];
for (const src of sources) {
try { out.push(new RegExp(`^(?:${src})$`, "is")); } catch { /* skip bad pattern */ }
}
return out;
}
// Returns the matched banner text (the trimmed assistant text) if `text` IS a claude-
// CLI auth-failure banner in its entirety, else null. `patternsRaw` defaults to
// process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_ERROR_PATTERNS:
// - undefined → narrowed default auth-banner detector (isDefaultAuthFailureBanner).
// - non-empty → operator regex override REPLACES the default.
// - empty/ws → detection disabled (escape hatch).
export function detectTuiUpstreamError(text, patternsRaw = process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_ERROR_PATTERNS) {
if (typeof text !== "string") return null;
const trimmed = text.trim();
if (!trimmed) return null;
if (patternsRaw == null) {
return isDefaultAuthFailureBanner(trimmed) ? trimmed : null;
}
// Operator override path: empty/whitespace disables; otherwise use only their regexes.
const patterns = compileTuiErrorPatterns(patternsRaw);
if (patterns.length === 0) return null;
for (const re of patterns) {
if (re.test(trimmed)) return trimmed;
}
return null;
}
// Block until the session transcript is terminal (turn_duration) or
// the wall-clock cap elapses, polling the file (no fs.watch — robust over NFS /
// editors). Returns { text, entrypoint } where text is the latest assistant text
// and entrypoint is the billing-pool classifier from the turn_duration line (e.g.
// "cli"), or null if not yet present. On cap with text, returns the partial result;
// on cap with no text at all, throws.
// Block until the session transcript is terminal (turn_duration / final
// stop_reason) or the wall-clock cap elapses, polling the file (no fs.watch —
// robust over NFS / editors). Returns { text, entrypoint, truncated }:
// - text: latest assistant text.
// - entrypoint: billing-pool classifier (see verifyEntrypoint), or null.
// - truncated: FALSE when a terminal marker was reached (the turn completed);
// TRUE when the wall-clock cap was hit with partial text but NO
// terminal marker (the turn is INCOMPLETE — what we have is a
// cut-off prefix). (C-2, issue #133.)
//
// Why `truncated` matters: previously the terminal-marker path and the
// cap-with-partial-text path BOTH returned `{text, entrypoint}` identically, so
// callClaudeTui could not tell a complete answer from a truncated one and cached +
// returned the partial as finish_reason:stop (silent success). The caller now
// throws on `truncated` so a cut-off turn is neither cached nor counted as success.
// The field is additive — existing call sites that ignore it keep working.
//
// On cap with NO text at all, still throws (unchanged) — there is nothing to return.
//
// No quiescence heuristic by design: a long Opus thinking turn stalls transcript
// growth and a "file stable for N s" rule would false-abort it (spec §4.3).
@@ -135,10 +280,14 @@ export async function readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, home, sessionId, wa
lastText = extractLatestAssistantText(events) || lastText;
const ep = verifyEntrypoint(events);
if (ep != null) lastEntrypoint = ep;
if (events.some(isTerminalLine)) return { text: lastText, entrypoint: lastEntrypoint };
// Terminal marker reached → the turn is COMPLETE.
if (events.some(isTerminalLine)) return { text: lastText, entrypoint: lastEntrypoint, truncated: false };
}
await sleep(pollMs);
}
if (lastText) return { text: lastText, entrypoint: lastEntrypoint };
// Cap elapsed with no terminal marker. If we have partial text, flag it truncated
// so the caller rejects it (don't cache / don't count as success). No text at all
// → throw (nothing to return).
if (lastText) return { text: lastText, entrypoint: lastEntrypoint, truncated: true };
throw new Error("tui_transcript_timeout: no assistant text within wallclock cap");
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "open-claude-proxy",
"version": "3.19.0",
"version": "3.20.0",
"description": "OCP (Open Claude Proxy) — use your Claude Pro/Max subscription as an OpenAI-compatible API for any IDE. Works with Cline, OpenCode, Aider, Continue.dev, OpenClaw, and more.",
"type": "module",
"bin": {
+91 -6
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
* CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT — system prompt appended to all requests
* CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG — path to MCP server config JSON file
* CLAUDE_SESSION_TTL — session TTL in ms (default: 3600000 = 1h)
* CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT — max concurrent claude processes (default: 8)
* CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT — max concurrent claude processes, -p/stream-json path (default: 8)
* OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT — max concurrent interactive TUI turns, TUI-mode path (default: 2)
* CLAUDE_BREAKER_THRESHOLD — failures in window before circuit opens (default: 6)
* CLAUDE_BREAKER_COOLDOWN — base ms to wait before retrying after circuit opens (default: 120000)
* CLAUDE_BREAKER_WINDOW — sliding window duration in ms (default: 300000 = 5min)
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ import { validateKey, recordUsage, getUsageByKey, getUsageTimeline, getRecentUsa
import { DEFAULT_PORT } from "./lib/constants.mjs";
import { isLoopbackBind } from "./lib/net.mjs";
import { runTuiTurn, reapStaleTuiSessions } from "./lib/tui/session.mjs";
import { detectTuiUpstreamError } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
import { TuiSemaphore, recordTuiEntrypoint, buildTuiHealthBlock } from "./lib/tui/semaphore.mjs";
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const _pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"));
@@ -299,6 +302,22 @@ const TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS = parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS || "120000
const TUI_CWD = process.env.OCP_TUI_CWD || `${process.env.HOME}/.ocp-tui/work`;
const TUI_HOME = process.env.OCP_TUI_HOME || process.env.HOME;
const TUI_ENTRYPOINT = process.env.OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT || "cli"; // cli|auto|off — see ADR 0007
// Independent concurrency bound for the TUI path (audit C-4). Default 2: a TUI turn is
// HEAVY (per-request cold-boot of a tmux+claude session + up to TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS=120s of
// wallclock), so a small host (e.g. a Pi 4 serving a family) cannot run many at once
// without OOM + multiplied subscription rate-limit pressure. This is NOT the global
// MAX_CONCURRENT gate (that lives in spawnClaudeProcess, the -p/stream-json path, which
// callClaudeTui never reaches). See ADR 0007 PR-B amendment + lib/tui/semaphore.mjs.
const TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT || "2", 10);
const tuiSemaphore = new TuiSemaphore(TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT);
// Operator-visible TUI drift surface (audit C-5). lastEntrypoint + entrypointMismatches
// let the operator poll /health to catch a silent metered-pool drift (the audit's top
// risk: after the 6/15 flip a TTY-loss could flip cc_entrypoint cli→sdk-cli and drain
// metered credits invisibly — the warning currently only reaches journald).
const tuiStats = {
lastEntrypoint: null, // last observed cc_entrypoint from the transcript ("cli" | "sdk-cli" | null)
entrypointMismatches: 0, // count of cli-expected-but-got-other turns
};
// SECURITY fail-loud: TUI-mode is incompatible with any configuration that allows
// non-operator prompts to reach the interactive claude session. Three cases:
@@ -476,6 +495,28 @@ const cacheCleanupInterval = setInterval(() => {
}
}, 600000);
// TUI defunct-session reap (periodic): the boot reap (below) only fires once, but a
// long-lived host (PI231 ran 30 days without restart) accumulates defunct `<claude>`
// zombies between restarts — the pane's claude is a child of the tmux server, not node,
// so only the server can reap it (see reapStaleTuiSessions). We sweep every 15 min, but
// ONLY when the TUI path is fully idle: reapStaleTuiSessions may `kill-server`, which would
// tear down a live turn's pane, so we skip the sweep while any turn is inflight or queued.
// RESIDUAL (documented, accepted): a brand-new request whose pane is created in the narrow
// window between this idle-check and kill-server would have its pane torn down and fail the
// turn cleanly via runTuiTurn's existing honesty gates (rare; the boot reap is the primary
// mechanism and the 15-min cadence makes the window negligible).
// Gated on TUI_MODE — zero effect (no kill-server, no list-sessions) when TUI is off.
// cli.js does NOT perform this operation (Class B, OCP-owned TUI spawn) — see ADR 0007.
const TUI_REAP_INTERVAL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
const tuiReapInterval = TUI_MODE ? setInterval(() => {
if (tuiSemaphore.inflight > 0 || tuiSemaphore.queued > 0) return; // a turn is live — defer
try {
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions();
if (n) logEvent("info", "tui_reaped_stale_sessions", { count: n, trigger: "periodic" });
} catch (e) { logEvent("error", "tui_periodic_reap_failed", { error: e.message }); }
}, TUI_REAP_INTERVAL_MS) : null;
if (tuiReapInterval && typeof tuiReapInterval.unref === "function") tuiReapInterval.unref();
// ── Active child process tracking ────────────────────────────────────────
const activeProcesses = new Set();
@@ -917,7 +958,11 @@ function callClaudeTui(model, messages, _conversationId, _keyName) {
const cliModel = MODEL_MAP[model] || model;
const prompt = messagesToPrompt(messages); // includes system as [System] inline
recordModelRequest(cliModel, prompt.length);
return runTuiTurn({
// C-4: gate the heavy interactive boot behind the TUI semaphore. run() acquires a slot
// (queuing if all are busy, up to maxQueue), then releases in a finally so any throw from
// runTuiTurn (tmux spawn failure, paste-not-landed) OR from the honesty gates below
// (truncation / error banner) can NEVER leak a slot. tuiSemaphore.inflight feeds /health.
return tuiSemaphore.run(() => runTuiTurn({
prompt,
model: cliModel,
claudeBin: CLAUDE,
@@ -926,19 +971,47 @@ function callClaudeTui(model, messages, _conversationId, _keyName) {
cwd: TUI_CWD,
wallclockMs: TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS,
entrypointMode: TUI_ENTRYPOINT,
}).then(({ text, entrypoint }) => {
}).then(({ text, entrypoint, truncated }) => {
// ── Honesty gates (issue #133) ─ run BEFORE recordModelSuccess / cache write-back.
// A throw here propagates to the .catch below (recordModelError + reject), so the
// result never reaches the downstream setCachedResponse / singleflight / SUCCESS path.
// C-2: the wall-clock cap hit with partial text and NO terminal marker — the turn
// is INCOMPLETE. Returning the cut-off prefix would cache it and report it as
// finish_reason:stop (a truncated answer served as a complete one). Reject instead.
if (truncated) {
logEvent("error", "tui_wallclock_truncated", { model: cliModel, chars: (text || "").length, wallclockMs: TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS });
throw new Error("tui_wallclock_truncated: turn hit the wall-clock cap before completing; partial text dropped");
}
// C-1: the interactive claude CLI renders in-session errors (expired/invalid
// credentials, transient API failure) as ordinary assistant text. Returning that
// banner would cache an error AS an answer and record a model SUCCESS. Detect a
// known error banner (anchored whole-text match — see detectTuiUpstreamError) and
// reject so it does NOT enter the cache and the client gets a 5xx.
