feat(chat): forward OpenAI image_url parts to Claude (multimodal vision) (#154)

* feat(chat): forward OpenAI image_url parts to Claude (multimodal vision)

`POST /v1/chat/completions` previously flattened every message to plain text
via contentToText(), replacing image_url parts with "[non-text content
omitted]" — so images were silently dropped (issue #110). This adds real
multimodal support: OpenAI `image_url` content parts are translated to
Anthropic image blocks and fed to the Claude CLI over
`--input-format stream-json`, keeping subscription auth (the reason OCP routes
through the CLI rather than the API).

Class B.1 (OpenAI-compatibility surface), authorized by ADR 0006. Request
shape follows OpenAI's published vision / chat-completions spec
(https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/vision and the chat/completions
`content` image_url part) — no field is introduced beyond OpenAI's shape. The
CLI's `--input-format stream-json` is the transport for this Class B endpoint,
not a forwarded cli.js operation, so there is no Class A cli.js citation to
make; scope is justified under the ALIGNMENT.md Class B mapping of Rule 2
(no invention beyond the cited OpenAI spec).

Mechanism (verified empirically against the installed CLI, v2.1.206): a user
message whose `content` is an Anthropic block array including
`{type:"image",source:{type:"base64",media_type,data}}` fed to
`claude -p --input-format stream-json` is correctly described by the model.
Confirmed live end-to-end through this endpoint (a base64 PNG returns the
correct color).

Design:
- New pure module `lib/multimodal.mjs` (mirrors the lib/*.mjs pattern; unit-
  testable without a live server): hasImageContent, buildImageBlocks,
  buildStreamJsonInput, MultimodalError.
- server.mjs: text path is byte-for-byte unchanged. Only when a request carries
  an image_url part does spawnClaudeProcess switch stdin to a stream-json user
  envelope and buildCliArgs add `--input-format stream-json`. Image parsing runs
  before any stats mutation so a validation failure never leaks counters/slots.
- Images bypass the text char budget (CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS) and are bounded
  by explicit byte/count caps with clear 4xx errors (413 for size/count, 400
  for malformed/unsupported/disabled-remote), never a silent drop.

Scope decisions (v1):
- Base64 data URIs supported by default (image/jpeg,png,gif,webp).
- Remote http(s) image URLs OFF by default behind CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL; when
  enabled they are passed through as an Anthropic url-source (OCP never fetches
  the URL itself, so no OCP-side SSRF surface).
- Audio/file parts deferred: existing placeholder behavior preserved.
- Images anywhere in multi-turn history, not just the last message.

New env vars (documented in README Environment Variables table):
CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL, CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES,
CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES, CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE (now configurable; default
5 MB unchanged).

Tests: 26 unit tests in test-features.mjs covering data-URI parse, multiple
images, text/image ordering, multi-turn history images, malformed/oversized/
too-many handling, remote-URL policy, and text-path parity. `npm test` green
(289 passed). `node --check` clean. No alignment-blacklist tokens added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(chat): address PR #154 review blockers — TUI guard, fail-closed caps, text budget

Remediates the three merge-blocking findings from the maintainer's review of the
multimodal vision PR. Class B.1 (OpenAI-compat surface): request shape per OpenAI
vision spec (image_url content parts), authorized by ADR 0006. No new wire shape
and no cli.js surface change — the stream-json image contract is the CLI's native
input format (already cited in the base commit); these are correctness fixes on the
OCP-owned validation/dispatch layer.

F1 — TUI mode silently dropped images and returned 200. callClaudeTui() renders
every non-text part as "[non-text content omitted]", so a vision request in
CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true was answered about an image the model never saw. Now
handleChatCompletions fails loudly with 400 images_unsupported_in_tui_mode instead
of a silent drop (ALIGNMENT.md forbids serving text the model did not mean).
Documented in README § Images / Multimodal.

F3 — NaN env parsing failed open. CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE=unlimited -> NaN ->
`body.length > NaN` always false -> body cap gone (OOM DoS); =5MB -> 5 bytes ->
proxy bricked; same on CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES / _IMAGE_BYTES / _IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES.
Added lib/env.mjs parsePositiveInt (pure, fail-closed) + a thin parseIntEnv warn
wrapper; a malformed cap now keeps the safe default and warns at startup.

