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feat(chat): forward OpenAI image_url parts to Claude (multimodal vision) (#154)
* feat(chat): forward OpenAI image_url parts to Claude (multimodal vision) `POST /v1/chat/completions` previously flattened every message to plain text via contentToText(), replacing image_url parts with "[non-text content omitted]" — so images were silently dropped (issue #110). This adds real multimodal support: OpenAI `image_url` content parts are translated to Anthropic image blocks and fed to the Claude CLI over `--input-format stream-json`, keeping subscription auth (the reason OCP routes through the CLI rather than the API). Class B.1 (OpenAI-compatibility surface), authorized by ADR 0006. Request shape follows OpenAI's published vision / chat-completions spec (https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/vision and the chat/completions `content` image_url part) — no field is introduced beyond OpenAI's shape. The CLI's `--input-format stream-json` is the transport for this Class B endpoint, not a forwarded cli.js operation, so there is no Class A cli.js citation to make; scope is justified under the ALIGNMENT.md Class B mapping of Rule 2 (no invention beyond the cited OpenAI spec). Mechanism (verified empirically against the installed CLI, v2.1.206): a user message whose `content` is an Anthropic block array including `{type:"image",source:{type:"base64",media_type,data}}` fed to `claude -p --input-format stream-json` is correctly described by the model. Confirmed live end-to-end through this endpoint (a base64 PNG returns the correct color). Design: - New pure module `lib/multimodal.mjs` (mirrors the lib/*.mjs pattern; unit- testable without a live server): hasImageContent, buildImageBlocks, buildStreamJsonInput, MultimodalError. - server.mjs: text path is byte-for-byte unchanged. Only when a request carries an image_url part does spawnClaudeProcess switch stdin to a stream-json user envelope and buildCliArgs add `--input-format stream-json`. Image parsing runs before any stats mutation so a validation failure never leaks counters/slots. - Images bypass the text char budget (CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS) and are bounded by explicit byte/count caps with clear 4xx errors (413 for size/count, 400 for malformed/unsupported/disabled-remote), never a silent drop. Scope decisions (v1): - Base64 data URIs supported by default (image/jpeg,png,gif,webp). - Remote http(s) image URLs OFF by default behind CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL; when enabled they are passed through as an Anthropic url-source (OCP never fetches the URL itself, so no OCP-side SSRF surface). - Audio/file parts deferred: existing placeholder behavior preserved. - Images anywhere in multi-turn history, not just the last message. New env vars (documented in README Environment Variables table): CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL, CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES, CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES, CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE (now configurable; default 5 MB unchanged). Tests: 26 unit tests in test-features.mjs covering data-URI parse, multiple images, text/image ordering, multi-turn history images, malformed/oversized/ too-many handling, remote-URL policy, and text-path parity. `npm test` green (289 passed). `node --check` clean. No alignment-blacklist tokens added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(chat): address PR #154 review blockers — TUI guard, fail-closed caps, text budget Remediates the three merge-blocking findings from the maintainer's review of the multimodal vision PR. Class B.1 (OpenAI-compat surface): request shape per OpenAI vision spec (image_url content parts), authorized by ADR 0006. No new wire shape and no cli.js surface change — the stream-json image contract is the CLI's native input format (already cited in the base commit); these are correctness fixes on the OCP-owned validation/dispatch layer. F1 — TUI mode silently dropped images and returned 200. callClaudeTui() renders every non-text part as "[non-text content omitted]", so a vision request in CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true was answered about an image the model never saw. Now handleChatCompletions fails loudly with 400 images_unsupported_in_tui_mode instead of a silent drop (ALIGNMENT.md forbids serving text the model did not mean). Documented in README § Images / Multimodal. F3 — NaN env parsing failed open. CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE=unlimited -> NaN -> `body.length > NaN` always false -> body cap gone (OOM DoS); =5MB -> 5 bytes -> proxy bricked; same on CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES / _IMAGE_BYTES / _IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES. Added lib/env.mjs parsePositiveInt (pure, fail-closed) + a thin parseIntEnv warn wrapper; a malformed cap now keeps the safe default and warns at startup. F2 — images let unbounded text bypass MAX_PROMPT_CHARS. buildImageBlocks only counted textChars and never truncated; the budget was never passed in. Threaded maxTextChars (= MAX_PROMPT_CHARS) into the multimodal transform, which now truncates text tail-first (mirroring messagesToPrompt) while preserving image blocks, and logs prompt_truncated. Tests: +11 in test-features.mjs (all pure-module, per the repo's no-server-import pattern) covering the text-budget enforcement and the fail-closed cap parsing, including the exact F2 (500k chars + 1 image) and F3 (unlimited/5MB/0/20.5) scenarios. 300 passed, 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): address PR #154 review round 2 — MAX_PROMPT_CHARS fail-closed + system-only image guard Closes the two residual gaps from the round-2 review, both traced to the same root as the already-fixed blockers. Class B.1 (OpenAI-compat vision): authorized by ADR 0006; request shape is the OpenAI `image_url` content part. No new wire shape — the Anthropic image block over `--input-format stream-json` is the CLI's native contract (cli.js buildStreamJsonInput path, verified live in round 1). MAX_PROMPT_CHARS is OCP's own truncation guard, not a cli.js operation. Gap (a) — MAX_PROMPT_CHARS was left on the raw parseInt while every other cap moved to the fail-closed helper. `let MAX_PROMPT_CHARS = parseInt(env||"150000",10)` sat five lines above the parseIntEnv helper this PR added, so CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS=unlimited → NaN → enforceTextBudget's `!(NaN > 0)` early-return → 500k chars passed unbounded, truncated:false, silently defeating F2's text-budget guarantee under a plausible operator config. Fix: hoist parseIntEnv above the declaration and derive MAX_PROMPT_CHARS through it (keeps `let` for the settings API). A misconfigured value now keeps the 150k default and warns, like the other caps. Gap (b) — an image present ONLY in a system message silently dropped in non-TUI mode. Detection runs on the full message list, but extraction/spawn filter role==="system" out, so a system-only image was detected as multimodal, survived no filter, fell to the text path, and rendered as "[non-text content omitted]" → 200 with a hallucinated answer — the one silent-drop outcome F1 exists to forbid. Fix: after filtering, if hasImageContent(full) is true but no image survives, return `400 images_unsupported_in_system_messages`. Narrow (OpenAI disallows images in the system role) so no legitimate request is rejected. Documented in README § Images. Tests: +4 (all pure-module) — parsePositiveInt('unlimited') keeps the 150k default (gap a) and a valid override is honored; hasImageContent proves the guard predicate fires for a system-only image (true on full list, false after the system filter) and does NOT fire for a user-message image. 304 passed, 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: vvlasy-openclaw <vvlasy-openclaw@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: vvlasy-openclaw <vvlasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
openclaw.vvlasy.cz
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ One proxy. Multiple IDEs. All models. **$0 API cost.**
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- [How It Works](#how-it-works)
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- Reference: [Available Models](#available-models) · [API Endpoints](#api-endpoints) · [Environment Variables](#environment-variables)
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- Modes & operations: [LAN & multi-user](#lan--multi-user) → [`docs/lan-mode.md`](docs/lan-mode.md) · [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) → [`docs/tui-mode.md`](docs/tui-mode.md) · [Upgrading](#upgrading) → [`docs/upgrading.md`](docs/upgrading.md)
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- [Built-in Usage Monitoring](#built-in-usage-monitoring) · [Response Cache](#response-cache) · [OpenClaw Integration](#openclaw-integration)
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- [Built-in Usage Monitoring](#built-in-usage-monitoring) · [Response Cache](#response-cache) · [Images / Multimodal](#images--multimodal-vision) · [OpenClaw Integration](#openclaw-integration)
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- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) → [`docs/troubleshooting.md`](docs/troubleshooting.md)
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- [Repository Layout](#repository-layout) · [Security](#security) · [Governance](#governance) · [Support OCP](#support-ocp) · [License](#license)
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@@ -222,12 +222,17 @@ The canonical list lives in [`models.json`](./models.json) — the single source
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT` | `8` | Max concurrent claude processes (`-p`/stream-json path) |
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE` | `16` | Max requests **waiting** for a `-p` concurrency slot. Beyond `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT`, requests queue (up to this cap) instead of being rejected; when the queue is **also** full, the request gets `HTTP 429` + `Retry-After` (not an opaque 500). Surfaced on `/health.concurrency` + `/health.stats.queueRejections`. |