const banner = detectTuiUpstreamError(text);
if (banner) {
logEvent("error", "tui_upstream_error", { model: cliModel, banner: banner.slice(0, 200) });
throw new Error("tui_upstream_error: claude CLI returned an in-session error banner instead of an answer");
}
recordModelSuccess(cliModel, 0); // elapsed not measurable here; wallclock at reader level
// Assert the subscription-pool classification. TUI exists to keep cc_entrypoint=cli
// (subscription pool); a silent degrade to sdk-cli (metered Agent SDK pool) would still
// return text but cost money — warn loudly so it's visible. (issue #115)
if (TUI_ENTRYPOINT === "cli" && entrypoint !== "cli") {
// C-5: also surface the observation on /health. recordTuiEntrypoint sets lastEntrypoint
// unconditionally (operators can poll it to confirm cli) and increments
// entrypointMismatches when expected=cli but observed≠cli — the same condition the
// journald warning already covers — so a silent metered-pool drift is visible on /health
// without tailing logs.
if (recordTuiEntrypoint(tuiStats, entrypoint, TUI_ENTRYPOINT)) {
logEvent("warn", "tui_entrypoint_mismatch", { expected: "cli", got: entrypoint, model: cliModel });
}
return text;
}).catch((err) => {
recordModelError(cliModel, false);
throw err;
});
}));
}
// ── SSE heartbeat (opt-in idle watchdog) ────────────────────────────────
@@ -1990,6 +2063,17 @@ const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
circuitBreaker: "disabled",
sessions: sessionList,
recentErrors: recentErrors.slice(-5),
// ── TUI observability (audit C-5) — ADDITIVE block (ADR 0007 PR-B amendment) ──
// /health is a grandfathered B.2 endpoint (ADR 0006). This block is NEW fields only;
// every existing field above is byte-identical → behaviour-preserving for existing
// consumers per ALIGNMENT.md's grandfather provision. When TUI_MODE is off the block
// still appears with enabled:false (cheap, harmless) so the shape is stable.
// entrypointMismatches/lastEntrypoint exist so an operator can poll /health to catch a
// silent metered-pool drift (the audit's top risk after the 6/15 billing flip).
tui: buildTuiHealthBlock(
{ enabled: TUI_MODE, entrypointMode: TUI_ENTRYPOINT, maxConcurrent: TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT },
tuiStats, tuiSemaphore,
),
});
}
@@ -2222,6 +2306,7 @@ function gracefulShutdown(signal) {
clearInterval(sessionCleanupInterval);
clearInterval(authCheckInterval);
clearInterval(cacheCleanupInterval);
if (tuiReapInterval) clearInterval(tuiReapInterval);
closeDb();
// 3. Kill all active child processes
@@ -2280,7 +2365,7 @@ server.listen(PORT, BIND_ADDRESS, () => {
else console.log(`Cache: disabled (set CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL to enable)`);
if (TUI_MODE) {
console.warn(`⚠️ TUI-mode ON — single-user only; do NOT enable on a multi-user OCP (guest prompts would run claude with operator filesystem access). See ADR 0007.`);
console.log(` TUI-mode: ON home=${TUI_HOME} cwd=${TUI_CWD} wallclock=${TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS}ms`);
console.log(` TUI-mode: ON home=${TUI_HOME} cwd=${TUI_CWD} wallclock=${TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS}ms maxConcurrent=${TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT}`);
try {
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions();
if (n) logEvent("info", "tui_reaped_stale_sessions", { count: n });
+8
View File
@@ -141,6 +141,13 @@ try {
}
// Check claude auth (quick test)
// NOTE: This probe uses `claude -p` (sdk-cli spawn). After the 2026-06-15 Anthropic billing
// split, every `claude -p` call draws from the Agent SDK credit pool rather than the
// Pro/Max subscription. Re-running setup after 6/15 will consume one metered credit.
// Set OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST=1 to skip this probe (auth is still validated at first real request).
if (process.env.OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST === "1") {
warn("OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST=1 — skipping claude auth probe (will be validated at first request).");
} else {
try {
const out = execSync('claude -p --output-format text --no-session-persistence -- "ping"', {
encoding: "utf-8",
@@ -154,6 +161,7 @@ try {
warn(`Claude CLI auth test failed: ${e.message.slice(0, 100)}`);
warn("Make sure you're logged in: claude login");
}
}
// Check openclaw config (optional — OCP runs standalone without OpenClaw)
const OPENCLAW_PRESENT = existsSync(CONFIG_PATH);
+466 -4
View File
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ test("streamStringAsSSE empty content: role + stop + [DONE] only", () => {
});
// ── Suite: TUI transcript reader ────────────────────────────────────────
import { encodeCwd, transcriptPath, findTranscriptPath, parseTranscriptLines, isTerminalLine, extractLatestAssistantText, verifyEntrypoint } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
import { encodeCwd, transcriptPath, findTranscriptPath, parseTranscriptLines, isTerminalLine, extractLatestAssistantText, verifyEntrypoint, detectTuiUpstreamError } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
import { readFileSync as tuiReadFileSync, mkdtempSync as tuiMkdtemp0, mkdirSync as tuiMkdir0, writeFileSync as tuiWrite0 } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir as tuiTmp0 } from "node:os";
@@ -1436,6 +1436,173 @@ test("real complete fixture: verifyEntrypoint returns 'cli'", () => {
assert.equal(verifyEntrypoint(evs), "cli");
});
// ── C-3 (#133): verifyEntrypoint is version-robust ───────────────────────
// Some claude builds do NOT emit a turn_duration line; entrypoint lives on
// ordinary lines on BOTH emitting and non-emitting builds. Reading ONLY
// turn_duration made the server.mjs tui_entrypoint_mismatch assertion get null
// every turn on non-emitting builds. verifyEntrypoint must fall back to ANY line.