F2 — images let unbounded text bypass MAX_PROMPT_CHARS. buildImageBlocks only
counted textChars and never truncated; the budget was never passed in. Threaded
maxTextChars (= MAX_PROMPT_CHARS) into the multimodal transform, which now
truncates text tail-first (mirroring messagesToPrompt) while preserving image
blocks, and logs prompt_truncated.

Tests: +11 in test-features.mjs (all pure-module, per the repo's no-server-import
pattern) covering the text-budget enforcement and the fail-closed cap parsing,
including the exact F2 (500k chars + 1 image) and F3 (unlimited/5MB/0/20.5)
scenarios. 300 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(server): address PR #154 review round 2 — MAX_PROMPT_CHARS fail-closed + system-only image guard

Closes the two residual gaps from the round-2 review, both traced to the same root as the
already-fixed blockers. Class B.1 (OpenAI-compat vision): authorized by ADR 0006; request
shape is the OpenAI `image_url` content part. No new wire shape — the Anthropic image block
over `--input-format stream-json` is the CLI's native contract (cli.js buildStreamJsonInput
path, verified live in round 1). MAX_PROMPT_CHARS is OCP's own truncation guard, not a cli.js
operation.

Gap (a) — MAX_PROMPT_CHARS was left on the raw parseInt while every other cap moved to the
fail-closed helper. `let MAX_PROMPT_CHARS = parseInt(env||"150000",10)` sat five lines above
the parseIntEnv helper this PR added, so CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS=unlimited → NaN →
enforceTextBudget's `!(NaN > 0)` early-return → 500k chars passed unbounded, truncated:false,
silently defeating F2's text-budget guarantee under a plausible operator config. Fix: hoist
parseIntEnv above the declaration and derive MAX_PROMPT_CHARS through it (keeps `let` for the
settings API). A misconfigured value now keeps the 150k default and warns, like the other caps.

Gap (b) — an image present ONLY in a system message silently dropped in non-TUI mode.
Detection runs on the full message list, but extraction/spawn filter role==="system" out, so a
system-only image was detected as multimodal, survived no filter, fell to the text path, and
rendered as "[non-text content omitted]" → 200 with a hallucinated answer — the one silent-drop
outcome F1 exists to forbid. Fix: after filtering, if hasImageContent(full) is true but no image
survives, return `400 images_unsupported_in_system_messages`. Narrow (OpenAI disallows images in
the system role) so no legitimate request is rejected. Documented in README § Images.

