fix(prompt): OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS wrapper no longer hard-codes a tool list (closes #185)

The positive local-tools wrapper (server.mjs) claimed the model has "full access
to the local filesystem, working directory, and shell through your available
tools (Bash, Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep, etc.)". That over-promises when an
operator narrows CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS (e.g. to Read,Grep): the model is told it
has Bash/Write/shell it doesn't hold, then attempts a non-granted tool and gets
denied. The default set matches the text, so the primary/OpenClaw path was fine —
but the enumeration was a prompt-honesty mismatch (flagged in the #182 fact-check).

Reworded to flip the POSTURE only ("you may use your available local tools … do
not assume access beyond the tool set provided to you in this session") without
enumerating specific tools or asserting shell/write capability. The model learns
its real tools from the tool definitions claude is given (--allowedTools), so the
enumeration was redundant as well as fragile — now honest under any allowed set.

No const reordering / no CONFIG_EPOCH change (still a constant; the epoch-fold
test confirms toggling still invalidates the cache with the new text). Test
markers updated (selectPromptWrapper unit + the boot-server integration assertion
that the positive wrapper reaches the -p spawn). Suite 449/0.

Rule 2: OCP-owned prompt composition, no wire change, no cli.js citation.

Closes #185

Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-4-8> <noreply@anthropic.com>

server.mjs

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ const OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER = `You are accessed via the OCP HTTP proxy. You
 // default wrapper above is byte-for-byte unchanged. Selecting the positive wrapper does NOT expand
 // the tool surface (governed independently by --allowedTools/--disallowedTools) — it only changes the
 // prompt — and is boot-gated below (multi/non-loopback/anon → refuse) mirroring OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS.
-const OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS_WRAPPER = `You are accessed via the OCP HTTP proxy running on the operator's own machine. You have full access to the local filesystem, working directory, and shell through your available tools (Bash, Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep, etc.). Use them as needed to complete the operator's requests.`;
+const OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS_WRAPPER = `You are accessed via the OCP HTTP proxy running on the operator's own machine. Unlike the shared-gateway posture, you may use your available local tools to act on the operator's machine as the task requires. Use only the tools you actually have — do not assume filesystem, shell, or other access beyond the tool set provided to you in this session.`;
 
 // OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS is inert in TUI mode: the interactive (non-`-p`) path composes its own prompt via
 // callClaudeTui/messagesToPrompt and never calls extractSystemPrompt, so the wrapper is only ever

test-features.mjs

@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ test("appendOperatorPrompt: operator value is trimmed before appending", () => {
 console.log("\nOCP_LOCAL_TOOLS wrapper + safety gate:");
 
 const NEG = "You do NOT have access to any local filesystem";
-const POS = "You have full access to the local filesystem";
+const POS = "you may use your available local tools";
 
 test("selectPromptWrapper: default (disabled) returns the negative wrapper BYTE-IDENTICAL", () => {
   // Mutation-proof: flip the ternary and the default path leaks the positive wrapper.
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath as _ltF2P } from "node:url";
 const LT_SERVER = _ltF2P(new URL("./server.mjs", import.meta.url));
 const LT_POSIX = process.platform !== "win32"; // fake is a /bin/sh script; CI is POSIX
 const LT_NEG_MARK = "You do NOT have access to any local filesystem";
-const LT_POS_MARK = "You have full access to the local filesystem";
+const LT_POS_MARK = "you may use your available local tools";
 // Fake claude: record the --system-prompt it was spawned with, bump an optional spawn counter,
 // then emit a minimal valid stream-json response so the request completes (and caches).
 const LT_FAKE = `#!/bin/sh