console.log("\nTUI transcript — verifyEntrypoint version-robustness (C-3, #133):");
test("verifyEntrypoint PREFERS the turn_duration line's entrypoint", () => {
// turn_duration says "cli"; an earlier ordinary line says "sdk-cli" — the
// authoritative turn_duration value must win, not last-writer-wins on the fallback.
const evs = [
{ type: "assistant", entrypoint: "sdk-cli", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "x" }] } },
{ type: "system", subtype: "turn_duration", entrypoint: "cli" },
];
assert.equal(verifyEntrypoint(evs), "cli");
});
test("verifyEntrypoint falls back to entrypoint on an ordinary assistant line when no turn_duration", () => {
const evs = [
{ type: "user", entrypoint: "cli", message: { content: "hi" } },
{ type: "assistant", entrypoint: "cli", message: { stop_reason: "end_turn", content: [{ type: "text", text: "ok" }] } },
];
assert.equal(verifyEntrypoint(evs), "cli");
});
test("verifyEntrypoint returns null when NO line carries an entrypoint", () => {
const evs = [
{ type: "assistant", message: { stop_reason: "end_turn", content: [{ type: "text", text: "ok" }] } },
];
assert.equal(verifyEntrypoint(evs), null);
});
test("real no-turn_duration fixture: verifyEntrypoint still resolves 'cli' (was null before C-3)", () => {
const evs = parseTranscriptLines(tuiReadFileSync("./lib/tui/fixtures/no-turn-duration.jsonl", "utf8"));
// Sanity: the fixture genuinely lacks a turn_duration line (so this exercises the fallback).
assert.ok(!evs.some((e) => e && e.type === "system" && e.subtype === "turn_duration"), "fixture must NOT emit turn_duration");
assert.equal(verifyEntrypoint(evs), "cli");
});
// ── C-1 (#133): honest AUTH-FAILURE banner detection ─────────────────────
// The interactive claude CLI renders in-session errors as ordinary assistant text.
// C-1 catches the R-1 case: expired/invalid creds, where EVERY turn returns the same
// one-line auth-failure banner and OCP would cache it as a real answer. The detector
// is deliberately NARROW/conservative: a false-positive (killing a real long answer
// that merely DISCUSSES an API error) costs the user a missing answer + a double-burn
// retry, which is worse than the rare false-negative (caching one transient error for
// the 5-min TTL). Signal = ALL of: SHORT whole-message (≤100; live samples 69/73) AND
// "API Error: 4xx" AND an auth keyword (authenticat | /login | credential) AND NO
// backtick/quote char. When unsure → PASS. The earlier generalised rule
// (^<short-prefix>?API Error:\d{3}.*$) was TOO BROAD: its unbounded .* tail killed
// legit long answers; this block encodes the full narrowed matrix.
console.log("\nTUI transcript — auth-failure banner detection (C-1, #133):");
// ---- Required matrix: MUST detect (kill) ----
test("C-1 KILL: live /login 401 auth banner", () => {
const banner = "Please run /login · API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(banner), banner);
});
test("C-1 KILL: live 'Failed to authenticate.' 401 banner variant", () => {
// Second real PI231 banner: a different short auth-failure prefix before the same
// "API Error: 4xx" core. Still short, still 4xx, still has 'authenticate'/'credentials'.
const banner = "Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(banner), banner);
});
// ---- Required matrix: MUST NOT kill (pass) ----
test("C-1 PASS: long answer discussing a 500 (not 4xx, too long)", () => {
// The exact false-positive the over-broad .* rule produced. 166 chars; 5xx.
const legit = "API Error: 500 happened because the server was overloaded. To fix this, retry with exponential backoff and verify your rate limits before resending the request again.";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(legit), null);
});
test("C-1 PASS: long answer with 'API Error: 401 details' (too long, no auth keyword)", () => {
// 142 chars; the literal word 'authenticate'/'credential'/'/login' never appears, and
// it is far over the length cap — rejected on length AND keyword.
const legit = "Failed to parse the config. Here are the API Error: 401 details you asked about: the token expired and must be refreshed before the next call.";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(legit), null);
});
test("C-1 PASS: 'To debug a 401 … API Error: 401 Unauthorized' (no auth keyword)", () => {
// 91 chars (short!) and 4xx, but 'Unauthorized' is authoriz-, not authenticat-, and
// there is no /login or credential — the auth-keyword signal rejects it.
const legit = "To debug a 401: the server returns API Error: 401 Unauthorized, then you refresh the token.";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(legit), null);
});
test("C-1 PASS: handler answer logging 'API Error: 503' (not 4xx)", () => {
const legit = "Here is the handler you asked for. It logs the string API Error: 503 on failure and retries.";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(legit), null);
});
test("C-1 PASS: short instructional answer quoting `API Error: 401` + /login (has backtick)", () => {
// 75 chars: short, 4xx, has '/login' — passes signals 1-3. Rejected ONLY by the
// backtick/quote constraint: it QUOTES the error in code formatting, it is not the banner.
const legit = "You'll see `API Error: 401` when your token expires — run /login to fix it.";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(legit), null);
});
test("C-1 PASS: bare HTTP-status sentence (no 'API Error:' core)", () => {
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("HTTP 401 means unauthorized."), null);
});
test("C-1 PASS: plain unrelated answer", () => {
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("The capital of France is Paris."), null);
});
// ---- Supporting / regression coverage ----
test("C-1 PASS: transient 5xx banner is NOT detected (narrowed to 4xx auth only)", () => {
// The old rule flagged any 3-digit code; the narrowed detector is 4xx-only by design
// (5xx is transient/server-side, not the R-1 auth case). Accepted false-negative.