Tests: +4 (all pure-module) — parsePositiveInt('unlimited') keeps the 150k default (gap a) and a
valid override is honored; hasImageContent proves the guard predicate fires for a system-only
image (true on full list, false after the system filter) and does NOT fire for a user-message
image. 304 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: vvlasy-openclaw <vvlasy-openclaw@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: vvlasy-openclaw <vvlasy@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: dtzp555 <dtzp555@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
openclaw.vvlasy.cz
2026-07-20 07:50:17 +10:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by vvlasy-openclaw Claude Opus 4.8 vvlasy-openclaw taodeng
parent fe12419386
commit ac81badda1
5 changed files with 878 additions and 28 deletions
+92 -2
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ One proxy. Multiple IDEs. All models. **$0 API cost.**
- [How It Works](#how-it-works)
- Reference: [Available Models](#available-models) · [API Endpoints](#api-endpoints) · [Environment Variables](#environment-variables)
- Modes & operations: [LAN & multi-user](#lan--multi-user) → [`docs/lan-mode.md`](docs/lan-mode.md) · [Subscription-pool (TUI) mode](#subscription-pool-tui-mode) → [`docs/tui-mode.md`](docs/tui-mode.md) · [Upgrading](#upgrading) → [`docs/upgrading.md`](docs/upgrading.md)
- [Built-in Usage Monitoring](#built-in-usage-monitoring) · [Response Cache](#response-cache) · [OpenClaw Integration](#openclaw-integration)
- [Built-in Usage Monitoring](#built-in-usage-monitoring) · [Response Cache](#response-cache) · [Images / Multimodal](#images--multimodal-vision) · [OpenClaw Integration](#openclaw-integration)
- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) → [`docs/troubleshooting.md`](docs/troubleshooting.md)
- [Repository Layout](#repository-layout) · [Security](#security) · [Governance](#governance) · [Support OCP](#support-ocp) · [License](#license)
@@ -222,12 +222,17 @@ The canonical list lives in [`models.json`](./models.json) — the single source
| `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT` | `8` | Max concurrent claude processes (`-p`/stream-json path) |
| `CLAUDE_MAX_QUEUE` | `16` | Max requests **waiting** for a `-p` concurrency slot. Beyond `CLAUDE_MAX_CONCURRENT`, requests queue (up to this cap) instead of being rejected; when the queue is **also** full, the request gets `HTTP 429` + `Retry-After` (not an opaque 500). Surfaced on `/health.concurrency` + `/health.stats.queueRejections`. |
| `CLAUDE_QUEUE_RETRY_AFTER` | `5` | Seconds advertised in the `Retry-After` header on a `-p` concurrency-overflow `429`. |
| `CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` | *(derived)* | Prompt truncation limit in chars. Default derives from the models.json SPOT: `max(contextWindow) × 3` — currently **600,000** (≈150200k tokens). Setting this env var (or the runtime settings API) overrides the derivation absolutely. See [ADR 0009](docs/adr/0009-spot-derived-prompt-budget.md). Note: very large prompts burn subscription-window quota quickly and slow TTFT; the TUI-mode paste path is untested beyond ~hundreds of KB. |
| `CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` | *(derived)* | Prompt truncation limit in chars. Default derives from the models.json SPOT: `max(contextWindow) × 3` — currently **600,000** (≈150200k tokens). Setting this env var (or the runtime settings API) overrides the derivation absolutely. See [ADR 0009](docs/adr/0009-spot-derived-prompt-budget.md). Note: very large prompts burn subscription-window quota quickly and slow TTFT; the TUI-mode paste path is untested beyond ~hundreds of KB. Applies to **text only** — image bytes bypass this budget (see [Images / Multimodal](#images--multimodal-vision)). |
| `CLAUDE_SESSION_TTL` | `3600000` | Session expiry (ms, default: 1 hour) |
| `CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL` | `0` | Response cache TTL (ms, 0 = disabled). Set to e.g. `300000` for 5-min cache. See [Response Cache](#response-cache). |
| `CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS` | `Bash,Read,...,Agent` | Comma-separated tools to pre-approve |
| `CLAUDE_SKIP_PERMISSIONS` | `false` | Bypass all permission checks |
| `CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG` | *(unset)* | Path to an MCP server config JSON, passed to the spawned `claude` as `--mcp-config` (both the `-p` path and TUI `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS` panes) |
| `CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE` | `5242880` | Max request body size (bytes, default 5 MB). Base64 image payloads inflate ~33%; raise this to admit larger multimodal requests. Fail-closed parsing: a garbage value keeps the default. |
| `CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL` | `false` | Allow remote `http(s)` image URLs in `image_url` parts. **Off by default** (v1 supports base64 `data:` URIs only). When on, the URL is passed through to Anthropic as a `url` image source — **OCP does not fetch it** (no OCP-side SSRF surface); unreachable/blocked URLs surface as an API error. |
| `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES` | `5242880` | Per-image decoded-byte cap (default 5 MB). Over-cap images get `HTTP 413`. |
| `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES` | `20` | Max image parts per request. Over-cap gets `HTTP 413`. |