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| `CLAUDE_QUEUE_RETRY_AFTER` | `5` | Seconds advertised in the `Retry-After` header on a `-p` concurrency-overflow `429`. |
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` | *(derived)* | Prompt truncation limit in chars. Default derives from the models.json SPOT: `max(contextWindow) × 3` — currently **600,000** (≈150–200k tokens). Setting this env var (or the runtime settings API) overrides the derivation absolutely. See [ADR 0009](docs/adr/0009-spot-derived-prompt-budget.md). Note: very large prompts burn subscription-window quota quickly and slow TTFT; the TUI-mode paste path is untested beyond ~hundreds of KB. |
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` | *(derived)* | Prompt truncation limit in chars. Default derives from the models.json SPOT: `max(contextWindow) × 3` — currently **600,000** (≈150–200k tokens). Setting this env var (or the runtime settings API) overrides the derivation absolutely. See [ADR 0009](docs/adr/0009-spot-derived-prompt-budget.md). Note: very large prompts burn subscription-window quota quickly and slow TTFT; the TUI-mode paste path is untested beyond ~hundreds of KB. Applies to **text only** — image bytes bypass this budget (see [Images / Multimodal](#images--multimodal-vision)). |
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| `CLAUDE_SESSION_TTL` | `3600000` | Session expiry (ms, default: 1 hour) |
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| `CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL` | `0` | Response cache TTL (ms, 0 = disabled). Set to e.g. `300000` for 5-min cache. See [Response Cache](#response-cache). |
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| `CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS` | `Bash,Read,...,Agent` | Comma-separated tools to pre-approve |
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| `CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS` | `false` | Bypass all permission checks |
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| `CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG` | *(unset)* | Path to an MCP server config JSON, passed to the spawned `claude` as `--mcp-config` (both the `-p` path and TUI `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS` panes) |
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE` | `5242880` | Max request body size (bytes, default 5 MB). Base64 image payloads inflate ~33%; raise this to admit larger multimodal requests. Fail-closed parsing: a garbage value keeps the default. |
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| `CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL` | `false` | Allow remote `http(s)` image URLs in `image_url` parts. **Off by default** (v1 supports base64 `data:` URIs only). When on, the URL is passed through to Anthropic as a `url` image source — **OCP does not fetch it** (no OCP-side SSRF surface); unreachable/blocked URLs surface as an API error. |
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES` | `5242880` | Per-image decoded-byte cap (default 5 MB). Over-cap images get `HTTP 413`. |
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES` | `20` | Max image parts per request. Over-cap gets `HTTP 413`. |
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| `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES` | `20971520` | Aggregate decoded-byte cap across all images in a request (default 20 MB). Over-cap gets `HTTP 413`. |
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| `CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT` | *(unset)* | Operator-wide system-prompt text appended (last) to every request's composed system prompt on the default `-p` path. TUI-mode panes are unaffected (they keep the interactive CLI's own system prompt). Echoed truncated on `/health.systemPrompt`. Note: changing this value and restarting auto-invalidates the response cache (the key carries a boot-config epoch, #177). |
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| `CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT` | `false` | Suppress CLAUDE.md and auto-memory injection (pure API mode) |
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| `PROXY_API_KEY` | *(unset)* | Bearer token for shared-mode authentication |
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@@ -382,6 +387,91 @@ ocp settings cacheTTL 0 # disable at runtime
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Cache is **disabled by default** (`CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL=0`). All data is stored locally in `~/.ocp/ocp.db`. **Hash format upgrade in v3.13.0:** legacy `v1` cache rows don't match new `v2`-format lookups; they orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — no migration script required.
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## Images / Multimodal (Vision)
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`POST /v1/chat/completions` accepts OpenAI-style multimodal `content` parts, so a
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message can carry images alongside text and Claude will actually see them. This
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follows OpenAI's [vision](https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/vision) /
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[chat-completions `image_url`](https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create#chat-create-messages)
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request shape — no OCP-invented fields. (Class B.1 endpoint; see ADR 0006.)
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Under the hood, when a request carries an image OCP feeds the conversation to the
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Claude CLI as Anthropic image blocks over `--input-format stream-json`. Text-only
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requests are completely unaffected (unchanged code path).
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### Supported input
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- **Base64 data URIs** (default, recommended):
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`data:image/png;base64,<...>`. Media types: `image/jpeg`, `image/png`,
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`image/gif`, `image/webp`.
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- **Remote `http(s)` URLs** — **off by default**. Set `CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL=1`
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to enable; the URL is passed through to Anthropic (OCP never fetches it itself,
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so there is no OCP-side SSRF surface).
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- Images may appear in **any** message in the history (multi-turn), not just the
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last one.
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- Non-image, non-text parts (audio, files) are **not** yet supported and are
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replaced with a `[non-text content omitted]` placeholder (deferred to a future
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version).
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### Example (base64 data URI)
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```bash
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curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/chat/completions \
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-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{
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"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
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"messages": [{
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"role": "user",
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"content": [
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{ "type": "text", "text": "What is in this image?" },
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{ "type": "image_url",
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"image_url": { "url": "..." } }
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]
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}]
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}'
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```
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### Not supported in TUI mode
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Multimodal images require the default `-p` spawn path. In **TUI / subscription-pool
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mode** (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true`) the CLI is driven interactively and cannot carry
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image blocks, so a request with an `image_url` part returns **`400
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images_unsupported_in_tui_mode`** rather than silently dropping the image and
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answering about something the model never saw. Remove the images, or run OCP
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without TUI mode, to use vision.
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Images must also live in a **user or assistant** message, not a `system` message
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(system content is not forwarded to the CLI as image blocks). An `image_url` part
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present only in a system message returns **`400 images_unsupported_in_system_messages`**
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for the same reason — fail loudly rather than answer about an unseen image. This matches
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the OpenAI vision spec, which does not place images in the system role.