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("API Error: 500 Internal Server Error"), null);
});
test("C-1 PASS: bare 4xx with no auth keyword is NOT detected", () => {
// 'API Error: 403 Forbidden' alone — 4xx and short, but no authenticat/login/credential.
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("API Error: 403 Forbidden"), null);
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError trims surrounding whitespace before matching", () => {
const out = detectTuiUpstreamError("\n\n Please run /login · API Error: 401 credential boom \n");
assert.equal(out, "Please run /login · API Error: 401 credential boom");
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError is case-insensitive on the banner keywords", () => {
// lower-cased: /login + api error: 401 + 'credential' keyword, short, no code char.
assert.ok(detectTuiUpstreamError("please run /login · api error: 401 bad credential") !== null);
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError does NOT match prose that mentions an API error mid-paragraph (#133 regression guard)", () => {
// A long, legit answer that merely discusses an API error — rejected on length alone.
const para = "When integrating with the upstream service you may occasionally hit an API Error: 401 response if the bearer token has lapsed; the recommended remediation is to re-run the login flow and retry the request with a fresh credential, after which the 401 should clear.";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(para), null);
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError does NOT match a long plain-text auth answer with NO code chars (length cap is load-bearing)", () => {
// 226 chars, no backtick/quote, has 4xx + /login + credential + authenticate — passes
// signals 2-4. ONLY the length cap rejects it. Guards against dropping the cap.
const para = "If you call the endpoint without a bearer token the API Error: 401 response tells you the credential is missing; just authenticate again with /login and the request will succeed on the next attempt without any further changes.";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(para), null);
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError returns null on empty / whitespace / non-string", () => {
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(""), null);
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(" \n "), null);
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(null), null);
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(undefined), null);
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(42), null);
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError respects CLAUDE_TUI_ERROR_PATTERNS override (custom banner)", () => {
// Override with a single custom pattern; the default 401 banner no longer matches,
// but the custom one does (anchored whole-text).
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("Please run /login · API Error: 401 x", "Session expired, please re-auth"), null);
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("Session expired, please re-auth", "Session expired, please re-auth"), "Session expired, please re-auth");
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError with an empty override disables detection (escape hatch)", () => {
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("API Error: 500 boom", ""), null);
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("API Error: 500 boom", " "), null);
});
test("detectTuiUpstreamError override accepts '||'-separated patterns", () => {
const raw = "First banner||Second banner";
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("First banner", raw), "First banner");
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("Second banner", raw), "Second banner");
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError("Third", raw), null);
});
test("real error fixture: latest assistant text IS the banner and detectTuiUpstreamError flags it", () => {
const evs = parseTranscriptLines(tuiReadFileSync("./lib/tui/fixtures/error-401.jsonl", "utf8"));
const text = extractLatestAssistantText(evs);
assert.equal(text, "Please run /login · API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials");
assert.ok(detectTuiUpstreamError(text) !== null, "error fixture's final turn must be flagged as an upstream error");
});
test("real error fixture (Failed-to-authenticate variant): final turn is flagged (#133 runtime gap)", () => {
const evs = parseTranscriptLines(tuiReadFileSync("./lib/tui/fixtures/error-401-failauth.jsonl", "utf8"));
const text = extractLatestAssistantText(evs);
assert.equal(text, "Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials");
assert.ok(detectTuiUpstreamError(text) !== null, "Failed-to-authenticate banner must be flagged as an upstream error");
});
test("real complete fixture: final answer is NOT flagged as an upstream error", () => {
const evs = parseTranscriptLines(tuiReadFileSync("./lib/tui/fixtures/complete-haiku.jsonl", "utf8"));
const text = extractLatestAssistantText(evs);
assert.equal(detectTuiUpstreamError(text), null);
});
// ── TUI transcript — polling reader (async) ──────────────────────────────
import { readTuiTranscript } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
import { mkdtempSync as tuiMkdtemp, writeFileSync as tuiWriteFile } from "node:fs";
@@ -1455,12 +1622,30 @@ await asyncTest("readTuiTranscript returns assistant text when terminal marker p
assert.equal(out.entrypoint, "cli");
});
await asyncTest("readTuiTranscript honours wall-clock cap and returns partial text", async () => {
// C-2 (#133): the terminal-marker path must signal a COMPLETE turn.
await asyncTest("readTuiTranscript signals truncated:false when a terminal marker is hit (complete turn)", async () => {
const dir = tuiMkdtemp(`${tuiTmpdir()}/tui-`);
const p = `${dir}/s.jsonl`;
tuiWriteFile(p, [
JSON.stringify({ type: "assistant", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "done" }] } }),
JSON.stringify({ type: "system", subtype: "turn_duration", durationMs: 1200, entrypoint: "cli" }),
].join("\n") + "\n");
const out = await readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, wallclockMs: 2000, pollMs: 50 });
assert.equal(out.truncated, false);
});
// C-2 (#133): cap-with-partial-text must be DISTINGUISHABLE from a complete turn.