| `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES` | `20971520` | Aggregate decoded-byte cap across all images in a request (default 20 MB). Over-cap gets `HTTP 413`. |
| `CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT` | *(unset)* | Operator-wide system-prompt text appended (last) to every request's composed system prompt on the default `-p` path. TUI-mode panes are unaffected (they keep the interactive CLI's own system prompt). Echoed truncated on `/health.systemPrompt`. Note: changing this value and restarting auto-invalidates the response cache (the key carries a boot-config epoch, #177). |
| `CLAUDE_NO_CONTEXT` | `false` | Suppress CLAUDE.md and auto-memory injection (pure API mode) |
| `PROXY_API_KEY` | *(unset)* | Bearer token for shared-mode authentication |
@@ -382,6 +387,91 @@ ocp settings cacheTTL 0 # disable at runtime
Cache is **disabled by default** (`CLAUDE_CACHE_TTL=0`). All data is stored locally in `~/.ocp/ocp.db`. **Hash format upgrade in v3.13.0:** legacy `v1` cache rows don't match new `v2`-format lookups; they orphan and are reaped by the TTL cleanup interval within one window — no migration script required.
## Images / Multimodal (Vision)
`POST /v1/chat/completions` accepts OpenAI-style multimodal `content` parts, so a
message can carry images alongside text and Claude will actually see them. This
follows OpenAI's [vision](https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/vision) /
[chat-completions `image_url`](https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat/create#chat-create-messages)
request shape — no OCP-invented fields. (Class B.1 endpoint; see ADR 0006.)
Under the hood, when a request carries an image OCP feeds the conversation to the
Claude CLI as Anthropic image blocks over `--input-format stream-json`. Text-only
requests are completely unaffected (unchanged code path).
### Supported input
- **Base64 data URIs** (default, recommended):
`data:image/png;base64,<...>`. Media types: `image/jpeg`, `image/png`,
`image/gif`, `image/webp`.
- **Remote `http(s)` URLs** — **off by default**. Set `CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL=1`
to enable; the URL is passed through to Anthropic (OCP never fetches it itself,
so there is no OCP-side SSRF surface).
- Images may appear in **any** message in the history (multi-turn), not just the
last one.
- Non-image, non-text parts (audio, files) are **not** yet supported and are
replaced with a `[non-text content omitted]` placeholder (deferred to a future
version).
### Example (base64 data URI)
```bash
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"messages": [{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{ "type": "text", "text": "What is in this image?" },
{ "type": "image_url",
"image_url": { "url": "..." } }
]
}]
}'
```
### Not supported in TUI mode
Multimodal images require the default `-p` spawn path. In **TUI / subscription-pool
mode** (`CLAUDE_TUI_MODE=true`) the CLI is driven interactively and cannot carry
image blocks, so a request with an `image_url` part returns **`400
images_unsupported_in_tui_mode`** rather than silently dropping the image and
answering about something the model never saw. Remove the images, or run OCP
without TUI mode, to use vision.
Images must also live in a **user or assistant** message, not a `system` message
(system content is not forwarded to the CLI as image blocks). An `image_url` part
present only in a system message returns **`400 images_unsupported_in_system_messages`**
for the same reason — fail loudly rather than answer about an unseen image. This matches
the OpenAI vision spec, which does not place images in the system role.
### Limits
Images bypass the text `CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` budget and are instead bounded by
their own byte/count caps. The **text** in a multimodal request is still subject to
`CLAUDE_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS` (older text is truncated exactly as on the text-only
path — only the image bytes are exempt). All numeric caps are parsed **fail-closed**:
a malformed value (e.g. `CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE=unlimited` or `=5MB`) is rejected with
a startup warning and the safe default is kept — a misconfigured cap can never
silently disable the guard. Requests that violate a cap get a clear `4xx` (never a
silent drop):
| Cap | Env var | Default | Error |
|-----|---------|---------|-------|
| Request body | `CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE` | 5 MB | `413` request body too large |
| Per-image bytes | `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES` | 5 MB | `413` `image_too_large` |
| Total image bytes | `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_TOTAL_BYTES` | 20 MB | `413` `images_too_large` |
| Image count | `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGES` | 20 | `413` `too_many_images` |
| Unsupported media type | — | — | `400` `unsupported_image_type` |
| Malformed data URI | — | — | `400` `invalid_data_uri` |
| Remote URL while disabled | `CLAUDE_IMAGE_ALLOW_URL` | off | `400` `remote_url_disabled` |
Base64 payloads are large: a 5 MB image is ~6.7 MB as a data URI, so raise
`CLAUDE_MAX_BODY_SIZE` (and, if needed, `CLAUDE_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES`) to admit big
images. Vision support depends on the target model — request a current
vision-capable Claude model.
## OpenClaw Integration
OCP was originally built for [OpenClaw](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw) and includes deep integration: