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taodeng 1978a375e3 fix(ocp-plugin): add openclaw.extensions for OpenClaw 2026.5.27 compat + sync version (②/ocp)
ocp-plugin/package.json's openclaw object lacked the 'extensions' field that
OpenClaw 2026.5.27 requires to install/load a plugin (matches the sibling olp
plugin). Without it the daemon refused to load the local path plugin, breaking
/ocp Telegram commands. Version synced 3.12.0 -> 3.16.2 to match the manifest.
Plugin-layer change; no server.mjs / ALIGNMENT cli.js surface touched.
2026-06-25 11:24:47 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.8 d97cef7b30 docs(readme): document new env vars CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE / CLAUDE_QUEUE_RETRY_AFTER / OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME
Release_kit contract (CLAUDE.md Iron Rule 5.5: "new env var → README § Environment
Variables table") requires the three env vars added by the perf/concurrency fixes to be
in the README table. Adds rows for CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE (16) + CLAUDE_QUEUE_RETRY_AFTER (5)
(FIX ⑥ -p wait-queue + 429) and OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME (FIX ③ spawn-home isolation
kill-switch), each cross-referencing the additive /health.concurrency and /health.spawn
fields. Addresses the independent reviewer's MEDIUM finding. Docs only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 11:19:04 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.8 66dc9949ed fix(ocp): macOS restart uses bootout+bootstrap so plist env is re-read
The macOS restart path used `launchctl kickstart -k gui/$uid/dev.ocp.proxy`, which
only re-execs the process and reuses launchd's CACHED environment — so a plist
EnvironmentVariables edit (CLAUDE_BIND, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, etc.) was silently
ignored until a full unload/reload. This is the documented pit-index footgun.

`ocp restart` (macOS) now does a full `launchctl bootout` + `bootstrap` of the agent
via a new `_launchd_reload` helper, which re-reads the plist EnvironmentVariables so env
changes take effect. Success is keyed on the bootstrap (the env-reloading load), not the
bootout (which may legitimately fail if the agent is not currently loaded). A missing
plist returns failure so the `elif` chain falls through to the legacy label and then to
the Linux `systemctl --user restart` path unchanged (systemctl already re-reads its
EnvironmentFile). Updates `ocp restart` help text and adds a README Troubleshooting
subsection ("Env var change doesn't take effect after restart") with the manual
bootout+bootstrap commands and a ps-based verification one-liner.

Verified `_launchd_reload` with a stubbed launchctl: missing plist → rc=1 (falls through,
no launchctl call); bootout-fail + bootstrap-ok → rc=0; bootstrap-fail → rc=1; call order
is bootout then bootstrap. `bash -n ocp` clean; npm test 247/0 (server.mjs untouched).

ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 justification: this changes ONLY the `ocp` CLI wrapper's local
service-restart mechanism (launchctl invocation). It does not touch server.mjs, the wire
path, any endpoint/header, or any API token — so there is no cli.js function to cite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 11:13:18 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.8 758c2d703f fix(server): bounded wait-queue + HTTP 429 for -p concurrency overflow (⑥)
spawnClaudeProcess used `if (activeRequests >= MAX_CONCURRENT) throw` → the client
got an opaque 500 AND the rejection was uncounted (a 15-concurrent stress run returned
7×500 while /health stats.errors stayed 0). The TUI path already had a bounded-queue
semaphore (TuiSemaphore); the -p path did not.

Now the -p path reuses TuiSemaphore as `claudeSemaphore = new TuiSemaphore(MAX_CONCURRENT,
{ maxQueue: CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE })`. Requests beyond MAX_CONCURRENT WAIT (up to CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE,
default 16) instead of being rejected; only when the queue is ALSO full does the request get
HTTP 429 + Retry-After (rate_limit_error, NOT 500), a distinct `concurrency_queue_full` log,
and a stats.queueRejections counter surfaced on /health. callClaude / callClaudeStreaming now
acquire a slot (acquireClaudeSlot) before spawning; the release fn is wired into the existing
idempotent cleanup() so the slot is freed on EVERY exit path (close/error/timeout/abort) — the
#37/#40 slot-leak guard. MAX_CONCURRENT semantics (max concurrent claude procs) are unchanged;
only overflow handling changed from throw-500 to queue-then-429. claudeSemaphore.limit is kept
in sync with runtime /settings maxConcurrent changes.

Live-verified (fake claude, MAX_CONCURRENT=1 MAX_QUEUE=1): 3 concurrent → exactly one 429
(Retry-After: 7, rate_limit_error body) + two 200s, on BOTH the non-streaming and streaming
paths; /health stats.queueRejections=1 while stats.errors=0; after drain activeRequests=0 /
inflight=0 / queued=0 and a follow-up request returns 200 (no slot leak). 2 new unit tests
(247 passed, 0 failed).

ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 justification: this is an INFRA / PROCESS-MANAGEMENT change (a concurrency
queue + backpressure status code in front of the existing spawn). It does NOT mirror a cli.js
wire operation, adds no new endpoint or wire header, and introduces no API token — so there is
no cli.js function to cite. (Retry-After is a standard HTTP response header on OCP's own 429,
not a claude wire header.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 11:11:49 +10:00
taodengandClaude Opus 4.8 6cf5e950a5 fix(server): isolate default -p spawn in credential-free scratch HOME (latency ③)
The default (-p/stream-json) spawn inherited the operator's real HOME (global
~/.claude plugins/skills/hooks) and ran with cwd=~/ocp (project CLAUDE.md/skills),
loading heavy host context on EVERY request. Measured: pure API floor for haiku
"hi" ≈ 1–2s; same CLI in the operator's real HOME/cwd ≈ 10–28s; a clean minimal
HOME + CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN ≈ 3–7s with auth intact.

When an OAuth token is resolvable (and OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME!=1), spawnClaudeProcess
now runs claude under a credential-free minimal scratch HOME (<HOME>/.ocp/spawn-home,
no .credentials.json / settings.json / plugins) with cwd = that neutral dir and the
resolved token in CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (env token is authoritative for -p). Mirrors
the TUI path's resolveTuiHome() env-token mode. Falls back to real HOME + inherited cwd
when no token resolves (zero regression); OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME=1 is a kill-switch.

The token is resolved ONCE (memoized via getSpawnHomeMode, reusing getOAuthCredentials,
the same resolver the /usage probe uses) and never logged. Adds a startup log line and
an additive /health `spawn` block so the operator can confirm isolation is on.

ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2 justification: this is an INFRA / PROCESS-MANAGEMENT change
(HOME/cwd/env isolation of the spawned process). It does NOT mirror a cli.js wire
operation, introduces no new endpoint/header, and adds no API token to the wire path —
so there is no cli.js function to cite. CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN / CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_*
are existing claude-CLI env contracts already used by the TUI path and getOAuthCredentials.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 11:03:09 +10:00
21 changed files with 326 additions and 3364 deletions
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@@ -1,39 +1,5 @@
# Changelog
## v3.21.1 — 2026-07-07
Patch release: three bug fixes from an independent concurrency/session-lifecycle audit, each its own PR with a fresh-context reviewer (Iron Rule 10). No new `cli.js` wire behavior, no new endpoint, header, or env var; the `/health` field set is unchanged (only value truthfulness improved).
### Fixed
- **TUI session-scope / boot-reap (#148)** — `lib/tui/session.mjs`'s tmux session prefix is now scoped per-instance by listen port (`ocp-tui-<port>-`) instead of a bare host-wide `ocp-tui-` constant, so a second OCP instance on the same host (e.g. a temporary verification instance) can no longer have its live TUI sessions reaped or `kill-server`'d by another instance's boot/periodic sweep. The one-time boot reap also claims exact-shape legacy `ocp-tui-<8hex>` sessions (pre-fix naming) once, to clean up zombies left behind across an in-place upgrade.
- **`-p` spawn-token mutex + keychain caching (#150)** — the real-HOME token fallback used when the keychain token is within its 5-minute expiry window is now serialized behind a mutex, so concurrent `-p` spawns no longer race the same single-use refresh token against each other (the credential-fork hazard). Added a 30s TTL cache + last-good-label memoization for the keychain read, cutting per-spawn event-loop blocking. The isolation decision (`/health` isolated/real-home reporting) is now re-evaluated per spawn instead of memoized forever, so `/health` no longer misreports a stale decision. New module `lib/spawn-auth.mjs` extracts the pure, unit-testable primitives (mutex, TTL cache, expiry gate, label ordering).
- **Concurrency queue / disconnect handling (#149)** — the shared semaphore now honors a runtime-lowered `maxConcurrent` immediately (previously a decrease was silently ignored until in-flight tasks finished on their own) and wakes queued waiters right away when the limit is raised. Queued `-p`/TUI requests are now linked to the client's HTTP connection via `AbortSignal`; a client that disconnects while queued is spliced out of the queue instead of still spawning `claude` once a slot frees. A singleflight follower whose leader disconnected now retries instead of inheriting a spurious 500, and a queued-then-disconnected request is no longer recorded as a usage failure or logged as an error (quiet disconnect handling).
## v3.21.0 — 2026-06-25
Cleanup + docs release: TUI dead-code removal, docs honesty, and release prep. No new `cli.js` wire behavior; the default path (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` unset) is byte-for-byte unchanged.
### TUI dead-code / footgun cleanup
- **A1 — removed inert entrypoint-env path** (`lib/tui/session.mjs`): deleted `resolveTuiEntrypointEnv()` and the redundant env-strip block in `runTuiTurn`. The `{env}` object passed to `spawnSync` (tmux itself) was the wrong target — tmux does NOT forward the spawning process's environment to the pane; the pane's `claude` gets its env exclusively from the `env` prefix string built inside `buildTuiCmd` (verified live 2026-06-01). The spawnSync env is now intentionally minimal (`HOME` only). Behavior is unchanged: `buildTuiCmd` already handled all claude-specific env vars via its prefix string.
- **A2 — removed test-only transcript helpers** (`lib/tui/transcript.mjs`): deleted `encodeCwd()` and `transcriptPath()` exports and the tests that pinned them. Production resolves transcripts exclusively via `findTranscriptPath()` (glob by session-id), which is immune to the exact path-encoding rule. No non-test importers existed (grep confirms). A `// TODO` comment near `findTranscriptPath()` notes that a CI fixture-contract test would make claude-schema drift fail loudly.
- **A3 — removed headless-unusable `--dangerously-skip-permissions` branch** (`lib/tui/session.mjs` + `README.md`): `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS=1` now always takes the `--allowedTools` path. The removed branch pushed `--dangerously-skip-permissions` when `CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS=true`; on claude v2.1.x this triggers an interactive bypass-acceptance screen that a headless tmux pane cannot answer → the turn hangs to the wallclock cap and bricks the pane. The working path is `--allowedTools` + scratch-home `settings.json` `additionalDirectories`. `CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS` for the `-p` path is unchanged (still used in `server.mjs`).
### Docs
- **Client-tools boundary** (README `§ How It Works`): OCP is a text-prompt bridge only — it does not pass OpenAI `tools`/`functions` or Anthropic `tool_use` blocks to the client. Clients receive assistant TEXT only; client-local tool execution is not supported by design (bypassing `cli.js` = out of scope per `ALIGNMENT.md`).
- **ToS honesty** (README `§ Deployment model & security`): pooling one Claude subscription across multiple distinct people may violate Anthropic's Consumer ToS and risk account suspension by the abuse classifier. The defensible framing is "one person, your own devices" — friends/team sharing is not. The prior language ("account terms are your call") was accurate but understated the risk.
- **"Why OCP" posture** (README `§ Why OCP?`): new bullet making explicit that OCP drives the official `claude` CLI as-is — no OAuth token extraction, no binary patching, no protocol invention — so traffic looks like genuine Claude Code (`cc_entrypoint=cli`).
- **Promotion plan** (`docs/PROMOTION.md`): "stable & visible" strategy covering goal (polish + low-key OSS visibility, NOT growth-hacking given the live ToS/billing risk), pre-requisites (stability first), honest ToS disclosure requirement, items explicitly skipped (multi-backend routing → OLP; gateway model-discovery; raw API passthrough → ALIGNMENT.md scope), TUI toggle as billing-split insurance, and low-key visibility actions. Framed as a recommendation for the maintainer to review, not a committed plan.
### Previously shipped (v3.20.x) — documented here for completeness
- **Default `-p` spawn-home isolation** (v3.20.0 / PR-A): per-request `claude` spawns run in a credential-free minimal scratch HOME (`$HOME/.ocp/spawn-home`, no `.credentials.json`/`settings.json`/plugins) with a neutral cwd and the env token, cutting per-request latency (measured ~1028s → ~37s). Kill-switch: `OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME=1`. Active mode shown at startup and on `/health.spawn`.
- **Bounded concurrency wait-queue** (v3.20.0 / PR-B): excess `-p` requests queue (up to `CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE`, default 16) instead of being rejected; a full queue returns `HTTP 429` + `Retry-After` (not an opaque 500). New env vars: `CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE`, `CLAUDE_QUEUE_RETRY_AFTER`. Surfaced on `/health.concurrency` + `/health.stats.queueRejections`.
- **`ocp restart`** macOS `bootout`+`bootstrap` (v3.20.0 / PR-B): safe restart command that forces launchd to re-read the plist (unlike `kickstart -k` which reuses the cached env).
- **`/ocp` plugin OpenClaw-2026.5.27 compat** (v3.20.0 / PR-C): gateway plugin updated for the current OpenClaw API version.
## v3.20.1 — 2026-06-13
TUI-mode auth hardening: fixes the recurring `Please run /login · API Error: 401` (the PI231 incident) and reaps leaked defunct `claude` sessions. ([#141](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/pull/141))
+4 -63
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@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ There are several Claude proxy projects. OCP picks a specific lane: **align tigh
- **SSE heartbeat for long reasoning** ([v3.12.0](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/releases/tag/v3.12.0), opt-in). If you've ever watched your IDE die at the 60s idle mark during a long Claude tool-use pause — that's nginx/Cloudflare default behavior. OCP emits an SSE comment frame to keep the connection alive without polluting the response. ([PR #49](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/pull/49))
- **`cli.js` alignment + CI guardrail.** LLM-assisted code drifts easily — it's tempting to invent plausible-looking endpoints that `cli.js` doesn't actually use. [`ALIGNMENT.md`](./ALIGNMENT.md) is binding: every endpoint OCP exposes must cite a `cli.js` line. The [`alignment.yml`](./.github/workflows/alignment.yml) CI workflow blocks PRs that introduce known-hallucinated tokens. The payoff is boring: your setup keeps working when `cli.js` ships its next minor.
- **`models.json` single source of truth** (v3.11.0). Adding a model is one file edit; both `/v1/models` and the OpenClaw bootstrap derive from it. ([PR #30](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/pull/30))
- **Drives the official CLI as-is, no binary patching.** OCP spawns the official `claude` CLI (or hosts it in an interactive tmux pane for TUI mode) — it does not extract OAuth tokens from memory, patch the binary, or invent protocol extensions. Traffic therefore looks like genuine Claude Code to Anthropic's classifiers (`cc_entrypoint=cli`). See `ALIGNMENT.md` for why this constraint is load-bearing.
### Comparison
@@ -424,7 +423,7 @@ ocp keys revoke son-ipad # Revoke a key
- The per-key modes (`shared` / `multi`) give per-key **usage tracking, quotas, and cache separation** — useful for seeing who used what and capping budgets.
- They do **not** give a **security isolation boundary**. The spawned `claude` runs with the **operator's filesystem access** and is *not* sandboxed per key. **Only share with people you fully trust, on a trusted network.**
- For simple trusted family sharing, the easiest setup is a single shared **anonymous key** (see [Anonymous Access](#anonymous-access-optional)) — no per-person separation, same trust assumption.
- **Account terms and ToS — read before sharing with others.** Claude Pro/Max are *per-user* accounts. Pooling a single subscription across **multiple distinct people** may violate Anthropic's Consumer Terms of Service and risk account suspension by the abuse classifier. The defensible framing is **"one person, your own devices"** — sharing with friends or a team is not. OCP does not change your account terms, and whether any particular sharing setup complies with the ToS is the account holder's responsibility. Review Anthropic's Usage Policy before extending access to other people.
- **Account terms are your call.** Claude Pro/Max are *per-user* accounts, and Anthropic's Usage Policy governs who may use them. OCP is a localhost protocol adapter for your own tools and devices — it does not change your account terms, and whether any particular sharing setup complies with the Usage Policy is the account holder's responsibility. Review it before extending access to other people.
**Real per-user isolation (sandboxed, multi-tenant-safe) is planned for after 2026-06-15** — per-key ephemeral home + tool lockdown + an OS sandbox. Until then, treat a multi-user OCP as a *trusted-group convenience*, not a security boundary. (This is also why `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` is single-user-only — see [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode).)
@@ -701,14 +700,6 @@ Your IDE → OCP (localhost:3456) → claude --output-format stream-json CLI →
OCP translates OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` requests into `claude --output-format stream-json` CLI calls. Anthropic sees normal Claude Code usage — no API billing, no separate key needed.
### Client-tools boundary
OCP is a **text-prompt bridge** to the official `claude` CLI. It does **not** pass through OpenAI `tools`/`functions` payloads or Anthropic `tool_use` blocks to the client. Clients (Cline, Cursor, OpenClaw, etc.) pointed at OCP receive **assistant TEXT only** — they never get `tool_calls` to execute locally.
Any tool use happens server-side, under the `--allowedTools` set configured on the OCP host. In default mode (no `CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT`), the `claude` CLI's own built-in tools are available to the model; in TUI mode, the operator controls the tool surface via `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS`. Either way, the tools run under the operator's credentials on the server, and the client sees only the final text output.
**Client-local tool execution is not supported by design.** Supporting it would require bypassing the `claude` CLI to call the raw Anthropic API directly — that is a different product, and is out of scope per `ALIGNMENT.md` (every OCP endpoint must correspond to something `cli.js` actually does).
## Available Models
| Model ID | Notes |
@@ -894,10 +885,6 @@ node ~/ocp/scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs
This is read-only at startup; the warning never blocks the gateway from running.
### A TUI session vanished right after upgrading OCP
If you ran a pre-3.21.1 OCP instance and a post-3.21.1 instance on the same host at the same time during an upgrade, the new instance's one-time boot reap can, once, kill an old-format (`ocp-tui-<8hex>`) live TUI session belonging to the still-running old instance — restart the affected session (`ocp restart` or re-run your TUI turn) and it will come back under the new instance's port-scoped naming.
### OpenClaw shows old models after `ocp update` (v3.10→v3.11 only)
One-time bootstrap quirk for the v3.10.0 → v3.11.0 jump only — the running shell had the old `cmd_update` cached. Run once manually:
@@ -958,11 +945,9 @@ See [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) and ADR 0007 PR-
| `OCP_TUI_CWD` | `$HOME/.ocp-tui/work` | (TUI-mode) Scratch working directory where interactive claude sessions run. Transcripts land under `<HOME>/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/`. Created automatically. |
| `OCP_TUI_HOME` | *(auto)* | (TUI-mode) `HOME` claude runs under. **When unset, OCP picks it for you:** if `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is set → a **credential-isolated** scratch home `$HOME/.ocp-tui/home` (no `credentials.json`, env-token auth — **recommended**); if no env token → the operator's real home (legacy shared `credentials.json`). Setting this to an **explicit** path overrides the auto-default. The credential handling at that path still follows the env token: **with** the env token it is credential-free (env-token auth, no `credentials.json` written); **without** the env token (and the path ≠ real home) it uses the legacy symlinked-credentials scratch mode, which carries the credential-fork caveat — see ADR 0007. |
| `OCP_TUI_ENTRYPOINT` | `cli` | (TUI-mode) Billing-classifier labeling: `cli` (default) pins `cc_entrypoint=cli` deterministically; `auto` lets claude self-classify via TTY detection; `off` leaves the inherited env untouched. Honest only when the spawn is a genuine interactive PTY — see ADR 0007. |
| `OCP_TUI_EFFORT` | `low` | (TUI-mode) Effort level passed to the interactive `claude` as an explicit `--effort` flag: `low` (default), `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`, or `inherit` to omit the flag (the pre-flag behaviour: the pane inherits a HOME-dependent effort — the operator's `~/.claude/settings.json` `effortLevel` in real-home mode, claude's built-in default in env-token scratch mode). Explicit `low` cuts measured TTFT p50 by ~40% and collapses run-to-run variance ~15× versus an inherited `xhigh` (see `docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/`); proxied requests rarely benefit from extended thinking. Banner-verified to stay on the subscription pool (`· Claude Max`). An invalid value logs a warning and falls back to `low`. |
| `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` | `2` | (TUI-mode) Max concurrent interactive TUI turns. **Independent** of `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT` (which bounds the `-p`/stream-json path; TUI never uses it). A TUI turn is heavy (per-request cold-boot of tmux+claude + up to `CLAUDE_TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS` wallclock), so the default is low to keep small hosts (e.g. a Pi 4) alive under a burst. Excess turns **queue** (bounded); a full queue yields a 503. See ADR 0007 PR-B amendment. |
| `OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE` | `0` (off) | (TUI-mode) Number of **pre-booted warm `claude` panes** kept ready, so a request does not pay the cold boot. `0` disables the pool entirely — the request path is then exactly the cold-boot path. Max `4`; an unparseable value disables it rather than guessing. **Measured on a Mac mini (Sonnet 4.6, `--effort low`): end-to-end p50 `10.17s` (n=6, pool off) → `6.00s` (n=12 warm hits) — 4.2 s / 41%** — the pool recovers both the ~1.2 s boot *and* ~2.9 s of post-input-bar init that a pane which has been idle a moment has already finished. **Cost:** each warm pane is a *live idle `claude` process* held whether or not a request ever arrives (peak processes ≈ pool size + `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` + 1 booting replacement) — which is why it is opt-in. Panes are **single-use**: one turn, then killed and replaced in the background. The **first request after start (and after any model switch) is always a cold miss** — the pool warms the most recently requested model, since OCP cannot know which model the next caller wants. See `docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/`. |
| `OCP_SKIP_AUTH_TEST` | *(unset)* | When `=1`, skip the `claude -p` auth probe during `setup.mjs`. After 2026-06-15 this probe draws from the Agent SDK credit pool; set this to avoid burning a metered credit on re-installs or `ocp update` runs. Auth is validated at the first real request. |
| `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS` | *(unset)* | (TUI-mode, **single-user only**) When `=1`, grant the interactive session the **same tool surface as the `-p` path** — `--allowedTools` (+ optional `--mcp-config`, read from `CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS` / `CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG`) — instead of the default MCP-walled, built-in-tools-only set. Lets a trusted single-operator TUI deployment run a **tool-using / MCP agent** (e.g. an OpenClaw assistant) on the subscription pool. Safe because TUI **refuses to boot under `AUTH_MODE=multi`** (hard exit) — no guest key can ever reach the TUI path, so this gate cannot expose tools to an untrusted caller. (Under `AUTH_MODE=shared` + `OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1`, anyone holding the single shared key reaches it — that is the existing TUI trust model, unchanged.) Note: `--dangerously-skip-permissions` / `CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS` is **not** supported for TUI — claude v2.1.x shows an interactive bypass-acceptance screen in headless tmux that cannot be answered, bricking the pane. Use scratch-home `settings.json` `additionalDirectories` instead. See [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) and ADR 0007. |
| `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS` | *(unset)* | (TUI-mode, **single-user only**) When `=1`, grant the interactive session the **same tool surface as the `-p` path** — `--allowedTools` (+ optional `--mcp-config` / `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, read from `CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS` / `CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG` / `CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS`) — instead of the default MCP-walled, built-in-tools-only set. Lets a trusted single-operator TUI deployment run a **tool-using / MCP agent** (e.g. an OpenClaw assistant) on the subscription pool. Safe because TUI **refuses to boot under `AUTH_MODE=multi`** (hard exit) — no guest key can ever reach the TUI path, so this gate cannot expose tools to an untrusted caller. (Under `AUTH_MODE=shared` + `OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1`, anyone holding the single shared key reaches it — that is the existing TUI trust model, unchanged.) See [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) and ADR 0007. |
### Streaming heartbeat
@@ -1034,43 +1019,13 @@ Then restart OCP. At boot you will see (with the env token set, isolated home au
### What changes / what doesn't
- **Callers see no API change.** The response is a normal OpenAI completion object or chunked SSE — identical wire format.