// Previously both returned {text, entrypoint} identically and the partial was cached
// + returned as finish_reason:stop. The cap path now returns truncated:true so the
// caller (callClaudeTui) can throw instead of serving a cut-off answer.
await asyncTest("readTuiTranscript honours wall-clock cap and flags partial text truncated:true", async () => {
const dir = tuiMkdtemp(`${tuiTmpdir()}/tui-`);
const p = `${dir}/s.jsonl`;
// No terminal marker → reader will spin to the cap then return the partial.
tuiWriteFile(p, JSON.stringify({ type: "assistant", message: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "partial" }] } }) + "\n");
const out = await readTuiTranscript({ transcriptPath: p, wallclockMs: 300, pollMs: 50 });
assert.equal(out.text, "partial");
assert.equal(out.truncated, true);
});
await asyncTest("readTuiTranscript against real fixture: entrypoint is 'cli'", async () => {
@@ -1506,6 +1691,96 @@ test("buildTuiCmd keeps version pin + entrypoint label + MCP wall", () => {
assert.ok(/-u CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT/.test(auto), "auto mode unsets any inherited entrypoint");
});
// CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN passthrough (PI231 401 incident): tmux doesn't forward the parent
// env to the pane, so the token must be set explicitly on the pane command or the TUI claude
// falls back to credentials.json (whose refresh token gets corrupted by the spawn/kill cycle).
test("buildTuiCmd passes CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN when the env is set (shq-escaped)", () => {
const save = process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN;
try {
process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = "sk-ant-oat01-abc123";
const cmd = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "sid-tok", "/home/u", "cli");
// shq wraps in single quotes; a plain token renders as 'token'.
assert.ok(cmd.includes("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN='sk-ant-oat01-abc123'"),
"token must be set on the pane command, shq-escaped");
} finally {
if (save === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN;
else process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = save;
}
});
test("buildTuiCmd does NOT add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN when the env is unset", () => {
const save = process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN;
try {
delete process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN;
const cmd = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "sid-notok", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(!/CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN/.test(cmd),
"no token added when env unset (credentials.json-only hosts unaffected)");
} finally {
if (save === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN;
else process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = save;
}
});
test("buildTuiCmd shq-escapes a token containing shell metacharacters (no injection)", () => {
const save = process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN;
try {
// A token with a single quote must be escaped via the '\'' idiom so it can't break out
// of the shell string tmux runs via sh -c.
process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = "tok'; rm -rf /;'";
const cmd = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "sid-inj", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(cmd.includes(`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN='tok'\\''; rm -rf /;'\\'''`),
"single quote must be shq-escaped, not left bare");
assert.ok(!/CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=tok'; rm/.test(cmd), "raw unescaped token must NOT appear");
} finally {
if (save === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN;
else process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = save;
}
});
test("buildTuiCmd OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS=1 grants -p-equivalent tool surface (single-user opt-in)", () => {
const save = { ...process.env };
const restore = () => {
for (const k of ["OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS", "CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS", "CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG", "CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS"]) {
if (k in save) process.env[k] = save[k]; else delete process.env[k];
}
};
try {
// default (gate off) keeps the MCP wall, no --allowedTools
delete process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS;
const off = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "s", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(off.includes("--strict-mcp-config") && !off.includes("--allowedTools"), "gate off = MCP wall");
// gate on: --allowedTools (default set incl Bash), MCP wall dropped
process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS = "1";
delete process.env.CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS;
delete process.env.CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG;
delete process.env.CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS;
const full = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "s", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(full.includes("--allowedTools") && full.includes("Bash"), "full-tools grants --allowedTools incl Bash");
assert.ok(!full.includes("--strict-mcp-config") && !/--disallowedTools/.test(full), "full-tools drops the MCP wall");
// skip-permissions supersedes --allowedTools
process.env.CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS = "true";
const skip = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "s", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(skip.includes("--dangerously-skip-permissions") && !skip.includes("--allowedTools"), "skip-permissions honored");
// mcp-config threaded through
delete process.env.CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS;
process.env.CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG = "/tmp/mcp.json";
const mcp = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "s", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(/--mcp-config '\/tmp\/mcp.json'/.test(mcp), "mcp-config passed through (shq'd)");
// operator-supplied scoped tool specifiers must be shell-quoted (no injection via ()*~)
delete process.env.CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG;
process.env.CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS = "Bash(npm run test:*),Read";
const scoped = buildTuiCmd("/usr/bin/claude", "m", "s", "/home/u", "cli");
assert.ok(scoped.includes("'Bash(npm run test:*)'"), "scoped tool tokens are shq'd in the shell string");
assert.ok(!/--allowedTools Bash\(npm/.test(scoped), "scoped token must NOT appear unquoted");
} finally {
restore();
}
});
test("reaper kills ONLY ocp-tui- sessions, never olp-tui-", () => {
const killed = [];
const fakeTmux = (args) => {
@@ -1537,6 +1812,41 @@ test("reaper returns 0 for empty session list", () => {
assert.equal(killed.length, 0);
});
// Defunct-zombie reaping (PI231 incident): the pane's claude is a child of the tmux server,
// so only kill-server actually reaps it. We kill-server ONLY when no foreign session remains.