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### Limits
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Images bypass the text `CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` budget and are instead bounded by
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their own byte/count caps. The **text** in a multimodal request is still subject to
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`CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` (older text is truncated exactly as on the text-only
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path — only the image bytes are exempt). All numeric caps are parsed **fail-closed**:
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a malformed value (e.g. `CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE=unlimited` or `=5MB`) is rejected with
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a startup warning and the safe default is kept — a misconfigured cap can never
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silently disable the guard. Requests that violate a cap get a clear `4xx` (never a
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silent drop):
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| Cap | Env var | Default | Error |
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|-----|---------|---------|-------|
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| Request body | `CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE` | 5 MB | `413` request body too large |
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| Per-image bytes | `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES` | 5 MB | `413` `image_too_large` |
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| Total image bytes | `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES` | 20 MB | `413` `images_too_large` |
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| Image count | `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES` | 20 | `413` `too_many_images` |
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| Unsupported media type | — | — | `400` `unsupported_image_type` |
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| Malformed data URI | — | — | `400` `invalid_data_uri` |
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| Remote URL while disabled | `CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL` | off | `400` `remote_url_disabled` |
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Base64 payloads are large: a 5 MB image is ~6.7 MB as a data URI, so raise
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`CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE` (and, if needed, `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES`) to admit big
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images. Vision support depends on the target model — request a current
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vision-capable Claude model.
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## OpenClaw Integration
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OCP was originally built for [OpenClaw](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw) and includes deep integration:
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+29
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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// OCP env-var parsing helpers.
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//
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// Fail-closed positive-integer parsing for numeric caps (body size, image
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// byte/count limits). A misconfigured cap must NEVER silently disable a guard:
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// `parseInt("unlimited", 10)` is NaN and `x > NaN` is always false, so a naive
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// parse of CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE=unlimited would remove the body-size limit
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// entirely (unbounded body → OOM). Likewise CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE=5MB naively
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// parses to 5 (bytes) and bricks the proxy. So a present-but-invalid value is
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// REJECTED (default kept, caller warns), not accepted. (PR #154 review F3.)
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//
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// Pure (no env access, no IO) so it is unit-testable without a live server.
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// Parse `raw` as a strictly-positive base-10 integer of bytes/count (no unit
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// suffix). Returns { value, ok, reason }:
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// - missing/empty → { value: def, ok: true } (use default)
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// - valid positive int → { value: n, ok: true }
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// - anything else → { value: def, ok: false, reason } (fail closed)
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// Rejects: NaN ("unlimited"), non-positive ("0", "-1"), unit-suffixed ("5MB"),
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// and fractional/ambiguous ("20.5", "0x10") values — String(n) !== trimmed catches
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// any input parseInt only partially consumed.
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export function parsePositiveInt(raw, def) {
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if (raw === undefined || raw === null || raw === "") return { value: def, ok: true };
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const trimmed = String(raw).trim();
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const n = parseInt(trimmed, 10);
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if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n <= 0 || String(n) !== trimmed) {
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return { value: def, ok: false, reason: "not a strictly-positive integer (bytes/count, no unit suffix)" };
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}
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return { value: n, ok: true };
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
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// OCP multimodal helpers — OpenAI `image_url` content parts → Anthropic image
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// blocks fed to `claude -p --input-format stream-json`. (issue #110)
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//
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// Class B.1 (OpenAI-compatibility surface). Protocol authority is OpenAI's
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// chat/completions spec — the multimodal `content` parts shape
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// (https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/vision and
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// https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create#chat-create-messages,
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// `image_url` part with `image_url.url` = data URI or http(s) URL). Authorized
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// by ADR 0006. This module introduces NO field beyond OpenAI's published shape:
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// the OpenAI-side vocabulary read here is `type:"image_url"` +
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// `image_url:{url, detail?}`; the Anthropic-side vocabulary written here
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// (`type:"image", source:{type:"base64"|"url", ...}`) is the CLI's native
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// stream-json input contract, not an OCP invention.
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//
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// Kept as a pure module (no I/O, no network, no process state) mirroring the
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// lib/*.mjs pattern so it is unit-testable without a live server. server.mjs is
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// the only consumer; it owns spawning, caps configuration, and HTTP status.
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// Anthropic vision-supported image media types. A data URI whose media type is
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// outside this set is rejected with a clear 4xx rather than forwarded (the API
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// would reject it anyway; failing early gives a better error).
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export const SUPPORTED_IMAGE_TYPES = new Set([
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"image/jpeg",
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"image/png",
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"image/gif",
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"image/webp",
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]);
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// Default caps. server.mjs overrides these from env; they live here so the
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// pure transform is self-contained and testable.
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export const DEFAULT_MULTIMODAL_OPTS = {
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allowRemoteUrl: false, // http(s) image URLs are OFF by default (v1: data URIs only)
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maxImageBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024, // per-image decoded-byte cap
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maxImages: 20, // max image parts across the whole request
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maxTotalImageBytes: 20 * 1024 * 1024, // aggregate decoded-byte cap
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maxTextChars: Infinity, // text-char budget (server passes MAX_PROMPT_CHARS); Infinity = no truncation
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};
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// Typed error so server.mjs can map to the right HTTP status + OpenAI-shaped
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// error body. `status` is the HTTP code; `type` is the OpenAI error `type`.
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export class MultimodalError extends Error {
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constructor(code, status, message) {
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super(message);
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this.name = "MultimodalError";
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this.code = code;
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this.status = status;
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this.type = "invalid_request_error"; // OpenAI error `type` for 4xx client errors
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}
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}
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// True if any message carries an OpenAI `image_url` content part. Cheap guard so
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// the byte-for-byte text path is only left when an image is genuinely present.
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export function hasImageContent(messages) {
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if (!Array.isArray(messages)) return false;
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for (const m of messages) {
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if (m && Array.isArray(m.content)) {
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for (const part of m.content) {
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if (part && part.type === "image_url") return true;
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}
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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||||
|
||||
// Extract the URL string from an OpenAI image_url part. Spec form is
|
||||
// `{type:"image_url", image_url:{url, detail?}}`; many OpenAI-compatible clients
|
||||
// also send `image_url` as a bare string. Accept both (input leniency — no new
|
||||
// output field). `detail` (auto|low|high) is OpenAI-only and has no Anthropic
|
||||
// analogue, so it is read-and-ignored.
|
||||
function imageUrlOf(part) {
|
||||
const iu = part.image_url;
|
||||
if (typeof iu === "string") return iu;
|
||||
if (iu && typeof iu.url === "string") return iu.url;
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse a base64 data URI: `data:[<media_type>][;base64],<data>`.
|
||||
// Returns { mediaType, data (base64), bytes (decoded size) } or throws MultimodalError.
|
||||
function parseDataUri(uri) {
|
||||
const comma = uri.indexOf(",");
|
||||
if (comma === -1) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("invalid_data_uri", 400, "Malformed image data URI (no comma).");
|
||||
}
|
||||
const meta = uri.slice(5, comma); // strip leading "data:"
|
||||
const segs = meta.split(";");
|
||||
const mediaType = (segs[0] || "").trim().toLowerCase();
|
||||
const isBase64 = segs.slice(1).some((s) => s.trim().toLowerCase() === "base64");
|
||||
if (!isBase64) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("invalid_data_uri", 400, "Only base64-encoded image data URIs are supported.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!SUPPORTED_IMAGE_TYPES.has(mediaType)) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError(
|
||||
"unsupported_image_type",
|
||||
400,
|
||||
`Unsupported image media type '${mediaType || "(none)"}'. Supported: ${[...SUPPORTED_IMAGE_TYPES].join(", ")}.`
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Strip incidental whitespace/newlines some encoders insert into data URIs.
|
||||
const data = uri.slice(comma + 1).replace(/\s/g, "");
|
||||
if (data.length === 0 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/.test(data)) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("invalid_data_uri", 400, "Image data URI payload is not valid base64.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Decoded size from base64 length (minus padding); avoids decoding the buffer
|
||||
// just to measure it.
|
||||
const padding = data.endsWith("==") ? 2 : data.endsWith("=") ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
const bytes = Math.floor((data.length * 3) / 4) - padding;
|
||||
return { mediaType, data, bytes };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Convert a single OpenAI image_url part to an Anthropic image block, enforcing
|
||||
// caps via the mutable `acc` accumulator ({ images, bytes }). Throws MultimodalError.
|
||||
function imagePartToBlock(part, opts, acc) {
|
||||
const url = imageUrlOf(part);
|
||||
if (!url) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("invalid_image_url", 400, "image_url part is missing a URL.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
acc.images += 1;
|
||||
if (acc.images > opts.maxImages) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("too_many_images", 413, `Too many images in request (max ${opts.maxImages}).`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (url.startsWith("data:")) {
|
||||
const { mediaType, data, bytes } = parseDataUri(url);
|
||||
if (bytes > opts.maxImageBytes) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("image_too_large", 413, `Image exceeds per-image size limit (${opts.maxImageBytes} bytes).`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
acc.bytes += bytes;
|
||||
if (acc.bytes > opts.maxTotalImageBytes) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("images_too_large", 413, `Total image payload exceeds limit (${opts.maxTotalImageBytes} bytes).`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { type: "image", source: { type: "base64", media_type: mediaType, data } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(url)) {
|
||||
if (!opts.allowRemoteUrl) {
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError(
|
||||
"remote_url_disabled",
|
||||
400,
|
||||
"Remote image URLs are disabled. Enable CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL=1 to allow http(s) image URLs, or pass the image as a base64 data URI."
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Passthrough as an Anthropic url-source block. OCP does NOT fetch the URL
|
||||
// itself (no OCP-side SSRF surface); the fetch is performed upstream by the
|
||||
// Anthropic API. Best-effort: unreachable/blocked URLs surface as an API error.
|
||||
return { type: "image", source: { type: "url", url } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
throw new MultimodalError("unsupported_url_scheme", 400, "image_url must be a base64 data URI or an http(s) URL.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Role prefix mirrors messagesToPrompt()'s text-path labeling so a multi-turn
|
||||
// conversation reads the same whether or not it carries images. System messages
|
||||
// are handled by the caller via --system-prompt and never reach here.
|
||||
function rolePrefix(role) {
|
||||
if (role === "assistant") return "[Assistant] ";
|
||||
return ""; // user / tool / anything else: verbatim, as in the text path
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the Anthropic content-block array for a single stream-json user
|
||||
// envelope. Mirrors the text path's "collapse the whole conversation into one
|
||||
// turn passed via stdin" model (OCP runs stateless, full context per spawn), but
|
||||
// preserves image position relative to text and keeps images out of the text
|
||||
// char budget entirely. Returns { blocks, stats } or throws MultimodalError.
|
||||
export function buildImageBlocks(messages, opts = {}) {
|
||||
const o = { ...DEFAULT_MULTIMODAL_OPTS, ...opts };
|
||||
const blocks = [];
|
||||
const acc = { images: 0, bytes: 0 };
|
||||
let textChars = 0;
|
||||
let firstMessage = true;
|
||||
|
||||
const pushText = (text) => {
|
||||
if (!text) return;
|
||||
blocks.push({ type: "text", text });
|
||||
textChars += text.length;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
for (const m of messages) {
|
||||
const prefix = rolePrefix(m.role);
|
||||
// Separate messages with a blank line, matching messagesToPrompt's "\n\n" join.
|
||||
const sep = firstMessage ? "" : "\n\n";
|
||||
firstMessage = false;
|
||||
let prefixEmitted = false;
|
||||
const emitPrefixWith = (t) => {
|
||||
if (prefixEmitted) return t;
|
||||
prefixEmitted = true;
|
||||
return sep + prefix + t;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if (typeof m.content === "string") {
|
||||
pushText(emitPrefixWith(m.content));
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(m.content)) {
|
||||
// null / object content: mirror contentToText's fallback.
|
||||
const t = m.content == null ? "" : JSON.stringify(m.content);
|
||||
pushText(emitPrefixWith(t));
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const part of m.content) {
|
||||
if (part && part.type === "text" && typeof part.text === "string") {
|
||||
pushText(emitPrefixWith(part.text));
|
||||
} else if (part && part.type === "image_url") {
|
||||
// Ensure the role prefix isn't lost when a message leads with an image.
|
||||
if (!prefixEmitted && prefix) pushText(emitPrefixWith(""));
|
||||
blocks.push(imagePartToBlock(part, o, acc));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// audio / file / unknown parts: preserve the existing placeholder
|
||||
// behavior (issue #110) — deferred to a future version.
|
||||
pushText(emitPrefixWith("[non-text content omitted]"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Defensive: a stream-json user turn must have at least one content block.
|
||||
if (blocks.length === 0) blocks.push({ type: "text", text: "" });
|
||||
|
||||
// Enforce the text-char budget (PR #154 review F2). Without this, attaching a
|
||||
// single tiny image would let unbounded text bypass the gateway's runaway-context
|
||||
// guard entirely — messagesToPrompt truncates the text path, so the multimodal
|
||||
// path must too. Image blocks are preserved and are NOT counted (they are bounded
|
||||
// by the byte/count caps above).
|
||||
const budgeted = enforceTextBudget(blocks, o.maxTextChars);
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
blocks: budgeted.blocks,
|
||||
stats: {
|
||||
imageCount: acc.images,
|
||||
totalImageBytes: acc.bytes,
|
||||
textChars: budgeted.textChars,
|
||||
originalTextChars: budgeted.originalTextChars,
|
||||
truncated: budgeted.truncated,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Enforce a text-char budget over already-built content blocks, mirroring
|
||||
// messagesToPrompt's "keep the tail, drop the oldest" truncation. Image blocks are
|
||||
// preserved in place; only text blocks count against the budget. A truncation note
|
||||
// is prepended when anything is dropped. Returns
|
||||
// { blocks, truncated, originalTextChars, textChars }.
|
||||
function enforceTextBudget(blocks, maxTextChars) {
|
||||
let originalTextChars = 0;
|
||||
for (const b of blocks) if (b.type === "text") originalTextChars += b.text.length;
|
||||
if (!(maxTextChars > 0) || originalTextChars <= maxTextChars) {
|
||||
return { blocks, truncated: false, originalTextChars, textChars: originalTextChars };
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Keep the most recent text up to the budget; trim within the boundary block and
|
||||
// drop older text blocks. Non-text (image) blocks always survive, in order.
|
||||
let budget = maxTextChars;
|
||||
const out = [];
|
||||
for (let i = blocks.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
||||
const b = blocks[i];
|
||||
if (b.type !== "text") { out.unshift(b); continue; }
|
||||
if (budget <= 0) continue; // older text fully dropped
|
||||
if (b.text.length <= budget) {
|
||||
out.unshift(b);
|
||||
budget -= b.text.length;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
out.unshift({ type: "text", text: b.text.slice(b.text.length - budget) });
|
||||
budget = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.unshift({ type: "text", text: "[System] Note: older text content was truncated to fit the context limit." });
|
||||
let textChars = 0;
|
||||
for (const b of out) if (b.type === "text") textChars += b.text.length;
|
||||
return { blocks: out, truncated: true, originalTextChars, textChars };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Serialize the non-system conversation to a single newline-terminated
|
||||
// stream-json user message for `claude -p --input-format stream-json` stdin.
|
||||
// Returns { payload, stats } or throws MultimodalError.
|
||||
export function buildStreamJsonInput(messages, opts = {}) {
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = buildImageBlocks(messages, opts);
|
||||
const envelope = { type: "user", message: { role: "user", content: blocks } };
|
||||
return { payload: JSON.stringify(envelope) + "\n", stats };
|
||||
}
|
||||
+148
-26
@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ import { TuiSemaphore, SemaphoreAbortError, recordTuiEntrypoint, buildTuiHealthB
|
||||
import { TuiPanePool, resolvePoolSize, POOL_MAX_SIZE } from "./lib/tui/pool.mjs";
|
||||
import { TuiDeltaAssembler, DEFAULT_HOLDBACK_CHARS, resolveStreamHoldback } from "./lib/tui/stream.mjs";
|
||||
import { createSerialMutex, createTtlCache, isTokenExpiring, orderLabelsLastGoodFirst } from "./lib/spawn-auth.mjs";
|
||||
import { appendOperatorPrompt, resolvePromptCharBudget } from "./lib/prompt.mjs";
|
||||
import { hasImageContent, buildImageBlocks, buildStreamJsonInput, MultimodalError } from "./lib/multimodal.mjs";
|
||||
import { parsePositiveInt } from "./lib/env.mjs";
|
||||
import { appendOperatorPrompt, derivePromptCharBudget } from "./lib/prompt.mjs";
|
||||
|
||||
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
||||
const _pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"));
|
||||
@@ -1100,7 +1102,7 @@ const authCheckInterval = setInterval(checkAuth, 600000);
|
||||
// CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT env var is absorbed into the system prompt via
|
||||
// extractSystemPrompt() at the caller level; APPEND_SYSTEM_PROMPT no longer used.
|
||||
// Note: ALLOWED_TOOLS / SKIP_PERMISSIONS / MCP_CONFIG are preserved as before.
|
||||
function buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt) {
|
||||
function buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt, opts = {}) {
|
||||
const args = [
|
||||
"--model", cliModel,
|
||||
"--output-format", "stream-json",
|
||||
@@ -1109,6 +1111,14 @@ function buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt) {
|
||||
"--system-prompt", systemPrompt,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// Multimodal path (issue #110): images are fed as Anthropic content blocks over
|
||||
// a stream-json stdin stream. `--input-format stream-json` (§ --input-format,
|
||||
// choices text|stream-json; realtime streaming input) is added ONLY when the
|
||||
// request carries an image part; the default (text) input path is untouched.
|
||||
if (opts.streamJsonInput) {
|
||||
args.push("--input-format", "stream-json");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Permissions
|
||||
// ADR 0007 B-path: in multi-tenant mode, suppress operator-FS tools so a guest
|
||||
// prompt cannot drive Bash/Read/Write/Edit/etc. on the operator's filesystem.
|
||||
@@ -1144,17 +1154,45 @@ function buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt) {
|
||||
return args;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Thin env wrapper over parsePositiveInt (lib/env.mjs): resolve `name` from the
|
||||
// environment fail-closed, warning on a present-but-invalid value. Keeps the pure
|
||||
// parse in a unit-testable module. (PR #154 review F3)
|
||||
function parseIntEnv(name, def) {
|
||||
const { value, ok } = parsePositiveInt(process.env[name], def);
|
||||
if (!ok) console.warn(`⚠ ${name}="${process.env[name]}" is not a valid positive integer (bytes/count, no unit suffix); ignoring and using default ${def}.`);
|
||||
return value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Format messages to prompt text ──────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Truncation guard: if total chars exceed MAX_PROMPT_CHARS, keep the system
|
||||
// message(s) + first user message + last N messages, dropping the middle.
|
||||
// This prevents runaway context from gateway-side conversation accumulation.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Default is SPOT-DERIVED (ADR 0009): max(models.json contextWindow) × 3 chars/token —
|
||||
// currently 200000 × 3 = 600,000 chars — instead of the old hand-set 150000 (≈37.5k
|
||||
// English tokens), which silently under-delivered the advertised window by ~5×. The env
|
||||
// var (and the runtime settings API below) remain absolute operator overrides. If
|
||||
// models.json ever advertises a bigger window, this budget follows automatically.
|
||||
let MAX_PROMPT_CHARS = resolvePromptCharBudget(process.env.CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS, modelsConfig.models);
|
||||
// Routed through parseIntEnv so a misconfigured cap fails CLOSED to the default rather than
|
||||
// NaN — CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS=unlimited previously → NaN → enforceTextBudget's `!(NaN > 0)`
|
||||
// early-return → 500k chars passed unbounded, silently defeating F2's text-budget guarantee
|
||||
// (PR #154 round 2, gap (a)). The default itself is SPOT-DERIVED (ADR 0009, PR #179):
|
||||
// max(models.json contextWindow) × 3 chars/token — currently 600,000 — so the two fixes
|
||||
// compose: parseIntEnv guards a SET-but-garbage value, the derivation supplies the honest
|
||||
// default when unset/empty. `let` is kept for the settings API.
|
||||
let MAX_PROMPT_CHARS = parseIntEnv("CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS", derivePromptCharBudget(modelsConfig.models));
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Multimodal image caps (issue #110) ──────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// OpenAI `image_url` parts are forwarded to claude as Anthropic image blocks via
|
||||
// `--input-format stream-json`. Images deliberately BYPASS the text char budget
|
||||
// (MAX_PROMPT_CHARS) — they are bounded by these byte/count caps instead, and by
|
||||
// MAX_BODY_SIZE at the HTTP layer. Data URIs are supported by default; remote
|
||||
// http(s) image URLs are OFF unless CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL is set (v1: data URIs
|
||||
// only). See docs/adr/0006-openai-shim-scope.md (Class B.1) and README § "Images".
|
||||
const IMAGE_ALLOW_URL = /^(1|true|yes|on)$/i.test(process.env.CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL || "");
|
||||
const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = parseIntEnv("CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES", 5 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
const MAX_IMAGES = parseIntEnv("CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES", 20);
|
||||
const MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES = parseIntEnv("CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES", 20 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
const MULTIMODAL_OPTS = {
|
||||
allowRemoteUrl: IMAGE_ALLOW_URL,
|
||||
maxImageBytes: MAX_IMAGE_BYTES,
|
||||
maxImages: MAX_IMAGES,
|
||||
maxTotalImageBytes: MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Flatten OpenAI content (string | array of parts) to plain text for the prompt.
|
||||
// Array content: concatenate text parts; replace non-text parts (e.g. image_url)
|
||||
@@ -1246,25 +1284,51 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlo
|
||||
|
||||
// Circuit breaker: disabled (see comment at top of breaker section)
|
||||
|
||||
stats.activeRequests++;
|
||||
stats.totalRequests++;
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 6c: always serialize full conversation via stdin (no session resume).
|
||||
// System messages are extracted and passed via --system-prompt; the remaining
|
||||
// messages (user/assistant/tool) are serialized by messagesToPrompt.
|
||||
// messages (user/assistant/tool) are serialized for stdin.
|
||||
const systemPrompt = extractSystemPrompt(messages);
|
||||
|
||||
// messagesToPrompt skips system messages now that they go via --system-prompt.
|
||||
// Filter them out before calling to avoid double-injection.
|
||||
// messagesToPrompt / buildStreamJsonInput skip system messages (they go via
|
||||
// --system-prompt). Filter them out first to avoid double-injection.
|
||||
const nonSystemMessages = messages.filter(m => m.role !== "system");
|
||||
const prompt = messagesToPrompt(nonSystemMessages);
|
||||
|
||||
stats.oneOffRequests++;
|
||||
if (conversationId) {
|
||||
console.log(`[session] stateless conv=${conversationId.slice(0, 12)}... key=${keyName || "anon"} msgs=${messages.length} prompt_chars=${prompt.length}`);
|
||||
// Multimodal (issue #110): when any message carries an OpenAI image_url part,
|
||||
// feed the conversation as Anthropic content blocks over --input-format
|
||||
// stream-json (images preserved and kept OUT of the text char budget).
|
||||
// Otherwise the text path is byte-for-byte unchanged. buildStreamJsonInput may
|
||||
// throw MultimodalError on an invalid/oversized image; it runs BEFORE any stats
|
||||
// mutation so a validation failure never leaks counters or the concurrency slot
|
||||
// (handleChatCompletions validates first, so in practice it will not throw here).
|
||||
const useStreamJson = hasImageContent(nonSystemMessages);
|
||||
let stdinPayload, promptChars;
|
||||
if (useStreamJson) {
|
||||
// Pass MAX_PROMPT_CHARS so the multimodal text is bounded by the same
|
||||
// runaway-context guard as the text path (PR #154 review F2). Images bypass it.
|
||||
const built = buildStreamJsonInput(nonSystemMessages, { ...MULTIMODAL_OPTS, maxTextChars: MAX_PROMPT_CHARS });
|
||||
stdinPayload = built.payload;
|
||||
promptChars = built.stats.textChars;
|
||||
if (built.stats.truncated) {
|
||||
logEvent("warn", "prompt_truncated", {
|
||||
originalChars: built.stats.originalTextChars,
|
||||
maxChars: MAX_PROMPT_CHARS,
|
||||
keptChars: built.stats.textChars,
|
||||
path: "multimodal",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
stdinPayload = messagesToPrompt(nonSystemMessages);
|
||||
promptChars = stdinPayload.length;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const cliArgs = buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt);
|
||||
stats.activeRequests++;
|
||||
stats.totalRequests++;
|
||||
stats.oneOffRequests++;
|
||||
if (conversationId) {
|
||||
console.log(`[session] stateless conv=${conversationId.slice(0, 12)}... key=${keyName || "anon"} msgs=${messages.length} prompt_chars=${promptChars}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const cliArgs = buildCliArgs(cliModel, systemPrompt, { streamJsonInput: useStreamJson });
|
||||
|
||||
const env = { ...process.env };
|
||||
delete env.CLAUDECODE;
|
||||
@@ -1350,12 +1414,13 @@ function spawnClaudeProcess(model, messages, conversationId, keyName, releaseSlo
|
||||
// the spawned process, NOT on the stdin Writable — it does not catch this.
|
||||
proc.stdin.on("error", (e) => logEvent("warn", "stdin_write_error", { error: e.message }));
|
||||
|
||||
// Write prompt to stdin immediately
|
||||
proc.stdin.write(prompt);
|
||||
// Write the serialized turn to stdin immediately. Text path: the flat prompt.
|
||||
// Multimodal path: a single newline-terminated stream-json user envelope.
|
||||
proc.stdin.write(stdinPayload);
|
||||
proc.stdin.end();
|
||||
|
||||
recordModelRequest(cliModel, prompt.length);
|
||||
logEvent("info", "claude_spawned", { model: cliModel, promptChars: prompt.length, timeout: TIMEOUT, tier: getModelTier(cliModel), session: conversationId ? conversationId.slice(0, 12) + "..." : "none" });
|
||||
recordModelRequest(cliModel, promptChars);
|
||||
logEvent("info", "claude_spawned", { model: cliModel, promptChars, inputFormat: useStreamJson ? "stream-json" : "text", timeout: TIMEOUT, tier: getModelTier(cliModel), session: conversationId ? conversationId.slice(0, 12) + "..." : "none" });
|
||||
|
||||
// Single request timeout — no separate first-byte timer.
|
||||
// Claude tool-use causes long pauses in the token stream (30s-5min),
|
||||
@@ -2579,7 +2644,13 @@ async function handleSettings(req, res) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Handle chat completions ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
const MAX_BODY_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB
|
||||
// Default 5 MB, byte-for-byte unchanged unless CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE is set. Base64
|
||||
// image payloads inflate ~33%; operators enabling large images (issue #110) can
|
||||
// raise this to admit bigger requests. Parsed fail-closed (PR #154 review F3): a
|
||||
// bad value (`unlimited` → NaN, `5MB` → 5) must not disable the body cap or brick
|
||||
// the proxy — parseIntEnv keeps the 5 MB default and warns instead.
|
||||
const MAX_BODY_SIZE = parseIntEnv("CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE", 5 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
const MAX_BODY_SIZE_LABEL = `${Math.round(MAX_BODY_SIZE / (1024 * 1024))}MB`;
|
||||
|
||||
// Set of all valid model identifiers (canonical IDs + aliases)
|
||||
const VALID_MODELS = new Set(Object.keys(MODEL_MAP));
|
||||
@@ -2590,7 +2661,7 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
|
||||
for await (const chunk of req) {
|
||||
body += chunk;
|
||||
if (body.length > MAX_BODY_SIZE) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(res, 413, { error: { message: "Request body too large (max 5MB)", type: "invalid_request_error" } });
|
||||
return jsonResponse(res, 413, { error: { message: `Request body too large (max ${MAX_BODY_SIZE_LABEL})`, type: "invalid_request_error" } });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
@@ -2619,6 +2690,57 @@ async function handleChatCompletions(req, res) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(res, 400, { error: { message: "'messages' must be a non-empty array", type: "invalid_request_error" } });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Multimodal validation (issue #110): when a request carries OpenAI `image_url`
|
||||
// content parts, validate/parse them now so an invalid, unsupported, or oversized
|
||||
// image returns a clean 4xx BEFORE the cache/spawn path (rather than a silent drop
|
||||
// or an opaque 500). The stream-json transform itself runs at spawn time
|
||||
// (spawnClaudeProcess → buildStreamJsonInput). Class B.1: authorized by ADR 0006;
|
||||
// request shape per OpenAI vision spec (image_url content parts). buildImageBlocks
|
||||
// validates without stringifying, so this early pass is cheap.
|
||||
if (hasImageContent(messages)) {
|
||||
// F1 (PR #154 review): the TUI path (callClaudeTui → messagesToPrompt) cannot
|
||||
// carry image blocks — it renders every non-text part as "[non-text content
|
||||
// omitted]". Forwarding here would let the model answer about an image it never
|
||||
// saw and return 200, which is strictly worse than an honest error (the one
|
||||
// outcome ALIGNMENT.md forbids: silently serving text the model did not mean).
|
||||
// Stream-json image input requires the `claude -p` path, so in TUI_MODE we fail
|
||||
// loudly instead of dropping. Documented in README § "Images".
|
||||
if (TUI_MODE) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(res, 400, {
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
message: "Image inputs are not supported in TUI mode (CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true). Images require the default -p spawn path; remove images or run OCP without TUI mode.",
|
||||
type: "invalid_request_error",
|
||||
code: "images_unsupported_in_tui_mode",
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Detection runs on the FULL message list, but extraction/spawn drop system messages
|
||||
// (system role carries no image blocks to the CLI). So an image present ONLY in a
|
||||
// system message would be detected as multimodal, survive no filter, fall to the text
|
||||
// path, and render as "[non-text content omitted]" → 200 with a hallucinated answer —
|
||||
// the exact silent-drop this guard exists to forbid. Fail loudly instead. OpenAI
|
||||
// disallows images in the system role anyway, so no legitimate request is rejected.