- **No real token streaming *today* — but it is achievable, and planned.** TUI-mode currently buffers the full response then replays it as chunked SSE: you see a delay, then the complete response. This is a limitation of the current implementation, **not** of the path — `claude` fires a `MessageDisplay` hook carrying incremental, byte-faithful `delta`s of the raw reply (they concatenate exactly to the final text, and stay prefix-stable), on the subscription pool, without `-p`. Wiring it into OCP's SSE is tracked as backlog item #2. What is *not* available is token-by-token granularity (the hook fires once per rendered block — roughly one per paragraph, list item, or code block, so the count scales with answer length) — which is plenty for SSE. Evidence: [`docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/streaming-spike.md`](docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/streaming-spike.md).
- **No real token streaming.** TUI-mode buffers the full response then replays it as chunked SSE. You will see a delay then the complete response rather than real-time tokens.
- **Cache and singleflight work normally.** TUI-mode writes the buffered response to the cache on success; cache-hits skip the interactive turn entirely.
- **The host's `CLAUDE.md` / auto-memory is never injected.** OCP is a proxy — the proxied client (OpenClaw / your IDE) owns its own context and memory. TUI-mode always runs `claude` with `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS` + `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY`, so a `CLAUDE.md` on the OCP host can never leak into proxied turns (verified live; see #4). Built-in tool schemas + the interactive system prompt remain (the inherent ~2035K context floor of interactive mode); MCP is hard-disabled.
- **Authenticate via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` in a credential-isolated home (recommended).** tmux does not forward the parent process's env to the pane, so OCP sets the token explicitly on the spawned `claude` when `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is present. But passing the token is **not enough on its own**: interactive `claude` *prefers* `~/.claude/.credentials.json` over the env var (unlike the `-p` path), so a stale `credentials.json` would shadow the token. With the env token set and `OCP_TUI_HOME` unset, OCP therefore runs claude in a **credential-isolated home** (`$HOME/.ocp-tui/home`) that has **no `credentials.json`** — so the env token is the only credential and is authoritative, and claude never runs the token-refresh path (so the single-use refresh token can't be corrupted by the spawn/teardown cycle). On a long-running host the credentials.json path produced a permanent `Please run /login · API Error: 401` that re-login could not fix (the next spawn re-corrupted it); the isolated home ends that at the root. Transcripts land under the same isolated home, so the answer-reader is unaffected. Without the env token, claude falls back to the real home's `credentials.json` (byte-for-byte the previous behaviour). (The token is visible in `ps` on the pane command — acceptable for the single-user A-path; the multi-user B-path is refused at boot.) See ADR 0007 PR-C / PR-D amendments.
- **Stale tmux sessions are reaped.** The pane's `claude` is a child of the tmux server (not OCP), so OCP cannot reap it directly; `claude` zombies can otherwise accumulate as `<defunct>` over a long-running host. OCP reaps them at boot and on a 15-min idle sweep by issuing `tmux kill-server` — but **only when no foreign tmux session remains** (it never disrupts a co-hosted `olp-tui-*` instance). See ADR 0007 PR-C amendment.
- **Default path unchanged.** Unset `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` and restart → `callClaude` / `callClaudeStreaming` are used again, byte-for-byte identical to today.
- **Concurrency is bounded separately.** TUI turns are heavy (per-request cold-boot + long wallclock), so the TUI path has its own limiter — `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` (default `2`), independent of `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT`. Excess turns queue; a full queue returns a 503. Tune it up only on a host that can run more interactive `claude` sessions at once.
- **Optional warm pane pool (`OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE`, default off).** Pre-boots panes so a request skips the cold boot — measured p50 `10.17s` → `6.00s` (41%). Pooled panes are **single-use** (one turn, then killed and replaced in the background), each carrying its own fresh `--session-id`, so one session still means one exchange and no earlier-turn text can leak into a later answer. They are named `ocp-tui-<port>-p<hex>` and coexist with the reaper by design: the sweep **drains the pool first**, then reaps (so `kill-server` still flushes `<defunct>` zombies), then the pool refills in the background. Drain→reap→resume is synchronous, so no request can land mid-sweep; a request arriving while the pool is still re-booting simply misses it and cold-boots. A live pooled pane is never reaped — **including one that is still booting**, whose tmux session already exists — while an *orphaned* one (left by a previous process generation) still is.
### ⚠️ Latency: TUI mode has a ~6-second floor, and it is immovable
**TUI mode cannot serve real-time or interactive-latency consumers.** This is a hard property of the
path, stated plainly so you can rule it out before building on it:
| | measured |
|---|---|
| **TTFT floor (first token)** | **≈ 6 s** — immovable |
| cold boot → input bar ready | ~1 s (per request; not the bottleneck) |
| OCP's own overhead above the CLI | ~4 s (n=1 same-turn decomposition) |
| direct Anthropic API, same prompt (for scale) | 0.841.64 s |
The ~6 s floor is the `claude` CLI itself: it always injects the full Claude Code system prompt plus
its tool definitions before your prompt, on every turn, no matter what you ask. No flag removes it
(`--exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections` was measured: **no effect** on the floor). Extended
thinking is *not* the cause — `OCP_TUI_EFFORT` already defaults to `low`, which is what cuts a
formerly-inherited `xhigh` down to this floor and collapses its variance.
On top of the floor you pay the model's generation time (a function of output length). Progressive
output is not wired up **yet** (see "No real token streaming" above — it is achievable and planned),
so today a turn returns as one blob once generation completes. Note that streaming, when it lands,
will move the *first* byte earlier — it does **not** shorten the turn, and a consumer that needs the
complete answer gains nothing from it.
**Use TUI mode for**: batch, background, and latency-insensitive work where the subscription pool is
the point. **Do not use it for**: anything a person is waiting on interactively, or any consumer with
a sub-5-second budget. Full measurements and methodology:
[`docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/`](docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/).
### Monitoring drift via `/health`
@@ -1084,26 +1039,12 @@ a sub-5-second budget. Full measurements and methodology:
"entrypointMismatches": 0, // count of cli-expected-but-got-other turns — ALERT if this climbs
"inflight": 1, // TUI turns running right now
"queued": 0, // TUI turns waiting for a concurrency slot
"maxConcurrent": 2, // OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT
"pool": { // warm pane pool — null when OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE=0 (the default)
"size": 2, // target warm panes (OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE)
"warm": 2, // panes ready right now — each is a LIVE idle claude process
"booting": 0, // replacement panes currently pre-booting
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6", // the model being warmed (the most recently requested one)
"hits": 12, // requests served by a warm pane
"misses": 1, // requests that fell back to the cold boot (the 1st is always one)
"boots": 14, // panes successfully pre-booted
"bootFailures": 0, // pre-boots that genuinely never reached the input bar — WATCH this
"cancelled": 4, // in-flight boots OCP killed on purpose (drain / model switch) — not faults
"dropped": 8 // panes discarded unused (drain sweep / expired / unhealthy)
}
"maxConcurrent": 2 // OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT
}
```
Alert on `entrypointMismatches > 0` (or `lastEntrypoint !== "cli"`): it means a turn drew from the metered Agent SDK pool instead of the subscription. `inflight` / `queued` show how close the TUI path is to its concurrency cap.
With the pool on, `hits` / `misses` is the hit rate (a steady single-model consumer should sit near 100% after the first request), and `warm` is your standing idle-process cost. A climbing `bootFailures` means panes are not reaching their input bar — the pool then degrades safely to the cold path, but latency reverts to the un-pooled numbers. `cancelled` counts boots OCP killed *on purpose* (a drain, a model switch) and is **not** a fault signal — do not alert on it. A steadily climbing `dropped` is likewise normal: the 15-min reap sweep drains and re-boots the pool on every tick so `kill-server` can still flush `<defunct>` zombies.
### Kill-switch
```bash
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# OCP Promotion Strategy — "Stable & Visible"
> **This document is a recommendation for the maintainer to review and adjust, not a committed plan.**
> It reflects the project's current posture (post-v3.21.0) and should be revisited whenever
> the Anthropic billing / ToS environment changes significantly.
---
## 1. Goal: Polish + Low-Key OSS Visibility
The goal is **stability and quiet discoverability**, not growth-hacking. OCP is a personal power tool
that has been open-sourced because others can benefit from it. The right audience finds it via GitHub
search, issue threads in related projects, and word of mouth — not viral posts.
**Explicitly avoid:**
- HN / Reddit front-page pushes, influencer outreach, or any campaign that would attract a large
influx of users before the ToS/billing situation has settled. Anthropic is actively tightening
billing and enforcement on subscription-sharing (the June-15 Agent-SDK billing split is
*paused*, not cancelled — and consumer-ToS enforcement on multi-person sharing is a live risk).
A high-traffic spotlight right now would draw scrutiny that a low-profile project avoids.
- Promising features that require bypassing the `claude` CLI (raw API calls, OAuth extraction, etc.)
— that would violate `ALIGNMENT.md` and the ToS simultaneously.
---
## 2. Pre-Requisite: Stability First
Do not promote until the house is in order:
- [x] The concurrency / latency perf fixes are shipped (v3.20.xv3.21.0).
- [x] Docs honesty is complete (client-tools boundary, ToS sharing disclosure, this doc).
- [ ] The June-15 Agent-SDK billing split is either confirmed cancelled or OCP has a confirmed
stable path (TUI toggle as insurance — see §5 below).
Promoting a project that has known rough edges in docs or stability only generates support burden
and negative first impressions.
---
## 3. Honest ToS Disclosure on Sharing
Any promotion materials must carry the same disclosure as `README.md § "Deployment model & security"`:
> Pooling a single Claude subscription across **multiple distinct people** may violate Anthropic's
> Consumer Terms of Service and risk account suspension. The defensible framing is "one person,
> your own devices". Friends/team sharing is not.
This framing should appear in any README badge, linked blog post, or issue comment that mentions
LAN sharing. It is not a disclaimer that discourages usage — it is honest positioning that protects
both the project and its users.
---
## 4. What to Explicitly Skip
These items are **not gaps in OCP** — they are deliberate stance decisions:
- **Multi-backend routing** (routing to OpenAI, Gemini, Llama, etc.) — that is the sibling [OLP
project](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/olp)'s role. OCP stays Claude-only by design.
- **Gateway model-discovery** (auto-detecting which models a remote server offers) — not needed
for OCP's single-provider, single-subscription model. `models.json` is the SPOT.
- **Raw Anthropic API passthrough** (bypassing the `claude` CLI) — out of scope per `ALIGNMENT.md`.
Do not add these to OCP roadmaps or respond to feature requests for them with "planned" — the
correct answer is "that's OLP territory" or "out of scope per ALIGNMENT.md".
---
## 5. TUI Toggle as Insurance
The `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE` opt-in is the primary mitigation if the June-15 billing split reactivates
and makes the default `-p` path draw from the metered Agent SDK credit pool.
Keep the TUI toggle:
- Functional and tested across the three deployment hosts.
- Documented in the README, including the security constraints (single-user only).
- Easily discoverable for users who get unexpectedly metered.
If the split reactivates, the recommended operator path is: set `CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true` +
`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` → credential-isolated scratch home → subscription pool. That path is
already shipped and documented.
---
## 6. Low-Key Visibility Actions (when §2 pre-requisites are met)
- Keep the GitHub README polished and honest — it is the primary landing page.
- Respond promptly to issues and PRs — the project's reputation is built on reliability, not
marketing.
- Add OCP to the `awesome-claude` / `awesome-llm-tools` lists if they exist and allow self-PRs
— low-effort, targeted, reaches the right audience.
- When related projects (Cline, OpenCode, OpenClaw, Continue.dev) post about local Claude proxies,
a short factual comment linking to OCP is appropriate — not spam.
- Maintain the `CHANGELOG.md` with clear, honest summaries — users who are already running OCP
are the best vector for word-of-mouth.
---
*Last updated: v3.21.0 cleanup cycle. Maintainer should re-read before any external promotion.*
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# ADR 0008 — TUI Warm Pane Pool
**Date:** 2026-07-13
**Status:** Proposed
**Extends:** [ADR 0007](0007-tui-interactive-mode.md) (TUI interactive mode). This ADR does not
change ADR 0007's billing-pool argument, security posture, or kill-switch — it adds a latency
optimization *inside* the TUI spawn machinery ADR 0007 owns.
---
## Context
TUI mode (ADR 0007) serves every request by cold-booting a fresh `tmux` session running an
interactive `claude`, submitting one prompt, reading the native transcript, and killing the
session. That cold boot is paid on **every** request.
[`docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/`](../plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/README.md) measured the
TUI path and listed a warm pane pool as backlog item #3, costed at "**~1.0 s**" (the observed
boot-to-input-bar time). Instrumenting the real request path showed that estimate is **~4×
too low**. Phase decomposition of the cold path (n=6 medians, Sonnet 4.6, `--effort low`,
through a real OCP instance):
| Phase | Median |
|---|---|
| prep (trust cwd, write prompt file) | 2 ms |
| `tmux new-session` | 27 ms |
| **boot → input bar ready** | **1232 ms** |
| paste (`load-buffer` + `paste-buffer`) | 8 ms |
| paste-verify poll | 426 ms |
| **submit → transcript terminal** | **8458 ms** |
| teardown | 8 ms |
| **total** | **10162 ms** |
| *claude's own reported `turn_duration`* | *5539 ms* |
| **OCP-side overhead** | **4490 ms** |
The `submit → terminal` phase exceeds claude's own `turn_duration` by **~2.9 s**. That gap is
**post-input-bar initialization inside `claude`** — work that a pane which has merely *sat idle
for a few seconds* has already completed. A direct spike confirmed it: an identical pane, idle
12 s before receiving the same prompt, completed its turn in a median 5537 ms versus 7980 ms
cold.
So a warm pane recovers **~1.26 s of boot *and* ~2.9 s of in-`claude` cold start** — not the
~1.0 s the plan predicted.
The reason this was worth a pool rather than a "keep one session and reuse it" cache is a
hazard already flagged in the code. `lib/tui/transcript.mjs` returns the **last text-bearing
assistant entry in the whole transcript file**, which is correct *only* under OCP's
one-session-per-request model, and it says so:
> *"If a future warm-pool ever reuses a session WITHOUT a fresh session-id / clear, earlier-turn
> text could leak — that author must add user-line scoping here."*
Reusing a pane for a second turn puts two exchanges in one transcript and would leak the earlier
turn's text into the later turn's answer — a **cross-request data leak**, not merely a bug.
---
## Decision
Add an **opt-in pool of pre-booted, single-use `claude` panes**, `OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE` (default
`0` = off, max `4`). Implementation: `lib/tui/pool.mjs`.
### 1. Panes are SINGLE-USE. This is the load-bearing rule.
A pooled pane serves **exactly one turn**, then is killed and replaced in the background. Each
pane is booted with its **own fresh `--session-id`**, fixed at spawn, and the turn locates its
transcript by that id.
This preserves one-session-per-request exactly, so the `transcript.mjs` hazard above **does not
arise** and no user-line scoping was needed. The warning in `transcript.mjs` is deliberately
left standing, now annotated: it still binds anyone who later wants a pane to serve a second
turn, or to reset a session with `/clear` and reuse it. **Neither is permitted without first
adding user-line scoping to the transcript reader.**
Rejected alternative — *reuse a pane for N turns, `/clear` between* — is strictly cheaper
(no re-boot per request) and was rejected on exactly this basis. The latency win is not worth a
cross-request text-leak surface guarded only by a `/clear` that we cannot verify landed.
### 2. The pool is keyed by model, and a MISS is always safe.
`--model` is fixed at spawn, so a pane can only serve the model it booted with. A pool miss
falls back to the existing cold-boot path with **zero behavioural difference**. There is no
boot-time pre-warm and no configured model: OCP cannot know which model the next caller wants,
so the pool warms the **most recently requested** model. Consequence, stated plainly: **the
first request after start, and the first after any model switch, is always a cold miss.**
### 3. The pool and the session reaper coexist by an explicit invariant.
This is the subtle part. `reapStaleTuiSessions()` kills every session matching this instance's
`ocp-tui-<port>-` prefix, and issues `tmux kill-server` when no foreign session remains (the
only mechanism that can reap `<defunct>` `claude` zombies — the pane's `claude` is a child of
the tmux *server*, not of node). A warm pooled pane **is** one of our own sessions, alive and
idle **by design** — and the periodic sweep runs precisely **when the instance is idle**, i.e.
exactly when the pool is full.
The invariant, stated in a comment above `reapStaleTuiSessions` and pinned by tests:
1. **A live pooled pane is never reaped — including one that is still BOOTING.** The reaper
takes a `spare` set of **exact session names** supplied by the pool's live registry.
2. **An orphaned pooled pane IS still reaped.** Membership is by **exact name from a live
in-memory registry, never by name shape**. A pane the pool no longer owns — handed out,
dropped, cancelled, or left behind by a previous process generation (whose registry died with
it) — is absent from `spare` and is killed like any other stale session. **Fail-safe:
omitting `spare` reaps *more*, never less.** Pool panes are named `ocp-tui-<port>-p<hex>`
purely for operator legibility; that shape is *not* the exemption mechanism.
3. **`kill-server` is suppressed while any pane is spared** (it would kill a live child of the
tmux server). Therefore **the pool is DRAINED immediately before every sweep**, so `spare` is
empty on the normal tick and `kill-server` still fires. Without the drain, a permanently-full
pool would **permanently disable zombie reaping** — the pool would silently break the thing
the sweep exists to do. The drain costs one pane re-boot per tick (15 min).
The `spare` mechanism is belt-and-braces given the drain: it makes it impossible for a reap call
site that *forgets* to drain to kill a live pane.
### 4. The pool tracks its in-flight boot BY NAME, not as a count.
`bootTuiPane` creates the tmux session **synchronously** and only *then* waits (up to
`POOL_BOOT_MS`, 20 s) for the input bar. So **a pooled tmux session can be live for ~20 s before
its boot resolves.** A pool that tracked in-flight boots as a *count* could not name that
session, and this produced two real bugs (both caught in review, both now regression-tested):
- the periodic sweep **killed the booting pane** (it could not be spared), then left the pool
empty with nothing scheduled, and logged the exact `tui_pool_boot_failed` warning operators are
told to alert on — for a completely healthy drain;
- graceful shutdown **orphaned a live, authenticated, idle `claude`**: `gracefulShutdown` calls
`process.exit(0)` in the same tick as the drain (TUI panes are tmux children, so node's
`activeProcesses` set is empty and the "wait for children" path exits immediately), so any
cleanup deferred to a `.then()` never ran.
The pool therefore **mints each pane's identity up front** (`{sessionId, name}`, name derived
from the session-id so `tmux ls` correlates to the transcript file) and holds it in
`_bootingPane`. `liveNames()` includes it; `drain()` kills it **synchronously**. A generation
counter distinguishes *"cancelled by us"* from *"genuinely failed"*, so a drain never inflates
`bootFailures` and `resume()` reliably starts a fresh boot.
### 5. Refills take no concurrency slot, and are serialized.
A refill boot deliberately does **not** take a `TuiSemaphore` slot: those slots bound concurrent
*turns* and belong to real requests, and charging a background pre-boot against them would let
the pool starve the traffic it exists to speed up. It cannot leak a slot either, since it never
holds one. Boots are **serialized** (one at a time): two cold boots racing an in-flight turn were
observed to overrun even the generous pool readiness cap. A genuinely failed boot does **not**
re-kick the chain (backoff — a broken `claude` must not respawn forever).
Background boots get a more generous readiness cap (`POOL_BOOT_MS` = 5 × `BOOT_MS`): `BOOT_MS` is
tight because a *client* is blocked on it, which is not true of a pre-boot. Slow ≠ broken.
---
## Consequences
### Cost — standing processes, paid whether or not a request arrives
**A warm pane is a live idle `claude` process.** Peak process count is
`OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE` + `OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` + 1 (booting replacement). This is the whole
reason the pool is **default-off**: an operator must opt into holding processes for traffic that
may never come. Size is clamped to `POOL_MAX_SIZE` = 4; an unparseable value **disables** the
pool rather than guessing.
Panes carry a 10-minute TTL and are health-checked at hand-out; a dead or degraded pane becomes
a **miss** (cold path), never a hung turn.
### Benefit
Measured end-to-end through a real OCP instance (Sonnet 4.6, `--effort low`):
**p50 10.17 s (n=6, pool off) → 6.00 s (n=12 warm hits) — 4.2 s / 41%.**
### The floor is unchanged
The pool does not touch the **~6 s TTFT floor** documented in the latency plan (claude always
prefills the full Claude Code system prompt). TUI mode remains unsuitable for interactive /
real-time consumers; it is for batch and background work. This ADR does not change that
conclusion.
### Observability
`/health`'s `tui` block gains a `pool` sub-object (`null` when off): `size`, `warm`, `booting`,
`model`, `hits`, `misses`, `boots`, `bootFailures`, `cancelled`, `dropped`. A climbing
`bootFailures` means panes are not reaching their input bar — the pool then degrades safely to
the cold path, but latency reverts to the un-pooled numbers. A steadily climbing `dropped` is
**normal** (the 15-min sweep drains and re-boots the pool on every tick, by design — see
Decision 3).
### ALIGNMENT authorization
- **Class B / OCP-owned.** The warm pool is process management around the `claude` CLI — the
same category as the existing tmux session lifecycle and the defunct-session reaper it extends.
**`cli.js` does not perform this operation, and no `cli.js` citation applies**; the authority
is ADR 0007 (which owns the TUI spawn machinery) plus this ADR. This is `ALIGNMENT.md` Rule 2's
Class B citation requirement, discharged explicitly rather than by silence.
- **The `/health` extension** adds sub-fields to the `tui` block. That block is **owned by ADR
0007** and post-dates ADR 0006's v3.16.4 grandfather snapshot, so it is not part of the frozen
B.2 inventory. The change is additive — every pre-existing `/health` field keeps a
byte-identical value, and `pool` is `null` unless the operator opts in — which is the
behaviour-preserving bar ADR 0006 sets. This ADR records that authorization.
- **No spawn argument changed.** `buildTuiCmd` is byte-identical; the pool calls it with the same
arguments. Banner-verified on live pooled panes: `· Claude Max`, never `API Usage Billing`
(the `--bare` trap documented in the latency plan).
### What a future contributor must not undo
- **Do not let a pane serve a second turn** (or `/clear`-and-reuse one) without first adding
user-line scoping to `lib/tui/transcript.mjs`. That is a cross-request text leak, not a perf
tweak. See Decision 1.
- **Do not remove the drain-before-sweep.** It is what keeps `kill-server` zombie reaping alive.
See Decision 3.
- **Do not go back to counting in-flight boots.** The pool must be able to *name* a session that
exists but has not finished booting. See Decision 4.
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| [0004](0004-openclaw-auto-sync.md) | OpenClaw Auto-Sync | Why `scripts/sync-openclaw.mjs` runs on `ocp update`, what its scope boundary is (writes only `models.providers["claude-local"].models` and `agents.defaults.models["claude-local/*"]`), and the idempotency contract. |
| [0005](0005-no-multi-provider.md) | No Multi-Provider | Why OCP stays single-provider (Anthropic-via-cli.js) and does not extend to OpenAI / Gemini / OpenRouter. Cost estimate: ~7 weeks for a v1 that buys neither moat nor commercial readiness. Separate commercial work starts in a separate repo. |
| [0006](0006-openai-shim-scope.md) | OpenAI Shim Scope | The Class A / Class B taxonomy. Class A endpoints (`cli.js`-mirror) keep Rules 15 verbatim; Class B endpoints (OCP-owned compatibility surface — `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/models`, admin endpoints) are anchored to OpenAI's spec (B.1) or to an authorizing ADR (B.2). Triggered by PR #99 (external `response_format` honoring). Grandfathers the existing B.2 inventory at v3.16.4. |
| [0007](0007-tui-interactive-mode.md) | TUI Interactive Mode | Why TUI-mode spawns an interactive `claude` in a tmux pane (no `-p`) to reach the **subscription** billing pool (`cc_entrypoint=cli`) rather than the metered Agent SDK pool. Owns the TUI spawn machinery: entrypoint labeling, credential-isolated home, MCP hard-disable, session namespace + defunct-session reaping, the independent concurrency bound, and the `/health` `tui` block. **Single-user only** — hard FATAL on multi-user configs. |
| [0008](0008-tui-warm-pane-pool.md) | TUI Warm Pane Pool | Why `OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE` pre-boots **single-use** `claude` panes (one turn each, own `--session-id`) — and why reuse is forbidden (`transcript.mjs` returns the last assistant entry in the file, so a reused session leaks the earlier turn's text). Measured 41% end-to-end. Defines the pool↔reaper invariant (exemption by exact name from a live registry; drain before every sweep so `kill-server` zombie reaping survives) and the standing idle-process cost. Extends ADR 0007. |
## When to write a new ADR
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# TUI-mode latency: measured floor, and the four things worth fixing
**Date**: 2026-07-13
**Status**: findings + backlog. **Superseded in part** — see the dated update boxes below.
Item #1 shipped ([#156](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/pull/156)); item #2 is **dead**
([`streaming-spike.md`](streaming-spike.md)); item #4 measured, **no effect**; item #3 stands.
**Measured on**: Mac mini / macOS 26.5.2 / Claude Code **v2.1.207** / Sonnet 5 / Claude Max subscription / **real-home mode** (no `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, no `OCP_TUI_HOME` in the service env)
**Evidence**: [`measurements.jsonl`](measurements.jsonl) — **n=15** (3 configs × 5) · banner captures [`billing-banner.txt`](billing-banner.txt) · harness [`floor.sh`](floor.sh)
## Why this exists
An external consumer (the 知音 AI project) benchmarked OCP's prompt path and measured
**TTFT p50 ≈ 3032 s**, and excluded OCP as a backend on that basis. That number is real,
but it is *not* the model being slow — this document decomposes where the 30 seconds
actually go, and what OCP can do about it.
**The harness deliberately does not go through OCP.** It spawns `tmux` + `claude` directly
(session prefix `zhiyin-floor-`, never `ocp-tui-*`) and polls `tmux capture-pane` for
incremental render, so it measures the **true first-token time** of the underlying
subscription path — the floor OCP could reach if it were perfect.
---
## Measurements
All rows in [`measurements.jsonl`](measurements.jsonl); every number below is recomputable from it.
| Config | n | boot→input-ready (median) | **TTFT (median)** | TTFT range | full answer (median) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| baseline (inherits global `effortLevel: xhigh`) | 5 | 1.07 s | **10.35 s** | 8.32 17.19 s | 11.32 s |
| **`--effort low`** | 5 | 1.03 s | **6.17 s** | **5.87 6.44 s** | 9.98 s |
| `--bare` | 5 | 0.44 s | **no answer at all** (5/5 `ttft_ms: -1`) | — | — |
> **Not from this harness**: the direct Anthropic API reference figure (TTFT 0.841.64 s, n=2)
> comes from the 知音 AI project's own smoke test, not from `measurements.jsonl`. It is quoted
> only to size the gap; do not look for it in the evidence file.
### Where the 30 seconds go
```
~1.0 s spawn → claude's input bar is ready ← NOT the bottleneck
~6-10 s true TTFT (first token rendered in the pane)
~20 s ████ waiting for the whole turn to finish ████ ← this is the 30s
```
`runTuiTurn` blocks on the native transcript until a terminal event (`lib/tui/session.mjs`
"Block on the native transcript … until terminal"; `readTuiTranscript` in
`lib/tui/transcript.mjs`; ADR 0007 step 4) — i.e. it waits for the **entire turn** to complete
before returning anything. There is no streaming path. The ~20 s delta between this harness's
real TTFT and OCP's reported 3032 s is exactly that.
> **⚠️ 2026-07-13 correction — this decomposition attributes the ~20 s to the wrong thing.** It was
> inferred from the external 3032 s report, never measured *through* OCP. It has since been measured
> through a real OCP instance (TUI mode, `claude-sonnet-4-6`, the same ~1850-token prompt, n=5):
> **median 11.30 s** before [#156](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/pull/156), **9.55 s** after.
> Same-turn decomposition (baseline row `i=5`): **11.563 s** wall through OCP vs `turn_duration:
> 7.319 s` of CLI-internal time on that same turn → **OCP's own overhead ≈ 4.2 s** (n=1), **not
> ~20 s**. The rest of any larger number is the model *generating a long answer*,
> which the blocking wait does not cause and streaming would not shorten — it would only move the
> first byte earlier. The 3032 s figure therefore reflects a much longer output (and/or the
> then-inherited `xhigh` effort), not 20 s of OCP dead time. See
> [`streaming-spike.md`](streaming-spike.md) § "What streaming would have bought".
---
## ⚠️ Blocking constraint: `--bare` silently drops you off the subscription pool
Captured live ([`billing-banner.txt`](billing-banner.txt)) — the startup banner is the **only**
reliable indicator:
```
[] | Sonnet 5 with xhigh effort · Claude Max
[--effort low] | Sonnet 5 with low effort · Claude Max
[--bare] | Sonnet 5 with xhigh effort · API Usage Billing ← ❌
```
`--bare` ("skip hooks, LSP, plugin…") **also skips the subscription-credential resolution
path**. It really does cut boot to 0.430.45 s — but you are no longer on the subscription,
which defeats the entire purpose of TUI mode (ADR 0007 exists solely to reach the
subscription pool).
**The failure is silent.** All 5 `--bare` samples reached input-ready (boot 0.430.45 s), were
sent the prompt, and then produced **no answer at all** — 60 s timeout, no error, no crash, the
pane simply never rendered a token (the API-billing account had no credit balance). Nothing in
the transcript or the exit status reveals this.
**Anyone changing spawn flags must diff the banner line before and after.**
---
## Backlog — four items, ranked by value ÷ effort
### 1. Pass `--effort` explicitly on spawn — **do this first**
`buildTuiCmd` (`lib/tui/session.mjs`) does not pass `--effort``grep -rn -- "--effort\|effortLevel" lib/ server.mjs`
returns zero hits. What the pane's `claude` ends up using therefore depends on **which HOME mode
`resolveTuiHome()` picked**:
| mode | HOME | effort the pane gets |
|---|---|---|
| **real-home** (legacy default — *current* service config: no `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, no `OCP_TUI_HOME`) | `~` | **inherits the operator's `~/.claude/settings.json` → `effortLevel: xhigh` on this host** |
| env-token scratch (`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` set — the direction #146/#150 pushed) | `~/.ocp-tui/home` | that settings.json contains only `permissions.additionalDirectories`; `prepareTuiHome()` never writes `effortLevel`**claude's built-in default** |
**Scope note**: TUI mode is currently *off* on this host (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=false`; `/health`
`"tui": {"enabled": false}`), so live traffic takes the `-p` path today. The statement below is
about what happens **when TUI mode is enabled**.
On the current HOME config, **every TUI request would run extended thinking** — pure waste
for the typical "generate this JSON" request, and it makes latency depend on an unrelated global
setting the operator may have changed for their own interactive use. And the mode split means
the effort level silently changes if the operator ever switches to env-token mode.
**Passing `--effort` explicitly fixes both problems at once.**
- **Effect (real-home, measured)**: TTFT p50 **10.35 s → 6.17 s (40 %)**, and the spread
collapses from 8.3217.19 s to **5.876.44 s**. For a proxy, the variance reduction matters
more than the median.
- **Cost**: one flag. Suggested: a new `OCP_TUI_EFFORT` env var (default `low`), documented in
README § "Environment Variables" per `release_kit.new_feature_doc_expectations`.
- **Risk**: none — banner confirms it stays on `Claude Max` (see `billing-banner.txt`).
- ⚠️ Do **not** reach for `--bare` to shave boot: see above.
### 2. Real streaming instead of blocking on turn-terminal — **ACHIEVABLE → [`streaming-spike.md`](streaming-spike.md)**
> **2026-07-13 update — the prereq spike was run. The answer is YES, but not from either source this
> item guessed at.** (a) The transcript grows at *event* granularity (the whole answer lands in one
> line, ~0.3 s before terminal) — dead. (b) The pane is a **rendered** view whose `capture-pane` text
> no longer contains the answer's source bytes (`## `, `**`, code fences are gone) — dead, and worse
> than "lossy": it is *not the model's text*. **But there is a third source neither this backlog nor
> the first spike considered: `claude` fires a `MessageDisplay` hook carrying incremental,
> byte-faithful `delta`s of the raw reply.** Verified live on a plain interactive TUI spawn (no `-p`),
> banner `· Claude Max`: 7 fires spread across generation, `concat(deltas) === T` **byte-exactly**
> (579 == 579), `T.startsWith(S)` true at every step, `## ` / `**` / ```` ```javascript ```` all
> present in the deltas. Granularity is block-level (~57 chunks/answer), not token-level — plenty for
> SSE. **Build it.**
>
> ⚠️ Two corrections to this item as written: the **"~20 s" is wrong** (inferred from an external
> report, never measured through OCP — the same-turn decomposition puts OCP's own overhead at **~4 s**,
> n=1), and **streaming moves the first byte, not the last** — so a consumer needing the *complete*
> answer (the JSON-card case that motivated this) gains **nothing** from it. Build it for
> progressively-rendering consumers, not as a throughput win.
>
> Full evidence + implementer caveats (the hook is `forceSyncExecution` — claude BLOCKS on it):
> **[`streaming-spike.md`](streaming-spike.md)**. Original framing preserved below.
Today `runTuiTurn` blocks on the transcript until the turn is *finished*. The pane is already
rendering tokens incrementally the whole time — this harness proves you can observe first token
at ~6 s by polling `tmux capture-pane`.
- **Effect**: turns a 30 s wall into a ~6 s TTFT with progressive output; enables SSE streaming
on the OCP endpoint instead of a single blob at the end.
- **Cost**: real work. Pane capture is ANSI/redraw-based and lossy for exact text (wrapping,
scrollback, spinner lines). Two candidate sources: (a) incremental reads of the transcript
JSONL, (b) `capture-pane` diffing with a stable start marker. (a) is much cleaner **if it
holds**.
- **Prereq spike (do this before designing anything)**: does the transcript JSONL grow *during*
a turn, or only at the end? If only at the end, (a) is dead and you are stuck with (b).
### 3. Warm pane pool — ~1 s
Every request spawns a fresh tmux session + `claude` (`randomUUID()` + `new-session`, then
`kill-session` in `finally`; `grep -rn "pool\|warm\|reuse" lib/tui/*.mjs` → zero hits). Boot to
input-ready is ~1.0 s, paid on every request. A pool of pre-booted panes (single-use, replaced in
the background) amortizes it to zero for any workload below the pool refill rate.
- **Effect**: 1.0 s.
- **Cost**: moderate; interacts with the session reaper and the per-port prefix scoping added in
#148 — pooled panes must not look like zombies to the sweep.
- Lower priority than #1 and #2: it is the smallest slice.
### 4. Trim the prefill — ~~probably not worth it~~ **MEASURED: no detectable benefit. Do not adopt.**
> **2026-07-13 update.** `--exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections` was measured with the same
> harness (`floor.sh`, n=5, Sonnet 5, on top of `--effort low`): **TTFT median 6.39 s**
> (5.8710.54 s) vs **6.17 s** (5.876.44 s) for `--effort low` alone — i.e. **0.22 s worse, inside
> the noise band**, with one worse outlier; dropping that outlier does not change the verdict. n=5
> cannot prove "zero", only "no benefit detectable above noise" — but there is also a **mechanistic**
> reason not to expect one: `--help` says the flag *"Improves cross-user prompt-cache **reuse**"*, and
> **OCP is single-user** — there is no cross-user cache to share, so the flag has nothing to buy here.
> The banner stayed on `· Claude Max` (no billing-pool drop), but there is no win to bank. The ~6 s
> floor stands as stated below. Raw rows: [`prefill-spike-measurements.jsonl`](prefill-spike-measurements.jsonl).
After #1#3, the floor is **~6 s**, and it does not go lower. `claude` always injects the full
Claude Code system prompt + tool definitions (thousands to tens of thousands of prefill tokens)
regardless of what you ask it. `--exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections` exists and may shave
some of it — **unmeasured**; worth one spike, but do not expect to reach the direct API's
~1 s.
**Consequence to accept, and to state in the README**: even fully optimized, TUI mode has a
**~6 s TTFT floor**, so it cannot serve real-time / interactive-latency consumers. It remains
appropriate for batch, background, and cost-insensitive-latency use. The 知音 AI project
excluded it on this basis (their prompt-latency budget is 24 s) *independently* of the ToS
question already documented in the README.
---
## Reproduction
```bash
# harness never touches OCP's :3456 service or ocp-tui-* sessions, and never kill-server
bash docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency/floor.sh 5 # baseline
TAG=effort-low EXTRA_ARGS="--effort low" bash .../floor.sh 5 # 40 %
TAG=bare EXTRA_ARGS="--bare" bash .../floor.sh 5 # the trap
# billing-pool check for ANY spawn-flag change — the banner is the only source of truth
tmux new-session -d -s probe -x 200 -y 50 -c "$HOME" \
"claude --model claude-sonnet-5 --session-id $(uuidgen) <your-flags-here>"
sleep 6; tmux capture-pane -p -t probe | grep -E "Claude Max|API Usage Billing"
tmux kill-session -t probe
```
## Interaction with OCP while the harness runs
- **Kill direction is safe both ways**: `reapStaleTuiSessions()` only `kill-session`s names
matching `ocp-tui-<port>-`, which `zhiyin-floor-*` never matches; and the harness only
`kill-session`s its own single session — it contains **no `kill-server`**.
- **One benign interaction** (only when TUI mode is enabled — the reap tick is itself gated on
`TUI_MODE`): OCP's periodic `kill-server` (zombie reaping) is gated on
`othersRemain`*any* foreign-prefixed tmux session suppresses it. So while the harness is
running, that sweep is skipped. This is the coexistence guard working as designed; it resumes
on the next tick.
## Harness caveats (stated so the numbers are not over-trusted)
- **n=5 per config**, single host, single model (Sonnet 5), single prompt size (~1850 tokens).
Enough to separate 6 s from 10 s from 30 s; **not** enough for a p95.
- TTFT is "marker visible in `capture-pane`", which includes tmux render latency (small, but
nonzero) — it is an upper bound on the true first-token time.
- **The harness's readiness marker is not OCP's.** `floor.sh` waits for `│ >||Try "`; OCP's
`tuiInputReady()` matches `/\? for shortcuts/`. These are different events, so the ~1.0 s
boot figure is **not** directly comparable to OCP's `BOOT_MS` gate (default cap 4000 ms). It
does not affect the conclusions (1 s ≪ 6 s TTFT), but it is not apples-to-apples.
- The first version of this harness reported TTFT **0.08 s** — a false positive: the prompt
literally contained the marker string it was grepping for, so the match fired the instant the
prompt was pasted. Fixed by describing the marker instead of spelling it. **The script exited 0
and "successfully" produced 5 samples both times** — exit status proves nothing here.
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
[] | ▝▜█████▛▘ Sonnet 5 with xhigh effort · Claude Max
[--effort low] | ▝▜█████▛▘ Sonnet 5 with low effort · Claude Max
[--bare] | ▝▜█████▛▘ Sonnet 5 with xhigh effort · API Usage Billing
-128
View File
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# OCP TUI-mode latency floor harness — see README.md in this directory.
#
# 目的:回答一个问题——如果把 OCP 现有的两个已知开销砍掉
# (a) 每请求 spawn + boot(可用预热进程池消除)
# (b) 假流式(等 turn_duration 才返回,可用增量读 pane 消除)
# 之后,订阅池路径的**真实 TTFT 地板**是多少?
#
# 判据:地板 ≤ 4s → OCP 作为"省钱选项"可行;> 8s → 死透,不再讨论。
#
# 红线:
# - 不经过生产 OCP 服务(:3456)—— 直接起 tmux+claudeOCP 进程零干扰
# - tmux session 前缀用 zhiyin-floor-**不是** ocp-tui-),避免被 OCP 的
# reaper 当成自己的会话杀掉,也避免我们杀到它的
# - 用 real HOME(凭据)—— scratch HOME + symlink 凭据会 fork OAuth 导致 401
# (见跨机记忆 tui_scratch_home_credential_fork
set -uo pipefail
N=${1:-5}
MODEL=${MODEL:-claude-sonnet-5}
EXTRA_ARGS=${EXTRA_ARGS:-} # 额外 CLI 参数(如 --effort low --bare
TAG=${TAG:-baseline}
OUT=${OUT:-$(dirname "$0")/measurements.jsonl}
PROMPT_FILE=$(mktemp)
PREFIX="zhiyin-floor"
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$OUT")"
# ── 构造提示:~2000 token 的假会议转写 + 明确的起始标记 ────────────────
# 单行(多行会在 tmux send-keys 时提前触发 Enter
build_prompt() {
local seg="Speaker A said the quarterly pipeline is tracking behind plan and the enterprise segment needs a different motion. Speaker B replied that the current onboarding flow loses roughly a third of trial accounts before the first integration is complete. They debated whether the fix belongs in product or in customer success. "
local body=""
for _ in $(seq 1 22); do body+="$seg"; done
printf '%s' "You are a real-time meeting copilot. Meeting transcript so far: $body --- Task: produce ONE prompt card as compact JSON with keys: points (array of 3 short Chinese bullet points), keyline (one English sentence the user can read aloud). IMPORTANT: your reply MUST begin with three hash characters immediately followed by the uppercase word CARD (no space between them), then the JSON. No preamble, no markdown fences." > "$PROMPT_FILE"
}
build_prompt
PROMPT_CHARS=$(wc -c < "$PROMPT_FILE" | tr -d ' ')
now_ms() { python3 -c 'import time;print(int(time.time()*1000))'; }
echo "配置: $TAG 参数: [$EXTRA_ARGS]"
echo "模型: $MODEL 样本: $N 提示长度: ${PROMPT_CHARS} chars (≈$((PROMPT_CHARS/4)) token)"
echo "输出: $OUT"
echo
for i in $(seq 1 "$N"); do
SESS="${PREFIX}-$$-$i"
SID=$(uuidgen)
# ── 冷启动:spawn + 等输入框就绪 ─────────────────────────────────
T_SPAWN=$(now_ms)
tmux new-session -d -s "$SESS" -x 200 -y 50 \
-e CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS=1 \
-e CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY=1 \
-c "$HOME" \
"claude --model $MODEL --session-id $SID --strict-mcp-config --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' $EXTRA_ARGS" 2>/dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "[$i] tmux spawn 失败,跳过"; continue; fi
# 轮询输入框就绪(claude TUI 的输入提示符)
READY=0
for _ in $(seq 1 150); do # 上限 15s
PANE=$(tmux capture-pane -p -t "$SESS" 2>/dev/null || true)
if grep -qE '│ >||Try "' <<<"$PANE"; then READY=1; break; fi
sleep 0.1
done
T_READY=$(now_ms)
BOOT_MS=$((T_READY - T_SPAWN))
if [ "$READY" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "[$i] 启动超时(${BOOT_MS}ms),pane 末 3 行:"
tmux capture-pane -p -t "$SESS" 2>/dev/null | tail -3 | sed 's/^/ /'
tmux kill-session -t "$SESS" 2>/dev/null
continue
fi
# ── 热态:粘提示 → 回车 → 量首 token ─────────────────────────────
tmux send-keys -t "$SESS" -l "$(cat "$PROMPT_FILE")" 2>/dev/null
sleep 0.4 # 让粘贴落地(OCP 用 400ms 轮询粒度)
T0=$(now_ms)
tmux send-keys -t "$SESS" Enter 2>/dev/null
TTFT_MS=-1
for _ in $(seq 1 600); do # 上限 60s
if tmux capture-pane -p -t "$SESS" 2>/dev/null | grep -q '###CARD'; then
TTFT_MS=$(( $(now_ms) - T0 )); break
fi
sleep 0.1
done
# ── 完整回答:pane 连续 2s 不再变化 ──────────────────────────────
COMPLETE_MS=-1
if [ "$TTFT_MS" -ge 0 ]; then
LAST=""; STABLE=0
for _ in $(seq 1 900); do # 上限 90s
CUR=$(tmux capture-pane -p -t "$SESS" 2>/dev/null | cksum)
if [ "$CUR" = "$LAST" ]; then
STABLE=$((STABLE+1))
[ "$STABLE" -ge 20 ] && { COMPLETE_MS=$(( $(now_ms) - T0 - 2000 )); break; }
else
STABLE=0; LAST="$CUR"
fi
sleep 0.1
done
fi
printf '{"i":%d,"tag":"%s","model":"%s","extra_args":"%s","prompt_chars":%s,"boot_ms":%d,"ttft_ms":%d,"complete_ms":%d}\n' \
"$i" "$TAG" "$MODEL" "$EXTRA_ARGS" "$PROMPT_CHARS" "$BOOT_MS" "$TTFT_MS" "$COMPLETE_MS" | tee -a "$OUT"
tmux kill-session -t "$SESS" 2>/dev/null
sleep 1
done
rm -f "$PROMPT_FILE"
echo
echo "=== 汇总 ==="
python3 - "$OUT" <<'EOF'
import json,sys,statistics
rows=[json.loads(l) for l in open(sys.argv[1]) if l.strip()]
ok=[r for r in rows if r['ttft_ms']>=0]
if not ok: print("无有效样本"); sys.exit()
def s(k):
v=[r[k] for r in ok if r[k]>=0]
return f"n={len(v)} 中位={statistics.median(v)/1000:.2f}s 最小={min(v)/1000:.2f}s 最大={max(v)/1000:.2f}s" if v else "无"
print(f" 冷启动 boot : {s('boot_ms')} ← 预热进程池可完全消除")
print(f" TTFT(首 token : {s('ttft_ms')} ★ 这就是地板")
print(f" 完整回答 : {s('complete_ms')}")
print(f"\n 失败样本: {len(rows)-len(ok)}/{len(rows)}")
EOF
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{"i": 1, "tag": "effort-low", "model": "claude-sonnet-5", "extra_args": "--effort low", "prompt_chars": 7451, "boot_ms": 1077, "ttft_ms": 6172, "complete_ms": 9929}
{"i": 2, "tag": "effort-low", "model": "claude-sonnet-5", "extra_args": "--effort low", "prompt_chars": 7451, "boot_ms": 1026, "ttft_ms": 6160, "complete_ms": 9996}
{"i": 3, "tag": "effort-low", "model": "claude-sonnet-5", "extra_args": "--effort low", "prompt_chars": 7451, "boot_ms": 1010, "ttft_ms": 6437, "complete_ms": 9977}
{"i": 4, "tag": "effort-low", "model": "claude-sonnet-5", "extra_args": "--effort low", "prompt_chars": 7451, "boot_ms": 1033, "ttft_ms": 5872, "complete_ms": 9944}
{"i": 5, "tag": "effort-low", "model": "claude-sonnet-5", "extra_args": "--effort low", "prompt_chars": 7451, "boot_ms": 1154, "ttft_ms": 6387, "complete_ms": 9993}
{"i":1,"tag":"baseline","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":1300,"ttft_ms":8321,"complete_ms":9939}
{"i":2,"tag":"baseline","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":1070,"ttft_ms":10347,"complete_ms":11320}
{"i":3,"tag":"baseline","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":911,"ttft_ms":13061,"complete_ms":15163}
{"i":4,"tag":"baseline","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":1441,"ttft_ms":9981,"complete_ms":11066}
{"i":5,"tag":"baseline","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":1036,"ttft_ms":17189,"complete_ms":17985}
{"i":1,"tag":"bare","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--bare","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":429,"ttft_ms":-1,"complete_ms":-1}
{"i":2,"tag":"bare","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--bare","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":437,"ttft_ms":-1,"complete_ms":-1}
{"i":3,"tag":"bare","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--bare","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":444,"ttft_ms":-1,"complete_ms":-1}
{"i":4,"tag":"bare","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--bare","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":446,"ttft_ms":-1,"complete_ms":-1}
{"i":5,"tag":"bare","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--bare","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":441,"ttft_ms":-1,"complete_ms":-1}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
{"hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay", "index": 0, "final": false, "delta": "## Mutex\n\n"}
{"hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay", "index": 1, "final": false, "delta": "A **mutual exclusion lock** prevents concurrent access to a shared resource, ensuring only one thread runs the critical section at a time.\n\n"}
{"hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay", "index": 2, "final": false, "delta": "- Acquiring a locked mutex blocks the caller until the current holder releases it.\n"}
{"hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay", "index": 3, "final": false, "delta": "- Failing to release a mutex causes a deadlock, freezing all waiting threads.\n\n```javascript\nconst { Mutex } = require('async-mutex');\n\nconst mutex = new Mutex();\n"}
{"hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay", "index": 4, "final": false, "delta": "let counter = 0;\n\nasync function increment() {\n const release = await mutex.acquire();\n try {\n"}
{"hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay", "index": 5, "final": false, "delta": " counter++; // only one caller here at a time\n } finally {\n release();\n }\n}\n"}
{"hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay", "index": 6, "final": true, "delta": "```"}
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
{"i":1,"tag":"effort-low-exclude-dynamic","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--effort low --exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":934,"ttft_ms":5867,"complete_ms":9953}
{"i":2,"tag":"effort-low-exclude-dynamic","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--effort low --exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":1275,"ttft_ms":6388,"complete_ms":9874}
{"i":3,"tag":"effort-low-exclude-dynamic","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--effort low --exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":874,"ttft_ms":10537,"complete_ms":11782}
{"i":4,"tag":"effort-low-exclude-dynamic","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--effort low --exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":1170,"ttft_ms":6379,"complete_ms":9947}
{"i":5,"tag":"effort-low-exclude-dynamic","model":"claude-sonnet-5","extra_args":"--effort low --exclude-dynamic-system-prompt-sections","prompt_chars":7451,"boot_ms":1329,"ttft_ms":6443,"complete_ms":9884}
@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
# Backlog #2 (real streaming): **achievable** — via the `MessageDisplay` hook
**Date**: 2026-07-13
**Status**: prereq-spike result. **Streaming IS achievable on the TUI path**, byte-faithfully, on the
subscription pool. Three obvious sources are dead ends; a fourth one works.