console.log("\nTUI defunct-zombie reaping (kill-server):");
test("reaper kill-servers when the server is ours-only (flush defunct claude zombies)", () => {
const calls = [];
const fakeTmux = (args) => {
calls.push(args.join(" "));
if (args[0] === "list-sessions") return { status: 0, stdout: "ocp-tui-aaaa\nocp-tui-bbbb\n" };
return { status: 0, stdout: "" };
};
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux: fakeTmux });
assert.equal(n, 2, "killed both of our sessions");
assert.ok(calls.includes("kill-server"), "kill-server fired — reaps the defunct backlog");
});
test("reaper does NOT kill-server when a foreign (non-ocp) session remains (coexistence)", () => {
const calls = [];
const fakeTmux = (args) => {
calls.push(args.join(" "));
if (args[0] === "list-sessions") return { status: 0, stdout: "ocp-tui-aaaa\nolp-tui-bbbb\n" };
return { status: 0, stdout: "" };
};
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux: fakeTmux });
assert.equal(n, 1, "killed only our own session");
assert.ok(!calls.includes("kill-server"), "kill-server MUST NOT fire — would disrupt olp-tui-*");
});
test("reaper does NOT kill-server when there is no server (status !== 0)", () => {
const calls = [];
const fakeTmux = (args) => { calls.push(args.join(" ")); return { status: 1, stdout: "" }; };
reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux: fakeTmux });
assert.ok(!calls.includes("kill-server"), "no server → no kill-server (early return)");
});
// ── TUI home preparation (scratch vs real) ───────────────────────────────
import { prepareTuiHome, ensureTuiCwdTrusted } from "./lib/tui/session.mjs";
import { mkdtempSync as hMkdtemp, mkdirSync as hMkdir, writeFileSync as hWrite, readFileSync as hRead, existsSync as hExists, readlinkSync as hReadlink } from "node:fs";
@@ -1622,6 +1932,147 @@ test("default mode (no second arg) behaves like 'cli'", () => {
assert.equal(env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT, "cli");
});
// ── TUI concurrency limiter + drift observability (PR-B: audit C-4 / C-5) ──
import { TuiSemaphore, recordTuiEntrypoint, buildTuiHealthBlock } from "./lib/tui/semaphore.mjs";
console.log("\nTUI concurrency limiter (C-4):");
const deferred = () => { let resolve, reject; const p = new Promise((res, rej) => { resolve = res; reject = rej; }); return { p, resolve, reject }; };
await asyncTest("limit=1 serializes two overlapping calls (second waits for the first)", async () => {
const sem = new TuiSemaphore(1);
const order = [];
const g1 = deferred();
// First task acquires the only slot and blocks on g1.
const t1 = sem.run(async () => { order.push("t1-start"); await g1.p; order.push("t1-end"); });
await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r)); // let t1 acquire
assert.equal(sem.inflight, 1, "t1 holds the only slot");
// Second task must QUEUE — it has not started yet.
const t2 = sem.run(async () => { order.push("t2-start"); });
await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
assert.equal(sem.queued, 1, "t2 is queued, not running");
assert.deepEqual(order, ["t1-start"], "t2 has not started while t1 holds the slot");
// Release t1 → t2 runs.
g1.resolve();
await t1; await t2;
assert.deepEqual(order, ["t1-start", "t1-end", "t2-start"], "t2 ran only after t1 finished");
assert.equal(sem.inflight, 0, "all slots released");
assert.equal(sem.queued, 0, "queue drained");
});
await asyncTest("limit=2 allows two concurrent, queues the third", async () => {
const sem = new TuiSemaphore(2);
const g = [deferred(), deferred(), deferred()];
const started = [];
const tasks = g.map((d, i) => sem.run(async () => { started.push(i); await d.p; }));
await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
assert.equal(sem.inflight, 2, "exactly 2 run concurrently");
assert.equal(sem.queued, 1, "the third is queued");
assert.deepEqual(started.sort(), [0, 1], "only the first two started");
g.forEach((d) => d.resolve());
await Promise.all(tasks);
assert.equal(sem.inflight, 0);
});
await asyncTest("slot is RELEASED on throw (finally) — a rejecting task never leaks its slot", async () => {
const sem = new TuiSemaphore(1);
await assert.rejects(sem.run(async () => { throw new Error("boom"); }), /boom/);
assert.equal(sem.inflight, 0, "throwing task released its slot");
// Prove the slot is reusable: a subsequent task acquires immediately.
let ran = false;
await sem.run(async () => { ran = true; });
assert.equal(ran, true);
assert.equal(sem.inflight, 0);
});
await asyncTest("wait queue is bounded — run() rejects with tui_queue_full when full (backpressure, not OOM)", async () => {
const sem = new TuiSemaphore(1, { maxQueue: 1 });
const g1 = deferred();
const t1 = sem.run(async () => { await g1.p; }); // holds the slot
await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
const t2 = sem.run(async () => {}); // fills the 1-deep queue
await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
assert.equal(sem.queued, 1, "queue is full");
await assert.rejects(sem.run(async () => {}), /tui_queue_full/, "third request rejects");
g1.resolve();
await t1; await t2;
assert.equal(sem.inflight, 0);
});
console.log("\nTUI drift observability (C-5):");
test("recordTuiEntrypoint: observed 'cli' is NOT a mismatch and sets lastEntrypoint", () => {
const ts = { lastEntrypoint: null, entrypointMismatches: 0 };
const mism = recordTuiEntrypoint(ts, "cli", "cli");
assert.equal(mism, false);
assert.equal(ts.lastEntrypoint, "cli");
assert.equal(ts.entrypointMismatches, 0);
});
test("recordTuiEntrypoint: expected cli but observed 'sdk-cli' increments the mismatch counter (drift)", () => {
const ts = { lastEntrypoint: null, entrypointMismatches: 0 };
assert.equal(recordTuiEntrypoint(ts, "sdk-cli", "cli"), true);
assert.equal(ts.lastEntrypoint, "sdk-cli");
assert.equal(ts.entrypointMismatches, 1);
// A second drift increments again (counter accumulates across turns).
