feat(server): OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS — positive local-tools system-prompt wrapper (single-user, default off) (#182)

Motivation (the OpenClaw case). OCP's `-p` path prepends OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER,
which tells the model it has NO local filesystem/shell/env access. Correct for a
shared/multi-tenant gateway. But an OpenClaw agent pointed at its own local OCP runs
the model SERVER-SIDE via `claude -p`, which already passes --allowedTools and has the
CLI's built-in tools — and on a loopback instance the OCP host IS the operator's
machine, so those are local tools. The wrapper gags them: the agent replies "I don't
have filesystem access" for tools it actually holds. OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS=1 swaps in a
positive wrapper for that case. (It does NOT enable client-side tool_calls for
OpenClaw/Cline — that remains unsupported by design; OCP is a text-prompt bridge.)

Safety: changes ONLY the system-prompt text, never the tool surface. Tools are governed
solely by --allowedTools/--disallowedTools; AUTH_MODE=multi still --disallowedTools the
whole FS/web/agent surface regardless of the wrapper. Fail-closed boot gate mirroring
OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS (ADR 0007): refuse to start when =1 is combined with
CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=multi, a non-loopback bind, or PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY.

Scope/alignment: no new endpoint/header/field/wire operation. The wrapper text is
OCP-owned prompt composition (same class as OCP_SYSTEM_PROMPT_WRAPPER and
CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT), passed via the already-cited `claude --system-prompt` flag
(unchanged). ALIGNMENT.md Rule 2: nothing invented on the wire.

- lib/prompt.mjs: pure selectPromptWrapper() + localToolsSafetyError() (unit-tested).
- server.mjs: single hoisted flag LOCAL_TOOLS_ACTIVE = OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS && !TUI_MODE
  (the wrapper is only applied on the -p path; TUI composes its own prompt, so the flag
  is inert under TUI — announced with a warning rather than a misleading "ON"). Wrapper
  selection, boot gate, and the CONFIG_EPOCH fold all key off it, so toggling the flag +
  restarting invalidates the standard response cache (#177). Default path byte-for-byte
  unchanged.
- README env-var row + tool-model note; CHANGELOG Unreleased entry.

Tests (+14): unit-test both ternary branches and every gate condition; plus an
INTEGRATION harness that boots real server.mjs with a fake `claude` capturing the
--system-prompt — asserting the POSITIVE wrapper reaches a request under =1 and the
EXACT negative wrapper when unset, the boot gate refuses all three unsafe configs, the
safe config boots, TUI announces inert, and toggling the flag re-spawns (cache
invalidated). Mutation-verified: reverting the wiring / neutering the gate / reverting
the epoch fold each turns a test RED. 443 passed, 0 failed.

Noticed but scoped out (Iron Rule 11): the structured-output cache path
(handleChatCompletions, the response_format branch) does not fold CONFIG_EPOCH at all —
a pre-existing gap from #177/#153, independent of this flag. Happy to fix in a follow-up.

Co-authored-by: vvlasy-openclaw <vvlasy@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
openclaw.vvlasy.cz
2026-07-21 21:05:38 +10:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by vvlasy-openclaw Claude Opus 4.8
parent 45c5717aea
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# Changelog
## Unreleased
### Added
- **`OCP_LOCAL_TOOLS` — positive local-tools system-prompt wrapper (single-user, loopback only; default off).** The `-p` path prepends a wrapper telling the model it has no local filesystem/shell access — correct for a shared gateway, but it makes a personal instance's model (e.g. an OpenClaw agent on its own local OCP) refuse to use the server-side `claude` tools it legitimately has (which, on a loopback instance, are the operator's own machine). `=1` swaps in a positive wrapper. Changes **only the prompt**, never the tool surface (`--allowedTools`/`--disallowedTools` untouched; multi-tenant still disallows the FS surface); it does **not** enable client-side `tool_calls` (still unsupported by design). Fail-closed boot gate mirroring `OCP_TUI_FULL_TOOLS` (ADR 0007): refuses to start under `CLAUDE_AUTH_MODE=multi`, a non-loopback bind, or `PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY`. Inert (and logged as such) in TUI mode. Pure selection + gate logic in `lib/prompt.mjs` (unit-tested); the active wrapper is folded into the config epoch so toggling it invalidates the standard response cache. Verified end-to-end (boot the server + a fake `claude` capturing `--system-prompt`); default path byte-for-byte unchanged. No new `cli.js` wire behavior (reuses the already-cited `--system-prompt` flag).
## v3.23.0 — 2026-07-17
Minor release. Headline: **the default `sonnet` alias now resolves to Claude Sonnet 5** — a behavior change for every request that omits `model` (pin `claude-sonnet-4-6` by full ID to keep the previous default). Also: Windows-safe upgrade snapshots, two upgrade-system reliability fixes from a live fleet update, the `CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT` env var made functional, cache-key honesty for config changes, a billing-policy status correction (the 2026-06-15 `-p` split is PAUSED by Anthropic), and a major README restructure. No new endpoint; no new `cli.js` wire behavior. Every code PR carried a fresh-context reviewer (Iron Rule 10).