**Scope**: answers the prereq spike that [`README.md`](README.md) § "Backlog #2" demanded *before* any
streaming design:
> **Prereq spike (do this before designing anything)**: does the transcript JSONL grow *during* a
> turn, or only at the end? If only at the end, (a) is dead and you are stuck with (b).
The answer: **(a) is dead, (b) is dead — and you are not stuck with either.** The CLI exposes its own
streaming interface as a **hook**, which the backlog did not consider.
**Measured on**: Mac mini / Claude Code **v2.1.207** / Sonnet 4.6 + Sonnet 5 / Claude Max /
real-home mode. Every claim below is reproducible from the commands given.
> **Honesty note on how this document was produced.** Its first version concluded the exact opposite —
> "streaming is not achievable; the CLI exposes no byte-faithful incremental source" — and was **wrong**.
> An adversarial reviewer, commissioned specifically to *refute* it, found `MessageDisplay` on a second
> pass; its own first pass had enumerated the hook registry with a truncated grep (it reported 21
> events — there are **30**). Both the wrong conclusion and its refutation are preserved here, because
> "we checked, it's impossible" is the most expensive kind of claim to get wrong: it closes a door and
> nobody re-opens it.
---
## ✅ The source that works: the `MessageDisplay` hook
`claude` fires a **`MessageDisplay`** hook as it renders each block of the assistant's reply. The
payload carries the **raw markdown source** of an incremental `delta`, plus a monotonic `index` and a
`final` flag:
```json
{ "hook_event_name": "MessageDisplay",
"turn_id": "6cb31d21-…", "message_id": "84ab9832-…",
"index": 0, "final": false, "delta": "## Mutex\n\n" }
```
*(payload also carries `session_id`, `transcript_path`, `prompt_id`, `cwd`)*
Registered as an ordinary command hook via `--settings` on a **plain interactive TUI spawn** (no `-p`,
no `--bare`), `claude-sonnet-4-6`, `--effort low`. Banner verified:
`▝▜█████▛▘ Sonnet 4.6 with low effort · Claude Max`**subscription pool, not metered billing**.
One live turn — 7 fires, spread across generation:
```
index=0 final=false len= 10 '## Mutex\n\n'
index=1 final=false len= 140 'A **mutual exclusion lock** prevents concurrent access to a shar…'
index=2 final=false len= 83 '- Acquiring a locked mutex blocks the caller until the current h…'
index=3 final=false len= 163 '- Failing to release a mutex causes a deadlock, freezing all wai…'
index=4 final=false len= 96 'let counter = 0;\n\nasync function increment() {\n const release =…'
index=5 final=false len= 84 ' counter++; // only one caller here at a time\n } finally {\n …'
index=6 final=true len= 3 '```'
```
**Every invariant a proxy needs — all hold:**
| requirement | result |
|---|---|
| **byte-faithful** — deltas are the model's *source*, not the rendered pane | ✅ `## `, `**`, ```` ```javascript ```` all present in the deltas |
| **exactness** — `concat(deltas) === T` (the transcript-authoritative text) | ✅ **true**, 579 == 579 bytes |
| **prefix-stable** — `T.startsWith(concat(deltas[0..n]))` at every n | ✅ **true at all 7 steps** |
| **incremental** — arrives during generation, not at the end | ✅ 7 fires spread across the turn |
| **no `-p`** — stays out of the metered `sdk-cli` pool | ✅ plain interactive TUI |
| **subscription pool** | ✅ banner `· Claude Max` |
This is exactly the contract a streaming design needs: deltas forward straight into SSE
`delta.content` chunks, and the transcript's final text `T` stays a cheap end-of-turn assertion
(`concat === T`) instead of a reconciliation problem.
### Caveats for the implementer
- **Block-level granularity, not token-level** — the hook fires **once per rendered block** (roughly one
per paragraph / list item / code block), so the chunk count **scales with answer length**: 7 fires for a
~600-byte answer, **18 for a ~2 KB one**. Plenty for SSE (`delta.content` has no minimum size), but do
not promise token-by-token output, and do not hard-code any assumption about chunk count.
- **🔴 The sink MUST be keyed by `session_id` — this is live TODAY, not a future concern.**
`OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT` defaults to **2**, so **two `claude` processes already run concurrently**. One
hook command writing to one shared sink would **interleave deltas from two different turns into one
stream** — request A's client receiving request B's text, the worst failure a proxy can have, and one a
single-request test will never surface. The payload carries `session_id` (and `turn_id` / `message_id`),
so demux is easy: derive the sink path from `session_id` (`<dir>/<session_id>.jsonl`) and read only your
own turn's file. This *also* keeps the design **warm-pool compatible**, because a pre-booted pane's
session-id is fixed at boot — one static hook script serves every pane. **Test it with ≥2 concurrent
streaming requests carrying distinguishable prompts and assert zero cross-contamination.**
- **⚠️ `forceSyncExecution: true` in the hook's source — `claude` BLOCKS on the hook.** A slow hook
adds latency to *every* delta. The hook must write and exit immediately (e.g. write to a FIFO / unix
socket that OCP reads; never work inline). **Measure the added per-delta latency.**
- **Thinking blocks appear to be excluded — but this is NOT yet stress-tested. Verify before shipping.**
The exclusion is inferred from `content.map(c => c.type === "text" ? c.text : "")` — but that snippet is
from the **`final:true`** call site, not the incremental one. Four live turns (incl. two at `--effort
high`) showed no thinking text in any delta and `concat === T` held — **but each transcript's thinking
block was empty (`thinking:""`, 0 chars)**, so the exclusion was never actually stressed. **The failure
mode is severe**: if thinking deltas *do* fire on some config (Opus, `xhigh`), `concat(deltas) !== T`
**and OCP streams the model's private reasoning to the caller**. The end-of-turn `concat === T` assertion
would *detect* that but **cannot prevent** it — SSE deltas cannot be un-sent. **Before shipping, run a
turn on a model+effort that produces substantive thinking** (a hard reasoning prompt on Opus / `xhigh`)
and confirm both (a) no thinking text in any delta and (b) `concat === T` still holds.
- OCP already owns the spawn (isolated HOME, its own flags), so injecting `--settings` with a
`MessageDisplay` hook sits inside the existing architecture.
- **`ALIGNMENT.md`**: this consumes `claude`'s **own** hook surface as emitted — forwarding, not
inventing. Not a new endpoint, not a fabricated protocol. (Class B / ADR 0007 — the TUI spawn is
OCP-owned; no `cli.js` citation applies.)
### Reproduce in 60 seconds
```bash
# hook script: append the payload (arrives on stdin) and exit immediately
printf '#!/bin/bash\ncat >> "$MD_LOG"; printf "\\n" >> "$MD_LOG"; exit 0\n' > /tmp/h.sh && chmod +x /tmp/h.sh
echo '{"hooks":{"MessageDisplay":[{"hooks":[{"type":"command","command":"MD_LOG=/tmp/deltas.jsonl /tmp/h.sh"}]}]}}' > /tmp/s.json
# plain interactive claude in tmux (prefix NOT ocp-tui-*, and never kill-server)
tmux new-session -d -s md-probe -x 220 -y 50 \
"claude --model claude-sonnet-4-6 --effort low --session-id $(uuidgen) --settings /tmp/s.json"
# …wait for '? for shortcuts', paste a markdown-producing prompt, press Enter…
jq -r '"\(.index) \(.final) \(.delta|@json)"' /tmp/deltas.jsonl # incremental raw-markdown deltas
# then assert: concat(deltas) == extractLatestAssistantText(<transcript>.jsonl)
```
---
## The three dead ends (still worth knowing — they say what NOT to build)
### (a) Incremental transcript reads — **dead: event granularity, not token granularity**
The transcript JSONL *does* grow during a turn, but one **whole event at a time**; the assistant's text
event is written as **one complete line**, appearing only ~0.3 s before the terminal `turn_duration`.
Observed (session `efd5b161`, `turn_duration: 7319 ms`):
```
#6 t+0.0s type=user (the prompt)
#15 t+4.7s type=assistant blocks=thinking
#16 t+7.0s type=assistant blocks=text ← the ENTIRE answer, in one line
#21 t+7.3s type=system subtype=turn_duration ← terminal
```
Cross-checked at **20 ms polling + `fs.watch`** (25× finer): a partial line **never touches disk** —
one write, `+1` line, carrying the complete answer. Also forced with the undocumented
`CLAUDE_CODE_INCLUDE_PARTIAL_MESSAGES=1`: still 1 assistant event, 0 partials (interactive mode has no
stream-json *sink* for it to write to).
**The transcript is still needed** — as the terminal-turn signal, as the authoritative `concat === T`
check, and as the input to the existing honesty gates (auth-banner detection, `truncated`). It is just
not the *streaming* source.
### (b) `tmux capture-pane` diffing — **dead: the pane is a RENDERED view, not the text**
The backlog expected to fall back to this, calling it "lossy … (wrapping, scrollback, spinner lines)".
The loss is far worse than formatting noise: **the pane does not contain the answer's source bytes at
all.** The TUI *renders* markdown, and `capture-pane -p` strips the ANSI that rendering produced.
Same turn, same lines:
```
TRANSCRIPT (authoritative T): PANE (capture-pane -p -J -S -500):
'## Semaphore' '⏺ Semaphore' ← heading marker gone
'' ''
'A **semaphore** is a synchro…' ' A semaphore is a synchro…' ← bold markers gone, indented
```
| token in the answer | in `T` | in the pane's answer region |
|---|---|---|
| `## ` (ATX heading) | yes | **no** — rendered as `` |
| `**` (bold markers) | yes | **no** — rendered to ANSI bold, then stripped by `-p` |
| ` ```javascript ` (fence + language) | yes | **no** — fence and language tag both gone |
| `- ` (list item) | yes | yes |
*(A literal `**` does appear elsewhere in the pane — in the **prompt echo**, because the prompt asked
for bold. Not in the answer.)*
**`capture-pane -e` (keeping the ANSI) does not rescue it — the inverse is provably non-unique.**
With `T` = ``"## Alpha\n\n**bravo**\n\n```javascript\nlet x=1;\n```"``:
```
⏺\e[39m \e[1mAlpha\n\n\e[0m \e[1mbravo\n\n\e[0m \e[34mlet\e[39m x=\e[32m1\e[39m;
```
`## Alpha` → **SGR 1 (bold)**. `**bravo**` → **SGR 1 (bold)**. *Identical ANSI* — an H2 and a bold span
are indistinguishable, never mind `**` vs `__`. The fence and its `javascript` tag are consumed by the
syntax highlighter into colours; recovering the tag would mean inverting a highlighter, and
`let x=1;` is valid in several languages.
So `T.startsWith(paneText)` is **false** — raw and indent-stripped, on essentially every markdown
answer. A proxy streaming pane text would be streaming **something the model did not say**. With
`MessageDisplay` available there is no reason to go near it.
### (c) `--debug-file` — **dead: it logs stream *timing*, never stream *content***
Worth stating precisely, because a casual check misleads in **both** directions here.
The default log level is `debug`, which **suppresses every `verbose` site**. Raise it and per-chunk
lines *do* appear, spread across generation:
```bash
CLAUDE_CODE_DEBUG_LOG_LEVEL=verbose claude --debug-file /tmp/d.log …
```
```
05:51:11.088 [VERBOSE] [shoji-engine] yield stream_event/- ← 16 of these, mid-turn,
05:51:11.537 [VERBOSE] [shoji-engine] yield stream_event/- over ~3.9 s of generation
05:51:15.192 [DEBUG] [shoji-engine] turn 1 end (usage in=575 out=255 api=6736ms stop=end_turn resultLen=857)
```
**But they carry no payload** — the format is `yield <type>/<subtype>`, a bare presence marker. Run with
no category filter (i.e. all categories) at verbose level: `content_block_delta` = **0**, `text_delta` =
**0**, `content_block_start` / `message_start` = **0**. The only byte-exact text in the log is the
end-of-turn `Stop` hook payload (`"last_assistant_message":"## Title\n\n**alpha bravo charlie**"`) —
transcript granularity. The log tells you **when** tokens arrive, never **what** they are. It is also
~2.7 MB per turn.
### Also checked, also not the answer
| candidate | outcome |
|---|---|
| `--output-format stream-json` (the one interface that emits `text_delta`) | **requires `--print`/`-p`** → `cc_entrypoint=sdk-cli` → the **metered** credit pool, which is exactly what TUI mode exists to avoid. Reproduced live. |
| `--input-format stream-json` | `Error: --input-format=stream-json requires output-format=stream-json` → same gate. |
| `CLAUDE_CODE_INCLUDE_PARTIAL_MESSAGES=1` (undocumented) | No stream-json sink in interactive mode → no partials. Banner stayed `· Claude Max`. |
| `sessionMirror` (undocumented) | Gated on `outputFormat === "stream-json"` → the `-p` family. |
| `--sdk-url` (hidden) | Forces stream-json + non-interactive → `sdk-cli`. *(inferred from the minified bundle; not banner-tested)* |
| `~/.claude/sessions/<pid>.json` | Registry metadata only (`{pid, sessionId, cwd, status, version, entrypoint:"cli", kind:"interactive"}`). No assistant text. *(Its `entrypoint:"cli"` incidentally confirms the TUI path stays on the subscription pool.)* |
| `~/.claude/history.jsonl` | User prompts only; the answer text is absent. |
| Asking the model to emit plain text (so the pane renders faithfully) | Would mean **mutating the caller's prompt** — a correctness violation for a proxy, and still not byte-faithful (wrapping + indent remain). Rejected. |
---
## Value: what streaming actually buys (read before building)
Streaming is *possible*. Whether it is *worth it* depends on the consumer, and the honest answer is
uncomfortable:
- **Streaming never makes the answer arrive sooner. It moves the *first* byte, not the *last*.** The
final token lands at the same wall-clock moment either way.
- So a consumer that must have the **complete** answer before it can act — e.g. one parsing a structured
JSON reply, **which is exactly the 知音 AI use case that motivated this entire investigation** — gains
**nothing at all**. Only a **progressively-rendering** consumer (a chat UI) gains.
And the number the backlog attached to this item was wrong:
- The backlog's "~20 s" was inferred from an external 3032 s report, **never measured through OCP**.
Measured through a real OCP instance (TUI mode, `claude-sonnet-4-6`, ~1850-token prompt, n=5):
**median 11.30 s** before [#156](https://github.com/dtzp555-max/ocp/pull/156), **9.55 s** after.
- **Same-turn decomposition** (baseline row `i=5`): **11.563 s** wall through OCP vs `turn_duration:
7.319 s` of CLI-internal time on that same turn → **OCP's own overhead ≈ 4.2 s** (n=1, baseline
`effort=high` config). *Caveats*: n=1; and `turn_duration` is the CLI's internal duration of an
**OCP-driven** turn, not a separate "native" baseline. Do **not** subtract this `effort=high` 7.3 s
from the `effort=low` 9.55 s median — a low-effort turn generates faster, so mixing them
*understates* the overhead.
- So OCP's own overhead is **single-digit seconds**, not ~20 s. The rest of any large number is the
model generating a long answer — which streaming hides but does not shorten.
**Recommendation**: build it — the contract is clean and the cost is small — but size the expectation
honestly. It is a *perceived-latency* feature for progressively-rendering consumers, not a throughput
win, and it does not move the **~6 s TTFT floor** ([`README.md`](README.md)) that rules TUI mode out for
interactive-latency consumers regardless.
+2 -16
View File
@@ -382,25 +382,11 @@ export function getCacheStats() {
// Per ADR 0005 / spec D4: in-process scope only (single Node process per host).
const inflightMap = new Map();
// `retryIf` (optional, audit finding M1): a predicate applied on the FOLLOWER path only.
// When a follower joins an existing flight and the shared promise rejects with an error for
// which retryIf(err) is true (in practice: the LEADER's client disconnected while queued —
// an error that is personal to the leader, not a verdict about the upstream), the follower
// does NOT inherit that rejection. Instead it re-enters singleflight with its OWN fn: it
// either becomes the new leader (the map entry is already deleted — see the finally below,
// which runs before any follower's catch because it is attached upstream of the promise the
// followers await) or joins a flight another retrying follower just created. The leader's
// own rejection is never retried here — its error belongs to it (leader path returns the
// bare promise). Callers that pass no retryIf get the exact pre-M1 share-everything behavior.
export function singleflight(hash, fn, retryIf) {
export function singleflight(hash, fn) {
const existing = inflightMap.get(hash);
if (existing) {
existing.requesters++;
if (!retryIf) return existing.promise;
return existing.promise.catch((err) => {
if (!retryIf(err)) throw err;
return singleflight(hash, fn, retryIf);
});
return existing.promise;
}
// Wrap fn() in Promise.resolve().then() so synchronous throws don't escape.
const promise = Promise.resolve().then(fn).finally(() => {
-67
View File
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
// Pure, dependency-injected primitives for the `-p` spawn-token resolution + HOME-isolation
// layer. Extracted from server.mjs (findings F3 / F5 / F6, 2026-07-07) so the concurrency,
// caching and expiry logic is unit-testable WITHOUT booting the server or mocking execFileSync /
// child_process.spawn / fs. server.mjs owns all I/O (macOS keychain exec, process spawn, fs);
// this module owns only pure decision logic.
//
// ALIGNMENT NOTE: none of this touches the OAuth wire machinery (no endpoint / header / body).
// OCP still NEVER performs a refresh_token grant itself — these helpers only READ + GATE a token
// that some other process (the operator's real claude, or a spawned claude under the real HOME)
// refreshes. That property is load-bearing (issue #112) and preserved.
// Promise-chain mutex. `acquire()` resolves to a `release()` fn; the NEXT `acquire()` does not
// resolve until the current holder calls its `release()`. Serializes async critical sections
// without busy-waiting. release() is idempotent.
export function createSerialMutex() {
let tail = Promise.resolve();
return {
acquire() {
let release;
const gate = new Promise((r) => { release = r; });
const prev = tail;
tail = tail.then(() => gate);
// Hand the caller its release fn only after the previous holder has released.
return prev.then(() => {
let released = false;
return function releaseMutex() { if (!released) { released = true; release(); } };
});
},
};
}
// Short-TTL memo. `get(produce, now)` returns the cached value while `now - storedAt < ttlMs`,
// otherwise calls `produce()` and re-stores. A miss that produces null/undefined is STILL stored
// (so a genuinely-absent source is not re-probed on every call within the TTL window). `now` is
// injectable for testing.
export function createTtlCache({ ttlMs }) {
let value;
let at = -Infinity;
let has = false;
return {
get(produce, now = Date.now()) {
if (has && now - at < ttlMs) return value;
value = produce();
at = now;
has = true;
return value;
},
clear() { has = false; value = undefined; at = -Infinity; },
};
}
// Pure expiry gate. Returns true when `creds` carries a known expiry that is at/within `bufferMs`
// of `now`. Creds WITHOUT `expiresAt` (e.g. long-lived env tokens) are never treated as expiring.
// This gate is applied to the CACHED creds on EVERY use — which is precisely why a short-TTL
// keychain cache (createTtlCache) cannot reintroduce the #146 forever-stale-token regression: the
// cache bounds how often we re-READ the keychain, but the expiry decision is recomputed per use.
export function isTokenExpiring(creds, now = Date.now(), bufferMs = 300000) {
return !!(creds && creds.expiresAt && now + bufferMs >= creds.expiresAt);
}
// Order candidate keychain labels so the last-known-good label is tried first (avoids the
// wrong-label miss that doubles the `security` exec count on the hot path). Pure: performs no
// read. Returns a fresh array; input is not mutated.
export function orderLabelsLastGoodFirst(labels, lastGood) {
if (!lastGood || !labels.includes(lastGood)) return labels.slice();
return [lastGood, ...labels.filter((l) => l !== lastGood)];
}
-309
View File
@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
// TUI warm pane pool (docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency backlog #3).
//
// WHAT IT IS: a small set of PRE-BOOTED `claude` panes, each already sitting at its
// input bar, so a request does not pay the cold boot. Opt-in: OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE=0
// (default) disables it entirely and the request path is byte-for-byte today's.
//
// ── SINGLE-USE IS THE LOAD-BEARING RULE ─────────────────────────────────────
// A pooled pane serves EXACTLY ONE turn and is then killed and replaced in the
// background. Each pane carries its OWN fresh `--session-id`, fixed at boot, and the
// turn locates its transcript by that id. So OCP's one-session-per-request model is
// preserved: a session's transcript still holds exactly one logical exchange.
// That is what keeps lib/tui/transcript.mjs's extractLatestAssistantText (which returns
// the LAST text-bearing assistant entry in the whole file, not "text since the matching
// user line") correct — see the scoping note there. A pane MUST NEVER serve a second
// turn, and a session MUST NEVER be reset with /clear and reused: either would put two
// exchanges in one transcript and leak the earlier turn's text into the later turn's
// answer. Nothing here reuses a pane; keep it that way.
//
// ── WHY IT'S WORTH MORE THAN THE BOOT TIME ──────────────────────────────────
// Measured on this host (n=6 through OCP, Sonnet 4.6, --effort low): the cold path
// spends ~1.23 s reaching the input bar, but ALSO ~2.9 s inside the first turn beyond
// what claude itself reports as the turn duration — post-input-bar init that a pane
// which has been idle for a few seconds has already finished. A warm pane recovers both.
//
// ── COST (bounded, and paid whether or not a request arrives) ───────────────
// Each warm pane is a LIVE `claude` process (plus its tmux pane) sitting idle. Peak
// process count is (pool size) + (OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT in-flight turns) + (panes
// currently booting as replacements). Pool size is clamped to POOL_MAX_SIZE.
//
// Pure + injectable (bootPane / killPane / paneHealthy / now) so test-features.mjs can
// assert acquire / miss / refill / TTL / reaper-exemption with no tmux and no claude.
// Hard cap on OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE. Each pane is an idle claude process; 4 is already a
// lot of resident memory on a small host (a Pi serving a family) for zero in-flight work.
export const POOL_MAX_SIZE = 4;
// A warm pane older than this is dropped on acquire rather than handed out. The periodic
// reap tick (server.mjs) drains the pool every 15 min anyway, so this only bites when
// that tick kept getting skipped because the TUI path was never idle. Guards against
// handing out a pane whose `claude` has been sitting so long it may have drifted
// (auto-compaction prompts, an idle-disconnect banner, an expired in-pane token).
export const POOL_MAX_AGE_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
// Clamp the operator-supplied size into [0, POOL_MAX_SIZE]. A garbage value disables the
// pool rather than guessing — an unparseable size must never silently boot 4 processes.
export function resolvePoolSize(raw) {
const n = parseInt(raw, 10);
if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n <= 0) return 0;
return Math.min(n, POOL_MAX_SIZE);
}
export class TuiPanePool {
// size: target number of warm panes (0 = disabled).
// maxAgeMs: per-pane TTL (see POOL_MAX_AGE_MS).
// mintPane: () => ({ sessionId, name }) — mints the identity of the NEXT pane. The POOL,
// not the boot function, owns this: the tmux session springs into existence the
// instant bootPane starts, so the pool must already know its NAME (see
// _bootingPane below). Deriving the name from the sessionId also makes `tmux ls`
// correlate to the transcript file.
// bootPane: async (model, {sessionId, name}) => { name, sessionId, model, bootedAt } —
// boots ONE pane under exactly that identity and resolves only once it is
// input-ready; throws if it never becomes ready.
// killPane: (name) => void — tmux kill-session. MUST be synchronous (see drain).
// paneHealthy:(name) => bool — pane still exists AND is still at its input bar.
constructor({ size, maxAgeMs = POOL_MAX_AGE_MS, mintPane, bootPane, killPane, paneHealthy, now = Date.now, log = () => {} }) {
this.size = Math.max(0, Math.min(parseInt(size, 10) || 0, POOL_MAX_SIZE));
// Fail fast at CONSTRUCTION, not at request time. refill() is called synchronously from
// the request path (runTuiTurn), so a missing collaborator would otherwise surface as a
// 500 on a live request instead of a loud error at boot.
if (this.size > 0) {
for (const [k, fn] of [["mintPane", mintPane], ["bootPane", bootPane], ["killPane", killPane], ["paneHealthy", paneHealthy]]) {
if (typeof fn !== "function") throw new TypeError(`TuiPanePool: ${k} must be a function`);
}
}
this.maxAgeMs = maxAgeMs;
this._mintPane = mintPane;
this._bootPane = bootPane;
this._killPane = killPane;
this._paneHealthy = paneHealthy;
this._now = now;
this._log = log;
this._panes = []; // warm, available panes: { name, sessionId, model, bootedAt }
// The pane currently BOOTING, BY NAME ({sessionId, name, model}) — or null.
//
// WHY A NAME AND NOT A COUNT (this is a fixed bug, don't regress it): bootTuiPane creates
// the tmux session SYNCHRONOUSLY and only THEN waits up to POOL_BOOT_MS (20 s) for the
// input bar. So for up to 20 s there is a LIVE pooled tmux session. When the pool tracked
// only a count, it could not NAME that session, so:
// - liveNames() could not spare it and the periodic reap sweep KILLED it (and
// kill-server'd on top), leaving the pool empty with nothing scheduled and firing the
// very tui_pool_boot_failed WARN operators are told to alert on; and
// - drain() could not kill it, so on shutdown it ORPHANED a live authenticated `claude`
// (the boot's .then that was supposed to clean up never runs — gracefulShutdown calls
// process.exit in the same tick).
// Both are fixed by holding the identity here, before the session exists.
this._bootingPane = null;
// Generation counter. Bumped whenever an in-flight boot is CANCELLED (drain / model
// switch). A boot compares the generation it started under against the current one:
// if they differ, its pane was already killed by us and its settle is inert — in
// particular a rejection is a CANCELLATION, not an operator-visible boot failure.
this._gen = 0;
this._paused = false; // true while drained; refill() is a no-op until resume()
this.warmModel = null; // the model the pool currently warms — learned from traffic (see acquire)
this.hits = 0; // requests served by a warm pane
this.misses = 0; // requests that fell back to the cold path
this.boots = 0; // panes successfully pre-booted
this.bootFailures = 0; // pre-boots that genuinely never reached the input bar
this.cancelled = 0; // in-flight boots WE killed (drain / model switch) — not failures
this.dropped = 0; // panes discarded unused (unhealthy / expired / wrong model / drained /
// cancelled — a cancelled in-flight boot also lands here via _drop)
}
get enabled() { return this.size > 0; }
get warm() { return this._panes.length; }
get booting() { return this._bootingPane ? 1 : 0; }
// The reaper's spare set: the EXACT names of every pane the pool currently owns and has NOT
// handed out — the warm ones AND the one currently booting (whose tmux session is already
// live; see _bootingPane). See the POOL/REAPER INVARIANT in lib/tui/session.mjs.
// Fail-safe by construction: a pane leaves this set the instant it is acquired, dropped, or
// cancelled, and if the pool is empty (or the process restarted) the set is empty — so an
// orphaned pooled pane looks exactly like any other stale session and IS reaped.
liveNames() {
const names = new Set(this._panes.map((p) => p.name));
if (this._bootingPane) names.add(this._bootingPane.name);
return names;
}
// Take a warm pane for `model`, or null (caller must fall back to the cold path — a MISS
// is always safe, never an error). Synchronous: paneHealthy is a cheap tmux capture.
//
// The pool warms the MOST RECENTLY REQUESTED model (`warmModel`). There is no boot-time
// pre-warm and no configured model: OCP cannot know which model the next caller wants, and
// pre-booting a process for a model nobody asks for is pure waste. Consequence, stated
// plainly: the FIRST request after start (and the first after a model switch) is always a
// MISS. The pool pays off for the steady repeat traffic it exists to serve.
acquire(model) {
if (!this.enabled) return null;
// Retarget on a model switch: --model is fixed at spawn, so panes for another model are
// useless. Drop them now (they are replaced by the next refill) rather than holding
// processes for a model that is no longer being asked for. This includes any pane
// currently BOOTING for the old model — its tmux session already exists, so leaving it to
// die on resolve would both hold a useless process and block the next refill (one boot at
// a time) for up to POOL_BOOT_MS.
if (model !== this.warmModel) {
for (const p of this._panes) { this._drop(p, "model_switch"); }
this._panes = [];
this._cancelBooting("model_switch");
this.warmModel = model;
}
while (this._panes.length) {
const p = this._panes.shift();
if (this._now() - p.bootedAt > this.maxAgeMs) { this._drop(p, "expired"); continue; }
if (!this._paneHealthy(p.name)) { this._drop(p, "unhealthy"); continue; }
this.hits++;
return p; // caller OWNS it now: it is out of the registry (so out of the spare set),
// and the caller's finally MUST kill it. Single-use — never returned here.
}
this.misses++;
return null;
}
// Bring the pool back up to `size` warm panes for `warmModel`. Fire-and-forget: never
// awaited on the request path and never throws into it.
//
// SLOT ACCOUNTING: a refill boot deliberately does NOT take a TuiSemaphore slot. Those
// slots bound concurrent *turns* (each up to the 120 s wallclock) and belong to real
// requests; charging a background pre-boot against them would let the pool starve the
// traffic it exists to speed up. It cannot leak a slot either, because it never holds one.
//
// SERIALIZED, ONE BOOT AT A TIME (and re-kicked on success until the pool is at target).
// An earlier version launched all `want` boots at once; live at size=2 that put two cold
// `claude` boots plus an in-flight turn on the CPU together, and a refill overran even the
// generous pool readiness cap (tui_pool_boot_failed). Booting sequentially keeps each boot
// near its uncontended ~1.2 s, bounds the CPU burst the pool can cause, and still has the
// replacement pane warm long before the next request arrives.
//
// A genuinely FAILED boot deliberately does NOT re-kick the chain — that is the backoff. A
// persistently failing boot (bad claude binary, no auth) would otherwise spin, respawning
// forever. The next natural trigger (the following request's refill, or the reap tick's
// resume) retries it. A CANCELLED boot is different: we killed it on purpose, nothing is
// wrong, and resume() is expected to start a fresh one immediately.
refill() {
if (!this.enabled || this._paused || !this.warmModel) return;
if (this._bootingPane) return; // one boot in flight at a time
if (this._panes.length >= this.size) return; // already at target
const model = this.warmModel;
const gen = this._gen;
// Mint the identity BEFORE booting: bootPane creates the tmux session synchronously, so
// the pool must be able to name (and therefore spare, and kill) it from this moment on.
const ident = this._mintPane();
this._bootingPane = { ...ident, model };
let enlisted = false;
Promise.resolve()
.then(() => this._bootPane(model, ident))
.then((pane) => {
// The world may have moved while we booted. If our generation was cancelled, kill the
// pane here rather than ASSUMING _cancelBooting already did.
//
// Why not just `return`: _cancelBooting kills by name, but the tmux session only EXISTS
// once _bootPane has actually run — and _bootPane is queued on a microtask (above). A
// caller that does refill() and then drain() in the SAME synchronous block would have
// _cancelBooting find nothing to kill (a no-op), bump the generation, and then this
// microtask would create the session, boot it fine, and — under a bare `return` — walk
// away from a LIVE authenticated `claude` that nothing owns. That is M1b in a new costume.
// No current call site does that, so this is defense-in-depth, not a live bug — but ADR
// 0008 and the reap-tick comment in server.mjs both explicitly contemplate a boot-time
// pre-warm, which is exactly the shape that would reach it.
//
// Killing an already-dead session is a harmless no-op (_drop swallows it), so this is
// idempotent whether or not _cancelBooting got there first.
if (gen !== this._gen) { this._drop(pane, "cancelled_late"); return; }
// Otherwise: still possible the pool filled or retargeted without a cancellation.
if (this._paused || model !== this.warmModel || this._panes.length >= this.size) {
this._drop(pane, "stale_boot");
return;
}
this._panes.push(pane);
this.boots++;
enlisted = true;
})
.catch((e) => {
// A rejection from a CANCELLED generation is not a fault: it is almost always
// "tui_pane_not_ready", thrown because WE killed the pane out from under the boot.
// Counting it as a bootFailure would fire the exact WARN operators are told to alert
// on, for a completely healthy drain. Stay silent — _cancelBooting already counted
// this as a cancellation, so do NOT count it again here.
if (gen !== this._gen) return;
this.bootFailures++;
this._log("warn", "tui_pool_boot_failed", { model, error: e && e.message });
})
.finally(() => {
// ONLY the current generation's boot owns the booting slot. A stale settle must not
// clear a slot that a newer boot (started by resume()) already holds.
if (gen === this._gen) this._bootingPane = null;
if (enlisted) this.refill(); // continue toward target, still one at a time
});
}
// Kill the in-flight boot's pane, SYNCHRONOUSLY, and invalidate its generation. Returns 1
// if there was one, else 0. The tmux session already exists (bootPane created it before it
// started waiting for readiness), so this is a real kill, not a cancellation flag.
_cancelBooting(reason) {
if (!this._bootingPane) return 0;
this._gen++; // the in-flight boot's settle is now inert
this._drop(this._bootingPane, reason); // synchronous kill-session
this._bootingPane = null;
this.cancelled++;
return 1;
}
// Kill every pane the pool owns — warm AND currently booting — and stop refilling. Returns
// how many were killed.
//
// Called (a) before the periodic reap sweep — reapStaleTuiSessions can only reap defunct
// `claude` zombies via kill-server, and kill-server is suppressed while any live pooled pane
// exists (including a booting one), so without this drain the pool would permanently disable
// zombie reaping; and (b) on graceful shutdown, so no pane outlives the process as an orphan.
//
// EVERY KILL HERE IS SYNCHRONOUS, and that is load-bearing. It is NOT safe to leave the
// booting pane to clean itself up on resolve: gracefulShutdown calls process.exit() in the
// same tick as this drain (TUI panes are children of the tmux SERVER, not of node, so
// node's activeProcesses set is empty on a TUI host and the "wait for children" path exits
// immediately). A .then()/.catch() scheduled here would never run, and the pane would
// survive as an orphaned, authenticated, idle `claude`.
drain() {
this._paused = true;
let n = this._panes.length;
for (const p of this._panes) this._drop(p, "drain");
this._panes = [];
n += this._cancelBooting("drain_booting");
return n;
}
// Undo drain() and start refilling again. Because drain() CANCELLED the in-flight boot
// (rather than leaving it pending), the booting slot is free and this really does start a
// fresh boot — the pool is never left empty with nothing scheduled.
resume() {
this._paused = false;
this.refill();
}
// /health surface (additive).
stats() {
return {
size: this.size,
warm: this._panes.length,
booting: this.booting,
model: this.warmModel,
hits: this.hits,
misses: this.misses,
boots: this.boots,
bootFailures: this.bootFailures,
cancelled: this.cancelled,
dropped: this.dropped,
};
}
_drop(pane, reason) {
this.dropped++;
try { this._killPane(pane.name); } catch { /* already gone */ }
this._log("info", "tui_pool_pane_dropped", { name: pane.name, reason });
}
}
+10 -66
View File
@@ -20,15 +20,6 @@
//
// Pure + importable so test-features.mjs can assert the bound directly (no server boot).
// Thrown by acquire() when the caller-supplied AbortSignal fires before a slot was granted
// (audit finding F2 — a client that disconnects while queued must never receive a slot; the
// queue entry is spliced out, not just flagged, so `queued` accounting stays exact). Distinct
// `name` lets callers (server.mjs acquireClaudeSlot) tell "client went away" apart from
// "queue is full" without string-matching the message.
export class SemaphoreAbortError extends Error {
constructor(message) { super(message); this.name = "SemaphoreAbortError"; }
}
export class TuiSemaphore {
// limit: max concurrent slots. maxQueue: max waiters before run() rejects with backpressure.
constructor(limit, { maxQueue } = {}) {
@@ -43,30 +34,9 @@ export class TuiSemaphore {
get inflight() { return this._inflight; }
get queued() { return this._waiters.length; }
// Runtime-adjust the concurrency limit (audit finding F1 — a PATCH /settings maxConcurrent
// change must actually take effect, not just be ignored until every currently-inflight task
// happens to finish). Lowering the limit is handled lazily by release() (see below) — it
// simply stops re-granting until inflight drains under the new, lower limit. Raising the
// limit has immediate headroom, so we wake as many queued waiters as now fit.
setLimit(limit) {
this.limit = Math.max(1, parseInt(limit, 10) || 1);
while (this._inflight < this.limit && this._waiters.length > 0) {
const next = this._waiters.shift();
this._inflight++;
next();
}
}
// Acquire a slot. Resolves once a slot is free (immediately if under the limit, otherwise
// when an in-flight task releases). Rejects synchronously-ish if the wait queue is full.
// `signal` (optional AbortSignal, F2) lets the caller cancel a QUEUED wait — e.g. wired to
// a client's socket "close" event so a request that disconnects before a slot is granted
// is removed from the queue instead of eventually being handed a slot for a dead socket.
// If `signal` is already aborted, reject immediately without ever touching the queue.
acquire(signal) {
if (signal?.aborted) {
return Promise.reject(new SemaphoreAbortError("acquire aborted before requesting a slot"));
}
acquire() {
if (this._inflight < this.limit) {
this._inflight++;
return Promise.resolve();
@@ -76,44 +46,24 @@ export class TuiSemaphore {
`tui_queue_full: TUI concurrency limit (${this.limit}) reached and wait queue ` +
`(${this.maxQueue}) is full`));
}
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let waiter; // the FIFO entry — captured so onAbort can find + splice exactly this one
const onAbort = () => {
const idx = this._waiters.indexOf(waiter);
if (idx === -1) return; // already granted a slot (shifted out by release()/setLimit) — too late to cancel
this._waiters.splice(idx, 1); // remove, not just flag — keeps `queued` accounting exact
reject(new SemaphoreAbortError("acquire aborted while queued"));
};
waiter = () => {
signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
resolve();
};
signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
this._waiters.push(waiter);
});
return new Promise((resolve) => { this._waiters.push(resolve); });
}
// Release a slot. Always frees the caller's own slot first, then re-grants it to the next
// waiter ONLY if the (post-decrement) inflight count is still under the current limit (F1
// fix). This is what makes a runtime-lowered limit actually bite: if the limit was lowered
// while over-subscribed, releases stop re-granting and inflight drains toward the new limit
// instead of a freed slot being handed straight back out at the old, higher occupancy.
// Release a slot. If a waiter is queued, hand the slot directly to it (inflight stays
// constant across the handoff); otherwise decrement.
release() {
if (this._inflight > 0) this._inflight--;
if (this._inflight < this.limit) {
const next = this._waiters.shift();
if (next) {
this._inflight++;
next();
}
next(); // the woken waiter already "owns" the slot — inflight unchanged
} else if (this._inflight > 0) {
this._inflight--;
}
}
// Run fn() under one slot. Releases in a finally so a throw (PR-A's honesty gates,
// wallclock truncation, paste-not-landed, tmux spawn failure) NEVER leaks a slot.
// `signal` (optional, F2) is forwarded to acquire() so a queued run() can be cancelled.
async run(fn, signal) {
await this.acquire(signal);
async run(fn) {
await this.acquire();
try {
return await fn();
} finally {
@@ -139,12 +89,7 @@ export function recordTuiEntrypoint(tuiStats, observed, expectedMode = "cli") {
// Build the additive /health `tui` block (ADR 0007 PR-B amendment). Pure: given the
// config + live counters, returns the exact object embedded in /health. New fields only —
// behaviour-preserving for existing /health consumers (grandfathered B.2 under ADR 0006).
//
// `pool` (optional, warm pane pool — lib/tui/pool.mjs): a TuiPanePool, or null/undefined
// when the pool is off (the default). Reported as `pool: null` when off so the block's
// shape stays stable, and as the pool's stats (size / warm / hits / misses / …) when on —
// the operator's window onto both the hit rate and the standing idle-process cost.
export function buildTuiHealthBlock({ enabled, entrypointMode, maxConcurrent }, tuiStats, semaphore, pool = null) {
export function buildTuiHealthBlock({ enabled, entrypointMode, maxConcurrent }, tuiStats, semaphore) {
return {
enabled,
entrypointMode, // cli | auto | off
@@ -153,6 +98,5 @@ export function buildTuiHealthBlock({ enabled, entrypointMode, maxConcurrent },
inflight: semaphore.inflight, // current concurrent TUI turns
queued: semaphore.queued, // turns waiting for a slot
maxConcurrent,
pool: pool ? pool.stats() : null, // warm pane pool, or null when disabled
};
}
+95 -275
View File
@@ -15,48 +15,14 @@ import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { readTuiTranscript } from "./transcript.mjs";
// F7 fix (audit finding, LOW): the prefix used to be a bare, host-wide constant
// ("ocp-tui-"), so a SECOND OCP instance on the same host (e.g. a temporary
// verification instance stood up alongside production — a real pattern used during
// PR #144/#146 verification) would boot-reap and potentially kill-server the OTHER
// instance's LIVE sessions: the coexistence guard below only ever spared foreign
// PRODUCT prefixes (olp-tui-*), never a second ocp-tui-* instance on a different port.
//
// Fix: scope the prefix to the instance's own listen port. The port is the natural
// stable per-instance discriminator on one host (two OCP instances cannot share a
// port), so `ocp-tui-<port>-` uniquely namespaces this instance's sessions and makes
// a same-host sibling OCP instance look exactly like a foreign product (olp-tui-*) to
// the coexistence guard — its `ocp-tui-<otherPort>-*` sessions never match our own
// prefix and are therefore never reaped/kill-server'd by us.
//
// LEGACY_SESSION_PREFIX / LEGACY_SESSION_NAME_RE describe the OLD bare-prefix shape
// (pre-this-fix), retained ONLY for the boot-time legacy-zombie migration handled in
// reapStaleTuiSessions (see comment there). No code path in this version ever CREATES
// a legacy-shaped session name again — sessionPrefixForPort() is the only session-name
// prefix constructor used going forward.
export const LEGACY_SESSION_PREFIX = "ocp-tui-";
// Exact legacy shape: LEGACY_SESSION_PREFIX + sessionId.slice(0, 8), where sessionId is
// a randomUUID() — so the suffix is always exactly 8 lowercase hex characters with NO
// further separator. The new port-scoped shape always inserts a "-" between the port
// digits and the 8-hex suffix (see sessionPrefixForPort), so this regex can never match
// a new-shape name: a new-shape suffix is `<port digits>-<8 hex>` (contains a literal
// "-"), which `[0-9a-f]{8}$` anchored immediately after the prefix cannot satisfy.
export const LEGACY_SESSION_NAME_RE = /^ocp-tui-[0-9a-f]{8}$/;
// Build this instance's own session-name prefix, scoped by its listen port so a
// second OCP instance on the same host (different port) is never mistaken for "ours".
export function sessionPrefixForPort(port) {
return `ocp-tui-${port}-`;
}
export const SESSION_PREFIX = "ocp-tui-"; // per-proxy namespace (coexistence rule)
const TMUX = process.env.OCP_TUI_TMUX_BIN || "tmux";
const defaultTmux = (args, opts = {}) =>
spawnSync(TMUX, args, { encoding: "utf8", ...opts });
// Kill ONLY our own stale sessions. Scoped to sessionPrefixForPort(port) so a co-hosted
// OLP test instance's `olp-tui-*` sessions — AND a co-hosted second OCP instance's
// `ocp-tui-<otherPort>-*` sessions — are never touched (F7 fix).
// Kill ONLY our own stale sessions. Scoped to SESSION_PREFIX so a co-hosted
// OLP test instance's `olp-tui-*` sessions are never touched.
//
// Defunct-reaping (PI231 incident): the pane's `claude` process is a child of the
// long-lived tmux SERVER daemon, NOT of the OCP node process — `tmux new-session -d`
@@ -70,86 +36,29 @@ const defaultTmux = (args, opts = {}) =>
// merely re-signalling — is to stop the tmux server: when the server exits, the kernel
// reparents its surviving children to init (PID 1), which reaps them immediately.
//
// `port` (required) is this instance's own listen port (server.mjs's PORT / lib/constants.mjs
// DEFAULT_PORT resolution) — the SPOT for "which sessions are ours."
//
// ── POOL/REAPER INVARIANT (warm pane pool — lib/tui/pool.mjs) ───────────────────────────
// A warm pooled pane is one of OUR OWN `ocp-tui-<port>-*` sessions that is ALIVE AND IDLE
// BY DESIGN — and the periodic sweep runs precisely when the instance is idle, i.e. exactly
// when the pool is full. Without an exemption the sweep would kill every warm pane on every
// tick (and kill-server on top). The exemption is `spare`: a set of EXACT session names the
// caller declares live. Three properties, all load-bearing:
//
// 1. A LIVE POOLED PANE IS NEVER REAPED — INCLUDING ONE THAT IS STILL BOOTING. It is in
// `spare` (the pool's live registry), so it is skipped by name. The booting case is not
// a footnote, it is the one that bit us: bootTuiPane creates the tmux session
// SYNCHRONOUSLY and only then waits up to POOL_BOOT_MS for the input bar, so a pooled
// session can be live for ~20 s before its boot resolves. The pool therefore mints the
// pane's NAME up front and holds it in `_bootingPane`, so liveNames() can name — and
// spare — a session whose boot has not finished. (An earlier version tracked only a
// COUNT of in-flight boots; the sweep could not name that session and killed it.)