|
||||
// (PR #154 review round 2, gap (b).)
|
||||
const nonSystem = messages.filter(m => m.role !== "system");
|
||||
if (!hasImageContent(nonSystem)) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(res, 400, {
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
message: "Image inputs are only supported in user/assistant messages, not in system messages. Move the image_url part to a user message.",
|
||||
type: "invalid_request_error",
|
||||
code: "images_unsupported_in_system_messages",
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
buildImageBlocks(nonSystem, { ...MULTIMODAL_OPTS, maxTextChars: MAX_PROMPT_CHARS });
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
if (e instanceof MultimodalError) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(res, e.status, { error: { message: e.message, type: e.type, code: e.code } });
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw e;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NOTE: quota is best-effort / eventually-consistent. The gate reads the recorded count
|
||||
// at entry and records only after the upstream completes, so concurrent requests at the
|
||||
// boundary can overshoot the cap by up to MAX_CONCURRENT, and cache hits (served before
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3413,6 +3413,337 @@ test("contentToText: null returns empty string", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(contentToText(null), "");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── multimodal image transform (issue #110) ──────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// OpenAI image_url parts → Anthropic image blocks for `claude -p --input-format
|
||||
// stream-json`. lib/multimodal.mjs is a PURE module (no server.listen()), so it is
|
||||
// imported directly here. Class B.1: shape per OpenAI vision spec, authorized by
|
||||
// ADR 0006. Mechanism verified live: a base64 PNG fed as an Anthropic image block
|
||||
// via --input-format stream-json is correctly described by the model.
|
||||
import {
|
||||
hasImageContent as mmHasImageContent,
|
||||
buildImageBlocks as mmBuildImageBlocks,
|
||||
buildStreamJsonInput as mmBuildStreamJsonInput,
|
||||
MultimodalError as MmError,
|
||||
SUPPORTED_IMAGE_TYPES as MM_SUPPORTED,
|
||||
} from "./lib/multimodal.mjs";
|
||||
import { parsePositiveInt } from "./lib/env.mjs";
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("\nmultimodal image transform (issue #110):");
|
||||
|
||||
// A short, valid base64 string (charset-valid; not decoded by the transform).
|
||||
const MM_B64 = "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAAAAAA6fptVAAAACklEQVR4nGP4DwABAQEAG7buVgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==";
|
||||
const dataUri = (mt = "image/png") => `data:${mt};base64,${MM_B64}`;
|
||||
const imgPart = (mt) => ({ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: dataUri(mt) } });
|
||||
const txtPart = (t) => ({ type: "text", text: t });
|
||||
|
||||
test("hasImageContent: plain string message → false (text path preserved)", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(mmHasImageContent([{ role: "user", content: "hello" }]), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("hasImageContent: array of text-only parts → false", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(mmHasImageContent([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("a"), txtPart("b")] }]), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("hasImageContent: message with an image_url part → true", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(mmHasImageContent([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("q"), imgPart()] }]), true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("hasImageContent: image anywhere in history (not just last) → true", () => {
|
||||
const msgs = [
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("look"), imgPart()] },
|
||||
{ role: "assistant", content: "ok" },
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: "and now?" },
|
||||
];
|
||||
assert.equal(mmHasImageContent(msgs), true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── PR #154 review round 2, gap (b): image ONLY in a system message must not silently drop ──
|
||||
// The handler detects multimodal on the FULL list but extraction/spawn filter system messages out.
|
||||
// The guard fires exactly when the full list has an image but the non-system list does not — proven
|
||||
// here against the same predicate the guard uses, so a system-only image is rejected (400) rather
|
||||
// than falling to the text path and returning a 200 hallucinated answer.
|
||||
test("hasImageContent: image ONLY in a system message → true on full list, false after system filter (guard fires)", () => {
|
||||
const msgs = [
|
||||
{ role: "system", content: [txtPart("context"), imgPart()] },
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: "describe it" },
|
||||
];
|
||||
assert.equal(mmHasImageContent(msgs), true, "detected as multimodal on the full list");
|
||||
assert.equal(mmHasImageContent(msgs.filter(m => m.role !== "system")), false, "no image survives the system filter → guard must 400");
|
||||
});
|
||||
test("hasImageContent: image in a USER message survives the system filter (legitimate request not rejected)", () => {
|
||||
const msgs = [
|
||||
{ role: "system", content: "you are helpful" },
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("describe it"), imgPart()] },
|
||||
];
|
||||
assert.equal(mmHasImageContent(msgs.filter(m => m.role !== "system")), true, "user image survives → normal multimodal path");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: data-URI parsed into an Anthropic base64 image block", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("what is this?"), imgPart("image/png")] }]);
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks.length, 2);
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks[0].type, "text");
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks[0].text, "what is this?");
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocks[1], { type: "image", source: { type: "base64", media_type: "image/png", data: MM_B64 } });
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.imageCount, 1);
|
||||
assert.ok(stats.totalImageBytes > 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: media_type carried through (jpeg/gif/webp)", () => {
|
||||
for (const mt of ["image/jpeg", "image/gif", "image/webp"]) {
|
||||
const { blocks } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [imgPart(mt)] }]);
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks.find(b => b.type === "image").source.media_type, mt);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: multiple images in one message both emitted", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("compare"), imgPart(), imgPart()] }]);
|
||||
const imgs = blocks.filter(b => b.type === "image");
|
||||
assert.equal(imgs.length, 2);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.imageCount, 2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: text/image/text ordering preserved", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("A"), imgPart(), txtPart("B")] }]);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocks.map(b => (b.type === "text" ? b.text : "IMG")), ["A", "IMG", "B"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: image-first message keeps ordering (image before text)", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [imgPart(), txtPart("caption")] }]);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocks.map(b => (b.type === "text" ? b.text : "IMG")), ["IMG", "caption"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: multi-turn history — role prefixes + separators preserved", () => {
|
||||
const msgs = [
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: "first q" },
|
||||
{ role: "assistant", content: "prior answer" },
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("now this"), imgPart()] },
|
||||
];
|
||||
const { blocks } = mmBuildImageBlocks(msgs);
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks[0].text, "first q");
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks[1].text, "\n\n[Assistant] prior answer");
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks[2].text, "\n\nnow this");
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks[3].type, "image");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: image in an EARLIER turn is carried (history image)", () => {
|
||||
const msgs = [
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("here"), imgPart()] },
|
||||
{ role: "assistant", content: "got it" },
|
||||
{ role: "user", content: "thanks" },
|
||||
];
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks(msgs);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.imageCount, 1);
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks.filter(b => b.type === "image").length, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: image_url as bare string is accepted (client leniency)", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: dataUri() }] }]);
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks.find(b => b.type === "image").source.data, MM_B64);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildStreamJsonInput: emits one newline-terminated user envelope", () => {
|
||||
const { payload } = mmBuildStreamJsonInput([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("hi"), imgPart()] }]);
|
||||
assert.ok(payload.endsWith("\n"));
|
||||
const env = JSON.parse(payload.trim());
|
||||
assert.equal(env.type, "user");
|
||||
assert.equal(env.message.role, "user");
|
||||
assert.equal(env.message.content[1].type, "image");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── malformed / policy / oversized handling (clean 4xx, never a silent drop) ──
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: unsupported media type → 400 unsupported_image_type", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [imgPart("image/tiff")] }]),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "unsupported_image_type" && e.status === 400
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: non-base64 data URI → 400 invalid_data_uri", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "data:image/png,notbase64" } }] }]),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "invalid_data_uri" && e.status === 400