assert.equal(recordTuiEntrypoint(ts, "sdk-cli", "cli"), true);
assert.equal(ts.entrypointMismatches, 2);
});
test("recordTuiEntrypoint: null observation → lastEntrypoint null, counts as mismatch when expected cli", () => {
const ts = { lastEntrypoint: "cli", entrypointMismatches: 0 };
assert.equal(recordTuiEntrypoint(ts, null, "cli"), true);
assert.equal(ts.lastEntrypoint, null);
assert.equal(ts.entrypointMismatches, 1);
});
test("recordTuiEntrypoint: non-cli expected mode (auto) never counts a mismatch", () => {
const ts = { lastEntrypoint: null, entrypointMismatches: 0 };
assert.equal(recordTuiEntrypoint(ts, "sdk-cli", "auto"), false);
assert.equal(ts.lastEntrypoint, "sdk-cli");
assert.equal(ts.entrypointMismatches, 0);
});
test("buildTuiHealthBlock: shape + live counters (the additive /health tui block)", () => {
const sem = new TuiSemaphore(2);
const ts = { lastEntrypoint: "cli", entrypointMismatches: 3 };
const block = buildTuiHealthBlock(
{ enabled: true, entrypointMode: "cli", maxConcurrent: 2 }, ts, sem);
assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(block).sort(),
["enabled", "entrypointMismatches", "entrypointMode", "inflight", "lastEntrypoint", "maxConcurrent", "queued"]);
assert.equal(block.enabled, true);
assert.equal(block.entrypointMode, "cli");
assert.equal(block.lastEntrypoint, "cli");
assert.equal(block.entrypointMismatches, 3);
assert.equal(block.inflight, 0);
assert.equal(block.queued, 0);
assert.equal(block.maxConcurrent, 2);
});
test("buildTuiHealthBlock: TUI off → enabled:false but block still present (stable shape)", () => {
const sem = new TuiSemaphore(2);
const ts = { lastEntrypoint: null, entrypointMismatches: 0 };
const block = buildTuiHealthBlock(
{ enabled: false, entrypointMode: "cli", maxConcurrent: 2 }, ts, sem);
assert.equal(block.enabled, false);
assert.equal(block.lastEntrypoint, null);
assert.equal(block.entrypointMismatches, 0);
});
await asyncTest("buildTuiHealthBlock reflects live inflight/queued while turns are in flight", async () => {
const sem = new TuiSemaphore(1);
const ts = { lastEntrypoint: null, entrypointMismatches: 0 };
const g1 = deferred();
const t1 = sem.run(async () => { await g1.p; });
const t2 = sem.run(async () => {}); // queued behind t1
await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
const block = buildTuiHealthBlock({ enabled: true, entrypointMode: "cli", maxConcurrent: 1 }, ts, sem);
assert.equal(block.inflight, 1, "one turn in flight");
assert.equal(block.queued, 1, "one turn queued");
g1.resolve();
await t1; await t2;
});
// ── TUI session driver: runTuiTurn (live-only, guarded) ──────────────────
console.log("\nTUI session driver:");
@@ -1655,7 +2106,7 @@ function _tuiPromptLanded(pane, prompt) {
if (flatPane.includes("[Pasted text")) return true;
const firstLine = String(prompt).split("\n").map(s => s.trim()).find(Boolean) || "";
const needle = firstLine.replace(/\s+/g, " ").slice(0, 24);
return needle.length >= 3 && flatPane.includes(needle);
return needle.length >= 2 && flatPane.includes(needle); // C-4 (#133): 3 → 2 (see lib/tui/session.mjs)
}
// Real captured pane samples (empirically confirmed via live capture-pane on PI231,
@@ -1687,12 +2138,23 @@ test("tuiPromptLanded(READY_PANE, 'Reply with exactly: PONG_TEST') === false (s
test("tuiPromptLanded(LANDED_PANE, 'Reply with exactly: PONG_TEST') === true (prompt prefix visible)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiPromptLanded(TUI_LANDED_PANE, "Reply with exactly: PONG_TEST"), true);
});
test("tuiPromptLanded(READY_PANE, 'ping') === false (needle <3 chars, placeholder present)", () => {
test("tuiPromptLanded(READY_PANE, 'ping') === false (prompt text absent from placeholder pane)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiPromptLanded(TUI_READY_PANE, "ping"), false);
});
test("tuiPromptLanded(' ping\\n ? for shortcuts', 'ping') === true (needle present, no placeholder)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiPromptLanded(" ping\n ? for shortcuts", "ping"), true);
});
// C-4 (#133): short prompts (12 char first line) MUST be able to land. Threshold
// lowered 3 → 2. A 2-char prompt ("hi") present in the pane now lands instead of
// 5s-failing with tui_paste_not_landed every time (live-reproduced: "hi").
test("tuiPromptLanded(' hi\\n ? for shortcuts', 'hi') === true (2-char prompt lands — C-4)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiPromptLanded(" hi\n ? for shortcuts", "hi"), true);
});
// False-positive guard for the lowered threshold: a 2-char needle ABSENT from the
// still-empty placeholder pane must NOT land (no spurious Enter into an empty box).
test("tuiPromptLanded(READY_PANE, 'hi') === false (2-char prompt not yet visible — no false positive)", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiPromptLanded(TUI_READY_PANE, "hi"), false);
});
// issue #130 root cause: a big bracketed paste shows "[Pasted text #N +M lines]" — must be landed.
test("tuiPromptLanded(bracketed-paste pane, big prompt) === true", () => {
assert.equal(_tuiPromptLanded(" [Pasted text #1 +301 lines]\n ? for shortcuts", "[System] Context 0."), true);