// 2. A LEAKED/ORPHANED POOLED PANE IS STILL REAPED. Membership is by EXACT NAME from a
// live in-memory registry — NOT by "looks pooled" (name shape). A pane the pool no
// longer owns (handed out, dropped, cancelled, or left behind by a previous process
// generation — whose registry died with it) is absent from `spare` and is killed like
// any other stale session. Fail-safe: forgetting to pass `spare` reaps MORE, never less.
// 3. KILL-SERVER NEVER KILLS A LIVE POOL PANE. A spared session suppresses kill-server
// exactly as a foreign session does (it is a live child of the tmux server). The
// consequence — that a permanently-full pool would permanently disable the defunct-
// zombie reaping that ONLY kill-server can do — is resolved in server.mjs by DRAINING
// the pool immediately before the sweep, so `spare` is empty on the normal tick and
// kill-server still fires. `spare` is the belt-and-braces: a reap call site that
// forgets to drain still cannot kill a live pane.
//
// `spare` (default: none) — iterable of session names, or a Set. Ignored when the pool is off.
//
// `includeLegacy` (default false): when true, sessions matching the exact OLD bare-prefix
// shape (LEGACY_SESSION_NAME_RE) are ALSO treated as ours for kill-session purposes. This is
// the boot-time legacy migration: an operator upgrading past this fix could otherwise be left
// with orphaned bare-prefix zombie sessions from the PREVIOUS (pre-fix) process generation of
// this SAME instance, since no live instance of the new version ever creates that shape again
// — a legacy-shaped session found at boot is therefore presumed to be this instance's own
// leftover, not a stranger's. Passed true ONLY from the one-time boot-reap call site in
// server.mjs; the periodic idle-reap sweep does NOT set it, so a lingering legacy session
// during steady-state is conservatively treated as foreign (correctly blocking kill-server)
// rather than assumed to be ours on every 15-minute tick. Residual (accepted, documented):
// if a genuinely-still-running PRE-FIX OCP instance is coexisting on the same host at the
// exact moment a new instance boots, its live legacy-shaped session could be reaped — the
// same class of residual risk the audit finding itself accepts ("no live instance of the new
// version creates them"); this PR does not regress that scenario, it only removes the far
// more common same-version collision (the actual F7 finding).
export function reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux = defaultTmux, port, includeLegacy = false, spare = null } = {}) {
// So after killing our own sessions, if the server has NO sessions left of ANY prefix
// (i.e. nothing we could disrupt — no co-hosted `olp-tui-*` or other instance), we
// `kill-server` to flush the defunct backlog. If ANY non-ocp session remains we leave the
// server running (coexistence rule, ADR 0007) and let the next boot/periodic sweep retry
// once the server is otherwise idle.
export function reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux = defaultTmux } = {}) {
const r = tmux(["list-sessions", "-F", "#{session_name}"]);
if (!r || r.status !== 0) return 0; // no tmux server / no sessions
const names = String(r.stdout || "").split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
const ownPrefix = sessionPrefixForPort(port);
const spared = spare instanceof Set ? spare : new Set(spare || []);
let killed = 0;
let othersRemain = false;
let sparedLive = 0;
for (const name of names) {
// Property 1+2: exemption is by EXACT NAME from the pool's live registry. A pooled-
// LOOKING name that is not in the registry is an orphan and falls through to the
// normal kill path below.
if (spared.has(name)) { sparedLive++; continue; }
const isOwn = name.startsWith(ownPrefix);
const isLegacyOwn = includeLegacy && LEGACY_SESSION_NAME_RE.test(name);
if (isOwn || isLegacyOwn) {
if (name.startsWith(SESSION_PREFIX)) {
tmux(["kill-session", "-t", name]);
killed++;
} else {
othersRemain = true; // a session we do NOT own (olp-tui-*, a sibling ocp-tui-<otherPort>-*,
// or — outside includeLegacy — a legacy-shaped name) — never kill-server
othersRemain = true; // a session we do NOT own (e.g. olp-tui-*) — never kill-server
}
}
// Reap defunct `claude` zombies: safe ONLY when the server is now ours-only/empty.
// kill-server is what actually reaps (server exit reparents survivors to init); a
// per-session kill cannot, since node is not the zombies' parent.
//
// Property 3: a SPARED session is a live child of this tmux server, so kill-server would
// kill it — it therefore suppresses kill-server exactly as a foreign session does. On the
// normal sweep the pool is drained first, so sparedLive is 0 and kill-server still fires.
if (!othersRemain && sparedLive === 0) {
if (!othersRemain) {
tmux(["kill-server"]);
}
return killed;
@@ -159,12 +68,6 @@ export function reapStaleTuiSessions({ tmux = defaultTmux, port, includeLegacy =
// Boot + paste-settle timing. Conservative defaults validated on PI231; env-tunable.
const BOOT_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_BOOT_MS || "4000", 10); // max wait for input-ready
// Readiness cap for a POOL pre-boot. Deliberately far more generous than BOOT_MS: BOOT_MS is
// tight because a client is blocked on it, whereas a warm-pane boot happens in the background
// with nobody waiting. Observed live at size=2: a refill booting alongside an in-flight turn
// exceeded 4000 ms and was discarded (tui_pool_boot_failed), quietly costing hit rate for a
// pane that was merely slow, not broken. Scales with OCP_TUI_BOOT_MS if an operator raises it.
export const POOL_BOOT_MS = BOOT_MS * 5;
const READY_POLL_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_READY_POLL_MS || "400", 10); // readiness / paste-verify poll interval
const PASTE_VERIFY_MS = parseInt(process.env.OCP_TUI_PASTE_VERIFY_MS || "5000", 10); // max wait for pasted prompt to render
@@ -341,6 +244,23 @@ export function prepareTuiHome(realHome, tuiHome, cwd, { envTokenMode = false }
ensureTuiCwdTrusted(tuiHome, cwd);
}
// ── Billing-classifier labeling ─────────────────────────────────────────
// Resolve CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT on the spawn env per mode. ALWAYS deletes any
// inherited value first (so a stray entrypoint from OCP's own parent env can never
// leak into / mislabel the billing header). Then:
// "cli" (default) → set "cli": deterministic subscription-pool classification.
// HONEST ONLY because OCP's spawn is a genuine interactive PTY (tmux pane,
// no -p, stdout not redirected). Never set "cli" on a non-interactive spawn.
// "auto" → leave unset → claude self-classifies via its t$A (TTY → cli). Use to
// observe/diagnose the real TTY-derived value.
// "off" → leave the env exactly as inherited (diagnostics / honesty audit).
export function resolveTuiEntrypointEnv(env, mode = "cli") {
if (mode === "off") return env;
delete env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT;
if (mode === "cli") env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT = "cli";
return env;
}
// Build interactive claude argv: NO -p, NO --output-format (=> cc_entrypoint=cli).
// MCP hard-disabled: --strict-mcp-config (no --mcp-config) is the only mechanism
// that stops account-attached managed MCP from connecting (spec §5.2 / T6),
@@ -401,16 +321,18 @@ export function buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId, ehome, entrypointMode)
// DEFAULT (safe): hard-disable MCP (--strict-mcp-config + --disallowedTools mcp__*);
// built-in tools stay on, acceptable for single-user A-path.
// OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS=1: grant the SAME tool surface as the -p A-path
// (--allowedTools [+ --mcp-config]), so a SINGLE-USER / trusted TUI deployment can
// run a tool-using agent (e.g. an OpenClaw assistant that needs Bash/Read/Write/MCP)
// on the subscription pool. ALWAYS uses --allowedTools (CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS /
// --dangerously-skip-permissions is intentionally removed: claude v2.1.x shows an
// interactive bypass-acceptance screen in headless tmux that nothing can answer →
// the turn hangs until the wallclock cap, bricks the pane; not recoverable without a
// human at a keyboard). Use scratch-home settings.json additionalDirectories instead.
// (--allowedTools [+ --mcp-config] [+ --dangerously-skip-permissions]), so a
// SINGLE-USER / trusted TUI deployment can run a tool-using agent (e.g. an OpenClaw
// assistant that needs Bash/Read/Write/MCP) on the subscription pool. This mirrors
// buildCliArgs() in server.mjs. Safe to gate ON only because TUI is hard-incompatible
// with AUTH_MODE=multi (server.mjs refuses to boot), so it can never widen a guest's
// surface. Env mirrors server.mjs's CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS / _SKIP_PERMISSIONS / _MCP_CONFIG.
let toolArgs;
if (process.env.OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS === "1") {
toolArgs = [];
if (process.env.CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS === "true") {
toolArgs.push("--dangerously-skip-permissions");
} else {
const allowed = (process.env.CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS ||
"Bash,Read,Write,Edit,Glob,Grep,WebSearch,WebFetch,Agent")
.split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
@@ -419,99 +341,49 @@ export function buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId, ehome, entrypointMode)
// like "Bash(npm run test:*)" / "Read(~/**)" whose ( ) * ~ would break/inject the shell
// command if pasted bare. (operator-self-injection only — guests can't reach TUI.)
if (allowed.length) toolArgs.push("--allowedTools", ...allowed.map(shq));
}
if (process.env.CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG) toolArgs.push("--mcp-config", shq(process.env.CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG));
} else {
toolArgs = ["--strict-mcp-config", "--disallowedTools", shq("mcp__*")];
}
// Effort: pass --effort EXPLICITLY. Without it, the pane's claude inherits a
// HOME-dependent effortLevel — real-home mode inherits the operator's
// ~/.claude/settings.json (whatever they set for their own interactive use),
// env-token scratch mode inherits claude's built-in default (prepareTuiHome never
// writes effortLevel) — so latency silently depends on which HOME mode
// resolveTuiHome() picked AND on an unrelated operator setting. Pinning it here
// removes both. Measured (docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency): explicit low cuts
// direct-spawn TTFT p50 10.35s → 6.17s (40%) and collapses the spread ~15×;
// banner-verified to stay on the subscription pool (`· Claude Max`).
// OCP_TUI_EFFORT=inherit restores the pre-flag argv byte-for-byte (no --effort).
// An unknown value falls back to the default rather than reaching claude's argv:
// a typo'd --effort value must not risk a spawn-time usage error in the pane.
const EFFORT_LEVELS = ["low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max"]; // claude 2.1.207 --help
const effortRaw = (process.env.OCP_TUI_EFFORT || "low").trim().toLowerCase();
let effortArgs;
if (effortRaw === "inherit") {
effortArgs = [];
} else if (EFFORT_LEVELS.includes(effortRaw)) {
effortArgs = ["--effort", effortRaw];
} else {
console.error(`[tui] invalid OCP_TUI_EFFORT=${JSON.stringify(process.env.OCP_TUI_EFFORT)}; using "low" (valid: ${EFFORT_LEVELS.join("|")}, or "inherit" to omit the flag)`);
effortArgs = ["--effort", "low"];
}
return [
envPrefix,
shq(claudeBin),
"--model", shq(model),
"--session-id", sessionId,
...toolArgs,
...effortArgs,
].join(" ");
}
// Is a pane alive AND still sitting at its input bar? Used by the warm pool to decide,
// at hand-out time, whether a pre-booted pane is still usable (a dead/degraded pane must
// become a MISS → cold path, never a hung turn). capture-pane exits non-zero when the
// session no longer exists, so this covers "pane gone" and "pane not ready" in one call.
export function tuiPaneHealthy(tmux, tmuxName) {
const r = tmux(["capture-pane", "-p", "-t", tmuxName]);
if (!r || r.status !== 0 || typeof r.stdout !== "string") return false;
return tuiInputReady(r.stdout);
}
// Pool pane names carry a "p" marker after the port-scoped prefix:
// turn pane: ocp-tui-<port>-<8hex> (unchanged)
// pool pane: ocp-tui-<port>-p<8hex>
// Purely for operator legibility (`tmux ls` shows which panes are warm). It is NOT the
// reaper's exemption mechanism — that is the exact-name spare set (see the POOL/REAPER
// INVARIANT above), so a pooled-LOOKING orphan is still reaped. Both shapes start with
// sessionPrefixForPort(port), so both remain reapable as "ours", and neither can match
// LEGACY_SESSION_NAME_RE.
export function poolPaneName(port, sessionId) {
return sessionPrefixForPort(port) + "p" + sessionId.slice(0, 8);
}
// Boot ONE interactive `claude` pane and wait for its input bar. Shared by the cold
// request path (runTuiTurn) and the warm pool (lib/tui/pool.mjs) so a pooled pane is
// spawned with byte-for-byte the same argv, HOME, cwd and trust preparation as a
// cold-booted one — the pool must not become a second, drifting spawn path.
//
// Each pane gets its OWN fresh randomUUID() --session-id, fixed at boot. That is what
// keeps a pooled pane single-use-safe: its transcript holds exactly one exchange.
//
// requireReady: the cold path tolerates a readiness timeout (it falls through and lets
// the paste-verify decide — pre-existing behaviour, unchanged). The POOL sets it, because
// a pane that never reached its input bar is worthless as a warm pane and must not be
// enlisted: throw, let the pool count a bootFailure, and leave the request path to
// cold-boot as usual.
// bootMs: max wait for the input bar. Defaults to BOOT_MS (the REQUEST path's cap, which is
// deliberately tight — a client is blocked on it). The POOL passes POOL_BOOT_MS instead: a
// background pre-boot has nobody waiting on it, and capping it at the request-path's 4 s
// made real refills fail (observed live: a refill booting alongside an in-flight turn took
// >4 s and was discarded, silently lowering the hit rate). Slow != broken for a pre-boot.
// `sessionId` / `name` (both optional): the caller may supply the pane's identity instead of
// letting bootTuiPane mint it. The POOL does, because it must know the tmux session's NAME
// before this function runs — the session is created synchronously below, well before the
// readiness wait returns, so a pool that only learned the name on resolve could neither spare
// the session from the reaper nor kill it on shutdown. Supplying BOTH also keeps the name's
// hex suffix equal to the session-id's, so `tmux ls` correlates to the transcript file.
export async function bootTuiPane({
model, claudeBin, home, realHome, cwd, port, entrypointMode = "cli",
tmux = defaultTmux, sessionId = null, name = null, requireReady = false, bootMs = BOOT_MS,
// Full per-request TUI lifecycle:
// 1. Pre-trust the scratch cwd (no trust dialog will appear).
// 2. Write prompt to a 0600 temp file (no shell injection from prompt content).
// 3. Boot an interactive `claude` in a fresh tmux session in the scratch cwd; poll
// capture-pane until the `? for shortcuts` input bar appears (readiness-poll
// replaces the old blind boot sleep). BOOT_MS is the max wait, not a fixed delay.
// 4. Paste the prompt via tmux load-buffer + paste-buffer -p (bracketed paste) —
// reliable for large multi-line prompts where send-keys -l is not (issue #130).
// Poll-verify the prompt landed in the input (placeholder gone / [Pasted text]);
// fast-fail with tui_paste_not_landed if it never lands (prevents the 120s
// wallclock "stuck typing" hang). Then submit with a SEPARATE Enter key event.
// 5. Block on the native JSONL transcript (located by session-id) until terminal
// marker or wall-clock cap.
// 6. Always teardown: kill session + rm temp dir (even on throw).
// Returns { text, entrypoint } from readTuiTranscript (entrypoint is the billing-pool
// classifier, e.g. "cli", or null if the transcript did not include a turn_duration).
export async function runTuiTurn({
prompt,
model,
claudeBin,
home,
realHome,
cwd,
wallclockMs = 120000,
entrypointMode = "cli",
tmux = defaultTmux,
}) {
const sid = sessionId || randomUUID();
// Port-scoped session name (F7 fix) — see sessionPrefixForPort / reapStaleTuiSessions
// for why this instance's own listen port is the namespace discriminator.
const tmuxName = name || (sessionPrefixForPort(port) + sid.slice(0, 8));
const sessionId = randomUUID();
const tmuxName = SESSION_PREFIX + sessionId.slice(0, 8);
const ehome = home || process.env.HOME; // HOME claude runs under (scratch or real)
const rhome = realHome || process.env.HOME; // real home (OAuth + onboarded config source)
@@ -528,97 +400,46 @@ export async function bootTuiPane({
if (!existsSync(cwd)) mkdirSync(cwd, { recursive: true });
prepareTuiHome(rhome, ehome, cwd, { envTokenMode });
// Minimal env for spawnSync (tmux itself). The pane's claude env comes exclusively
// from the `env` prefix string built inside buildTuiCmd — tmux does NOT forward the
// spawning process's env to the pane, so the {env} here is intentionally minimal.
const env = { ...process.env };
env.HOME = ehome; // tmux needs HOME; all claude-specific vars go via buildTuiCmd prefix
// Write prompt to a temp file (mode 0600) so the content never touches argv.
const tmpDir = mkdtempSync(`${tmpdir()}/ocp-tui-`);
const promptFile = `${tmpDir}/prompt.txt`;
writeFileSync(promptFile, prompt, { mode: 0o600 });
// Boot the interactive session inside tmux, rooted at the scratch cwd.
// Capture the result: if tmux new-session fails (status !== 0) there is no PTY, no
// interactive spawn — abort BEFORE the boot wait rather than paste into a non-existent
// session or issue a billing request without a verified interactive context.
// Build the env: disable marketplace auto-install, strip any Anthropic / CC
// env vars that might interfere with interactive-mode classification.
const env = { ...process.env, CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_OFFICIAL_MARKETPLACE_AUTOINSTALL: "1" };
delete env.CLAUDECODE;
delete env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY;
delete env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL;
delete env.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN;
env.HOME = ehome; // claude reads credentials + writes the transcript under this HOME
resolveTuiEntrypointEnv(env, entrypointMode);
try {
// 1. Boot the interactive session inside tmux, rooted at the scratch cwd.
// Capture the result: if tmux new-session fails (status !== 0) there is no
// PTY, no interactive spawn — abort BEFORE the boot sleep rather than paste
// into a non-existent session or issue a billing request without a verified
// interactive context. The finally teardown is still harmless (kill-session
// is a no-op when the session never existed).
const spawnResult = tmux(
["new-session", "-d", "-s", tmuxName, "-x", "220", "-y", "50", "-c", cwd,
buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sid, ehome, entrypointMode)],
buildTuiCmd(claudeBin, model, sessionId, ehome, entrypointMode)],
{ env },
);
if (!spawnResult || spawnResult.status !== 0) {
throw new Error("tui_spawn_failed: tmux session not created");
}
// Wait until claude's input bar is actually ready (not a blind sleep).
// bootMs is the MAX readiness wait, not a fixed delay.
// 2. Wait until claude's input bar is actually ready (was: blind sleep(BOOT_MS)).
// BOOT_MS is now the MAX readiness wait, not a fixed delay.
const ready = await pollUntil(() => tuiInputReady(tuiCapturePane(tmux, tmuxName)),
{ timeoutMs: bootMs, intervalMs: READY_POLL_MS });
{ timeoutMs: BOOT_MS, intervalMs: READY_POLL_MS });
if (!ready) {
if (requireReady) {
try { tmux(["kill-session", "-t", tmuxName]); } catch { /* already gone */ }
throw new Error("tui_pane_not_ready: input bar did not appear within " + bootMs + "ms");
}
// Cold path (pre-existing behaviour): readiness timed out; rely on paste-verify.
// (readiness timed out; relying on paste-verify)
console.error("[tui] input_not_ready", tmuxName);
}
return { name: tmuxName, sessionId: sid, model, ehome, bootedAt: Date.now() };
}
// Full per-request TUI lifecycle:
// 1. Take a WARM pane from the pool if one is available for this model (opt-in;
// OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE=0 => always null => steps 2-3 below are exactly today's path).
// A pooled pane is SINGLE-USE: it already carries its own fresh --session-id, it
// serves this one turn, and it is killed in the finally like any other pane.
// 2. On a MISS: pre-trust the scratch cwd, boot an interactive `claude` in a fresh tmux
// session in the scratch cwd, poll capture-pane until the `? for shortcuts` input bar
// appears (bootTuiPane). BOOT_MS is the max wait, not a fixed delay.
// 3. Write prompt to a 0600 temp file (no shell injection from prompt content).
// 4. Paste the prompt via tmux load-buffer + paste-buffer -p (bracketed paste) —
// reliable for large multi-line prompts where send-keys -l is not (issue #130).
// Poll-verify the prompt landed in the input (placeholder gone / [Pasted text]);
// fast-fail with tui_paste_not_landed if it never lands (prevents the 120s
// wallclock "stuck typing" hang). Then submit with a SEPARATE Enter key event.
// 5. Block on the native JSONL transcript (located by THIS pane's session-id) until
// terminal marker or wall-clock cap.
// 6. Always teardown: kill session + rm temp dir (even on throw), and kick a background
// pool refill so the next request finds a warm pane.
// Returns { text, entrypoint } from readTuiTranscript (entrypoint is the billing-pool
// classifier, e.g. "cli", or null if the transcript did not include a turn_duration).
export async function runTuiTurn({
prompt,
model,
claudeBin,
home,
realHome,
cwd,
port,
wallclockMs = 120000,
entrypointMode = "cli",
tmux = defaultTmux,
pool = null, // TuiPanePool | null — null (default) === today's cold-boot-only path
onPane = null, // optional observer: ({ warm }) => void, for logging/metrics
}) {
// 1. Warm pane, or cold boot. A MISS is never an error — it is exactly today's path.
let pane = pool ? pool.acquire(model) : null;
const warm = !!pane;
// Kick the refill IMMEDIATELY (not after the turn): the replacement pane then boots
// CONCURRENTLY with this turn and is warm by the time the next request arrives. Also
// runs on a MISS — acquire() has just retargeted the pool to this model, so the miss
// that cold-boots today warms the pool for the next caller. Fire-and-forget; it takes
// no TuiSemaphore slot (see pool.refill's SLOT ACCOUNTING note).
if (pool) pool.refill();
if (onPane) { try { onPane({ warm }); } catch { /* observer must never break a turn */ } }
if (!pane) {
pane = await bootTuiPane({ model, claudeBin, home, realHome, cwd, port, entrypointMode, tmux });
}
const tmuxName = pane.name;
const sessionId = pane.sessionId; // THIS pane's own session-id — one session, one turn
const ehome = pane.ehome || home || process.env.HOME;
// Write prompt to a temp file (mode 0600) so the content never touches argv.
const tmpDir = mkdtempSync(`${tmpdir()}/ocp-tui-`);
const promptFile = `${tmpDir}/prompt.txt`;
writeFileSync(promptFile, prompt, { mode: 0o600 });
try {
// 3. Paste the prompt via a tmux PASTE BUFFER with bracketed paste (-p), NOT
// `send-keys -l`. send-keys of a large multi-line prompt is unreliable: the
// embedded newlines arrive as separate key events (effectively repeated Enter),
@@ -644,12 +465,11 @@ export async function runTuiTurn({
// Submit (separate Enter key event).
tmux(["send-keys", "-t", tmuxName, "Enter"]);
// 5. Block on the native transcript (resolved by THIS pane's session-id) until terminal.
// 4. Block on the native transcript (resolved by session-id) until terminal.
// Returns { text, entrypoint } from readTuiTranscript.
return await readTuiTranscript({ home: ehome, sessionId, wallclockMs });
} finally {
// 6. Teardown — always, even on throw. A pooled pane is torn down here exactly like a
// cold-booted one: SINGLE-USE, never returned to the pool (see pool.mjs).
// 5. Teardown — always, even on throw.
try { tmux(["kill-session", "-t", tmuxName]); } catch { /* already gone */ }
try { rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
}
+15 -13
View File
@@ -9,11 +9,24 @@ import { readFileSync, existsSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
// Project-dir encoding: claude replaces every "/" AND every "." with "-".