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: malformed data URI (no comma) → 400 invalid_data_uri", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "data:image/png;base64" } }] }]),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "invalid_data_uri"
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: image_url part missing a URL → 400 invalid_image_url", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: {} }] }]),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "invalid_image_url"
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: oversized single image → 413 image_too_large", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [imgPart()] }], { maxImageBytes: 4 }),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "image_too_large" && e.status === 413
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: too many images → 413 too_many_images", () => {
|
||||
const many = Array.from({ length: 3 }, () => imgPart());
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: many }], { maxImages: 2 }),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "too_many_images" && e.status === 413
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: aggregate image bytes over cap → 413 images_too_large", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [imgPart(), imgPart()] }], { maxTotalImageBytes: 100, maxImageBytes: 1000 }),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "images_too_large" && e.status === 413
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: remote http(s) URL disabled by default → 400 remote_url_disabled", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "https://example.com/a.png" } }] }]),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "remote_url_disabled" && e.status === 400
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: remote URL passthrough when allowRemoteUrl=true (url source, OCP does not fetch)", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks } = mmBuildImageBlocks(
|
||||
[{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "https://example.com/a.png" } }] }],
|
||||
{ allowRemoteUrl: true }
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocks.find(b => b.type === "image").source, { type: "url", url: "https://example.com/a.png" });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: unsupported URL scheme → 400 unsupported_url_scheme", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "ftp://x/y.png" } }] }], { allowRemoteUrl: true }),
|
||||
(e) => e instanceof MmError && e.code === "unsupported_url_scheme"
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: non-image parts (audio/file) fall back to placeholder text", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("hear this"), { type: "input_audio", input_audio: {} }] }]);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocks.map(b => b.text), ["hear this", "[non-text content omitted]"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("SUPPORTED_IMAGE_TYPES: exactly the four Anthropic vision types", () => {
|
||||
assert.deepEqual([...MM_SUPPORTED].sort(), ["image/gif", "image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/webp"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: pure-text conversation still yields text blocks (untouched-path parity)", () => {
|
||||
// hasImageContent would be false for this input in server.mjs (text path taken),
|
||||
// but the transform must still be well-defined for a text-only turn.
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: "just text" }]);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocks, [{ type: "text", text: "just text" }]);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.imageCount, 0);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.truncated, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── F2 (PR #154 review): text char budget is enforced on the multimodal path ──
|
||||
// Regression guard: without maxTextChars, attaching one tiny image let unbounded
|
||||
// text bypass MAX_PROMPT_CHARS entirely (the text path truncates; the image path
|
||||
// did not). server.mjs passes maxTextChars: MAX_PROMPT_CHARS into this transform.
|
||||
console.log("\nmultimodal text-budget enforcement (PR #154 F2):");
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: text under budget → not truncated, blocks unchanged", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks(
|
||||
[{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("short"), imgPart()] }],
|
||||
{ maxTextChars: 1000 }
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.truncated, false);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.textChars, "short".length);
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks.filter(b => b.type === "image").length, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: text over budget → truncated, keeps most-recent tail + note", () => {
|
||||
const big = "A".repeat(300) + "TAIL_MARKER";
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks(
|
||||
[{ role: "user", content: [txtPart(big)] }],
|
||||
{ maxTextChars: 50 }
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.truncated, true);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.originalTextChars, big.length);
|
||||
// The most recent characters (the tail) survive; the oldest 'A's are dropped.
|
||||
const joined = blocks.filter(b => b.type === "text").map(b => b.text).join("");
|
||||
assert.ok(joined.includes("TAIL_MARKER"), "tail text must be kept");
|
||||
assert.ok(joined.includes("truncated to fit"), "a truncation note must be present");
|
||||
assert.ok(stats.originalTextChars > stats.textChars, "post-truncation text is smaller");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: F2 exact scenario — 500k chars + one image → text bounded, image preserved", () => {
|
||||
const { blocks, stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks(
|
||||
[{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("Z".repeat(500000)), imgPart()] }],
|
||||
{ maxTextChars: 150000 }
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.truncated, true);
|
||||
assert.ok(stats.textChars <= 150000 + 200, "text char count is bounded by the budget (+note)");
|
||||
// The image bypasses the text budget and is NOT dropped by truncation.
|
||||
assert.equal(blocks.filter(b => b.type === "image").length, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("buildImageBlocks: default (no maxTextChars) never truncates — pure module standalone", () => {
|
||||
const { stats } = mmBuildImageBlocks([{ role: "user", content: [txtPart("x".repeat(10000))] }]);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.truncated, false);
|
||||
assert.equal(stats.textChars, 10000);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── F3 (PR #154 review): fail-closed positive-int env parsing ────────────────
|
||||
// A misconfigured numeric cap must NEVER silently disable a guard (`x > NaN` is
|
||||
// always false) or brick the proxy with a nonsense value. parsePositiveInt keeps
|
||||
// the default and reports ok:false so the caller can warn.
|
||||
console.log("\nfail-closed env-cap parsing (PR #154 F3):");
|
||||
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: missing/empty → default, ok", () => {
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(parsePositiveInt(undefined, 42), { value: 42, ok: true });
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(parsePositiveInt("", 42), { value: 42, ok: true });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: valid positive integer → parsed value", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(parsePositiveInt("5000000", 42).value, 5000000);
|
||||
assert.equal(parsePositiveInt("5000000", 42).ok, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: 'unlimited' → NaN rejected, default kept (would drop the cap)", () => {
|
||||
const r = parsePositiveInt("unlimited", 5 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.value, 5 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.ok, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: '5MB' → unit suffix rejected (naive parseInt would give 5 bytes)", () => {
|
||||
const r = parsePositiveInt("5MB", 5 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.value, 5 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.ok, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: '0' and '-1' → non-positive rejected", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(parsePositiveInt("0", 20).ok, false);
|
||||
assert.equal(parsePositiveInt("0", 20).value, 20);
|
||||
assert.equal(parsePositiveInt("-1", 20).ok, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: '20.5' → fractional/ambiguous rejected", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(parsePositiveInt("20.5", 20).ok, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: surrounding whitespace tolerated", () => {
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(parsePositiveInt(" 20 ", 5), { value: 20, ok: true });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── PR #154 review round 2, gap (a): MAX_PROMPT_CHARS must fail closed like the other caps ──
|
||||
// server.mjs now derives MAX_PROMPT_CHARS via parseIntEnv → parsePositiveInt (was a raw parseInt).
|
||||
// CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS=unlimited previously → NaN → enforceTextBudget's `!(NaN > 0)` early-return
|
||||
// → 500k chars passed unbounded, defeating F2's text-budget guarantee. The default must be kept.
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS='unlimited' → default kept, cap not lost to NaN (gap a)", () => {
|
||||
const r = parsePositiveInt("unlimited", 150000);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.ok, false);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.value, 150000, "the 150k text budget must survive a bad config, not become NaN");
|
||||
});
|
||||
test("parsePositiveInt: CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS valid override honored", () => {
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(parsePositiveInt("200000", 150000), { value: 200000, ok: true });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── messages guard predicate truth-table (issue #110) ────────────────────────
|
||||
// Mirrors the guard at server.mjs line ~1650: Array.isArray(x) && x.length > 0
|
||||
console.log("\nmessages guard predicate (issue #110):");
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user