// Verified live (claude v2.1.158): cwd /home/u/.ocp-tui/work is stored under
// projects/-home-u--ocp-tui-work/ (the "." in ".ocp-tui" becomes "-", yielding
// the double dash). The earlier "/"-only rule was wrong for dotted paths; the
// fixture cwd /tmp/tui-test happened to have no dots so it never surfaced.
// NOTE: prefer findTranscriptPath() (glob by session-id) for resolution — it is
// immune to the exact encoding rule. This helper is kept for the known-path case.
export function encodeCwd(cwd) {
return cwd.replace(/[/.]/g, "-");
}
export function transcriptPath(home, cwd, sessionId) {
return `${home}/.claude/projects/${encodeCwd(cwd)}/${sessionId}.jsonl`;
}
// Locate a session's transcript by its UUID across every projects subdir, without
// reconstructing the encoded cwd. Robust to whatever encoding claude applies.
// Returns the path, or null if not present yet (it appears once the turn starts).
// TODO: add a CI fixture-contract test (a captured real transcript) so schema drift
// in the claude JSONL format fails loudly rather than silently degrading.
export function findTranscriptPath(home, sessionId) {
if (!home || !sessionId) return null;
const root = `${home}/.claude/projects`;
@@ -73,17 +86,6 @@ export function isTerminalLine(obj) {
// transcript holding one logical exchange). If a future warm-pool ever reuses a
// session WITHOUT a fresh session-id / clear, earlier-turn text could leak — that
// author must add user-line scoping here. See spec §7.2.
//
// STATUS (warm pool, lib/tui/pool.mjs — the "future warm-pool" this note anticipated):
// the pool does NOT reuse sessions, so the precondition above still holds and no
// user-line scoping was added. Each pooled pane is booted with its OWN fresh
// randomUUID() --session-id (bootTuiPane) and is SINGLE-USE: it serves exactly one turn
// and is then killed and replaced. One session still means one logical exchange, so the
// last assistant entry is still that request's answer.
// The warning therefore stands UNCHANGED for anyone who later wants a pane to serve a
// SECOND turn (or to reset one with /clear and reuse it): that is a leak, and it needs
// user-line scoping HERE before it can be safe. Do not relax pool.mjs's single-use rule
// without doing that work first.
export function extractLatestAssistantText(events) {
let text = "";
for (const ev of events) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "open-claude-proxy",
"version": "3.21.1",
"version": "3.20.1",
"description": "OCP (Open Claude Proxy) — use your Claude Pro/Max subscription as an OpenAI-compatible API for any IDE. Works with Cline, OpenCode, Aider, Continue.dev, OpenClaw, and more.",
"type": "module",
"bin": {
+82 -459
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@
* CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT — max concurrent claude processes, -p/stream-json path (default: 8)
* CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE — max requests waiting for a -p slot before HTTP 429 (default: 16)
* OCP_TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT — max concurrent interactive TUI turns, TUI-mode path (default: 2)
* OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE — pre-booted warm `claude` panes held for TUI-mode (default: 0 = off;
* max 4). Each is a live idle process; cuts ~3-4s per request.
* OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME — "1" forces the -p spawn to use the real HOME (disables the
* latency spawn-home isolation; default: isolated when a token exists)
* CLAUDE_BREAKER_THRESHOLD — failures in window before circuit opens (default: 6)
@@ -34,7 +32,7 @@
* CLAUDE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL — SSE heartbeat interval in ms on streaming path (default: 0 = disabled)
*/
import { createServer } from "node:http";
import { spawn, execFileSync, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import { spawn, execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
import { readFileSync, readdirSync, accessSync, existsSync, constants, chmodSync, statSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
@@ -43,11 +41,9 @@ import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { validateKey, recordUsage, getUsageByKey, getUsageTimeline, getRecentUsage, createKey, listKeys, revokeKey, closeDb, checkQuota, updateKeyQuota, getKeyQuota, findKey, cacheHash, getCachedResponse, setCachedResponse, clearCache, getCacheStats, hasCacheControl, singleflight, getInflightStats } from "./keys.mjs";
import { DEFAULT_PORT } from "./lib/constants.mjs";
import { isLoopbackBind } from "./lib/net.mjs";
import { runTuiTurn, reapStaleTuiSessions, resolveTuiHome, bootTuiPane, tuiPaneHealthy, poolPaneName, POOL_BOOT_MS } from "./lib/tui/session.mjs";
import { runTuiTurn, reapStaleTuiSessions, resolveTuiHome } from "./lib/tui/session.mjs";
import { detectTuiUpstreamError } from "./lib/tui/transcript.mjs";
import { TuiSemaphore, SemaphoreAbortError, recordTuiEntrypoint, buildTuiHealthBlock } from "./lib/tui/semaphore.mjs";
import { TuiPanePool, resolvePoolSize, POOL_MAX_SIZE } from "./lib/tui/pool.mjs";
import { createSerialMutex, createTtlCache, isTokenExpiring, orderLabelsLastGoodFirst } from "./lib/spawn-auth.mjs";
import { TuiSemaphore, recordTuiEntrypoint, buildTuiHealthBlock } from "./lib/tui/semaphore.mjs";
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const _pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"));
@@ -354,48 +350,6 @@ const tuiStats = {
entrypointMismatches: 0, // count of cli-expected-but-got-other turns
};
// ── Warm pane pool (docs/plans/2026-07-13-tui-latency #3) — opt-in; default OFF ─────────
// OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE=0 (default) => tuiPool is null => runTuiTurn's cold-boot path is
// byte-for-byte unchanged. Set it to N (clamped to POOL_MAX_SIZE) to keep N pre-booted
// `claude` panes warm, each SINGLE-USE (see lib/tui/pool.mjs for why single-use is the
// load-bearing rule, and lib/tui/session.mjs for the POOL/REAPER INVARIANT).
//
// Default-off is deliberate on a stable production path: a warm pane is a LIVE idle
// `claude` process held whether or not a request ever arrives, so the operator must opt
// in to that standing cost. Measured saving when on (this host, Sonnet 4.6, --effort low):
// end-to-end p50 10.17 s (n=6, pool off) -> 6.00 s (n=12 warm hits), i.e. -41%.
// cli.js does NOT perform this operation (Class B, OCP-owned TUI spawn) — see ADR 0007.
const TUI_POOL_SIZE = TUI_MODE ? resolvePoolSize(process.env.OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE) : 0;
const tuiPool = TUI_POOL_SIZE > 0
? new TuiPanePool({
size: TUI_POOL_SIZE,
// The POOL mints the pane's identity, not bootTuiPane: the tmux session exists the
// instant the boot starts, so the pool must be able to name (hence spare, hence kill)
// it before then. Name is derived from the session-id, so `tmux ls` correlates to the
// transcript file <HOME>/.claude/projects/*/<sessionId>.jsonl.
mintPane: () => {
const sessionId = randomUUID();
return { sessionId, name: poolPaneName(PORT, sessionId) };
},
bootPane: (model, ident) => bootTuiPane({
model,
claudeBin: CLAUDE,
home: TUI_HOME,
realHome: process.env.HOME,
cwd: TUI_CWD,
port: PORT,
entrypointMode: TUI_ENTRYPOINT,
sessionId: ident.sessionId,
name: ident.name,
requireReady: true, // a pane that never reached its input bar must not be enlisted
bootMs: POOL_BOOT_MS, // background pre-boot — no client is blocked, so be patient
}),
killPane: (name) => { try { spawnSync(process.env.OCP_TUI_TMUX_BIN || "tmux", ["kill-session", "-t", name]); } catch { /* already gone */ } },
paneHealthy: (name) => tuiPaneHealthy((args) => spawnSync(process.env.OCP_TUI_TMUX_BIN || "tmux", args, { encoding: "utf8" }), name),
log: (level, event, data) => logEvent(level, event, data),
})
: null;
// ── FIX ③ (latency): default-path (-p / stream-json) spawn-home isolation ──────────────
// PROBLEM (measured, not theoretical): OCP's default spawn inherits the operator's real HOME
// (loading the global ~/.claude — plugins, skills, hooks) and runs with cwd=~/ocp (loading the
@@ -433,104 +387,29 @@ function prepareSpawnHome(dir = SPAWN_HOME_DIR) {
} catch { /* best effort — spawn will surface a hard error if the dir is truly unusable */ }
}
// Resolve the default-spawn HOME-isolation decision. Returns { isolated, home, reason }:
// Resolve the default-spawn HOME-isolation decision ONCE, lazily + memoized (so it runs after
// getOAuthCredentials is defined regardless of source order, and the token probe happens at most
// once). Returns { isolated, home, token } where:
// - isolated:true → spawn under SPAWN_HOME_DIR with cwd=SPAWN_HOME_DIR + the env token.
// - isolated:false → legacy real-HOME spawn, no cwd override (no token, or kill-switch on).
//
// FIX F6 (2026-07-07): this decision is NO LONGER memoized permanently. The previous version
// cached it forever at first call, which meant: (a) credentials appearing after startup never
// enabled isolation; (b) `rm -rf ~/.ocp/spawn-home` at runtime made every isolated spawn ENOENT
// until restart; (c) during a token-expiry stint /health reported isolated:true while spawns
// actually ran real-HOME. Re-evaluating per spawn is cheap because F5's 30s keychain TTL cache
// backs getOAuthCredentials(). This function is the CONFIG-level decision (isolated iff a token
// resolves AND the kill-switch is off) and has NO fs side effects — the per-spawn EFFECTIVE
// decision additionally applies the expiry gate (resolveSpawnDecision), and scratch-HOME dir prep
// moved to ensureSpawnHome() at the isolated spawn site.
//
// The token itself is re-resolved FRESH per spawn via resolveSpawnToken(); a memoized token goes
// stale when its source rotates (the macOS keychain access token rotates ~hourly, refreshed by the
// operator's real claude), which 401'd every isolated spawn for ~31h on 2026-06-26 (#146). OCP
// deliberately does NOT refresh the token itself — a refresh-token grant would consume the
// single-use refresh token and log out the operator's real claude (issue #112).
// NEVER logs/returns the token verbatim to any caller that logs; spawnClaudeProcess uses it only
// to populate the spawn env. token is null when isolation is off.
let _spawnHomeMode = null;
function getSpawnHomeMode() {
if (_spawnHomeMode) return _spawnHomeMode;
if (SPAWN_REAL_HOME) {
return { isolated: false, home: null, reason: "kill-switch (OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME=1)" };
_spawnHomeMode = { isolated: false, home: null, token: null, reason: "kill-switch (OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME=1)" };
return _spawnHomeMode;
}
let hasToken = false;
try { hasToken = !!(getOAuthCredentials()?.accessToken); } catch { hasToken = false; }
if (hasToken) return { isolated: true, home: SPAWN_HOME_DIR, reason: "oauth token resolved" };
return { isolated: false, home: null, reason: "no oauth token resolvable" };
}
// FIX F6: re-verify the scratch HOME exists before each isolated spawn and re-create it if it was
// deleted at runtime (it used to be prepared once at startup, so a runtime deletion made every
// isolated spawn fail ENOENT until restart). mkdirSync is recursive+idempotent → cheap to re-run.
function ensureSpawnHome(dir = SPAWN_HOME_DIR) {
if (!existsSync(`${dir}/.claude`)) prepareSpawnHome(dir);
}
// Resolve a FRESH OAuth access token for an isolated spawn. Read-only (keychain / credentials.json
// / env) — NEVER refreshes/rotates (see getSpawnHomeMode note). Returns null if none resolvable OR
// if a known expiry is within the 5-min buffer (isTokenExpiring): a null return makes the caller
// fall back to real HOME, where the spawned claude refreshes the credential natively and self-heals
// (the keychain token is then fresh again → next spawn is fast). The env-token path (Linux) carries
// no expiresAt → never expiry-gated (those tokens are long-lived).
function resolveSpawnToken() {
try {
const creds = getOAuthCredentials();
if (!creds?.accessToken) return null;
if (isTokenExpiring(creds)) return null; // 5-min buffer; applied to the CACHED creds every use
return creds.accessToken;
} catch { return null; }
}
// FIX F3 (2026-07-07): serializes ONLY the real-HOME fallback spawns. Isolated spawns (the common
// fast path) never touch this mutex.
const realHomeFallbackMutex = createSerialMutex();
// Resolve the EFFECTIVE per-spawn HOME/token decision. Returns
// { isolated, home, token, releaseFallback }
// `releaseFallback` is non-null ONLY for a real-HOME fallback holder — the caller MUST call it on
// spawn teardown (wired into cleanup()); it releases the serialization mutex. It is null (no-op)
// for isolated and stable real-HOME (kill-switch / no-token) spawns.
//
// This is async so the real-HOME fallback can `await` the mutex; the keychain reads inside stay
// synchronous (F5 keeps the call sites off async conversion).
async function resolveSpawnDecision() {
const shm = getSpawnHomeMode();
if (!shm.isolated) return { isolated: false, home: null, token: null, releaseFallback: null };
const token = resolveSpawnToken();
let token = null;
try { token = getOAuthCredentials()?.accessToken || null; } catch { token = null; }
if (token) {
ensureSpawnHome(shm.home);
return { isolated: true, home: shm.home, token, releaseFallback: null };
prepareSpawnHome(SPAWN_HOME_DIR);
_spawnHomeMode = { isolated: true, home: SPAWN_HOME_DIR, token, reason: "oauth token resolved" };
} else {
_spawnHomeMode = { isolated: false, home: null, token: null, reason: "no oauth token resolvable" };
}
// Token is present but within the 5-min expiry window → we would fall back to real HOME, where
// the spawned claude refreshes the credential natively. HAZARD PREVENTED: without serialization,
// every concurrent -p spawn inside this window runs claude under the real HOME simultaneously,
// and each spawned claude races a `refresh_token` grant against the SAME single-use refresh
// token — rotating it out from under the others AND the operator's own real claude (the
// credential-fork hazard; #112 / #146 class). Serialize: admit ONE real-HOME spawn at a time.
// When the next waiter is admitted (the prior holder torn down → its claude has had its lifetime
// to refresh the keychain), re-run resolveSpawnToken(): a now-fresh token means we proceed
// ISOLATED and release the mutex immediately, so the queue drains to the fast path instead of
// piling every request into the real HOME.
const release = await realHomeFallbackMutex.acquire();
try {
// Drop the 30s keychain TTL cache so the re-check reads FRESH keychain state — otherwise a
// waiter admitted right after the prior holder's claude refreshed the token could still see the
// stale (expiring) cached creds and needlessly fall back to real HOME again for up to ~30s.
invalidateKeychainReadCache();
const retry = resolveSpawnToken();
if (retry) {
release();
ensureSpawnHome(shm.home);
return { isolated: true, home: shm.home, token: retry, releaseFallback: null };
}
} catch (e) {
release();
throw e;
}
return { isolated: false, home: null, token: null, releaseFallback: release };
return _spawnHomeMode;
}
// ── FIX ⑥ (concurrency): bounded wait-queue for the -p / stream-json path ──────────────
@@ -552,61 +431,16 @@ class ConcurrencyOverflowError extends Error {
constructor(message) { super(message); this.name = "ConcurrencyOverflowError"; this.httpStatus = 429; this.retryAfter = CLAUDE_QUEUE_RETRY_AFTER; }
}
// Tagged error for audit finding F2: the client disconnected while queued (or was already gone
// before we even tried to queue it). Distinct from ConcurrencyOverflowError so callers never send
// a response on this path — there is no socket left to write to.
class RequestDisconnectedError extends Error {
constructor(message) { super(message); this.name = "RequestDisconnectedError"; }
}
// Build an AbortSignal that fires when `res` (an http.ServerResponse) closes — i.e. the client
// disconnected. Used to cancel a QUEUED concurrency-slot wait (F2) so a client that gives up
// before a slot is granted is spliced out of the wait queue instead of eventually spawning a
// claude process for a dead socket. If `res` has already closed by the time we get here (its
// underlying stream already torn down), the signal is returned pre-aborted so acquire() rejects
// immediately without ever touching the queue — the "close already fired before we attach" case.
// `detach()` MUST be called once the wait settles (granted or rejected) to avoid a listener leak.
function closeSignalFor(res) {
const controller = new AbortController();
if (!res || typeof res.on !== "function") return { signal: controller.signal, detach() {} };
if (res.destroyed) {
controller.abort();
return { signal: controller.signal, detach() {} };
}
const onClose = () => controller.abort();
res.on("close", onClose);
return { signal: controller.signal, detach() { res.removeListener("close", onClose); } };
}
// Acquire a -p concurrency slot, queuing if all are busy (up to CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE). Resolves to a
// release() fn that MUST be called exactly once on every exit path (wired into ctx.cleanup()).
// Rejects with ConcurrencyOverflowError when the wait-queue is full, or with
// RequestDisconnectedError when `res` closes before a slot is granted (F2) — the caller must not
// spawn claude in that case. `res` is optional (back-compat for any caller without a live response
// object); omitting it just means a queued wait can't be cancelled early.
//
// F8 fix: stats.queued is set from claudeSemaphore.queued AFTER calling acquire() (not before) —
// acquire() synchronously updates _inflight/_waiters before its Promise ever resolves, so reading
// .queued right after the call already reflects reality. The old code set `queued + 1` BEFORE
// calling acquire() to account for "this waiter", which over-reported by 1 whenever the slot was
// granted immediately (the common case, not a queue at all).
async function acquireClaudeSlot(res) {
const { signal, detach } = closeSignalFor(res);
const slot = claudeSemaphore.acquire(signal);
stats.queued = claudeSemaphore.queued; // accurate: acquire() already updated the queue synchronously
// Rejects with ConcurrencyOverflowError when the wait-queue is full. Increments stats.queued while
// waiting (decremented on acquire) and stats.queueRejections on overflow.
async function acquireClaudeSlot() {
stats.queued = claudeSemaphore.queued + 1; // reflect this waiter before we (maybe) block
try {
await slot;
await claudeSemaphore.acquire();
} catch (e) {
detach();
stats.queued = claudeSemaphore.queued;
if (e instanceof SemaphoreAbortError) {
// Client-driven cancellation, not backpressure — do NOT count it as a queueRejection or
// log it as concurrency_queue_full (that log/counter means "the queue itself is full").
logEvent("info", "concurrency_wait_cancelled", {
reason: "client_disconnected", inflight: claudeSemaphore.inflight, queued: claudeSemaphore.queued,
});
throw new RequestDisconnectedError("client disconnected while waiting for a concurrency slot");
}
stats.queueRejections++;
logEvent("warn", "concurrency_queue_full", {
limit: claudeSemaphore.limit, maxQueue: claudeSemaphore.maxQueue,
@@ -616,7 +450,6 @@ async function acquireClaudeSlot(res) {
`backpressure: concurrency limit (${claudeSemaphore.limit}) reached and wait queue ` +
`(${claudeSemaphore.maxQueue}) is full — retry shortly`);
}
detach();
stats.queued = claudeSemaphore.queued;
let released = false;
return function releaseClaudeSlot() {
@@ -815,45 +648,13 @@ const cacheCleanupInterval = setInterval(() => {
// mechanism and the 15-min cadence makes the window negligible).
// Gated on TUI_MODE — zero effect (no kill-server, no list-sessions) when TUI is off.
// cli.js does NOT perform this operation (Class B, OCP-owned TUI spawn) — see ADR 0007.
//
// WARM POOL INTERACTION (the crux — see the POOL/REAPER INVARIANT in lib/tui/session.mjs).
// A warm pooled pane is one of OUR OWN ocp-tui-<port>-* sessions that is alive and idle BY
// DESIGN, and this sweep fires precisely when the instance is idle — i.e. exactly when the
// pool is full. Two things are therefore required, and both are done here:
// (a) DRAIN the pool BEFORE the sweep. Zombie reaping is possible ONLY via kill-server,
// and a live pooled pane suppresses kill-server (it is a live child of the tmux
// server). A permanently-full pool would otherwise permanently disable the very
// thing this tick exists to do. Draining costs one pane re-boot per tick (~1.2 s of
// background work every 15 min) and is invisible to callers: a request landing in the
// drain→refill gap simply MISSES the pool and takes today's cold path.
// (b) Pass the pool's live registry as `spare` anyway. After (a) it is empty, so this is
// belt-and-braces — it makes it impossible for THIS call site (or a future one) to
// kill a live pooled pane even if the drain were ever removed or reordered.
// RESIDUAL (unchanged in kind from the pre-pool code, and explicitly accepted there): a
// request arriving in the narrow window between the idle-check and kill-server has its pane
// torn down and fails cleanly via runTuiTurn's honesty gates. The drain widens that window
// by the cost of N kill-session calls (single-digit ms), not materially.
const TUI_REAP_INTERVAL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
const tuiReapInterval = TUI_MODE ? setInterval(() => {
if (tuiSemaphore.inflight > 0 || tuiSemaphore.queued > 0) return; // a turn is live — defer
try {
const drained = tuiPool ? tuiPool.drain() : 0;
// F7 fix: scope to THIS instance's own port; a sibling ocp-tui-<otherPort>-* session
// (a second OCP instance on the same host) is treated as foreign, same as olp-tui-*.
// includeLegacy is NOT set here — see reapStaleTuiSessions' comment: the periodic sweep
// conservatively treats any lingering bare-prefix legacy session as foreign so it can
// never trigger kill-server on a steady-state tick; only the one-time boot reap below
// claims legacy-shaped zombies.
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions({ port: PORT, spare: tuiPool ? tuiPool.liveNames() : null });
if (n || drained) {
logEvent("info", "tui_reaped_stale_sessions", { count: n, poolDrained: drained, trigger: "periodic" });
}
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions();
if (n) logEvent("info", "tui_reaped_stale_sessions", { count: n, trigger: "periodic" });
} catch (e) { logEvent("error", "tui_periodic_reap_failed", { error: e.message }); }
finally {
// Refill in the background regardless of how the sweep went — a throw mid-sweep must not
// leave the pool permanently paused (it would silently degrade to the cold path forever).
if (tuiPool) { try { tuiPool.resume(); } catch { /* best effort */ } }
}
}, TUI_REAP_INTERVAL_MS) : null;
if (tuiReapInterval && typeof tuiReapInterval.unref === "function") tuiReapInterval.unref();
@@ -1105,7 +906,7 @@ function getModelTier(cliModel) {
// budget. releaseSlot is wired into the idempotent cleanup() so the slot is freed on EVERY exit
// path (close/error/timeout/abort). Back-compat: releaseSlot defaults to a no-op so any future
// internal caller that does its own gating still works.
function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlot = () => {}, spawnDecision = null) {
function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlot = () => {}) {
const cliModel = MODEL_MAP[model] || model;
// Circuit breaker: disabled (see comment at top of breaker section)
@@ -1142,24 +943,22 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlo
env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY = "1";
}
// FIX ③ (latency) + F3 (concurrency): apply the pre-resolved per-spawn HOME/token decision.
// The decision is resolved ASYNC in the caller (resolveSpawnDecision) so the real-HOME fallback
// serialization can await its mutex; here we only apply the result. When isolated, run claude
// under a credential-free minimal HOME with cwd = that same neutral dir, so it loads NONE of the
// operator's global ~/.claude (plugins/skills/hooks) or the ~/ocp project CLAUDE.md/skills — the
// measured 1028s → 37s latency win. The env token is authoritative for `-p` (unlike
// interactive claude). When no fresh token is resolvable, decision.isolated is false → real HOME
// + inherited cwd (zero regression), and the spawned claude resolves+refreshes credentials
// natively. The DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS / AUTO_MEMORY flags are set unconditionally in isolated mode
// (belt-and-braces; mirrors the TUI path).
const decision = spawnDecision || { isolated: false, releaseFallback: null };
// FIX ③ (latency): default-path spawn-home isolation. When a token is resolvable (and the
// OCP_SPAWN_REAL_HOME kill-switch is off), run claude under a credential-free minimal HOME
// with cwd = that same neutral dir, so it loads NONE of the operator's global ~/.claude
// (plugins/skills/hooks) or the ~/ocp project CLAUDE.md/skills — the measured 1028s → 37s
// latency win. The env token is authoritative for `-p` (unlike interactive claude). When no
// token is resolvable, falls back to real HOME + inherited cwd (zero regression). See
// getSpawnHomeMode() / prepareSpawnHome() above. The DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS / AUTO_MEMORY flags
// are set unconditionally in isolated mode (belt-and-braces; mirrors the TUI path).
const spawnHome = getSpawnHomeMode();
const spawnOpts = { env, stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] };
if (decision.isolated && decision.token) {
env.HOME = decision.home;
env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = decision.token; // env token is authoritative for -p
if (spawnHome.isolated) {
env.HOME = spawnHome.home;
env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN = spawnHome.token; // env token is authoritative for -p
env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CLAUDE_MDS = "1";
env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY = "1";
spawnOpts.cwd = decision.home; // neutral cwd: no project CLAUDE.md/skills
spawnOpts.cwd = spawnHome.home; // neutral cwd: no project CLAUDE.md/skills
}
const proc = spawn(CLAUDE, cliArgs, spawnOpts);
@@ -1178,11 +977,6 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlo
// and cleanup() is guarded by `cleaned`, so the slot is released exactly once on the first
// exit path reached (proc 'exit' fires before 'close'; 'error' covers spawn failure).
try { releaseSlot(); } catch { /* never let release throw out of cleanup */ }
// F3: release the real-HOME fallback serialization mutex (no-op for isolated/normal spawns).
// By now this spawn's claude has had its lifetime to refresh the keychain token, so the next
// queued fallback waiter re-checks resolveSpawnToken() and proceeds ISOLATED with the now-fresh
// token instead of piling into the real HOME. Idempotent; cleanup() is guarded by `cleaned`.
try { if (decision.releaseFallback) decision.releaseFallback(); } catch { /* never throw out of cleanup */ }
}
// Guarantee slot release on ANY exit path (normal close, error, timeout kill,
@@ -1252,37 +1046,18 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlo
// We accumulate full text across all content_block_delta events plus the
// assistant-aggregate fallback, then resolve with the assembled string.
// Reference: OLP ADR 0009 Amendment 1 + commit 97e7d16.
// `res` (optional, F2) is the client's http.ServerResponse — passed through so a queued wait
// can be cancelled the moment the client disconnects, instead of spawning claude for a dead
// socket once a slot finally frees up.
async function callClaude(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, res) {
async function callClaude(model, messages, conversationId, keyName) {
// FIX ⑥: acquire a concurrency slot first (queues up to CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE; rejects with a
// ConcurrencyOverflowError → 429 when the queue is full, or a RequestDisconnectedError (F2)
// if the client goes away first). The release fn is passed into the spawn so the idempotent
// cleanup() frees it on every exit path. If the spawn itself throws synchronously (before
// cleanup is wired), release here so the slot never leaks.
// F2×F3 composition: the slot acquire comes FIRST and is the cancellable step — a client
// that disconnects while queued rejects here, BEFORE resolveSpawnDecision() runs, so a
// cancelled request can never acquire (or briefly hold) the real-HOME fallback mutex.
const releaseSlot = await acquireClaudeSlot(res);
// F3: resolve the per-spawn HOME/token decision (may serialize on the real-HOME fallback
// mutex). If it throws, release the just-acquired slot before propagating — cleanup() is
// not wired yet at this point.
let spawnDecision;
try {
spawnDecision = await resolveSpawnDecision();
} catch (err) {
releaseSlot();
throw err;
}
// ConcurrencyOverflowError → 429 when the queue is full). The release fn is passed into the
// spawn so the idempotent cleanup() frees it on every exit path. If the spawn itself throws
// synchronously (before cleanup is wired), release here so the slot never leaks.
const releaseSlot = await acquireClaudeSlot();
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let ctx;
try {
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlot, spawnDecision);
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlot);
} catch (err) {
releaseSlot();
// Spawn threw before cleanup() was wired → release the fallback mutex here so it never leaks.
try { spawnDecision.releaseFallback?.(); } catch { /* best effort */ }
return reject(err);
}
@@ -1353,59 +1128,26 @@ async function callClaude(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, res) {
// flag that could perturb cc_entrypoint classification.
// Authority: claude CLI v2.1.158 interactive mode (cc_entrypoint=cli).
// SECURITY: A-path single-user ONLY — home is NOT isolation (see ADR 0007).
// `res` (optional, F2) is the client's http.ServerResponse — see closeSignalFor.
async function callClaudeTui(model, messages, _conversationId, _keyName, res) {
function callClaudeTui(model, messages, _conversationId, _keyName) {
const cliModel = MODEL_MAP[model] || model;
const prompt = messagesToPrompt(messages); // includes system as [System] inline
recordModelRequest(cliModel, prompt.length);
// C-4: gate the heavy interactive boot behind the TUI semaphore (queuing if all slots are
// busy, up to maxQueue). F2: `signal` (tied to `res` "close") cancels a QUEUED wait the
// instant the client disconnects, so a dead socket never triggers a cold-boot tmux+claude
// spawn; detach() drops the "close" listener as soon as the wait settles rather than
// holding it for the whole (up to 120s) turn.
const { signal, detach } = closeSignalFor(res);
try {
await tuiSemaphore.acquire(signal);
} catch (err) {
detach();
if (err instanceof SemaphoreAbortError) {
// L1: client-driven cancellation, not an upstream failure — info, not error (mirrors
// acquireClaudeSlot's concurrency_wait_cancelled on the -p path).
logEvent("info", "concurrency_wait_cancelled", {
reason: "client_disconnected", path: "tui", inflight: tuiSemaphore.inflight, queued: tuiSemaphore.queued,
});
throw new RequestDisconnectedError("client disconnected while waiting for a TUI concurrency slot");
}
throw err;
}
detach();
// release() runs in a finally so any throw from runTuiTurn (tmux spawn failure,
// paste-not-landed) OR from the honesty gates below (truncation / error banner) can NEVER
// leak a slot. tuiSemaphore.inflight feeds /health.
try {
const { text, entrypoint, truncated } = await runTuiTurn({
// C-4: gate the heavy interactive boot behind the TUI semaphore. run() acquires a slot
// (queuing if all are busy, up to maxQueue), then releases in a finally so any throw from
// runTuiTurn (tmux spawn failure, paste-not-landed) OR from the honesty gates below
// (truncation / error banner) can NEVER leak a slot. tuiSemaphore.inflight feeds /health.
return tuiSemaphore.run(() => runTuiTurn({
prompt,
model: cliModel,
claudeBin: CLAUDE,
home: TUI_HOME,
realHome: process.env.HOME,
cwd: TUI_CWD,
port: PORT, // F7 fix: port-scopes the tmux session name so a sibling OCP instance on a
// different port never collides with this instance's reap/kill-server logic.
wallclockMs: TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS,
entrypointMode: TUI_ENTRYPOINT,
// Warm pane pool (null unless OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE > 0 → today's cold path exactly).
// A pooled pane is single-use: runTuiTurn kills it in its finally like any other.
pool: tuiPool,
// Only observe when the pool is ON — with it off (the default) no new log line is
// emitted, so the disabled path stays byte-for-byte today's, logs included.
onPane: tuiPool
? ({ warm }) => logEvent("info", warm ? "tui_pool_hit" : "tui_pool_miss",
{ model: cliModel, warmRemaining: tuiPool.warm })
: null,
});
}).then(({ text, entrypoint, truncated }) => {
// ── Honesty gates (issue #133) ─ run BEFORE recordModelSuccess / cache write-back.
// A throw here propagates to the catch below (recordModelError + reject), so the
// A throw here propagates to the .catch below (recordModelError + reject), so the
// result never reaches the downstream setCachedResponse / singleflight / SUCCESS path.
// C-2: the wall-clock cap hit with partial text and NO terminal marker — the turn
@@ -1440,12 +1182,10 @@ async function callClaudeTui(model, messages, _conversationId, _keyName, res) {
logEvent("warn", "tui_entrypoint_mismatch", { expected: "cli", got: entrypoint, model: cliModel });
}
return text;
} catch (err) {
}).catch((err) => {
recordModelError(cliModel, false);
throw err;
} finally {
tuiSemaphore.release();
}
}));
}
// ── SSE heartbeat (opt-in idle watchdog) ────────────────────────────────
@@ -1491,37 +1231,21 @@ async function callClaudeStreaming(model, messages, conversationId, res, authInf
// FIX ⑥: acquire a concurrency slot first (queues up to CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE). On overflow, surface
// HTTP 429 + Retry-After (NOT 500). Release is wired into cleanup() for every exit path; if the
// spawn throws synchronously before cleanup is wired, release here.
// F2: pass `res` so a queued wait is cancelled the instant this client disconnects — the client
// is already gone in that case, so there is no response to send back.
let releaseSlot;
try {
releaseSlot = await acquireClaudeSlot(res);
releaseSlot = await acquireClaudeSlot();
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof RequestDisconnectedError) return; // client gone — nothing to write to
if (err instanceof ConcurrencyOverflowError) {
return jsonResponse(res, 429, { error: { message: sanitizeError(err.message), type: "rate_limit_error" } }, { "Retry-After": String(err.retryAfter) });
}
return jsonResponse(res, 500, { error: { message: sanitizeError(err.message), type: "proxy_error" } });
}
// F3: resolve the per-spawn HOME/token decision (may serialize on the real-HOME fallback
// mutex). F2×F3 composition: this runs strictly AFTER the (cancellable) slot acquire, so a
// request cancelled while queued never touches the fallback mutex. If it throws, release
// the just-acquired slot before responding — cleanup() is not wired yet at this point.
let spawnDecision;
try {
spawnDecision = await resolveSpawnDecision();
} catch (err) {
releaseSlot();
return jsonResponse(res, 500, { error: { message: sanitizeError(err.message), type: "proxy_error" } });
}
let ctx;
try {
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, authInfo.keyName, releaseSlot, spawnDecision);
ctx = spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, authInfo.keyName, releaseSlot);
} catch (err) {
releaseSlot();
// Spawn threw before cleanup() was wired → release the fallback mutex here so it never leaks.
try { spawnDecision.releaseFallback?.(); } catch { /* best effort */ }
return jsonResponse(res, 500, { error: { message: sanitizeError(err.message), type: "proxy_error" } });
}
@@ -1793,51 +1517,6 @@ const OAUTH_REFRESH_MIN_BACKOFF = 60 * 1000;
const OAUTH_REFRESH_MAX_BACKOFF = 3600 * 1000;
let oauthRefreshBackoff = { nextAttemptAt: 0, currentDelay: OAUTH_REFRESH_MIN_BACKOFF };
// FIX F5 (2026-07-07): the macOS keychain read (`security find-generic-password`, up to 5s × 2
// labels when the first label misses) ran on EVERY -p spawn's hot path, blocking the event loop
// (worst case 10s) and stalling all in-flight SSE streams. Two minimal, sync-preserving mitigations:
// (a) memoize the last-good keychain label and try it FIRST → one exec instead of two on the
// steady-state path (orderLabelsLastGoodFirst);
// (b) a short (30s) TTL cache of the keychain read result (createTtlCache).
// SAFETY vs the #146 regression: #146 was a token memoized FOREVER at startup that went stale and
// 401'd. This is a 30s TTL (not forever), AND resolveSpawnToken() re-applies the 5-min expiry gate
// (isTokenExpiring) to the CACHED creds on EVERY use — the creds object carries `expiresAt`, so a
// token expiring within the cache window is still rejected → real-HOME fallback. A short TTL bounds
// how often we re-READ the keychain; it does NOT bound how often we re-DECIDE expiry. This is why a
// short-TTL keychain cache + a per-use expiry check does not reintroduce the forever-stale bug.
const KEYCHAIN_LABELS = ["claude-code-credentials", "Claude Code-credentials"];
const KEYCHAIN_CACHE_TTL_MS = 30 * 1000;
const _keychainCache = createTtlCache({ ttlMs: KEYCHAIN_CACHE_TTL_MS });
let _lastGoodKeychainLabel = null;
// Read the macOS keychain credentials, label-memoized + short-TTL cached (F5). Sync (execFileSync);
// returns the `claudeAiOauth` creds object or null.
function readKeychainCreds() {
return _keychainCache.get(() => {
for (const label of orderLabelsLastGoodFirst(KEYCHAIN_LABELS, _lastGoodKeychainLabel)) {
try {
const raw = execFileSync("security", [
"find-generic-password", "-s", label, "-w"
], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 5000 }).trim();
const creds = JSON.parse(raw);
if (creds?.claudeAiOauth?.accessToken) {
_lastGoodKeychainLabel = label; // remember the winner → try it first next time
return creds.claudeAiOauth;
}
} catch { /* try next label */ }
}
return null;
});
}
// F3 drain helper: drop the F5 keychain TTL cache so the NEXT getOAuthCredentials() re-reads the
// keychain from scratch. Called under the real-HOME fallback mutex just before the re-check, so a
// waiter admitted after the prior holder's claude refreshed the keychain sees the FRESH token
// immediately (and proceeds ISOLATED) instead of waiting out the ≤30s TTL on the stale creds.
function invalidateKeychainReadCache() {
_keychainCache.clear();
}
function getOAuthCredentials() {
// 1. Env var fallback — highest precedence for explicit overrides.
if (process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) {
@@ -1851,8 +1530,17 @@ function getOAuthCredentials() {
if (creds?.claudeAiOauth?.accessToken) return creds.claudeAiOauth;
} catch { /* fall through to macOS keychain */ }
// 3. macOS keychain (both label formats) — F5: label-memoized + 30s TTL cached (see above).
return readKeychainCreds();
// 3. macOS keychain (both label formats)
for (const label of ["claude-code-credentials", "Claude Code-credentials"]) {
try {
const raw = execFileSync("security", [
"find-generic-password", "-s", label, "-w"
], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 5000 }).trim();
const creds = JSON.parse(raw);
if (creds?.claudeAiOauth?.accessToken) return creds.claudeAiOauth;
} catch { /* try next */ }
}
return null;
}
async function refreshOAuthToken(refreshToken) {
@@ -2186,12 +1874,9 @@ function applySettingUpdate(key, value) {
switch (key) {
case "timeout": TIMEOUT = value; break;
// FIX ⑥ + F1: keep the -p wait-queue semaphore's limit in sync with the runtime MAX_CONCURRENT
// so a /settings change to maxConcurrent actually changes how many claude procs run at once
// in BOTH directions. setLimit() (not a bare `.limit =` assignment) is required: lowering
// needs release() to stop over-granting until inflight drains under the new cap, and raising
// needs queued waiters woken immediately to use the new headroom. See lib/tui/semaphore.mjs.
case "maxConcurrent": MAX_CONCURRENT = value; claudeSemaphore.setLimit(value); break;
// FIX ⑥: keep the -p wait-queue semaphore's limit in sync with the runtime MAX_CONCURRENT
// so a /settings change to maxConcurrent actually changes how many claude procs run at once.
case "maxConcurrent": MAX_CONCURRENT = value; claudeSemaphore.limit = Math.max(1, value); break;
case "sessionTTL": SESSION_TTL = value; break;
case "maxPromptChars": MAX_PROMPT_CHARS = value; break;
case "cacheTTL": CACHE_TTL = value; break;
@@ -2348,7 +2033,7 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
const t0TuiStream = Date.now();
const promptCharsTuiStream = messages.reduce((a, m) => a + contentToText(m.content).length, 0);
try {
const content = await callClaudeTui(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName, res);
const content = await callClaudeTui(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName);
if (CACHE_TTL > 0 && req._cacheHash) {
try { setCachedResponse(req._cacheHash, model, content); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "cache_write_failed", { error: e.message }); }
}
@@ -2385,27 +2070,15 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
// will re-read the freshly-populated cache entry here rather than spawning.
const recheck = getCachedResponse(req._cacheHash, CACHE_TTL);
if (recheck) return recheck.response;
const c = await upstreamCall(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName, res);
const c = await upstreamCall(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName);
try { setCachedResponse(req._cacheHash, model, c); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "cache_write_failed", { error: e.message }); }
return c;
},
// M1: if the LEADER disconnected while queued (F2), its RequestDisconnectedError is
// personal to the leader — a live follower must not inherit it as a spurious 500.
// retryIf makes this follower re-enter singleflight with its OWN fn (own res, own
// disconnect signal), becoming the new leader or joining a retrying sibling's flight —
// but only while OUR client is still connected. If our client is also gone, the
// rejection propagates and the RDE early-return in the catch below ends it quietly.
(err) => err instanceof RequestDisconnectedError && !res.destroyed);
});
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
completionResponse(res, id, model, content);
try { recordUsage({ keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, model, promptChars, responseChars: content.length, elapsedMs: Date.now() - t0Usage, success: true }); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "usage_record_failed", { error: e.message }); }
return;
} catch (err) {
// L1: a client disconnect while queued is NOT an upstream failure — mirror the
// streaming path (which returns without recording anything): no usage-failure row,
// no [proxy] error log, no error response (the socket is gone). The disconnect is
// already logged at info level (concurrency_wait_cancelled) by acquireClaudeSlot.
if (err instanceof RequestDisconnectedError) { try { res.end(); } catch {} return; }
try { recordUsage({ keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, model, promptChars, responseChars: 0, elapsedMs: Date.now() - t0Usage, success: false }); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "usage_record_failed", { error: e.message }); }
console.error(`[proxy] error: ${err.message}`);
if (res.headersSent || res.writableEnded || res.destroyed) {
@@ -2418,14 +2091,11 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
// Fallback: cache disabled (CACHE_TTL=0) or no _cacheHash — original path untouched.
try {
const content = await upstreamCall(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName, res);
const content = await upstreamCall(model, messages, conversationId, req._authKeyName);
const id = `chatcmpl-${randomUUID()}`;
completionResponse(res, id, model, content);
try { recordUsage({ keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, model, promptChars, responseChars: content.length, elapsedMs: Date.now() - t0Usage, success: true }); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "usage_record_failed", { error: e.message }); }
} catch (err) {
// L1: disconnect-while-queued — same quiet non-error outcome as the singleflight
// path above and the streaming path (see acquireClaudeSlot's info-level log).
if (err instanceof RequestDisconnectedError) { try { res.end(); } catch {} return; }
try { recordUsage({ keyId: req._authKeyId, keyName: req._authKeyName, model, promptChars, responseChars: 0, elapsedMs: Date.now() - t0Usage, success: false }); } catch (e) { logEvent("error", "usage_record_failed", { error: e.message }); }
console.error(`[proxy] error: ${err.message}`);
if (res.headersSent || res.writableEnded || res.destroyed) {
@@ -2603,22 +2273,11 @@ const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
spawn: (() => {
if (TUI_MODE) return { mode: "tui (default -p path unused)", isolated: false, home: null };
const shm = getSpawnHomeMode();
// FIX F6: report the EFFECTIVE current decision, not just token PRESENCE. During the
// 5-min pre-expiry window the token exists (shm.isolated=true) but resolveSpawnToken()
// returns null and spawns actually run real-HOME — so `isolated` MUST also reflect the
// expiry gate, or /health lies. The field SET is unchanged (grandfathered B.2 contract,
// ADR 0006 — HARD CONSTRAINT: no field add/remove/rename); only the VALUES are made
// truthful. resolveSpawnToken() is read-only + backed by F5's 30s keychain cache → cheap.
const effIsolated = shm.isolated && resolveSpawnToken() !== null;
return {
mode: effIsolated ? "isolated-scratch-home" : "real-home",
isolated: effIsolated,
home: effIsolated ? shm.home : null,
reason: effIsolated
? shm.reason
: (shm.isolated
? "oauth token within 5-min expiry window → real-HOME fallback (self-heals on next refresh)"
: shm.reason),
mode: shm.isolated ? "isolated-scratch-home" : "real-home",
isolated: shm.isolated,
home: shm.isolated ? shm.home : null,
reason: shm.reason,
};
})(),
// ── FIX ⑥ -p concurrency wait-queue surface — ADDITIVE ──
@@ -2638,12 +2297,9 @@ const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
// still appears with enabled:false (cheap, harmless) so the shape is stable.
// entrypointMismatches/lastEntrypoint exist so an operator can poll /health to catch a
// silent metered-pool drift (the audit's top risk after the 6/15 billing flip).
// `pool` is a NEW nested field inside the (already additive) tui block: null when the
// warm pool is off (the default), so the disabled shape is unchanged apart from one
// explicit null. Lets the operator confirm hit rate + standing process cost.
tui: buildTuiHealthBlock(
{ enabled: TUI_MODE, entrypointMode: TUI_ENTRYPOINT, maxConcurrent: TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT },
tuiStats, tuiSemaphore, tuiPool,
tuiStats, tuiSemaphore,
),
});
}
@@ -2880,27 +2536,6 @@ function gracefulShutdown(signal) {
if (tuiReapInterval) clearInterval(tuiReapInterval);
closeDb();
// 2b. Drain the warm pane pool. A pooled `claude` is a child of the tmux SERVER, not of
// this node process, so it is NOT in activeProcesses and step 3 below cannot reach it —
// without this explicit drain every warm pane would outlive OCP as an orphan (and the
// pool's in-memory registry dies with the process, so nothing would remember it owned them).
//
// drain() kills the pane that is currently BOOTING too, and it does so SYNCHRONOUSLY. That
// is required, not incidental: step 4 below calls process.exit(0) in THIS SAME TICK whenever
// activeProcesses is empty — which on a TUI host it always is — so any cleanup a boot
// deferred to a .then()/.catch() would simply never run. (That was a real bug: the pool used
// to track in-flight boots as a count, could not name the booting session, and orphaned a
// live authenticated `claude` on every shutdown that landed mid-boot.)
//
// Orphans that survive anyway (SIGKILL, power loss) are still caught by the next instance's
// boot reap — this makes the graceful path clean, it is not the only safety net.
if (tuiPool) {
try {
const drained = tuiPool.drain();
if (drained) logEvent("info", "tui_pool_drained", { count: drained, trigger: "shutdown" });
} catch (e) { logEvent("error", "tui_pool_drain_failed", { error: e.message }); }
}
// 3. Kill all active child processes
for (const proc of activeProcesses) {
try { proc.kill("SIGTERM"); } catch {}
@@ -2970,20 +2605,8 @@ server.listen(PORT, BIND_ADDRESS, () => {
? (TUI_HOME === process.env.HOME ? "env-token (real home — unset OCP_TUI_HOME for credential isolation)" : "env-token (credential-isolated home — no credentials.json)")
: "credentials.json (no CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN — see Troubleshooting #401)";
console.log(` TUI-mode: ON home=${TUI_HOME} cwd=${TUI_CWD} auth=${tuiAuth} wallclock=${TUI_WALLCLOCK_MS}ms maxConcurrent=${TUI_MAX_CONCURRENT}`);
console.log(TUI_POOL_SIZE > 0
? ` TUI warm pool: ON size=${TUI_POOL_SIZE}${TUI_POOL_SIZE} idle \`claude\` process(es) held warm; first request per model is still a cold MISS`
: ` TUI warm pool: OFF (set OCP_TUI_POOL_SIZE=1..${POOL_MAX_SIZE} to pre-boot panes and cut ~3-4s per request)`);
try {
// F7 fix: scope to THIS instance's own port (see reapStaleTuiSessions). includeLegacy:
// true ONLY here — the one-time boot reap is the designated point to claim orphaned
// bare-prefix ("ocp-tui-<uuid8>") zombie sessions left by a PRE-fix process generation
// of this same instance (no live post-fix instance ever creates that shape again).
// No `spare`: the warm pool is EMPTY at boot (there is no boot-time pre-warm — the pool
// learns its model from the first request), so this reap has no live pane to protect and
// it is exactly what SHOULD claim any ocp-tui-<port>-p* pool orphans left by a previous
// process generation of this instance (POOL/REAPER INVARIANT property 2). If a future
// change ever pre-warms at boot, this call MUST start passing tuiPool.liveNames().
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions({ port: PORT, includeLegacy: true });
const n = reapStaleTuiSessions();
if (n) logEvent("info", "tui_reaped_stale_sessions", { count: n });
} catch {}
}
+88 -1072
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